Germany and Rashid Ali Act More Decisively, April-May 1941

In *Britain's Informal Empire in the Middle East: A Case Study of Iraq 1929-1941*, pp. 133-134, Daniel Silverfarb suggests that the failure of Germany and Rashid Ali to act more quickly and decisively following the April 1941 coup had momentous consequences:

"To a considerable extent Britain's rapid and complete victory in the campaign was due to Germany's failure to act quicker and in greater strength. For example, the first German aircraft did not enter combat until 13 May, eleven days after the beginning of hostilities. By this time the British had already broken the siege of Habbaniya and taken the offensive against the Iraqis. An earlier commitment of German aircraft, especially if accompanied by a small number of highly trained ground troops to stiffen the Iraqi resistance, might have made a substantial difference in the campaign. It might even have affected the course of the war as a whole, especially if Germany had utilized the airfields in the vicinity of Baghdad to stage bombing raids against the large oil refinery at Abadan in southwestern Iran, the products of which were absolutely vital for the conduct of British military operations in North Africa, the Middle East, and the eastern Mediterranean.

"Rashid Ali's failure to open hostilities with an all-out attack on Habbaniya was another major factor in Britain's success. Clearly, Iraq's ability to overrun the base, or at least prevent flight operations, would have been greatly enhanced if he had struck first. Doubtless the Iraqis would have suffered heavy casualties in the endeavor but, given their considerable superiority in numbers of men and artillery pieces, with perseverance they probably would have succeeded. Their prospects would have been particularly good if they had attacked at night when the British aircraft could not bomb or strafe with precision and, without the use of a flare path which would have assisted the Iraqi gunners, could only take off and land with great difficulty and danger. Rashid Ali's hesitation at this decisive moment enabled Britain at the outset to gain control of the air over the battlefield and to maintain it for the duration of the campaign. The British commanders at Habbaniya exploited this advantage to the fullest by bringing up reinforcements and supplies by air from Shaiba, preventing the Iraqi commanders at Habbaniya from bringing up reinforcements and supplies by road from Baghdad, and depositing troops behind Iraqi lines by landing transport aircraft on the desert floor. Most important, however, the British commanders used their air superiority to give close air support to their troops in combat. These British air attacks had a devastating effect on the morale of the Iraqi troops. Thus Britain's control of the air, which contributed mightily to its success in the campaign, and which was absolutely dependent upon the use of the airbase at Habbaniya, flowed directly from Iraq's reluctance to cross the threshold from a diplomatic challenge and a military maneuver into open warfare.

"The Iraqis made other important mistakes too. For example, although Anglo-Iraqi relations were extremely tense for a month preceding the actual outbreak of hostilities, they did not stockpile aviation fuel, lubricants and bombs at Mosul, their main airbase in the north and later the center of the German air operations. Consequently, the Germans had to bring most of their supplies by transport aircraft from Rhodes. This airlift was only partly successful because the distances involved were great, and because the German government did not give it sufficient priority. As a result, the German commanders in Iraq were unable to make maximum use of their aircraft because of a severe shortage of fuel and stores.

"Nor did the Iraqis install demolition charges on the vitally located bridge over the Euphrates at Falluja on the road between Habbaniya and Baghdad. As a result of this error, the British were able to capture the bridge intact. Since the river at this point was 300 yards wide, the capture of the bridge greatly facilitated the advance of their troops toward Baghdad..." https://books.google.com/books?id=WsgtN4uJsL8C&pg=PA133

So suppose Rashid Ali and the Germans had done everything Silverfarb suggests. Effects?
 

Deleted member 1487

The biggest problem is that the Germans couldn't act, because they were busy prepping for Barbarossa, fighting in the Balkans, and running the invasion of Crete, while really not having good ways to get supplies into the area. Then the Iraqi Revolters were not coordinating with the Germans. Clearly there were HUGE benefits if they coordinated and launched the revolt when the Germans/Axis/Vichy French were ready to support it. I'd say wait until after Crete is in German hands firmly and they had the ability to move, but the issue is the loss of Ju52s in Crete and then the demands of Barbarossa. This would probably require a no-Barbarossa scenario and more of a German effort to cultivate Arab resistance movements are part of a 1941 Mediterranean strategy to work.
 
This is probably one of my favorite POD's for ww2. Even did a mini-TL where I tried to put the Germans in a perfect position to take advantage of the Iraqi willingness to switch sides.

I would agree with wiking that this does indeed require some variant of Raeder's Mediterranean strategy in order to work. Also imperative would be a conquest of Cyprus via paratroopers being flown in from Rhodes, and a firm commitment by Vichy Syria to support the axis cause, because without these two, any expedition in Iraq is bound to be a failure.

Stuff that would also help greatly would be a bigger British sealion scare, a much reduced loss of Ju-52s over Holland and an overall better axis position in the Med, with stuff like an early deployment of a mini-DAK too prevent the Italian disaster in Egypt, Spanish entry to seal off Gibraltar and no invasion of Greece that literally helped with nothing.

If the Germans, having done all that, manage to scare the Turks into permitting rail transit of supplies and weapons (men can be flown in over Cyprus to alleviate concerns of a possible backdoor invasion), then the British will be in real trouble in the area.

Of course, since this means no Barbarossa in '41, its completely dependent on Germany achieving some sort of political solution for the whole thing to be anything more than a ticking time bomb.
 
BTW, Silverfarb also discusses in some detail the specifically *Iraqi* reasons for Rashid Ali's failure:

p. 134: "Internal political and social considerations also explain Iraq's abrupt and overwhelming defeat in the fighting in May 1941. In this connection it is important to emphasize that the movement that Rashid Ali headed was not in favor of fundamental changes in the economy, society, or political structure of Iraq. On the contrary, Rashid Ali and the leading ministers in his government in April—May 1941 had all served extended periods in important cabinet positions and were an integral part-—the more nationalistic, anti-British, and pan-Arab part--of the small body of Sunni Arabs who had ruled Iraq since the creation of a quasi-independent government in Baghdad in 1920. For example, Rashid Ali first held ministerial office in 1924 and served as prime minister in 1933 and again in 1940. Naji Suwaydi, his finance minister, first held ministerial office in 1921 and served as prime minister in 1929-30. And Naji Shawkat, his defense minister, first held ministerial office in 1928 and served as prime minister in 1932-33...

p. 136: "...the split in 1941 between the group led by Rashid Ali and the golden square and that led by Nuri al-Said and the regent was essentially a dispute within iraq's governing class [caused in part by different perceptions of who would win the war and in part by personal animosities]...The fact that in composition, internal policy, and dependence on military support Rashid Ali's government did not differ materially from previous administrations in Iraq reduced its ability to mobilize large-scale popular support for the war effort. Since 1920 Iraq's ruling class had never made serious efforts to redistribute the wealth or land of the country in favor of the bulk of the population who lived in poverty. To a considerable extent this failure was due to the fact that through rampant corruption and gross misuse of public revenue most of the leading politicians had become quite wealthy and were disinclined to take measures that would injure themselves financially. Now, in 1941, their history of rapacity and indifference to the problems of the poor made them ill suited for the role of leaders of a truly national resistance..."

pp. 137-8: having previously noted that only only one member of Rashid Ali's cabinet was a Shiite, Silverfarb also notes his failure to win the support of Kurds and other minorities, and adds

"In this context it is worth recalling that Rashid Ali was prime minister in 1933 at the time of the Assyrian massacres. Undoubtedly, the memory of his role in these tragic events did nothing to encourage the Assyrians who were serving in the levies, and who composed the largest element in that organization, to waver in their loyalty to Britain. Since the levies played a vital role in the defense of Habbaniya and the subsequent battles against the Iraqi army, this point is of some significance...

"Iraq was also handicapped in the fighting because, with the exception of Yunis al-Sabawi, Rashid Ali and his leading associates were not very inspiring or resolute leaders. For example, during the conflict none of them ventured near the front. Nor did they make any serious effort to defend Baghdad or retreat to Mosul to carry on the struggle from the north. And at the first sign of real danger all of them fled to the safety of foreign lands. For all these reasons, in May 1941 most Iraqis outside of the army, while not welcoming a British invasion, were unwilling to risk their lives to defend Rashid Ali's government. Even in the army there were widespread desertions, while some 200 of those taken prisoner near Habbaniya readily switched to the side of the regent."

p. 139: "The Iraqi government's hasty capitulation, coupled with all its other mistakes and deficiencies already discussed, suggests that, whatever the shortcomings of their armaments (about which there is room for dispute), Rashid Ali and his military supporters lacked the boldness, determination, and competence to wage an all-out struggle against Britain with a reasonable chance of success. from their perspective, to challenge Britian militarily at the most conveneient opportunity for Iraq was morally and politically permissible, perhaps even incumbent. But their challenge was poorly prepared, halfheartefly executed, and quickly abandoned..."
 
would add that Germany was allied with Italy which overtly wanted to control whole Med and somewhat aligned with Turkey (or trying to align with Turkey), both of which are in complete opposition to Arab Nationalism -- they didn't want to switch from one colonial master to Italian one and if anything were even more opposed to return of "Ottomans."

without Italy they might have been able to sustain revolts across Arab populations.
 
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