After Barbarrossa, instead of trying to build a quality over quantity tank and ending up with the Panther troubled developement cycle, the germans decide to go ahead with the projected replacement of the PzIV with the sligthly larger, and much easier to upgrade, VK3001 (H) project. They end up with a tank that is easy to build, reliable, and avaiable in large numbers for the critical 1943 battles on the russian front.
Germany builds the VK3001(H)
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Why is this vehicle 'easier to build and upgrade' It has several obvious flaws from those points of view to start with
For example - It still uses multiple vertical plates and seams in the construction of the hull front. This all requires extra work
I think keeping the existing PZ IV in production while using the proposed Panther Hull as a basis for the new vehicle would be a better option. The one thing on the Panther I would change would be the suspension. Get rid of the interleaved wheels and install slightly smaller wheels while retaining torsion bar suspension so you end up with a track/wheel system similar to the modern LEOPARD/M-60/T-55
For example - It still uses multiple vertical plates and seams in the construction of the hull front. This all requires extra work
I think keeping the existing PZ IV in production while using the proposed Panther Hull as a basis for the new vehicle would be a better option. The one thing on the Panther I would change would be the suspension. Get rid of the interleaved wheels and install slightly smaller wheels while retaining torsion bar suspension so you end up with a track/wheel system similar to the modern LEOPARD/M-60/T-55
Interesting alternative
I agree wholeheartedly that standardising on an easier to build, maintain, supply and upgrade vehicle such as the one mentioned would have made a huge difference. As someone said about the Sherman, it might not have been comptetive on paper, but it was more likely to actually be there when it was needed and was thus superior to a Tiger tank broken down on the road to the battlefield (Again).
The biggest single cause of Tiger tank loss was supposedly logistics, either breaking down or running out of fuel, at 40 tons this would have been easier to keep running, find bridges for etc.
I have seen a history of the battle of Kursk that states that the German army high command recommended immediately cancelling production of all armoured vehicles except the Tiger and the Panther to standardise production. This was described as "...the council of desperation, since it would have cut production temporarily to 1200 tanks..." What you are showing looks like a Panzer IV derivative, presumably to minimise loss of production and re-training when converting over.
Whether being able to keep the panzer forces up to strength would have made enough of a difference to get Stalin to drop out of the war is another question.
I agree wholeheartedly that standardising on an easier to build, maintain, supply and upgrade vehicle such as the one mentioned would have made a huge difference. As someone said about the Sherman, it might not have been comptetive on paper, but it was more likely to actually be there when it was needed and was thus superior to a Tiger tank broken down on the road to the battlefield (Again).
The biggest single cause of Tiger tank loss was supposedly logistics, either breaking down or running out of fuel, at 40 tons this would have been easier to keep running, find bridges for etc.I have seen a history of the battle of Kursk that states that the German army high command recommended immediately cancelling production of all armoured vehicles except the Tiger and the Panther to standardise production. This was described as "...the council of desperation, since it would have cut production temporarily to 1200 tanks..." What you are showing looks like a Panzer IV derivative, presumably to minimise loss of production and re-training when converting over.
Whether being able to keep the panzer forces up to strength would have made enough of a difference to get Stalin to drop out of the war is another question.
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Upgrades
Why is this vehicle 'easier to build and upgrade' It has several obvious flaws from those points of view to start with
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The VK3001(H) was the basis of development of the VK4501(H) that led to the Tiger. The growth potencial was obviously there. Compared to the PzIV it was designed to be both heavier and wider. The two things that invariably mess up things in a upgrade are excessive weight and lack of width for enlarging the turret ring.
The Germans built roughly 2500 PzIII and 1000 PzIV in 42 while trying to create a new generation, having canceled the 3001 program. In 43 they built roughly 3000 PzIV, 1800 Panthers and 650 Tigers (wiki numbers, Jane's AFV of WW2 has the full numbers). A transition to a full speed VK3001 program could have seen the new 35t tanks replace the 22/24t PzIV and III during 1942. Let's say you would get 2000 III, 500 IV and 1000 VK3001 in 42 (that gives you a bit more heavy guns/armour). But in 1942, on a one Panther or Tiger = two VK3001 they could have built close to 8000 medium tanks with the beneficts of having everything (tanks/tankhunters/SPG) on the same chassis. Plus the chassis could have suited some awesome aplications, as demonstrated by the OTL convertion of two prototypes into heavy tank killers with 128mm Guns..
I don't see where the idea that one Panther or Tiger would give you two Vk3001. If you are basing it on equivalent weights I believe that is inaccurate. The biggest limitation is the amount of machine work and mechanical systems which would be needed on a 'one set per vehicle' One way to stretch resources would be to produce more 'Assault gun' type armored vehicles rather than traditional tanks which require much more complex systems for a rotating turret and all that complexity.
When I led tours at the U.S. Army Ordnance Museum at Aberdeen I liked showing groups our two Panthers that were side by side One an early Ausf D and the other a late production Ausf G. The D has a vison port cut into the Glacias for the driver, The G has a periscope in the top deck for the same purpose. The D has side plates that are assembled from at least two plates (there is a 'crease') while the G has a single plate that did not require separate pieces to be welded together. This all reduces the manpower required to assemble the vehicle. The Panther turret is a much simpler assembly than the VK3001 or the Pz IV (and the Schmalltum of the Panther II was even simpler). From looking at your pictures (which are great) I see at least 8 plates of armor that need to be assembled (some with complex angles). And there are side doors requiring plates, cuts, hinges (besides the fact they weaken the plate) This all increases the complexity of assembly which reduces the number of vehicles that can be built for a given industrial investment
From talking to staff at the Patton Museum the tolerances in the Maybach engines are so tight and the fuel systems so complex that one mechanic said a Indy race car wasn't any more difficult to work on. The interleaved roadwheels are a field maintenance nightmare. If there is a problem with an interier roadwheel you need to remove up to 5 other wheels to get to it. On a T34, an M60 or Leopard you only need to remove one wheel. This doesn't even figure in that the interleaved roadwheels gum up with mud, etc much easier and can cause track problems.
The Germans needed to understand that perfection was the enemy of 'good enough' and that any tank had a very short operational life (usually measured in weeks of operations) At the same time that life could be extended if 'maintainability' was built into the tank. A Sherman could have the entire final drive removed from the from=nt of the vehicle and replaced. In the Tiger and the Panther the drivers compartment had to just about dismantled to work on the transmission/Final drive and for some jobs the turret had to be removed to get large components in and out!
When I led tours at the U.S. Army Ordnance Museum at Aberdeen I liked showing groups our two Panthers that were side by side One an early Ausf D and the other a late production Ausf G. The D has a vison port cut into the Glacias for the driver, The G has a periscope in the top deck for the same purpose. The D has side plates that are assembled from at least two plates (there is a 'crease') while the G has a single plate that did not require separate pieces to be welded together. This all reduces the manpower required to assemble the vehicle. The Panther turret is a much simpler assembly than the VK3001 or the Pz IV (and the Schmalltum of the Panther II was even simpler). From looking at your pictures (which are great) I see at least 8 plates of armor that need to be assembled (some with complex angles). And there are side doors requiring plates, cuts, hinges (besides the fact they weaken the plate) This all increases the complexity of assembly which reduces the number of vehicles that can be built for a given industrial investment
From talking to staff at the Patton Museum the tolerances in the Maybach engines are so tight and the fuel systems so complex that one mechanic said a Indy race car wasn't any more difficult to work on. The interleaved roadwheels are a field maintenance nightmare. If there is a problem with an interier roadwheel you need to remove up to 5 other wheels to get to it. On a T34, an M60 or Leopard you only need to remove one wheel. This doesn't even figure in that the interleaved roadwheels gum up with mud, etc much easier and can cause track problems.
The Germans needed to understand that perfection was the enemy of 'good enough' and that any tank had a very short operational life (usually measured in weeks of operations) At the same time that life could be extended if 'maintainability' was built into the tank. A Sherman could have the entire final drive removed from the from=nt of the vehicle and replaced. In the Tiger and the Panther the drivers compartment had to just about dismantled to work on the transmission/Final drive and for some jobs the turret had to be removed to get large components in and out!
Timing is everything
By 1944 germany was producing 8000 tanks/assault guns per year. That was too late. Germany industry should have geared up for maximum production in 1941, but didn't. The decision to stick with the PzIII as the main production tank for 1942 meant that in the late 42 battles in russia the Germans lacked both quantity and quality (in the sense that the Pz III, despite being well built, lacked firepower and protection) There was no way that the Panther was going to built in large number and perform reliably by 1943. What was needed was a tank that could outperform the T34 and be built in large numbers in time for the late 42/early 43 battles. There are two way too do this. One is to stick with the planned VK3001(H) design and go for a fast service introduction and a quick change of production. This will allow a large number of 30/35t tanks that can be upgraded as needed, since they are big enough for that. The other would be to go for a simpler Panther, namely the VK3002(DB) that had the looks of the T34, but a 3 man turret, german enginering and optics, etc. The Panther was a fine tank for 1944, when the war was lost.
The VK3001 with the L48 gun was a bit like a german Comet, minus the powerfull engine. The arguments for the VK3001(H) follows a similar line to the "more Ausf G PzIV earlier" reasoning. In time DB could have produced a diesel engine that would fit it and work reliably, and a simplified turret design (with the L70) could have been worked in. The bottom line is that germany need to have produced (and delivered to the front) twice the number of tanks (with better fighting qualities than the PzIII/PzIV) they did in the September 1942/Jully1943 period to have a fighting chance...
By 1944 germany was producing 8000 tanks/assault guns per year. That was too late. Germany industry should have geared up for maximum production in 1941, but didn't. The decision to stick with the PzIII as the main production tank for 1942 meant that in the late 42 battles in russia the Germans lacked both quantity and quality (in the sense that the Pz III, despite being well built, lacked firepower and protection) There was no way that the Panther was going to built in large number and perform reliably by 1943. What was needed was a tank that could outperform the T34 and be built in large numbers in time for the late 42/early 43 battles. There are two way too do this. One is to stick with the planned VK3001(H) design and go for a fast service introduction and a quick change of production. This will allow a large number of 30/35t tanks that can be upgraded as needed, since they are big enough for that. The other would be to go for a simpler Panther, namely the VK3002(DB) that had the looks of the T34, but a 3 man turret, german enginering and optics, etc. The Panther was a fine tank for 1944, when the war was lost.
The VK3001 with the L48 gun was a bit like a german Comet, minus the powerfull engine. The arguments for the VK3001(H) follows a similar line to the "more Ausf G PzIV earlier" reasoning. In time DB could have produced a diesel engine that would fit it and work reliably, and a simplified turret design (with the L70) could have been worked in. The bottom line is that germany need to have produced (and delivered to the front) twice the number of tanks (with better fighting qualities than the PzIII/PzIV) they did in the September 1942/Jully1943 period to have a fighting chance...
The decision to keep the Pz III's chassis as the main production piece wasn't taken thinking about Pz IIIs. It was taken thinking about assault guns.
If you are looking at the 1944 figures, representing the German production's peak, you'll find some 3,900 StuG IIIs and some 900 StuH42s.
Closing those production lines down in 1941 won't give you these quite useful 4,800 vehicles produced in 1944 alone, and I doubt it will give you anything like this figure of any other type of armored vehicle for that same year.
Did the Germans actually think of designing another tank with no sloped armor after encountering the T-34?
Stug
1. The PzIII in 1942 was the "main tank program" The lines were building tanks for most of the year.
2. The Stugs were there to compensate for the lack of tanks. Given the possibility of having enough tanks the need for stugs would be reduced to the infantary support role.
3. Nobody shuts down production lines in wartime. They switch production to more advanced types. The line building PzIII and for would phase out those models to build something a bit better. They didn't because the Panther was to heavy and expensive to replace all existing tanks.
1. The PzIII in 1942 was the "main tank program" The lines were building tanks for most of the year.
2. The Stugs were there to compensate for the lack of tanks. Given the possibility of having enough tanks the need for stugs would be reduced to the infantary support role.
3. Nobody shuts down production lines in wartime. They switch production to more advanced types. The line building PzIII and for would phase out those models to build something a bit better. They didn't because the Panther was to heavy and expensive to replace all existing tanks.
Dates
Of course not. The VK3001 was a much earlier program that was canceled in late 41 to start again with a "clean sheet of paper design" The point here is wether there was enought time in late 41 to start again, or if they should have taken an existing design, improve it and mass produce it.
Germany basically lost one production year. Te couldn't afford it.
Of course not. The VK3001 was a much earlier program that was canceled in late 41 to start again with a "clean sheet of paper design" The point here is wether there was enought time in late 41 to start again, or if they should have taken an existing design, improve it and mass produce it.
Germany basically lost one production year. Te couldn't afford it.
I believe you are missing the point as to why the Germans could not produce enough tanks to satisfy their demand.
The Germans (like the British) sa the tank as a piece of heavy equipment that had to be produced by the traditional Heavy Equipment manufacturers. These were Railway equipment factories, ordinance works, etc. The Americans and the Soviets saw tank production as the manufacture of a consumer product, yes a large consumer product but one to be turned out in truely massive quantity.
The Americans actually had the easier task since they had an automotive industry that had developed the process of mass producing a complex assembly of parts into a finished product. The Soviets actually used the need to relocate factories away from the border regions to build entire factory complexes to produce a single product from start to finish
This mass production requires a great deal of work to be done before teh first article is turned out. This means that your idea of 'fast service introduction' and 'quick change over' works against the idea of establishing a true volume production environment. fast service introduction means that there will be changes that are discovered after the production is started that should be incorporated. this results in production items that are similar but subtley different from each other coming off the line. This usually also means production is slowed when new components are introduced. This incremental improvement is one of the advantages of the traditional heavy industry approach to production where a common set of tools is used to produce similar but unique products (Like locomotives)
A true mass production environment also make 'quick changeover' difficult mass production requires that assmbly lines be layed out with special assembly jigs, parts delivery racks, permanently installed welding equipment, chain hoists, etc that alolow a worker to make consistent repetitive steps as part of the assembly process. This requires that the facility be designed for ease of work flow, steady supply of needed components etc. Once that process flow is laid out and tested production starts at low speed. As workers develop skill at doing their task and kinks are worked out production is speeded up. If you want to keep a continious flow of product to the end user you don't want to break that flow once it is started. If a new product needs to be built (even if it is a replacement for the original) a second line is often set up so that it can be brought up to speed before the old line is shutdown. As the new line is brought up to speed the old line is producing product to keep existing customers satisfied (replacement tanks for existing units in this case) eventually once the second source isfully operational and enough backlog is produced by the first line to satsify customer needs until the origimal product is taken out of service the first assmbly line is converted to produce a new product (probably an improved version of the product on the second line or a replacement)
The U.S. was very lucky in that they had an multiple industries that truelly understood these concepts. In the Soviet Union the process was slightly different in that there was not a large underutilized industrial base that was converted to war production but a need to build from scratch and a powerful central authority that refused to accept excuses for not accomplishing those goals but even that central authority had been developed over the years prior to the war so that when the need arose everyone understood what the groundrules were.
Only after Speer began the rationalization of german industry did they begin to understand these concepts. If Speer had been able to implement his production changes in 1938 or 39 they would have been able to at least be competitive in the production war. When you are talking about producing design B instead of design D you are just rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic
The Germans (like the British) sa the tank as a piece of heavy equipment that had to be produced by the traditional Heavy Equipment manufacturers. These were Railway equipment factories, ordinance works, etc. The Americans and the Soviets saw tank production as the manufacture of a consumer product, yes a large consumer product but one to be turned out in truely massive quantity.
The Americans actually had the easier task since they had an automotive industry that had developed the process of mass producing a complex assembly of parts into a finished product. The Soviets actually used the need to relocate factories away from the border regions to build entire factory complexes to produce a single product from start to finish
This mass production requires a great deal of work to be done before teh first article is turned out. This means that your idea of 'fast service introduction' and 'quick change over' works against the idea of establishing a true volume production environment. fast service introduction means that there will be changes that are discovered after the production is started that should be incorporated. this results in production items that are similar but subtley different from each other coming off the line. This usually also means production is slowed when new components are introduced. This incremental improvement is one of the advantages of the traditional heavy industry approach to production where a common set of tools is used to produce similar but unique products (Like locomotives)
A true mass production environment also make 'quick changeover' difficult mass production requires that assmbly lines be layed out with special assembly jigs, parts delivery racks, permanently installed welding equipment, chain hoists, etc that alolow a worker to make consistent repetitive steps as part of the assembly process. This requires that the facility be designed for ease of work flow, steady supply of needed components etc. Once that process flow is laid out and tested production starts at low speed. As workers develop skill at doing their task and kinks are worked out production is speeded up. If you want to keep a continious flow of product to the end user you don't want to break that flow once it is started. If a new product needs to be built (even if it is a replacement for the original) a second line is often set up so that it can be brought up to speed before the old line is shutdown. As the new line is brought up to speed the old line is producing product to keep existing customers satisfied (replacement tanks for existing units in this case) eventually once the second source isfully operational and enough backlog is produced by the first line to satsify customer needs until the origimal product is taken out of service the first assmbly line is converted to produce a new product (probably an improved version of the product on the second line or a replacement)
The U.S. was very lucky in that they had an multiple industries that truelly understood these concepts. In the Soviet Union the process was slightly different in that there was not a large underutilized industrial base that was converted to war production but a need to build from scratch and a powerful central authority that refused to accept excuses for not accomplishing those goals but even that central authority had been developed over the years prior to the war so that when the need arose everyone understood what the groundrules were.
Only after Speer began the rationalization of german industry did they begin to understand these concepts. If Speer had been able to implement his production changes in 1938 or 39 they would have been able to at least be competitive in the production war. When you are talking about producing design B instead of design D you are just rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic
production
The US did use the auto industry as a role model for it's huge tank arsenal in Detroit, and for the grand Blanc tank factory. When the Russians reorganized industry in the late 20s they used Ford as a model, so their tank factories followed the same model with similar results. But The germans could mas produce, and did so in the desperate circunstances of 1944, going from prototype to mass produced Heinkel He162 in months. It was, of course, too late. There is howeverample evidence that German industry was not fully mobilized for war production until 1943, and tank production in 1941 and 1942 was low, because of two factors. One, the estimates of how many tanks would be needed were too low and priority was set according to the wrong factors. second, the germans should have started to plan for the replacement of the PzIII and PzIV earlier, and on an acelerated time frame. Until mid 41 they expected to win the war with the III as a battle tank and the IV as an infantry support tank, and to need about 3000 tanks per year max. There was no serious work on a next generation battle tank (remember that the US was working round the clock to perfect the Sherman at this point) The VK3001 had been designed as a next generation IV, and would be a good basis for a heavier battle tank. Since it was allredy planned to replace the IV with it, the transiotion would be easier. Basically, for early 1943, you can either have a mix of III, iV and stug, or a battle line of new 35t tanks with ticker armour and a better gun. Other options mean you have to stick with the III and the IVF2 for the 42/43 battles.
The US did use the auto industry as a role model for it's huge tank arsenal in Detroit, and for the grand Blanc tank factory. When the Russians reorganized industry in the late 20s they used Ford as a model, so their tank factories followed the same model with similar results. But The germans could mas produce, and did so in the desperate circunstances of 1944, going from prototype to mass produced Heinkel He162 in months. It was, of course, too late. There is howeverample evidence that German industry was not fully mobilized for war production until 1943, and tank production in 1941 and 1942 was low, because of two factors. One, the estimates of how many tanks would be needed were too low and priority was set according to the wrong factors. second, the germans should have started to plan for the replacement of the PzIII and PzIV earlier, and on an acelerated time frame. Until mid 41 they expected to win the war with the III as a battle tank and the IV as an infantry support tank, and to need about 3000 tanks per year max. There was no serious work on a next generation battle tank (remember that the US was working round the clock to perfect the Sherman at this point) The VK3001 had been designed as a next generation IV, and would be a good basis for a heavier battle tank. Since it was allredy planned to replace the IV with it, the transiotion would be easier. Basically, for early 1943, you can either have a mix of III, iV and stug, or a battle line of new 35t tanks with ticker armour and a better gun. Other options mean you have to stick with the III and the IVF2 for the 42/43 battles.
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Yes. At the time, they were unable to churn out in similar numbers anything better. But keeping the production lines running meant that they could then build specialized vehicles, and in particular StuGs, on those lines, later.
Sure! Only, you seem to believe that the "possibility" depends solely on design. It doesn't. Things like raw materials, production lines, man-hours and money also count.
For instance, StuGs were simpler, faster and cheaper to build and maintain than turreted tanks. So the "compensation" includes all sort of economies.
Yes, StuGs and specialized vehicles on the same chassis. Of course you can also retool the lines to produce vehicles on an entirely new chassis, which, even if it's not a Panther, will be larger and heavier, thus requiring a retooling of the lines, as mentioned.
In short, if you stop producing Pz IIIs and vehicles based on that chassis, you won't have the historical German production; but you won't have, either, any other AFV in the same numbers for the same time frame.
On top of that, deciding that you want a "better tank" instead of a StuG III is easy; you'll just have to throw more raw materials and more man-hours at it. Thus, even when you have the lines up and running, for the same amount of resources that you input you'll get a smaller number of "better tanks" instead of those StuG IIIs.
This will happen regardless of the production choice:
a) you can continue producing the Pz IIIs and their chassis on the existing production lines and at the same time build new production lines for the "better tank". This will give pz IIIs and StuGs as stopgaps in the meantime, but you'll also have you a long lead time as you set up the new production lines. Once you field the "better tank", you'll have less of those than of the IIIs and StuGs.
b) you can stop producing the IIIs and retool their lines. That still gives you a lead time while you retool, albeit shorter - but you also have no stopgap. Again, you'll be able to field less "better tanks" than the number of IIIs and StuGs you could have fielded.
c) you can do as per a) above, but once you have the "better tank" going, you also keep producing the StuGs. You still get the long lead time, and in the end, since you only have so much raw materials to go round, you still end with less vehicles, because the "better tank" still uses more of them.
Stugs
Many people have tried to bring back the stug concept after WW2. The best of the breed was probably the swedish S tank. They all failed at the end. The stugs were useful when used as assault artillery. Not when used as tank replacements. Read the memoirs of german tank unit commanders if you don't believe me. You make it sound as if the PzIII production line was just a single factory with one line. It was a multiple production lines effort that could be progressively turned into other products without loss of production. The British did a model change every year, and the factories would switch from crusader to Cromwell to comet to centurion without much pause. US factories went from M3 to M4 smoothly. The Tiger went from concept to the front in about one year.
The move from Pz IV to the VK3001 was planned. What they had to do was to improve the design, and build it instead of tha ausf F, with the L48 from the start. Hen they could work on replacing the III on the lines, either with more of this or with the DB VK3002 .
Many people have tried to bring back the stug concept after WW2. The best of the breed was probably the swedish S tank. They all failed at the end. The stugs were useful when used as assault artillery. Not when used as tank replacements. Read the memoirs of german tank unit commanders if you don't believe me. You make it sound as if the PzIII production line was just a single factory with one line. It was a multiple production lines effort that could be progressively turned into other products without loss of production. The British did a model change every year, and the factories would switch from crusader to Cromwell to comet to centurion without much pause. US factories went from M3 to M4 smoothly. The Tiger went from concept to the front in about one year.
The move from Pz IV to the VK3001 was planned. What they had to do was to improve the design, and build it instead of tha ausf F, with the L48 from the start. Hen they could work on replacing the III on the lines, either with more of this or with the DB VK3002 .
Production lines
This is interesting. All Stug III were built on the Alkett and MIAG lines. The PzIII were built by Henschel, Wegmann, Alkett, MNH, MAN MIAG and DB lines. So you have seven major companies building Pz III, only two of which switched to Stugs (Alkett was the major stug producer from the start). The others went to panthers or Tigers. The PzIV was a Krupp, vomag NBW product all the way.
So the timming would be. Henschel sticks with the 3001, designed from the start to take a 105mmL28 gun (OTL) and ready in March 41 (OTL) the POD is they don't start again with the 3601 only to start again with the 4501. The tank is coming off the Henschel line from May 41, is used in Barbarossa, the other factories follow and, you get the picture....
This is interesting. All Stug III were built on the Alkett and MIAG lines. The PzIII were built by Henschel, Wegmann, Alkett, MNH, MAN MIAG and DB lines. So you have seven major companies building Pz III, only two of which switched to Stugs (Alkett was the major stug producer from the start). The others went to panthers or Tigers. The PzIV was a Krupp, vomag NBW product all the way.
So the timming would be. Henschel sticks with the 3001, designed from the start to take a 105mmL28 gun (OTL) and ready in March 41 (OTL) the POD is they don't start again with the 3601 only to start again with the 4501. The tank is coming off the Henschel line from May 41, is used in Barbarossa, the other factories follow and, you get the picture....
There was loss of production but it was decided that it was more important to accept diminished production of one model to gain greater production of an improved model after the plant was retooled. This was true with all production systems. The trick is deciding when to make the break
Well I think they did it more often than that! They went from the A13 to the Covenantor to the Crusader to the Cavalier to the Centaur to the Cromwell to the Challanger to the Comet while another line went from the Matilda to the Valentine and Churchill to the Valiant and Black Prince until all lines merged with the Centurion
The move from the M3 to the M4 was planned from the beginning. The M3 was an interim type that was created to allow a 75mm gun to be fielded before there was sufficent machining cpability to create large numbers of large turret ring assemblies. As machine tool capacity increased assembly plants were converted from M3 to M4s. Much of the running gear stayed the same only upper hull fighting and driving compartments changed. I have seen at least one assmbly line picture where there are M3s in the forground and if you look very closely you can see M4s coming down the line in the back of the photo. The M4 is pretty much the poster child for flexible mass production. At least 5 different power plants, 5 different turrets, two different suspensions, 3 different hulls 4 different main guns and this is just in planned new production all while maintaining higher production rates than any other tank except one!
And the U.S. built a few non finishers also. There was the M6 Heavy which would have been considered a production tank in almost any other army but failed the U.S. Army reliability test ( I don't think any other army's tanks would have passed the U.S. Army tests. The Pz III and the Pz IV might have but I doubt it) But the U.S knowing all tanks would have to be shipped overseas also decided shipping capacity was too valuable to waste on a 63 ton tank. So heavy tanks were only continued as research projects. then there was the M7 which started life as a replacement for the M3/M5 light tank but gained weight until it was considered a a medium. There was the T14 Assault tank (features tested there were incorporated into the M4A3E2) and finally the T20, T22, T23, T25 and T26 medium tanks which ended up as the Heavy tank T26E1 and M26 Pershing. It was just that none of these until the pershing showed enough improvement to the end users (Army Ground Forces) that it was felt it was worth breaking the production flow. Some features such as the turret of the T23 with the 76mm gun and the HVSS suspension developed initially on the T20 were incorporated into M4 production with minimal disruptions to production.
I'm note sure that was an unqualified success. there were many teething problemsin both the Panther and the Tiger that were only discovered in the field
But I'm not sure you gain much by replacing the Ausf F with a new design. Keep the Ausf F since it is in production and produce teh Panther in place of the Pz III once that change is fully complete convert the Pz IV lines to the Panther II or a new design that resolves some of the Panthers problems (non maintainable final drive, interleaved suspension, tempramental engine)
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I never even went into the issue of battlefield effectiveness. We were discussing production practices and problems.
That said, yes, a casemated AFV isn't as flexible as a turreted one; but on the up side, it's cheaper and faster to build and maintain. And the StuG IIIG, for all its shortcomings, still carried around as much front armor and hitting power as a PzIVH.
as in when I always write "lines"?
So you are going to option b), above, only gradually. You will gradually end up with better AFVs - but also with less of them.
Don't compare apples with oranges.
a) the Centurion was produced since nov 1945, in four separate factories. To make the Centurion relevant to the issue, you'd need to demonstrate that those factories all kept producing other tank models until oct 1945. Can you?
b) the M3 and the M4 just happen to have nearly exactly the same lenght, width and weight. You don't think that that does have something to do with using the same production lines for both models with a minimum of fuss?
c) the Tiger I's concept was born in 1937, actually. Yes, the time from the final specs to the first line produced tanks is some 15 months, just that those first tanks were actually little more than prototypes, given the amount of retrofitting that they needed. Even so, to make the Tiger I relevant you'd need to demonstrate that in the two workshops of the one factory where they were produced, Henschel was producing other tank models up to July 1942. Can you?
You seem to be unaware that the one Henschel plant that was producing Pz IIIs and other AFVs both prewar and in the first part of the war is the same that later also produced the Tiger I - but, as long as something can remain the same after getting nearly twice as large.
So, again: can you demonstrate that the two workshops that turned out Tiger Is at Kassel (and which were the only source of finished Tiger Is) had been used to produce Pz IIIs, before?