Between Scotland and Greenland, in the GIUK Gap, is the best place to intercept.
Also, why would the British not intercept the Blockade Runners on favourable territory to them? Why stop and search in range of the HSF?
I want too, but I have lost my passion for writing. And when only partially motivated, the quality plummets.
Also, I looked at this topic many times, but I just don't think it is a war winner. IMO, Prince Henry and the 15 merchant subs would give you a war that looks almost identical to OTL. With a 100 million or so people in Germany and A-H and maximum capacity of maybe 100,000 tons of cargo a year, what difference does it make? We are talking about 2 pounds of goods per year per person. Maybe 20 pounds per soldier. Can you think of anything that weighs less than 20 pounds that makes that much difference to a soldier? That is like two 155mm artillery shells per year, per squad. And wasn't ammo more of an issue than say machine gun supply or artillery supplies?
100,000 tons of extra nitrates per year would make a big difference on CP harvests - the nitrates production in Germany was never enough to go around.
As to why we are having this discussion, we started with OTL distant blockade. Then we discussed the close blockade. Then a poster discussed blockading off Yorkshire which is the intermediate blockade, so we discussed it for a bit. IMO, the most likely think the UK does if there are a handful of fast blockade runners that sneak by the distant blockade each month is to keep doing the same and figure these ships will eventually be caught.
100,000 tons of extra nitrates per year would make a big difference on CP harvests - the nitrates production in Germany was never enough to go around.
Why not just build more cargo submarines earlier ? Its not like the British haven't done Blockade before ...
Would the OTL German Government use nitrates sensibly like this or plough it into ammunition production?
Would the OTL German Government use nitrates sensibly like this or plough it into ammunition production?
Ammo fills like the correct answer. I am beginning to wonder how much food could be grown if we cut ammo consumption down by 35% at Verdun. Or how much food could A-H grow if it used chemical weapons. i.e. every 3rd explosive shell used in OTL is replace with mustard gas and the nitrogen is used as fertilizer.
Cargo sub carries 750 ton. A fast surface ship of standard design can carry 3000 to 10000 tons of cargo at 17 knots.
Standard design, sure. But if you're building it low profile and so on, then it's going to - maybe - be 3000 tons.
Given the British can base out of the Carrbibean and Halifax, and has access to American harbours as well, Im pretty sure they can simply tail any unarmed blockade runner out of American harbours with an unarmed ship of their own, and then vector a light cruiser to it.
On the other hand, I really can't see what you can do about a submersible that leaves at night and submerges in US waters. If you want to be really nice to the Americans, you can even invite the Entente to inspect the cargo as it's loaded, which is going to be dual use items like fertiliser, special materials for steel and rubber.
I get the advantage of the speed. What is the advantage of the low profile?
Sure, the merchant subs work. I used them in my ATL. It looks like it takes under a year to build them, so we could have them showing up by mid 1915. Say 1 a month for the first 6 months, then two a month for the next 6 months, then 4 a month for the rest of the war.
You cant catch what you don't see.
And if you're going for cargo submarines, build them pre-war.
What would be the POD to cause them to be built?
In OTL Naval Exercises May 1914 Tirpitz asked the question to his Admirals. "What if they don't come?" Nobody had an answer and nobody did anything OTL. But if he brought that up (and risked the obvious questioning of his naval strategy), he must have been thinking about it for a while. So I don't think it implausible for people to think about a strategy in case this happens, its what militaries should do. Perhaps in 1913 or early 1914 the question could be raised and people could do something about it.Someone looks at a map and realises Distant Blockade breaks Risk Theory.
In OTL Naval Exercises May 1914 Tirpitz asked the question to his Admirals. "What if they don't come?" Nobody had an answer and nobody did anything OTL.
In OTL Naval Exercises May 1914 Tirpitz asked the question to his Admirals. "What if they don't come?" Nobody had an answer and nobody did anything OTL. But if he brought that up (and risked the obvious questioning of his naval strategy), he must have been thinking about it for a while. So I don't think it implausible for people to think about a strategy in case this happens, its what militaries should do. Perhaps in 1913 or early 1914 the question could be raised and people could do something about it.
Probably as BlondieBC pointed out the economic part of it would involve stockpiling raw materials. The Blockade running part is just a way to either force the British into action close to the German coasts or to supply colonies or raiders (via the construction of fast merchants).
I'd suggest that losing warship or merchant ship tonnage at a rate of 3x import of crucial materials was worth it. (i.e., if a Kaiser Class dreadnought could be cashed into 8,000 tons of nitrates, rubber, or other vital materials, it would be a good deal for Germany to do that).