Germany does not invade Belguim in 1914. What does Britain do?

[MichaelWest]

If that mattered Italy, Ottomans, Bulgaria, Romania and the USA wouldn't have joined, Russia already knew from their war with Japan and dived right in.

In 1914 there was no A and G variants of plan 19, indeed they even half-arsed the 1913 G variant in favour of the A variant. The difference between A and G was that the 7th of the 8 Armies mobilised, the one coming from the Kuban area, would be so late in arriving (6 weeks after mobilisation) that it could be diverted to the north to reinforce the 2 armies facing East Prussia or south to reinforce the 4 armies facing AH.

In July 1914 the new plan 19 was released, a hybrid between the existing plan 19 and the looming plan 20, the main difference being that Russia planned to mobilise 10 rather than 8 armies. 2 would still face EP available on week 2, 4 would face AH available on week 4 and the last 2 to be sent to face the German-Silieisa/Poland border on week 6, with 2 armies held back to face the Ottomans and others.

In the event these 2 armies were split and one sent south and the other north.

What impact though for the war as reported in Britain with an election pending sometime in 1915? I concede the leadership may not care the price in lives but the voters whose lives are going to be gambled might? I think most of the other nations saw this war as very much one of survival, you win or you are dead. Was that sentiment in Britain down in the streets?

My understanding was that Plan A was the more defensive one, a sit and wait to mobilize and let Germany attack because Russia is big and we have more peasants to lose until we attack and overwhelm them. G and then 19 and later 20 are evolving a more offensive approach spurred on by France. In other words Plan A was the initially defensive plan abandoned before 1914? Again, I understood Plan 19 to allow for a shift of one Army either North or South from the beginning. If correct, or in the alternative allowing for follow on forces, do the Russians have the flexibility to shift more than token forces to East Prussia if their intelligence reports "more" Germans? Do they bother or are they confident that their 1st and 2nd will handily deal with the 8th and "X" Army as they get after A-H per OTL?

 

[Glenn239]

With a POD in 1914, there is absolutely no way that the British are not joining the war. They have guarantees with the French, and upheld these guarantees before Belgium was invaded. The only way the British are remaining out of the war for any period of time is if the entire German navy stays in port, and the Ottomans stay out of the war. Even then, the Tories form a coalition government and bring them into the war anyways over one of a million different excuses.

But if Britain was joining the war, then Moltke got it right. And we can't have that, now can we?

 

[MichaelWest]

But if Britain was joining the war, then Moltke got it right. And we can't have that, now can we?

For some it is self-fulling prophesy, to invade Belgium is to bring the British to the war they are coming to anyway. For others it is the necessary pre-condition for the reluctant Britain, with Belgium her hand is forced. Accepting that Germany does not violate Belgian neutrality has spurred a lot of discussion on how the war opens and proceeds through 1914, something used to justify entry or keep Britain out of the war as 1914 ends and 1915 begins. One could argue fate, if Moltke had won and the war was over by Christmas France gets what she got, defeat, some measure of economic ruin, but far less loss of life. Or one could argue destiny, Germany gets what she got, destruction and the British Empire spun off to go extinct. Yet what does Britain do?

I think much of the naval preparations are agreeable, neutral or not, a closing of the Channel to Germany is just as palatable, opening the coffers and putting up for sale what ever France wants is barely controversial. The real point of departure is the BEF. Does Britain put its boots on the ground?

If yes, does the BEF deploy on the left flank somewhere opposite Luxembourg to Belgium? With the French 5th Army driving somewhere between Thionville and Metz do the British weigh in and enter the battle or stand ready to defend Belgium in case she is attacked?

We can get more dastardly and ask if Britain will enter Belgium or overlook a French violation? We can get further afield and ask if British troops go to Gallipoli or another side show? We can get strange and ask if the BEF might go to Russia?

The question ultimately is how much did Britain contribute to keeping France and Russia at war? How much did the BEF do to prevent Germany from defeating France? If we take that away, in whole or part, how much closer to victory does Germany get? How much sooner can this war end?

 

[Glenn239]

We can get more dastardly and ask if Britain will enter Belgium or overlook a French violation? We can get further afield and ask if British troops go to Gallipoli or another side show? We can get strange and ask if the BEF might go to Russia?

BEF to Russia would be out. Maybe Serbia, but almost certainly the bulk into France. That's my guess.

The question ultimately is how much did Britain contribute to keeping France and Russia at war? How much did the BEF do to prevent Germany from defeating France? If we take that away, in whole or part, how much closer to victory does Germany get? How much sooner can this war end?

What causes us to suppose Russia and France will even be in a mood for a fight to the death after Britain betrays them?

In the east, the posters that argue Russia can put in a good account on the defensive to me have a point - it was on the offensive 1914-1916 that the Russian army was broken. But Austria had a say too, and Austria wanted peace with Russia so I wouldn't be surprised if the Eastern war petered out on terms short of the defeat of the Tzar. The posters that argue Italy might stay out I think have a good point. I would add to that Romania. All this points quite forcefully to the conclusion Britain would not stay out in August 1914, not so much that Germany missed out on some sort of formula for victory that may have been apparent in a different opening offensive.

 

[Hammurabi]

Even in 1914 the British were slowly thawing towards the Germans. Mainly I think because they realized that the Germans were the ones that kept the Franco-Russians in check. So if in the first days / weeks the hawks do not get their wish to enter the war on the Entente side, I think there is a good chance that the Realpolitik may intervene and force a rethinking of the British position. Germany is NOT behaving like OTL and the Franco-Russians are the more aggressive side. Would the Empire and the British population support such a blatant policy when they can get news on the oodles of French dead? Personally I doubt it. But again it would take some time and the hawks would be pressing hard. No one is denying that. But on the other hand a more reactive approch of the Germans would take the wind out of many sails...

At what point between the Adadir Crisis of 1911 and the start of World War 1 did relations between the two nations thaw? Every action which was built up towards the onset of the war only estranged Britain and Germany further. Every action of Germany preceding the war, coupled with their economic and military dominance relative to the Franco-Russian alliance, was one which was viewed as aggressive by the Foreign Office, Cabinet, and the wider population. To say that the British joined because of Belgium is just silly. If you want to go far back enough, the British didn't need a violation of Belgian neutrality to threaten war on Germany in 1875. Germany doesn't need to invade Belgium to change the fact that the High Seas's Fleet is the greatest threat to Britain since the Napoleonic wars. Everybody understood this, Tripitz made an entire policy around this, and nothing is going to change it. Britain was forced into an Entente with France the moment they were required the concentrate the majority of their fleet against the Germans, and subsequently were forced into a war on the side of France regardless of a Belgian invasion. No amount of hand-waving is going to change everything which was built up to that crisis in 1914.

As to those gurantees, if it is advantageous for Germany to hold the HSF in port for the most part, then they will do so. Why would they not if the French are not in the position to threaten the German Coast in the, for me at leat, critical first weak? After that as I mentioned, there will be a crystalisation on the positions of the players. Even Britain will have to make clear statements and that will then influence the future actions of all sides.

There are no critical first weeks in a war where France isn't immediately knocked out. Britain will uphold her naval guarantees to the French. If the Ottomans are in the war and close the straights, they use that as a pretext to enter the war. If Germany has an inclination to use the navy which it spent a fortune on, the British go to war. If a British ship randomly sinks and lives are lost, they go to war. If the Russians are loosing the war in the East in any significant fashion, the British join the war. If the German's object to their economy being cut off from the rest of the world by a neutral British fleet, the fleet is no longer neutral.

And France is also the nation that got thrashed in OTL even on advantageous ratios for her. Here the Germans can fall back on their old staple and bleed them, then counter attack and press the French hard. Sure they have to be careful to keep the French at bay. But if OTL is an indication it should be possible. Could France win? Sure the possibility is there, but if OTL's performance is an indicator, then I think Germany has the better position and will probably make less mistakes.

France didn't get thrashed IOTL. They won and lost some offensive actions in the opening month of the war, and then stopped the full might of the German army dead it its tracks. They did this virtually on their own, with only minor support from the BEF. Now you have a Germany which hasn't invaded Belgium, a France whose heavy industry is intact, and the bulk of Germany's iron production, production which would loose the war for them in a matter of weeks if lost, right on the border ~15KM away. The French don't even have to consciously push for the Iron mines. All they have to do is push just a little bit into Lorraine, which is going to happen given the much shorter front, and the Germans loose the war.

 

[James Ricker]

The Royal Navy sends an older expendable cruiser with nobody important on board into the Baltic and waits for trouble.

 

[Glenn239]

At what point between the Adadir Crisis of 1911 and the start of World War 1 did relations between the two nations thaw?

Relations improved after 1911 when the Italian war in North Africa misfired and blew back into the Balkans in a manner that may have seen Italy on the German side or a Turkish war against Greece - either one not to the interests of the Entente.

All they have to do is push just a little bit into Lorraine, which is going to happen given the much shorter front, and the Germans lose the war.

Even in an eastern strategy the Germans would need to conduct a limited offensive around Metz to secure their iron ore. But, if it were lost, then there was still Sweden and some numbers of hundreds of thousands of tons of older warships whose steel could be melted down. Not saying you don't have a point though;losing the iron ore would not be happy fun time for the German war industry.

 

[Riain]

What impact though for the war as reported in Britain with an election pending sometime in 1915? I concede the leadership may not care the price in lives but the voters whose lives are going to be gambled might? I think most of the other nations saw this war as very much one of survival, you win or you are dead. Was that sentiment in Britain down in the streets?

My understanding was that Plan A was the more defensive one, a sit and wait to mobilize and let Germany attack because Russia is big and we have more peasants to lose until we attack and overwhelm them. G and then 19 and later 20 are evolving a more offensive approach spurred on by France. In other words Plan A was the initially defensive plan abandoned before 1914? Again, I understood Plan 19 to allow for a shift of one Army either North or South from the beginning. If correct, or in the alternative allowing for follow on forces, do the Russians have the flexibility to shift more than token forces to East Prussia if their intelligence reports "more" Germans? Do they bother or are they confident that their 1st and 2nd will handily deal with the 8th and "X" Army as they get after A-H per OTL?

IIRC Wilson was reelected because he kept the US out of the war, and then entered the war soon after. The war dragged on for over 4 years, the British Government changed during that time, but not to end the war because of the slaughter, but to fight it to the end.

I don't think the A and G variants can be called either defensive or offensive, but merely utilising a fact of mobilization to provide some flexibility. The 'swing' army isn't in position and able to move from one front to another, it was on its way from deep in Russia and it could be diverted during transit to either or north or south depending on circumstances.

The question is if Russia only had 8 armies in 1914 and the battlefield events of OTL happened where would the swing army go: north to stabilize the disaster or south to exploit success?

 

[BooNZ]

Meanwhile in France, the nation is untouched and ~15KM away from almost all of Germany's iron production. An offensive action into Lorraine, and consequently the Longwry-Briey basin, which reaches the aforementioned depths means the complete removal of Germany's capacity to wage war.

Probably not. In 1914 the production of pig-iron and steel in the Ruhr was greater than the combined production of Luxemburg and Lorraine.

West Germany, in the meanwhile, had almost emancipated itself from direct dependence upon Lorraine ore. This was made possible partly by a heavy consumption of pig iron, ingot steel, and other half-finished goods from the minette area; partly by the substitution of Swedish ore for that from Lorraine. The great ore deposits of Swedish Lappland had been opened up in the closing years of the 19th Century. The railway from the mines to the Baltic coast had been completed in 1888, and that to Narvik inl 1902. Suitable docks already existed at Ruhrort; the Dort- mund-Ems Canal was opened to traffic in 1898, and the intermediate Herne Canal was begun in 1906. As a result, Swedish ore could be delivered in the central Ruhr at a price a few pfennig less per ton of iron content than the minette. Add to this that the richer Swedish ores permitted a richer furnace charge and a larger output of pig iron from each furnace, gave less slag, and yielded other economies of a technical order. Henceforward, Swedish ores were to dominate the iron-smelting industry of the Ruhr. In these circumstances, the actual movement of ore from Lorraine to the Ruhr was quite small.

http://www.hks.re/wiki/lib/exe/fetch.php?media=2014:pounds.pdf

 

[sloreck]

The fact that Britain stayed in the war in spite of the slaughter is not an indicator that they would jump in for sure even absent Belgium is, IMHO, incorrect. Once a war has started, and before defeat has arrived or appears inevitable, countries will stay in. If you don't continue towards victory, or at least an acceptable peace, you admit the the sacrifices of blood and treasure were for naught. In WWI, as often happens in most wars, the longer it went on and the more blood was shed, the greater the war aims/victor's demands became.

 

[Anchises]

France didn't get thrashed IOTL. They won and lost some offensive actions in the opening month of the war, and then stopped the full might of the German army dead it its tracks. They did this virtually on their own, with only minor support from the BEF. Now you have a Germany which hasn't invaded Belgium, a France whose heavy industry is intact, and the bulk of Germany's iron production, production which would loose the war for them in a matter of weeks if lost, right on the border ~15KM away. The French don't even have to consciously push for the Iron mines. All they have to do is push just a little bit into Lorraine, which is going to happen given the much shorter front, and the Germans loose the war.

The German armies IOTL were busy with their offensive. ITTL the french will be faced with a short well manned defensive line. A shorter front favors the defender. And the Germans ITTL won't be faced with overstretched supply lines. The scenario you wan't to sell as beneficial for France is actually highly beneficial for the Reich.

 

[Kaze]

They have several options:
1. enter the war despite a pretext - follow Original Timeline
2. sell arms to both sides and popcorn the event until a victor is determined, then step in at the peace conference and say you brought about the peace. (basically what the USA did before the Lusitania and the Zimmerman telegram, then they went with option #1)
3. sell arms to both sides, popcorn the event, and become the mover of peace talks (the Switzerland model)

 

[marathag]

All the money which the British threw into France IOTL is getting poured into Russia.

Into the Churchillian 'soft underbelly' of the Ottoman Empire?

Gallipoli or Salonika ring any bells for how well that worked OTL, plus the experience of supplying the Whites during the Civil War?

 

[marathag]

They have several options:
1. enter the war despite a pretext - follow Original Timeline
2. sell arms to both sides and popcorn the event until a victor is determined, then step in at the peace conference and say you brought about the peace. (basically what the USA did before the Lusitania and the Zimmerman telegram, then they went with option #1)
3. sell arms to both sides, popcorn the event, and become the mover of peace talks (the Switzerland model)

Perfidious Albion, indeed.

 

[sloreck]

Absent somebody providing manpower, leadership and weapons, with a thin "white veneer" on the front the whites as such are not winning. "You can buff and buff but you can't make shit shine"

 

[MichaelWest]

IIRC Wilson was reelected because he kept the US out of the war, and then entered the war soon after. The war dragged on for over 4 years, the British Government changed during that time, but not to end the war because of the slaughter, but to fight it to the end.

I don't think the A and G variants can be called either defensive or offensive, but merely utilising a fact of mobilization to provide some flexibility. The 'swing' army isn't in position and able to move from one front to another, it was on its way from deep in Russia and it could be diverted during transit to either or north or south depending on circumstances.

The question is if Russia only had 8 armies in 1914 and the battlefield events of OTL happened where would the swing army go: north to stabilize the disaster or south to exploit success?

That was one of the campaign slogans used and I see your point. Perhaps the question is why the Liberals felt compelled to tackle this alone, did they truly believe they could be on the winning side before the election and get a bump? Or on another tangent if the election had already been called early in July for some reason? I appreciate your characterization, but I still have conflicting opinions as to if the Tories were going to war once in power, obviously it will be 1915 and a lot has happened.

So we have no solid planning by Russia to guide us other then OTL? I read that originally the planner wanted to go four Armies into East Prussia but pessimism had watered it down. As far as I can tell it was two armies and the expectation was for between 16 and 25 German Divisions, equal to or half-again as much. At best we might massage the Fourth Army to orient towards a possible third German Army in Silesia if intelligence reveals it, otherwise that is the nasty surprise.

Not using other Armies outside the initial set up I have six Armies arrayed, two against Germany and four against A-H. Are we tying down other Armies elsewhere, reducing available Divisions due to equipment or other reasons? I believe the Russians were ramping to 90 Divisions but if we had some delays in mobilizing units I think we see Russia only adding two Armies worth (of more scraped together units) and I think they have a three way demand, salvage the Northwest, reinforce the Southwest or do something about defending Poland. Panic usually means they choose all three. First priority is the North and stopping any possibility of moving towards the capital, next is defeating A-H and last is Poland. Thus my guesswork on some German drive into Poland since East Prussia has destroyed the Russian offensive and A-H should be doing at least as "well", Germany wants to relieve A-H and an attack into the rear might be higher priority than sending troops to die under Conrad's command.

My thinking on motivating Germany to look East is the original draft plan using four Armies, maybe a copy is in Germany hands or a spy has revealed it to the Germans. Thus at least two Armies expecting four Russian? This might still have us set up per OTL in A-H, expecting only a portion of Russian forces, they still divide between Serbia and Russia, but now Germany has real strength in the East. With eight Armies Russia would be assumed to be chasing both Germany and A-H with some unknown reserves. Do you have a recommendation on better primary sources for Russian pre-war plans?

 

[BooNZ]

MichaelWest, Riain, Glenn239, NoMommsen

British Conservative position

Messieurs, I was hoping you could fact check the following for accuracy and reasonableness.

• According to Massey (Dreadnaught) Bonar Law would meet with Grey on a daily basis during the crisis for an update on status and during those discussions it was apparent the Conservatives were still divided on British intervention, unless Belgium was invaded.
  
• According to Massey, the hawks got mauled by the doves on 1 August 1914 and on that afternoon, Cambon was given the impression by Grey (or his representative) the French were about to be thrown under a bus.
  
• On 2 August 1914 when Grey sought approval from Cabinet to retrospectively approve his private naval undertakings to the French, a letter/note indicating unconditional support was received from the Conservatives.
  
• On 3 August 1914, H. H. Asquith receives a note clarifying the Conservative support was still dependent on the violation of Belgium.

Prima facie, the British Cabinet appear to have been deliberately deceived by a note suggesting the Conservatives were ready to go to war. The peace faction would have seen Grey's threats to resign as potentially ushering a Conservative party already united on war. If Grey was not in on this ruse, there is a risk he would resign and collapse the liberal government only to see the Conservatives sit on the sidelines.

Further to the above, my understanding is Asquith was loyal specifically to Grey and while generally pro French, he did not assume the Germans were automatic adversaries - to that extent, he was not a true hawk.

Let the flames begin

 

[Zheng He]

Okay, all of this back and forth is great but why doesn't somebody start writing a TL where Germany doesn't invade Belgium and concentrates its offensive in the East. I would love to read it.

 

[AJE]

Meanwhile in France, the nation is untouched and ~15KM away from almost all of Germany's iron production. An offensive action into Lorraine, and consequently the Longwry-Briey basin, which reaches the aforementioned depths means the complete removal of Germany's capacity to wage war.

An offensive into Lorraine is exactly what the Germans wanted the French to do under Schlieffen's original plans, and they didn't plan to put any significant opposition to the French advance in that area, only enough to wear down the French armies as they advanced. All of the French armies that invaded Lorraine would have been destroyed by the counterattack if it was correctly implemented, so far from defeating Germany an offensive into that region would have crippled the French Army.

 

[sloreck]

A planned defensive action, like the German plan for Alsace-Lorraine etc does not give the initiative to the enemy, he is doing what you want him to do.