Germany does not invade Belguim in 1914. What does Britain do?

[marathag]

No French general was incompetent enough to get on the wrong side of a Tannenberg or Sedan.

I'd put Joffre right up there with Napoleon III

 

[Timmy811]

Realistically, the last 2 scenarios just described are very optimistic and should not be assumed to be the likely outcome in any such campaign, it depends on the French making lots of mistakes. The most likely outcome IMO by far is the second one, with 2 French armies being encircled and the army going through Luxembourg getting at least severely mauled if not encircled itself. This would still produce a devastating defeat for France, and would almost certainly result in Joffre's death, suicide in battle or sacking. But it wouldn't be decisive or end the war.

How is this not a mortal wound? Especially once it becomes obvious that the Russians are paper tiger. At that point, what hope would the Entente have? Better to attempt to negotiate a peace, because fighting to the end is going to be an obvious disaster.

 

[AJE]

The first is that "destroying" an army in World War I was very difficult. The generals were professionals and knew enough to pull back when they were in danger of being flanked, and you didn't have motorized units racing to the enemy's lines of communication.

Just advancing to the Saar river between Metz and Strasbourg constitutes a danger of being flanked.

No French general was incompetent enough to get on the wrong side of a Tannenberg or Sedan.

Yes they were.

There was also the near-disaster at Charleroi and the French army at Mulhouse getting counter-attacked by the XIV and XV Corps from the rear at Cernay and almost being cut off.

 

[Glenn239]

In that case it would likely end up like the battle of Tannenberg, but on a larger scale with most of 2 armies being encircled. This depends on what the French do. In the worst case, Belgium isn't crossed and the Germans still break through the flanks (there weren't many trench lines in the opening of the war) but a good chunk of the French (let's say 1 army) retreats before they can be encircled. Much like the OTL Masurian lakes or Charleroi. Then the French are down the equivalent of 1 army and along the rest of the line they're still attacking with huge losses. So a bigger defeat than usual but not a crippling one and it just increases the French losses in their opening campaign.

If the French left has been crushed in the Ardennes, does Paris fall? Can the German right encircle the French right from the north? Can the French fill the void with reservists? It's what happens after the encirclement and whether the Germans wind up in a better position than historical. IMO, letting the French advance and then attacking it was probably riskier, but the more likely to deliver a German victory than the Germans themselves advancing.

 

[Glenn239]

No, I agree much of Britain's foreign policy and military preparations were a closed shop before the war, which is why members claims about inevitable Anglo-British belligerence due to pre-war activity is absurd. There is no doubt the British foreign office and branches of the British military were enthusiastic for war, but the decision to go to war was not theirs to make.

The decision for war was Asquith's to make and if cabinet did not agree universally, the dissenters would have to resign. The resignation of cabinet members could cause the fall of a PM, but it would be (AFAIK) completely unprecedented in British history that the fall of a PM were caused by the decision to enter a war. The experts - army and navy - that you dismiss would have the opinions conveyed to House members that would be crucial in backing the PM's decision and leaving him with support despite large numbers of resignations. You seem to be assuming that something which has never happened (AFAIK) in all of British history - sacking a PM for going to war - would just trot out in this one case? I doubt it.

NoMommsen And @Glenn239 ... as said by @Galba Otho Vitelius :
ITTL there is NO ATTACK on France, that Britain might needs to "hurry to its help".

If Germany refrains from invading Belgium the British DOW against German would need to be in tandem with the French for political, not military, reasons. In that circumstance the French would need to declare war on Germany, doing so on the basis of Germany's "aggression" against Russia. If the British DOW were not in unison, the French DOW would be undermined and the prospects of a breach with Britain would enter the picture. In that case the British DOW on Germany could resemble the DOW as made on Austria - in that case it was worded as in support of the French decision, ad did not claim that Austria had done anything that was a direct casus belli against Britain.

I don't see a war of agreesion on the continent being sold to the british cabinet (of whatever compositiuon at that moment), parliament and public.

The French DOW could have accused Germany of using Sarajevo as a stalking horse, a pretext, to trigger a war for continental hegemony. You know, what a century's worth of historians have (IMO wrongly) accused Germany of ever since.

 

[MichaelWest]

Assuming only the German Third forms the right and the French 5th is the left, the 5th was aimed at Luxembourg and if the 4th is shifted to the South per Plan XVII then we do have an altered Battle of the Frontiers. To have the French left be flanked I think we need to use Belgium, and we might have the 5th crossing on a front spanning roughly Sedan to Longwy, staying North of fortifications at Thionville and the German Fifth who should be facing the 3rd's offensive and anchoring Metz.

Here the 5th has moved to where the 4th once was. The Fourth has 5 Corps and the 3rd had 3. The 5th has 5 Corps and should not lose any while the Third had 4 Corps. The Fifth has 5 Corps. And the battles should be the French 3rd faces the Fifth, the French 4th faces the Sixth with the 2nd who also has the Seventh out there along with the 1st. The 5th is facing the bulk of the Fourth and has the Third out there somewhere.

The French 5th with its 5 Corps is going to run head long into the defending Fourth (5 Corps) and see a flanking move by the Third (4 Corps). You decide how much other French units can be released without the First and Second in Belgium or if the BEF is added here. And if the Germans are in Belgium you should at least add in some portion of her Army to defend, but it may retreat behind the Meuse here. The 5th is nearly outnumbered 2 to 1. It can be encircled. The terrain is not great. If the 5th is shattered the road to Paris is long but open. Joffre must scramble to release units to get after the Third as it turns inward to get behind the entire French front.

Could the Third here get behind Verdun? Assuming the 3rd is grinding away on Metz, the 4th and 2nd have fallen into the German sack and taken heavier losses, and the 1st still botches the drive to Colmar, what is left to hold the front and reinforce the anchor of Verdun? Do those Armies fall back to Meuse and resist on the line roughly Verdun and Toul and Epinal (and Belfort)?

I do not feel Germany has the forces or the time to get the forces in place to exploit the potential breakthrough or virtual envelopment of the French army. French is not lost but it does look very bad here. If Moltke had dragged his feet and merely pulled away the First to reinforce the Eighth and left all or much of the Second to be his reserve, then we have the troops we want to try and encircle the French on an epic scale. Maybe not enough forces yet but when does panic set in?

This is my role some sixes on the Kaiser shredding the vaunted Plan. War is hell. Improvise, adapt and overcome.

EDIT: Meant to include quote and be a response to @Glenn239 post #1084 above.

 

[BooNZ]

The decision for war was Asquith's to make and if cabinet did not agree universally, the dissenters would have to resign. The resignation of cabinet members could cause the fall of a PM, but it would be (AFAIK) completely unprecedented in British history that the fall of a PM were caused by the decision to enter a war.

Asquith was not actively looking for war, which is illustrated by his communication Lichnowsky and various discussions with colleagues. You are confusing Grey and Asquith. Asquith was not about the destroy his Liberal Party for a war without cause and without Asquith, the hawks were very much isolated within Cabinet.

Do the math. You have a grand total of 2-3 hawks against: 5 doves, 2 neutralists and the balance of waverers with a default position of keeping out of Europe without good cause (i.e. a significant violation of Belgium neutrality). Without a consensus, the status quo is Britain siting on the sidelines.

The experts - army and navy - that you dismiss would have the opinions conveyed to House members that would be crucial in backing the PM's decision and leaving him with support despite large numbers of resignations. You seem to be assuming that something which has never happened (AFAIK) in all of British history - sacking a PM for going to war - would just trot out in this one case? I doubt it.

Sorry, Britain was not a military junta. You are trying to rewrite Asquith and George as hawks, which is simply not accurate.

 

[Glenn239]

Asquith was not actively looking for war, which is illustrated by his communication Lichnowsky and various discussions with colleagues. You are confusing Grey and Asquith. Asquith was not about the destroy his Liberal Party for a war without cause and without Asquith, the hawks were very much isolated within Cabinet.

The foreign minister served at the approval and under the supervision of the Prime Minister, not the other way around. The Prime Minister is responsible for all decisions and polices of the British government. The PM appoints cabinet members, including Grey. Asquith stated he would go if Grey did. Grey's policy was Asquith's policy. That's why Asquith made him foreign minister in the first place.

Do the math. You have a grand total of 2-3 hawks against: 5 doves, 2 neutralists and the balance of waverers with a default position of keeping out of Europe without good cause (i.e. a significant violation of Belgium neutrality). Without a consensus, the status quo is Britain siting on the sidelines.

In practice, IMO, a "significant" violation of Belgium would prove to be German while an "insignificant" violation would prove to be French.

Cabinet served the Prime Minister, not the other way around. Cabinet had no actual authority over the PM. The PM, not cabinet, could declare war in the name of the king. The PM had absolute authority over his cabinet, and each cabinet member had two choices when it was decision time - stay or go. The PM backed Grey and that meant intervention was going to happen. Unless the PM fell to a non-confidence vote in the House, Britain was entering the war. The idea of a non-confidence vote causing the fall of Asquith in the House, to reverse a DOW on Germany is not a serious scenario.

Sorry, Britain was not a military junta. You are trying to rewrite Asquith and George as hawks, which is simply not accurate.

Asquith and George were not hawks, they were interventionists.

 

[BooNZ]

The foreign minister served at the approval and under the supervision of the Prime Minister, not the other way around. The Prime Minister is responsible for all decisions and polices of the British government. The PM appoints cabinet members, including Grey. Asquith stated he would go if Grey did. Grey's policy was Asquith's policy. That's why Asquith made him foreign minister in the first place.

You are clearly not even vaguely aware of Asquith's leadership/management style or the precarious state of the Liberal Party (actually overall British politics) in 1914.

In practice, IMO, a "significant" violation of Belgium would prove to be German while an "insignificant" violation would prove to be French.

No, in practice there was a significant violation of Belgium neutrality by Germany, so the waverers attempts to give peace a chance were fruitless. From 29 July 1914 the British Cabinet were aware of an expectation of German violation of Belgium neutrality, so the term "significant" was introduced by the waverers (not the doves) to reduce the chances Britain drawn into the war on a minor matter. No one was imagining a French incursion.

Asquith and George were not hawks, they were interventionists.

No, in respect of George, the pivotal role Belgium played in his thinking is illustrated by correspondence to his wife:

"I am moving through a nightmare world these days. I have fought hard for peace and succeeded, so far, in keeping the Cabinet out of it, but I am driven to the conclusion that if the small nationality of Belgium is attacked by Germany all my traditions and even my prejudices will be engaged on the side of war."

Lloyd George's priority was to keep Britain out of the war, unless Britain's interests were threatened by a German invasion of Belgium (i.e. a neutralist, not interventionist). In Asquith's estimation, Lloyd George was more rational than the radical doves whose company he kept (On 2 August alone there were three shared meetings between the doves and neutralists, two of those meetings were at Lloyd George's residence), observing:

"Some ministers believed that we should declare now and at once that in no circumstances would we take a hand. There is no doubt that, for the moment, that is the view of the bulk of the party. Lloyd George - all for peace - is more sensible and statesmanlike, keeping the position open."

On 1 August 1914 Churchill wrote to Lloyd George imploring him to change his mind (for non-intervention), otherwise "All the rest of our lives we shall be opposed. I am deeply attached to you and have followed your instructions and guidance for nearly 10 years." So no, Lloyd George was not an interventionalist.

 

[BooNZ]

Two points of correction. The first is that "destroying" an army in World War I was very difficult. The generals were professionals and knew enough to pull back when they were in danger of being flanked, and you didn't have motorized units racing to the enemy's lines of communication. Tannenberg was the result of a really big screw up on the Russian part. The Russians had some really bad generals, along with some good ones. No French general was incompetent enough to get on the wrong side of a Tannenberg or Sedan.

With the benefit of hindsight (although it was also suspected before the war), it is more-or-less impossible for offensives to trap defenders without a gross disparity in quality and/or quantity of forces (don't bother trying to explain this to the Schlieffen plan advocates). The counter attack presented opportunities to inflict serious losses on wrong footed attackers, but even then, outcomes resembling Tannenburg required the complicity/incompetence of the attacking team.

The Germans lacked the room for maneuver and same qualitative superiority over the French to inflict anything resembling Tannenburg. Further, the real estate in Luxemburg was too valuable for such grand schemes. More likely the west would be a one sided battle of attrition with any maneuvers limited to a tactical scale. If the French decided on an advance through the Ardennes, then we potentially have a different game.

 

[MichaelWest]

With the benefit of hindsight (although it was also suspected before the war), it is more-or-less impossible for offensives to trap defenders without a gross disparity in quality and/or quantity of forces (don't bother trying to explain this to the Schlieffen plan advocates). The counter attack presented opportunities to inflict serious losses on wrong footed attackers, but even then, outcomes resembling Tannenburg required the complicity/incompetence of the attacking team.

The Germans lacked the room for maneuver and same qualitative superiority over the French to inflict anything resembling Tannenburg. Further, the real estate in Luxemburg was too valuable for such grand schemes. More likely the west would be a one sided battle of attrition with any maneuvers limited to a tactical scale. If the French decided on an advance through the Ardennes, then we potentially have a different game.

I think had the German Firth and Sixth held to plan and withdrew deeper with Joffre pursuing, emboldened really by (1) a lack of offense into Belgium and (2) his assumptions that Germany had grown weak or fearful of French elan, the French would potentially have fallen into the "sack" with disproportionate losses. Maybe not quite the encircle and destroy battle desired but ample opportunity for the French to attack dug in defending troops, subjected to machinegun and artillery fires, be counter-attacked, overrun or routed, and other abandoning material, taking losses and demoralized as the Germans retake every inch of ground.

My "worst" case scenario for Germany is the same occurs in Luxembourg with the 5th mounting a true offense into it, wrecking the iron ore and steel production early, and for France the same being flanked and a breakthrough by the Third into France behind the French position. It could go anything from hammering the French from behind to losing the Third as it over extends. For me it is that battle that gets interesting to the rest of the war.

 

[Glenn239]

You are clearly not even vaguely aware of Asquith's leadership/management style or the precarious state of the Liberal Party (actually overall British politics) in 1914.

Asquith was in charge. Asquith was backing Grey. Full stop. The rest of it, the pattycakes with cabinet, that was the parents breaking the news to the kids that daddy has a new job in another state and the family is moving.

From 29 July 1914 the British Cabinet were aware of an expectation of German violation of Belgium neutrality, so the term "significant" was introduced by the waverers (not the doves) to reduce the chances Britain drawn into the war on a minor matter. No one was imagining a French incursion.

Who introduced the idea of the small violation I don't think was ever settled - I don't think any of the naysayers ever took credit for it. Personally, I suspect Lloyd George, who was a sneaky interventionists of the Trojan Horse kind. In terms of who the reservation was for, must have been for France, as the minor German violation of Belgium on 4 August had not yet risen to any standard of 'substantial' when the ultimatum was issued.

No, in respect of George, the pivotal role Belgium played in his thinking is illustrated by correspondence to his wife:

"I am moving through a nightmare world these days. I have fought hard for peace and succeeded, so far, in keeping the Cabinet out of it, but I am driven to the conclusion that if the small nationality of Belgium is attacked by Germany all my traditions and even my prejudices will be engaged on the side of war."

Actually it was his wife that was the one who later gave the opinion LG was an interventionist throughout.

"Some ministers believed that we should declare now and at once that in no circumstances would we take a hand. There is no doubt that, for the moment, that is the view of the bulk of the party. Lloyd George - all for peace - is more sensible and statesmanlike, keeping the position open."

No one will know for certain, but my impression was that LG, Grey and Asquith were cooperating quite closely. Where I get that impression is that LG was acting more like a conduit between the sides than as a part of the non-interventionist group. I think he was playing the non-interventionists and moving them to where cabinet needed to be for intervention. You know. Lloyd George.

.

 

[Anchises]

Assume for a moment Britain jumps in, perhaps a few weeks or a month or two later than OTL. The French have been busy demonstrating the effects of "on les aura" against fortifications and entrenchments. Remember that the 75mm cannon, for all its good points, was crap against entrenchments due to the flat trajectory. Now the BEF fills in some part of the line to replace some shattered French units. Now Joffre, with fresh unblooded troops at hand orders yet another attack - what does the BEF do? As the junior partners do they British go along with this? The professional BEF got badly chewed up OTL, and then was when they were mostly on the defensive to slow the Germans down - here on the offensive against these fortifications and machine guns, with limited heavy artillery support the professionals will end up evaporating like snow in a furnace. This will have major consequences for the future of the British Army, as well as the alliance in the field.

Another question, if Britain has the extreme northern portion of the line, will they be the ones to violate Belgian neutrality? If so will the Belgians follow through on the threat to resist ANY incursion, or even worse will they request assistance from Germany to help them maintain sovereignty (per the treaty).

This would have wide reaching consequences. I could see an earlier switch to conscription and an overall lower quality of the BEF. If most of the officers and NCOs supposed to be the nucleus of an expanded BEF, are in a shallow grave in Alsace-Lorraine, qualitiy is going to suffer. Training new troops is going to take longer with worse results than IOTL.

Two points of correction. The first is that "destroying" an army in World War I was very difficult. The generals were professionals and knew enough to pull back when they were in danger of being flanked, and you didn't have motorized units racing to the enemy's lines of communication. Tannenberg was the result of a really big screw up on the Russian part. The Russians had some really bad generals, along with some good ones. No French general was incompetent enough to get on the wrong side of a Tannenberg or Sedan.

The second point is that IOTL, the French stopped trying to mount offensives in Alsace-Lorraine after early 1915. The front between Verdun and Switzerland became a place for both sides to rotate units to when those units needed to recuperate. The French are going to try to do something different in 1915. If things are really bad for Russia on the Eastern Front, this is probably their own invasion of Belgium which at least would draw German units back west. The other alternative is to try something against Turkey and/or Greece, if the British aren't already fighting Turkey, and if the British are fighting Turkey going through Belgium is more likely since with the British army and much of the navy committed to Turkey and Britain neutral and on the outs with France, there would not be much Britain could do about it.

"Easterners" tended to lose out in the OTL war, but there was a big elephant in the room in the form of five German armies in Flanders and Champagne. ITTL the Germans are on the defensive in the West, in their own territory, and behind a belt of fortresses, so I think in both Paris and London the "Easterners" will be a stronger position. Plus it becomes more imperative to open a good supply route to Russia.

1) I wouldn't blame the Generals alone. Army communication, Theater Command and High Command were atrocious or non existent. The Generals operated under a plan mutilated by inter-army struggles and especially Samsonov operated under faulty assumptions created by the bad information he received from STAVKA. I doubt that most Generals of WW1 would have performed significantly better under similar circumstances.

2) If France really stops offensive operations in A-L they have a problem. Attacking through Belgium is a political can of worms and a grave military danger. I mean if Germany has until mid 1915 to manhandle Russia in Poland, A-H has more than enough breathing room to build up serious steam. My assumption is that Germany could easily withdraw enough troops from the East to turn Belgium into a death trap, where a lengthening of the front actually works in favor of the Germans. And I don't see significant Russian offensives to relieve France once Germany has withdrawn some armies. Russia ITTL has been bleeding badly in 1914 and 1915, while A-H had time to get their shit together. I think Russia would use the reduced German pressure to plug gaps against a stronger A-H which is probably attacking towards the Ukraine. I just don't think Russia would be able to relieve France ITTL if Belgium turns into this timelines Verdun.

Even if Britain had absolute free passage through the Straits, how much material could they actually provide to Russia? It is going to take months and months for the UK to provide equipment for their own military expansion, provide ammunition (especially shells) for themselves and the French, before they can even begin to think about providing much of anything to the Russians. Because the British ammunition is not the same caliber as the Russian the British will either have to provide most of the ammo for rifles etc they provide, or tool up to produce rifles, ammunition etc in the Russian caliber. Either way, this slows things down. Frankly, the problem with the Russian Army was only partly the sort of equipment deficiencies Britain could make up. More equipment/ammunition won't solve corruption, incompetence and pure stupidity (such as transmitting orders over the radio in the clear). In any case the Ottomans, helped by the Germans, could screw up the shipping channels with blockships and mines if and when the British got that far and this will (again) slow things down.

I don't think that even substantial British aid would substantially enhance the Russian performance. It might delay the slow deterioration of Russia's economy, thus delaying the Revolution. However: Without the Munition Crisis the dynamic of the war might change and not necessarily to the benefit of Russia. I don't think that the Great Retreat is feasible without the Munition Crisis and no Great Retreat might cause terrible losses for Russia.

 

[Riain]

Asquith was in charge. Asquith was backing Grey. Full stop. The rest of it, the pattycakes with cabinet, that was the parents breaking the news to the kids that daddy has a new job in another state and the family is moving.

Amen brother!

 

[water123]

I mean, Germany doesn't have to not invade Belgium at all, only long enough to take out Russia. Once Russia is dealt with, the full force of the German Army can come in against France, and I don't think Britain is gonna enter the war if it looks like Paris is gonna fall.

 

[Timmy811]

I mean, Germany doesn't have to not invade Belgium at all, only long enough to take out Russia. Once Russia is dealt with, the full force of the German Army can come in against France, and I don't think Britain is gonna enter the war if it looks like Paris is gonna fall.

That's going to take 2 years. By that point, with Russia out, the French will ask for terms

 

[Alanith]

2) If France really stops offensive operations in A-L they have a problem. Attacking through Belgium is a political can of worms and a grave military danger. I mean if Germany has until mid 1915 to manhandle Russia in Poland, A-H has more than enough breathing room to build up serious steam. My assumption is that Germany could easily withdraw enough troops from the East to turn Belgium into a death trap, where a lengthening of the front actually works in favor of the Germans. And I don't see significant Russian offensives to relieve France once Germany has withdrawn some armies. Russia ITTL has been bleeding badly in 1914 and 1915, while A-H had time to get their shit together. I think Russia would use the reduced German pressure to plug gaps against a stronger A-H which is probably attacking towards the Ukraine. I just don't think Russia would be able to relieve France ITTL if Belgium turns into this timelines Verdun.

I don't know about you, but I suspect it becomes... awkward politically, at best, if the neutral nation who you issued a ultimatum to a second nation a few weeks or months previously regarding that second nation invading them.... then gets invaded by a third nation who you've been pushing your own nation towards joining the war, on their side.

That's going to take 2 years. By that point, with Russia out, the French will ask for terms

Nonsense! One more push and the whole rotten house of cards will come tumbling down!

In all seriousness, yes, I'd hope the French were smart enough to throw in the towel at that point.

 

[MichaelWest]

Asquith was in charge. Asquith was backing Grey. Full stop. The rest of it, the pattycakes with cabinet, that was the parents breaking the news to the kids that daddy has a new job in another state and the family is moving.

Who introduced the idea of the small violation I don't think was ever settled - I don't think any of the naysayers ever took credit for it. Personally, I suspect Lloyd George, who was a sneaky interventionists of the Trojan Horse kind. In terms of who the reservation was for, must have been for France, as the minor German violation of Belgium on 4 August had not yet risen to any standard of 'substantial' when the ultimatum was issued.

Actually it was his wife that was the one who later gave the opinion LG was an interventionist throughout.

No one will know for certain, but my impression was that LG, Grey and Asquith were cooperating quite closely. Where I get that impression is that LG was acting more like a conduit between the sides than as a part of the non-interventionist group. I think he was playing the non-interventionists and moving them to where cabinet needed to be for intervention. You know. Lloyd George.

So Britain intervenes for less than the pretty wrapped present of Belgium, and these three spend all the last political capital upon a war in France to curb Germany. The BEF is on its way. French displays his usual indifference and somewhere joins the war as the 5th heads off to war. I assume here the 5th does not violate Belgium.

How best do we employ the BEF? As the 5th runs headlong into the Fourth and other Armies are devoured in A-L, how does French react? Joffre needs the British and wants some dead so they get angry enough to want in it to the bitter end. I will not assume the BEF is obliterated but it surely must get some hard knocks on the line. Harder if it gets offensive and lighter if it stands off a German counter-attack. I am still curious what the BEF does in France and where. I leave open that Germany crosses Belgium with the Third to flank the 5th now that its assumptions about Britain proved correct.

My longer term will be the impact of some greater losses to the professional core of the BEF possible, the election that should be coming, the Tories in coalition and how the Liberal party looks as 1914 closes off to begin the biggest, ugliest and costliest war yet. I am tending to see the Liberal flag hoist on a petard. I think LG might survive it though.

 

[MichaelWest]

I mean, Germany doesn't have to not invade Belgium at all, only long enough to take out Russia. Once Russia is dealt with, the full force of the German Army can come in against France, and I don't think Britain is gonna enter the war if it looks like Paris is gonna fall.

Here I anticipate Germany having five Armies to face France and three fighting Russia to begin. Additional mobilized Armies can go East and we could remove some strength from the west if we want more punch in the East once we settle into a stalemate. I assume if Britain has joined it is before 1914 is over so in it and building its Army for some planned "breakthrough" with France. Russia should be able to survive through 1915 but it might look very bad. Germany may need to throttle back and return to the West. One must consider if Italy has joined, if Russia is fighting the Ottomans and if Britain has launched into her as well. We could be talking through 1916 before Germany can finish Russia on the economy offense still defending heavily in the West, or it could be earlier if Russia opts out, Britain is not a belligerent, Germany did more damage in the opening with France, or all three. France likely needs to go all in in 1915 or face the impending shift from Russia to her as early as 1916. 1915 should be the bloodiest year here. You decide if German moderates will get talks or the tide will be sink France.

 

[sloreck]

If Germany is going east and knocking the Russians about with the result that A-H is doing much better, France busy bleeding itself on the German defenses I don't see Italy throwing in with the Entente - the Entente is not in a position to make an offer Italy would believe. If things are stalemated in the west, with one failed French offensive after another, once Russia throws in the towel the CP can offer Italy some of the French territory along the Med, and possibly a chunk of Algeria.