Germany develops mass production pre-1930's

  • Thread starter Deleted member 1487
  • Start date

Deleted member 1487

Let's say that Ford makes a bigger impression on German industry in the 1920's and by the end of the decade most manufacturing in Germany is converting over to mass production. How does this effect the economy of Germany? Has the banning of german exports already been repealed by the allies? Are the Nazi's able to be avoided because of a better economy or does this only aid german production in world war 2?
 

Redbeard

Banned
Let's say that Ford makes a bigger impression on German industry in the 1920's and by the end of the decade most manufacturing in Germany is converting over to mass production. How does this effect the economy of Germany? Has the banning of german exports already been repealed by the allies? Are the Nazi's able to be avoided because of a better economy or does this only aid german production in world war 2?

German industry already was a modern mass production industry, and couldn't be said to be behind anyone - probably on the contrary. But the German system as a whole was surprisingly unprepared for a major war in 1939. For instance the artillery shell stocks were completely exhausted after the Polish campaign, and only after a hastily implemented programme to increase ammo production was the Wehrmacht ready for offensive operations by spring of 1940.

I'm not aware of any major bannings on German products before WWII, on the contrary the Soviets eagerly traded anything with the Nazis until 22nd of June 1941.

But all in all you could say that while Hitler exagerated Germany's military production and strength (and the world believed him) he actually focussed on pacifying the Germans by providing them with consumation. This policy was not left for serious until 1942, when it became clear to even Hitler that the war would be long and attritional. Anyway an ATL where Germany actually focus much earlier on war production is likely to have the Nazi regime be far less popular.

Regards

Steffen Redbeard
 
German industry already was a modern mass production industry, and couldn't be said to be behind anyone - probably on the contrary. But the German system as a whole was surprisingly unprepared for a major war in 1939. For instance the artillery shell stocks were completely exhausted after the Polish campaign, and only after a hastily implemented programme to increase ammo production was the Wehrmacht ready for offensive operations by spring of 1940.

I'm not aware of any major bannings on German products before WWII, on the contrary the Soviets eagerly traded anything with the Nazis until 22nd of June 1941.

But all in all you could say that while Hitler exagerated Germany's military production and strength (and the world believed him) he actually focussed on pacifying the Germans by providing them with consumation. This policy was not left for serious until 1942, when it became clear to even Hitler that the war would be long and attritional. Anyway an ATL where Germany actually focus much earlier on war production is likely to have the Nazi regime be far less popular.

Regards

Steffen Redbeard

Steffen, I am afraid to say you are very wrong.

Whilst some German companies were world leaders German industry a a whole was very mixed , with a large craft sector. Total manufacturing productivity was no higher than Britain in 1939, and the overall productibity of the economy noticeably lower. Solving this would acually be very difficult - it is not a case of certain companies sorting themselves out (they way it would be in Britain in the 30s say) but of whole craft industries needing to be destoryed and replaced by whole new companies (something more like Britain in the 80s)

Germany was the economy that prepared earliest for world war two, and had total defence spending of circa 25% of GDP by 39, far higher than any other country.

Germany remained the most mobilised combatant throughout the early years of war:
1940 - Germany domestic spending on the war is 36% of GDP, UK 31%
1941 -Germany 44%, UK 41%
1942 (the year Speer takes over - Germany 52%, UK 43% (but USSR 66%)
1943 - UK 47%, Germany 60%, USSR 58%

After this there are no accurate figures for Germany.

Th crucial thing about these figures is that they are domestically financed - they ignore lend-lease and German plunder. They show quite clearly that Germany was always more deeply mobilised than the UK, and that both economies were able to deepen molibilisation over time - which suggests that the idea that the Germans were holding back on mobilisation is wrong.

The Soviet figures - declining after the 60% peak (mobilisation declined to over 52% in 44) suggest that the German peak of 60% might also have been unsustainable (and Harrison provides further figures on workforce mobilisation to support this view.)

The conclusion therefore is that Germany went for military production, fairly hell for leather, and the fact that the Nazis were out-produced has other causes - possibly, going back to the topic, productive efficiency, possibly allocative efficiency but most likely of all sheer resource shortage.

The full and fascinating details can be found at the link below, where Mark Harrison explains why Berenice Carroll's figures are wrong:

http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/staff/faculty/harrison/public/

On the other topic consumption was low in Nazi Germany - it fell from 81% of GDP to 59% from 32-39. An interesting question does exist about whether it could have been even lower - that the Germans might have done their 39/40 mobilisation in say, 1936. Tim Mason would argue not for reasons of popularity, and he may be right for the wrong reasons - that there not could be a further push on military spending because it was already very high.
 

Redbeard

Banned
Steffen, I am afraid to say you are very wrong.

Whilst some German companies were world leaders German industry a a whole was very mixed , with a large craft sector. Total manufacturing productivity was no higher than Britain in 1939, and the overall productibity of the economy noticeably lower. Solving this would acually be very difficult - it is not a case of certain companies sorting themselves out (they way it would be in Britain in the 30s say) but of whole craft industries needing to be destoryed and replaced by whole new companies (something more like Britain in the 80s)

Germany was the economy that prepared earliest for world war two, and had total defence spending of circa 25% of GDP by 39, far higher than any other country.

Germany remained the most mobilised combatant throughout the early years of war:
1940 - Germany domestic spending on the war is 36% of GDP, UK 31%
1941 -Germany 44%, UK 41%
1942 (the year Speer takes over - Germany 52%, UK 43% (but USSR 66%)
1943 - UK 47%, Germany 60%, USSR 58%

After this there are no accurate figures for Germany.

Th crucial thing about these figures is that they are domestically financed - they ignore lend-lease and German plunder. They show quite clearly that Germany was always more deeply mobilised than the UK, and that both economies were able to deepen molibilisation over time - which suggests that the idea that the Germans were holding back on mobilisation is wrong.

The Soviet figures - declining after the 60% peak (mobilisation declined to over 52% in 44) suggest that the German peak of 60% might also have been unsustainable (and Harrison provides further figures on workforce mobilisation to support this view.)

The conclusion therefore is that Germany went for military production, fairly hell for leather, and the fact that the Nazis were out-produced has other causes - possibly, going back to the topic, productive efficiency, possibly allocative efficiency but most likely of all sheer resource shortage.

The full and fascinating details can be found at the link below, where Mark Harrison explains why Berenice Carroll's figures are wrong:

http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/staff/faculty/harrison/public/

On the other topic consumption was low in Nazi Germany - it fell from 81% of GDP to 59% from 32-39. An interesting question does exist about whether it could have been even lower - that the Germans might have done their 39/40 mobilisation in say, 1936. Tim Mason would argue not for reasons of popularity, and he may be right for the wrong reasons - that there not could be a further push on military spending because it was already very high.

Hi Wozza

I'm short on time (putting kids to bed), but in short I think the production output tells my point. The Germans kept their 1930s rearmament production output roughly until 1942, but UK started to accelarate her production already from 1936/37 and by 1941 UK (excl. Empire) outproduced the combined Axis. After that the British couldn't squeeze more out however, but the German production rose sharply from 1942 to 1944, where it had by a far margin outclassed the British. Germans having lived during WWII will also be able to tell you that well into WWII they really didn't feel the war that much and were well supplied with most items.

BTW productivity is a many sided term. The mass produced Liberty ships of WWII fame actually took more man hours (and money) to produce than a similar British produced merchant ship, but it could be completed much faster - what was more productive?

I usually image the Liberty method as a lot of men waiting to implement their short bursts of activity where the British shipyard method involved relatively few skilled workers being active all the time (materiel waiting for men).

Regards

Steffen Redbeard
 
As I've pointed out , Hitler in 1936 gambled on a limited war economy that was only geared to produce enough armaments for the Wehrmacht conducting campaigns lasting months. He encouraged expensive quality based armaments industry over cheap mass production industry so germany ended up with 'loss replacement industry' producing weaponary with 25 years life expectancy. Considering how fast technology in tanks and aircraft were advancing in the 1920s and 1930s, making 25 year armaments is plain silly.

Hitler expressely forbade any kind of stockpileing of resources since he was so convinced there would not be another protracted mass production based war until many years later. This mean't mass production was difficult to impliment quickly when the war began, thus he handicapped the german industry. Even though he adopted the idea of a conscripted work force, far far to much of that was allowed to continue producing consumer goods so some critial industry skilled work forces were maxed out thus further limiting conversion to mass production.

Deist points out that in 1934 Defense minister Von Blomberg faced with Hitlers demands for more more and more, tried to use his office as head of the newly erected Wehrmacht command to stream line all service branch industries and force the introduction of mass production technics . But Hitler , who had privately backed Blomberg, ignored this pressure and encouraged each service branch to negotiate seperately with him on their many 'needs' . Thus he had control over his industry at the expence of efficent mass producable war industry. It seems keeping political loyalty was of much more importance to Hitler than winning any war Germany might find itself in.

The fact that German armaments industry employed a larger proportion of workforce suggest a less efficent run industry that clearly had not converted over to mass production techniques. In 1940 UK was out producing Germany in armaments at something like 1/2 the cost and with what looks like a smaller work force. As Overy notes when the German air industry quadrupled aircraft out put between 1940 and 1944 , it was done with only a 20% increase in resource allocation and 5% decline in labor force.
 
Last edited:
Please excuse my ignorence, but in the early 1930's would it have really made that much difference? I'm assuming Germany like the rest of the world would still have run into the great economic depression of the 1930's. Even with mass production reducing costs, it doesn't matter if you can efficiently make 100,000 of something instead of only 10,000 of them, and sell them for less. If no one has any money at all how can they buy your product? If no one can afford to buy your product what have you gained?

I can see how better mass production might have helped with military war production during WWII, but in the 1930's they would still have had an economy that was in ruins, so what would mass production like that have gained them then?
 

Deleted member 1487

I think that had the German economy been based more on modern production techniques and there were no restrictions of exports, then given Germany's industrial potential, we may see the 'economic miracle' in the 1930's thus preempting the Nazis. Given that the Weimar republic was making a recovery before Hitler took power and that much of the economic boost that the Nazis boasted about was the result of previous policies coming to fruition, here will a modern economy, perhaps the slump that enabled the Nazis to come to power could be blunted somewhat. With Europe's biggest economy able to trade with other nations, we may see a reduced depression in Europe. Now i don't recall if the embargo was still in effect at this point, though.

I agree that the effects would be most noticable in wartime, but like I said, maybe the added economic activity may prevent the Nazis. I don't know.
 
Please excuse my ignorence, but in the early 1930's would it have really made that much difference? I'm assuming Germany like the rest of the world would still have run into the great economic depression of the 1930's. Even with mass production reducing costs, it doesn't matter if you can efficiently make 100,000 of something instead of only 10,000 of them, and sell them for less. If no one has any money at all how can they buy your product? If no one can afford to buy your product what have you gained?

I can see how better mass production might have helped with military war production during WWII, but in the 1930's they would still have had an economy that was in ruins, so what would mass production like that have gained them then?


German economy was already being run on credit issued by the governent for military contracts, even before Hitler took over. By the early 1930s this was used to pull germany out of the effects of depression much faster than any other industrialised power.The companies accepted credit for resources that the government tried to get through barter or trade arrangements with other countries, thus avoiding having to dip into 'real' gold or currency. Had that economy been geared towards mass production , twice as many could have been had for the same cost/industry/resource base.

Due to lack of funds tank contract for 287 Lt Traktors [tanks] had to be shelved to pay for more Panzerschliff [pocket battle cruisers], while plans to regun the Torpedoboot had to be shelved as well.
 
Hi Wozza

I'm short on time (putting kids to bed), but in short I think the production output tells my point. The Germans kept their 1930s rearmament production output roughly until 1942, but UK started to accelarate her production already from 1936/37 and by 1941 UK (excl. Empire) outproduced the combined Axis. After that the British couldn't squeeze more out however, but the German production rose sharply from 1942 to 1944, where it had by a far margin outclassed the British. Germans having lived during WWII will also be able to tell you that well into WWII they really didn't feel the war that much and were well supplied with most items.

BTW productivity is a many sided term. The mass produced Liberty ships of WWII fame actually took more man hours (and money) to produce than a similar British produced merchant ship, but it could be completed much faster - what was more productive?

I usually image the Liberty method as a lot of men waiting to implement their short bursts of activity where the British shipyard method involved relatively few skilled workers being active all the time (materiel waiting for men).

Regards

Steffen Redbeard

To this I would add the German Method of a few technicians building a tank, starting from the ground up in a bay, and assembling the parts, with quite some milling and persuading being done. This method is very slow, and makes each machine indiviual, rather than the interchangeable part mantra that the US followed. Even though far too many US tanks, and other pieces of epuipment were destroyed, scavenging got many of them back up and running. I don't think Germany had that same benefit.
 
As I've pointed out , Hitler in 1936 gambled on a limited war economy that was only geared to produce enough armaments for the Wehrmacht conducting campaigns lasting months. He encouraged expensive quality based armaments industry over cheap mass production industry so germany ended up with 'loss replacement industry' producing weaponary with 25 years life expectancy. Considering how fast technology in tanks and aircraft were advancing in the 1920s and 1930s, making 25 year armaments is plain silly.

Hitler expressely forbade any kind of stockpileing of resources since he was so convinced there would not be another protracted mass production based war until many years later. This mean't mass production was difficult to impliment quickly when the war began, thus he handicapped the german industry. Even though he adopted the idea of a conscripted work force, far far to much of that was allowed to continue producing consumer goods so some critial industry skilled work forces were maxed out thus further limiting conversion to mass production.

Do you mean limited war economy? Or economy rather heavily committed towards limited wars?

Regarding the limited war thesis, it does not follow from my reading of Deists The Wehrmacht and Re-armament, although you have read things I have not on this. But it is hard to see that much consistency and logic in Hitler's demands - usually he just wanted more as soon as possible. Is this not a model that has been imposed after the fact on production? Which naturally gravitated to "shop window" forces to impress the Fuhrer?

It is hard to say that too much of German industry is commmitted to consumer goods, the German consumption rate was very low by the late 30s, and the worforce producing civilian consumer goods fell by half in the first year of war.

The fact that German armaments industry employed a larger proportion of workforce suggest a less efficent run industry that clearly had not converted over to mass production techniques. In 1940 UK was out producing Germany in armaments at something like 1/2 the cost and with what looks like a smaller work force. As Overy notes when the German air industry quadrupled aircraft out put between 1940 and 1944 , it was done with only a 20% increase in resource allocation and 5% decline in labor force.

German and British overall manufacuring productivity were the same in 1939 (Harrison 1997) although overall British productivity was higher. However that presents an artificial picture - Germany has seen breakneck expansion of key industries - which often lowered productivity, because of things like opening up poor coal seams. This obviosuly left scope for rationalisation later (rationalisation that precedes Speer but is usually attributed to him.) But that is part of a natural cycle - you expand then you rationalise.

I am suspicious of the mass production conversion claim. The fastest increase in German armaments production in Jan-July 1940 (Tooze 2006), which suggests no particular problems making a rapid transfer to war production.
Overy's figures are interesting but are only a selection, there is no reason to see them as definitive.

Finally I think that the German economy needs to be put into context - it is consistently outperformed by the US economy. It is consisently behind the US in adopting the latest techniques. There is no reason to think that this can be magically changed in the 1930s - particularly by the Nazis who want to do about a zillion things in as little time as possible. In 1932 Germany had no aircraft industry, in 1940 it had the world's largest airforce. That is a pretty good achievement all round. Hypothetically, with hindsight and the universal application of best practice maybe more could have been achieved, but not in a realistic ATL.
 
Please excuse my ignorence, but in the early 1930's would it have really made that much difference? I'm assuming Germany like the rest of the world would still have run into the great economic depression of the 1930's. Even with mass production reducing costs, it doesn't matter if you can efficiently make 100,000 of something instead of only 10,000 of them, and sell them for less. If no one has any money at all how can they buy your product? If no one can afford to buy your product what have you gained?

I can see how better mass production might have helped with military war production during WWII, but in the 1930's they would still have had an economy that was in ruins, so what would mass production like that have gained them then?

That is confusing productivity and capacity.
In the long-run you always want higher productivity - more made by less people, as this destroys jobs in the short-term (but only the short-term) there are usually vested interests against change - Correlli Barnett finds great British examples, such as a machine that lets a two man job be done by one man, but under union pressure a second man now had to sit and watch the machine operator!

By the late 30s the German economy had a substantial labour shortage, and was already beginning to import workers (something that expanded in the war years of course.) Its productivity had also been static for several years, see above, so productivity gains would have been very helpful in preparing for war.
 
"By 1936 the rearmament efforts of the Third Reich had reached a scale which allowing for the country's over all economic needs, seemed just about feasible -at least from the point of view of the minister of economic affairs. In all his calculations and measures Schacht had always proceeded from the view 'that the productive capacity of the economy represented the natural limits of rearmament', and this he thought had been reached, if not exceeded by 1936. The war economy had arrived at a point where a decision had to be made between either slowing down the pace of rearmament in favor of intensified export effort- a decision which would have been justifiable , seeing that the war preparations were general rather than specifically aimed at a fixed date- or maintaining the rearmament drive at an undiminished pace, though at the expense of the population , of the maintenance and development of the party machine and of construction of ostentatious public buildings."

"A third option finally was the tightening up of rearmament production by aiming at a limited strategic objective at the earliest possible moment .A decision along these lines , which would have required intensified economic dirigisme was beginning to take shape in the spring of 1936. 'To ensure further militerization' Hitler therefore instructed Goering at the beginning of April to 'examine and order all necessary measures in governmental and Party institutions"


“Germany and the Second world war” Vol-1 section two [translated 1990] written by Hans Erich Volkmann. pp 273
Schacht declared to Hitler that
Quote:
"the economy itself and more especially industry and the banks bear the burden" [Hitler doubted this could be done ] " Even if such doubts were unfounded , the fact remained that any in depth rearmament oriented towards the concept of total war, could not have been satisfactorily completed until the mid 1940s. For Hitler this would have mean't an intolerable postponement of his plans. This the Furher was not willing to contemplate in 1936 . Instead he was determined to pursue his overall ambitions single mindedly in the future and , whenever possible, to exploit any shifts in the European balance of Power (such as might arise , for instance, in the course of the Spanish Civil war) to pursue his own hegemonistic ambitions on the Continent, even though he had not yet decided on the sequence of his thrusts-France or living space in the east. What mattered then was the pursuit of an economic policy which would make it possible to create within a foreseeable period an operational, numerically large, effective army, with modern equipment , capable of successful operations in campaigns limited in both time and space"

“Germany and the Second world war” Vol-1 section two [translated 1990] written by Hans Erich Volkmann. pp 276-277


Quote:
Hence forward the war economy , in view of the existing situation , was to be guided by the requirements of what was later to be called the Blitzkrieg . Effectively this meant the concentration of efforts on the material equipment of the armed forces , ie the neglect of in depth rearmament in favor of rearmament in breadth. It also meant the intensification of economic efforts to render possible an early operational employment of the Wehrmacht ; this to be ensured by an enlarged economic administrative machine furnished with extended powers.
“Germany and the Second world war” Vol-1 section two [translated 1990] written by Hans Erich Volkmann. pp 277


Quote:
" In his view [Hitlers] no country could succeed in 'stockpile up in advance the quantities of raw materials needed for war", He therefore emphatically demanded that full economic mobilization should neglect long term stockpiling and confine itself to sufficient armaments , equipment and food supplies" .

“Germany and the Second world war” Vol-1 section two [translated 1990] written by Hans Erich Volkmann. pp 278



Clearly 'Armaments in breadth' as opposed to 'Armaments in depth' is commonly understood to mean 'limited war economy' as opposed to 'total war economy'....the rest he would make up as he went along.


These volumes are good "Germany and the Second World War" since they feature a hole host of German historians dealing in their speciality, rather than one author dealing with the whole thing. Here is a like to a later volume I have not read yet. Hope it is of some help.

http://books.google.com/books?vid=I...l&sig=2_8KCKmroeFpL_ezqyMU0qRcTms#PRA1-PR9,M1
 
Last edited:

Redbeard

Banned
To this I would add the German Method of a few technicians building a tank, starting from the ground up in a bay, and assembling the parts, with quite some milling and persuading being done. This method is very slow, and makes each machine indiviual, rather than the interchangeable part mantra that the US followed. Even though far too many US tanks, and other pieces of epuipment were destroyed, scavenging got many of them back up and running. I don't think Germany had that same benefit.

You describe pre-industrial manufacturing, Germany was far out of that by WWII and German weapons or machines had as interchangeable parts as US or British. But by orders from Hitler spares were not produced in significant numbers and the Germans had an astonishing focus on finish on their products - astonishing when you know how long an average tank or plane lasted on the battlefield.

We all know the stories about silly weapons sytem monsters like the Maus tank, but it must not be overseen that the Germans introduced a lot of innovative techniques to utilise industrial methods. For instance by making guns out of pressed steel sheets (StGw 44 and MG42). That gave excellent guns (the MG 42 design is still in use and the StGw 44 forms the basis of practically all current assault rifles) being also very cheap to produce. The Panther tank also wasn't an expensive tank, on the contrary a lot of cost and time saving factors had been worked into the design, it did not cost significantly more than the PzIV, but was rushed into service - and suffered accordingly in early reliability.

Regarding battlefield scavenging I think the Germans were ahead, that is at least how both the North African and Russian battlefield are described. But late war when the Germans usually retreated scavenging of course became more difficult, as you had to leave the battlefield.

Regards

Steffen Redbeard
 
The Germans did not concentrate their wartime production on a limited number of designs - but had multiple, similiar projects underway.
Had they focused on a limited number of weapons they could have increased the level of output substantially.
Everytime you introduce a new weapon into the production line it means disruption - the weapon has to be battle tested and reworked if necessary, you have to retool the production facilities, establish new stocks of maintenance resources, start new training programs for crews & maintenance personnel, restructure the operating forces to integrate the new system, and so on. It isn't cheap to introduce new weapons.
Even in the very last days of the way, the Germans were looking a new family of AFV's the "E" series to replace the existing PzIV/Panther/Tiger.
 

Deleted member 1487

The E series was a much simplified version of those tanks. So in the end they realized the need for standardization and ease of manufacture. Too bad for them that the war was just about over when this became apparent.
 

Redbeard

Banned
The E series was a much simplified version of those tanks. So in the end they realized the need for standardization and ease of manufacture. Too bad for them that the war was just about over when this became apparent.

The Bf 109 was the most produced fighter of WWII and was the main German fighter for almost 10 years - that is hard to beat in a standardisation contest.

Going through WWII with just 6 different types of tanks (Pz I-VI) isn't bad either - try and compare to the British inventory. They even produced 1700 tanks unfit for service (Covenanter). BTW a tank like the Pz IV (serving all through WWII) underwent a lot of simplifications during the war, the later marks being much easier to produce. It is also hard to beat the versatility shown by the Pz III and IV in providing the basic design for a huge number of efficient combat vehicles.

Instead of light, medium and heavy machine guns the Germans introduced general purpose MGs fullfilling all three roles (MG 34 and MG 42) - not only a standardisation for the sake of logistics, but one that greatly enhanced fighting capacity.

The German failings in standardisation rarely had an origin in the industry, but rather when large numbers of captured materiel was included in the units. A Division would often have hundreds of different kinds of motor vehicles of foreign origin and most of the guns in the Atlantic wall were captured and with almost as many different types as batteries.

Regards

Steffen Redbeard
 
Clearly 'Armaments in breadth' as opposed to 'Armaments in depth' is commonly understood to mean 'limited war economy' as opposed to 'total war economy'....the rest he would make up as he went along.


These volumes are good "Germany and the Second World War" since they feature a hole host of German historians dealing in their speciality, rather than one author dealing with the whole thing. Here is a like to a later volume I have not read yet. Hope it is of some help.

http://books.google.com/books?vid=I...l&sig=2_8KCKmroeFpL_ezqyMU0qRcTms#PRA1-PR9,M1
[/B][/FONT][/FONT]

Esl, thank you very much for taking the time to post this material. I keep meaning to look at these books in the library - the cost of purchase seems sadly prohibitive.

Hopefully we can resume this when I have read more, as I do not wish to comment further without reading the material.
 
The Bf 109 was the most produced fighter of WWII and was the main German fighter for almost 10 years - that is hard to beat in a standardisation contest.

Going through WWII with just 6 different types of tanks (Pz I-VI) isn't bad either - try and compare to the British inventory. They even produced 1700 tanks unfit for service (Covenanter). BTW a tank like the Pz IV (serving all through WWII) underwent a lot of simplifications during the war, the later marks being much easier to produce. It is also hard to beat the versatility shown by the Pz III and IV in providing the basic design for a huge number of efficient combat vehicles.

Instead of light, medium and heavy machine guns the Germans introduced general purpose MGs fullfilling all three roles (MG 34 and MG 42) - not only a standardisation for the sake of logistics, but one that greatly enhanced fighting capacity.

The German failings in standardisation rarely had an origin in the industry, but rather when large numbers of captured materiel was included in the units. A Division would often have hundreds of different kinds of motor vehicles of foreign origin and most of the guns in the Atlantic wall were captured and with almost as many different types as batteries.

Steffen, I agree with much of this. The Me 109 is a particularly good example of the difficulty of balancing new models vs using tried and tested technology, choices for which there are no right answers.

When I think about the Germans using Pz IVs and Me 109s in 1944 (but having very advanced designs for tanks and jets on the way) is that the Germans tried to fight the war with the weapons of the 50s but ended up fighting it with the weapons of the 30s.
 

Redbeard

Banned
Steffen, I agree with much of this. The Me 109 is a particularly good example of the difficulty of balancing new models vs using tried and tested technology, choices for which there are no right answers.

When I think about the Germans using Pz IVs and Me 109s in 1944 (but having very advanced designs for tanks and jets on the way) is that the Germans tried to fight the war with the weapons of the 50s but ended up fighting it with the weapons of the 30s.

Agree, and apparently continued to develop until the last minuttes of the war. Wonder if the scientists did that because they didn't have a clue about how the war was going, or becuase they didn't dare anything else, or did they really believe that the war still wasn't lost? Or perhaps they just didn't know what else to do?

BTW back to the industry, the combination of relatively complicated products (like V2) and a pronounced reliance on forced/slave labour is some kind of a mystery. It anyway must have meant, that production processes must have been planned very much "Ford like" (i.e. for unskilled labour, each man doing very few operations) and not like you would do with skilled labour in a workshop.

Regards

Steffen Redbeard
 

Deleted member 1487

I'm not saying that the Germans did not simplify and standardize through the war and improve their equipment. In just the instances you mention, we see that they did. But their vehicles, even the Pz 3 and 4 both were more complex then the equivalent tanks in both the Russian and American arsenals. The E series was the response to this realization and a recognition of the improvements necessary to mass produce the heavy vehicles like the panther and tiger. Had something like this been introduced much earlier, like when the tanks were being designed (the T34 was already a perfect example), then the lower production numbers could have been avoided.
 
Top