Germany allowed fighters at Versailles

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BlondieBC

Banned
Being allowed a couple of squadrons (for arguments sake 36 active fighters) of fighters isn't going to create enough demand to get a domestic fighter engine production movement going anyway; Germany with such a small need will just buy their fighters from abroad


100 planes is rediculous; even my suggestion for 36 is probably too high; the entire british defense fighter force at some points after the war was only a single squadron of sopwith camels; and they are going to allow Germany 100 fighters?

Even if they were allowed to have them they would have been limited like every other military arm was. Having say a hundred planes will let you work on fighter design and keep a tiny cadre of experienced fliers that you can use to train an expanded air force. However all the planes and all the designs will still have to be built and created in the late thirties once Hitler begins rearmament. Having a small peace time force in place will not make for a significant difference. The Luftwaffe may have slightly better models and slightly better doctrine but will still be no match for the RAF unless someone other that Goering is in charge of it once Hitler comes to power.

Replacing Goering would make for a much larger change than simply having a few squadrons already in service.

With a hundred plane, they probably have 150 pilots, assuming single seat plane. The German will likely rotate people though active status and cheat, like the Army did, so 450 or more pilots is likely. These people will be the flag officers and squadron commanders in WW2. On the Doctrine, the Luftwaffe will have a complete, German Doctrine. It may be better or worse, but it will be fully evolved by the late 1930's. The Luftwaffe in this time line should be much more professional at the high levels. Not necessarily smarter, but more professional.

I was using you as the source. 2 squadrons of 36 planes each. Add some spare planes or trainers, and it is likely near 100 planes based on your assumptions. I was only review by how much the Germans would cheat by, which in my opinion could be in 4.5 to 1 ratio on pilots.

There is a LOTLOF quote in the chain, but you are the original source for the number.:confused:
 
I was using you as the source. 2 squadrons of 36 planes each. Add some spare planes or trainers, and it is likely near 100 planes based on your assumptions. I was only review by how much the Germans would cheat by, which in my opinion could be in 4.5 to 1 ratio on pilots.

There is a LOTLOF quote in the chain, but you are the original source for the number.:confused:

Oh... you misunderstood me

I meant 3 squadrons of 12 a piece plus a couple trainers not three squadrons of 36.... way too much
 

Deleted member 1487

Much of this thread is garbage level.
Thank you for your polite addition to this thread.

- The idea that they'd have standardized on heavy twin engine multi-role aircraft doesn't have even a semi-intelligent rationale attached. The Germans had an acute understanding of the needs of air to air combat from their experience in Spain. If anything more time would given them the opportunity to see that heavy twin engines could never be the answer. (Even light twins like the P38 suffer from high cost and hence the Lanchester Equation.)

The problem with this idea is that it wouldn't matter in the pre-1933 years because the Germans would be trying to maximize industrial involvement in military research and production. Twin engine fighters, while only practical for long range escort work, fighter bombers, and bomber destroyers, not to mention reconnaissance aircraft, would still maximize engine production in the interwar era, creating greater incentives for industry to invest in military grade engine production and research because its double the market for them. The goal wouldn't be to produce interceptors, because the Luftwaffe would be preparing industry for the day that full rearmament could start. It would need to maximize production experience and research into engines so that when bombers and interceptors can be constructed in tandem industry can have twice the initial capacity and more experience with twin engined aircraft.

Read up on the steps the Reichswehr took in the 1920's to try and clandestinely produce such a capacity. They failed because of serious allied enforcement of the Versailles treaty. Here they could have plausible excuses for all of the things they tried to get away with.
 
- The idea that they'd have standardized on heavy twin engine multi-role aircraft doesn't have even a semi-intelligent rationale attached. The Germans had an acute understanding of the needs of air to air combat from their experience in Spain.

Which, of course, is why Germany invested such effort in the development of the Bf-110 (and its sucessors) and considered zerstorer squadrons the elite of the Luftwaffe

Which, of course, is why the Germans entered WW2 with a fleet of poorly armed and armored twin-engined bombers like the He-111 and Do-17 they believed could outrun fighter opposition.

About the only thing that the Germans really got from Spain other than combat experience for some of its personnel is the knowledge that future single-engined fighters should be highly powered, sleek, low winged monoplanes - basically the same lessons that France, Britain and the USA were realizing at the same time. Everything else they got wrong.
 

amphibulous

Banned
Thank you for your polite addition to this thread.

De nada. Really: anyone who thinks that the Germans needed to learn to be as good at air-to-air combat as the RAF in 1940 should learn to do some research before posting. The rest of the world (except the Finns) had to catch up with the Germans.

Twin engine fighters, while only practical for long range escort work, fighter bombers, and bomber destroyers, not to mention reconnaissance aircraft, would still maximize engine production in the interwar era
There is no logic to this statement. Twin engine aircraft do use twice as many engines as singles per airframe - well done! But they also tend to cost twice as much, so you have half the number of aircraft. The results of this are tolerably obvious to anyone who can multiply.

Also: the driver for the type of aircraft you build should be your strategic need and doctrine. Otherwise you won't have the right type of aircraft to build the correct doctrine and you'll be crippled.

And, once again, "Lanchester's Equation". Google it.

It would need to maximize production experience and research into engines so that when bombers and interceptors can be constructed in tandem industry can have twice the initial capacity and more experience with twin engined aircraft.
People often confuse experience with learning - they're actually two different things. The problem the Germans had was that their system was still relatively craftsman based; it didn't take experience to see this - just a comparison with the US and UK. Building more aircraft wouldn't have helped change their minds about this - it was already obvious, and the reasons they didn't change it (which seemed good to them) wouldn't have changed.

Also, even forgetting your poor maths, there is no reason to believe that nuilding more twins would have maximized engine research. In fact, the higher cost per unit would have tended to reduce type numbers...
 
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There is no logic to this statement. Twin engine aircraft do use twice as many engines as singles per airframe - well done! But they also tend to cost twice as much, so you have half the number of aircraft. The results of this are tolerably obvious to anyone who can multiply.
Except this is talking about the interwar era, Germany would be limited by airframes as dictated by the treaty of Versailles, 36 is the assumption here, not money
 

amphibulous

Banned
Which, of course, is why the Germans entered WW2 with a fleet of poorly armed and armored twin-engined bombers like the He-111 and Do-17 they believed could outrun fighter opposition.

The German's did pretty well with these until they got to the UK. Designing an airforce to dominate UK airspace would have been pointless, as they couldn't build it.

About the only thing that the Germans really got from Spain other than combat experience for some of its personnel is the knowledge that future single-engined fighters should be highly powered, sleek, low winged monoplanes - basically the same lessons that France, Britain and the USA were realizing at the same time. Everything else they got wrong.

Other than the most important thing - their air to air combat doctrine. And the second most important, which was how to tactical ground attack.
 

amphibulous

Banned
For those strange people who think the RAF was better tactically than the Germans in 1940:

>>>>>>>>>>>>
http://battleofbritain.devhub.com/blog/681343-tactics-vic-vs-finger-four/


Flight tactics used by RAF Fighter Command proved themselves hopelessly inadequate; many a pilot paid for these shortcomings with his life. Senior RAF officers insisted upon obsolete movements and formations, including the standard pe-war "vic" formation. These may have been impressive during a peacetime air display but were not practical for combat. Luftwaffe pilots used a more mobile and flexible grouping, called the Schwarm.

Compared with the Schwarm, the tight "vic" or "vee" formation consisting of three fighters flying in close formation had several serious shortcomings. One of the most glaring disadvantages of this tight grouping was loss of manoeuverability.

In a turn, for instance, the two inside aircraft had to reduce speed, while the outside aircraft was forced to accelerate. If this throttling back and forth was not done properly, the tight formation would break. Which meant that a formation turn had to be done slowly and gently - not the best policy during an air battle over the Channel! Also, a sudden move might leave one (or more) pilots alone in a hostile skythe most dangerous possible situation for a fighter pilot.

Squadron formations consisted of four "vics" of three fighters each. To maintain this strict formation, pilots had to concentrate on watching each other instead of looking out for enemy fighters. Sometimes, an "assend Charlie" was stationed behind the rest of the squadron; his job was to weave back and forth and keep watch for approaching enemy fighters. But his position alone and behind everybody else in the formation was so vulnerable that he often did not live long enough to do his job. (As Red Tobin of 609 Squadron nearly found out.) As time went on and lessons were learned, "assend Charlie'' was discontinued.

Luftwaffe pilots used tactics better suited to air fighting, tactics that had been developed during the Spanish Civil War. The basic German formation was the Rotte, a two-fighter unit made up of a leader and his wingman. Two Rotten made up a Schwarm. The four fighters of the Schwarm flew a loose formation, and kept at different altitudes. This allowed each pilot to keep an eye out for the enemy, and allowed increased manoevrability without reducing speed.

RAF Fighter Command eventually adopted the Luftwaffe Schwarm, after individual squadrons had been using it unofficially that is, without permission throughout the Battle of Britain. The RAF called it "finger four" formation. (The U.S. Army Air Force also flew the "finger four" formation in its campaign against Germany.)
This new method of formation flying was considerably more successful than the old "vics." The change in tactics greatly improved the effectiveness of RAF fighter units and, in spite of initial opposition by senior RAF commanders, undoubtedly spared the lives of many fighter pilots.
<<<<<<<<<<<


The Germans had evolved their doctrine in extended combat over Spain. Doing so required a commitment to single engined air superiority aircraft. Anything else would have been an immediate disaster for them early in WW2.

So yes, anyone, who posts that the sausage-eaters"could" have caught up to the RAF is talking garbage!
 
As for the OP, Fokker stays in the US, and there is a big rivalry in the 1920s and 1930s between Fokker and Junkers to build airliners for Luftansa.
 

Deleted member 1487

There is no logic to this statement. Twin engine aircraft do use twice as many engines as singles per airframe - well done! But they also tend to cost twice as much, so you have half the number of aircraft. The results of this are tolerably obvious to anyone who can multiply.
They also have different roles. As was already stated, the cost isn't the issue in 1925, prior to rearmament, treaty-limited numbers of units are. It makes sense to build up an overcapacity in engine production to allow for further expansion in capacity when the Luftwaffe can rearm. Even the craftsman labor used needed to learn how to make military grade engines and still had problems with putting high hp engines into mass production as the war was starting OTL. Seriously read Edward Homze's "Arming the Luftwaffe".

Also: the driver for the type of aircraft you build should be your strategic need and doctrine. Otherwise you won't have the right type of aircraft to build the correct doctrine and you'll be crippled.
That's why the aircraft of the 1920's will be stand ins for twin engine bombers and other such aircraft, rather than interceptors. Gaining experience was a critical part of rearming the Luftwaffe after 1933, something the aircraft industry in Germany lacked and needed to relearn after Versailles.

And, once again, "Lanchester's Equation". Google it.
I am familiar with it. Again, overcapacity in construction. When rearmament starts Germany will have time to introduce new models of any kind they want. Its more critical to learn how to make military grade engines in as of large numbers as possible, so that when industry is given the green light to enter true mass production, it then has the experience to begin producing large numbers of high hp engines from the get-go.
Its like the idea behind the Reichswehr being an 'army of leaders' none were really intended to be just privates, but rather officers in the expanded army.

People often confuse experience with learning - they're actually two different things. The problem the Germans had was that their system was still relatively craftsman based; it didn't take experience to see this - just a comparison with the US and UK. Building more aircraft wouldn't have helped change their minds about this - it was already obvious, and the reasons they didn't change it (which seemed good to them) wouldn't have changed.
No, not up front, but it would educate their craftsmen in learning how to construct engines more efficiently early on. As it was Erhard Milch discovered in 1941 that the machining of a single DB601 engine was wasting 1,500 lbs of aluminum due to inefficient and poor machining methods. This by craftsmen.

Also, even forgetting your poor maths, there is no reason to believe that nuilding more twins would have maximized engine research. In fact, the higher cost per unit would have tended to reduce type numbers...
Standardization doesn't hurt. The issue is creating an over capacity in engine production and research.
 

amphibulous

Banned
They also have different roles. As was already stated, the cost isn't the issue in 1925, prior to rearmament, treaty-limited numbers of units are. It makes sense to build up an overcapacity in engine production to allow for further expansion in capacity when the Luftwaffe can rearm. Even the craftsman labor used needed to learn how to make military grade engines and still had problems with putting high hp engines into mass production as the war was starting OTL.

Once again:

- Building aircraft that don't allow you to test the combat doctrines that will determine your success or failure is "not an example of smartness"

- If the Germans want to produce more engines, they should leave the craftsman system behind

- If they want to practice engine making then they can build high performance airliner and air racers. Which is what they actually did. And as Cook pointed out, it worked well for them - in 1940 they were the clear engine leaders.

So if they had been allowed a small fighter force by Versailles, then things would hardly have changed at all.

**However** although I don't agree with you, I don't your argument is "garbage" - that's for the people who think that the Germans were tactical incompetents (when they were world leaders) and who think that a combined air superiority fighter/torpedo bomber was possible with 1940s technology!
 
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Deleted member 1487

Once again:

- Building aircraft that don't allow you to test the combat doctrines that will determine your success or failure is "not an example of smartness"
Just like OTL they will probably have multiple models to test things out. "Prototypes" of various (single engine) models for testing could be used to get around treaty restrictions. When rearmament is allowed then they can focus on producing real units, just like OTL, but they won't have missed out on over a decade of engine technology like OTL, which handicapped mass production of large numbers of aircraft of all types, including the strategic bomber.

- If the Germans want to produce more engines, they should leave the craftsman system behind
Agreed, but there was much room for efficiency to improve even in craftsman manufacturing.

- If they want to practice engine making then they can build high performance airliner and air racers. Which is what they actually did. And as Cook pointed out, it worked well for them - in 1940 they were the clear engine leaders.
That information is badly misleading. The DB601 was only entering mass production in 1940. It was technically ready in November 1937 for serial production, but the lines didn't really produce more than a few hundred units until 1940, while the British and Americans were producing +1000hp engines in the thousands in 1940. They weren't leading anyone and actually lost their parity by 1942-3.

The Jumo 211, the other 30 liter V12, was only able to match the DB601 in power output with a redesign in 1940, which meant it wasn't mass produced in until the following year.

**However** although I don't agree with you, I don't your argument is "garbage" - that's for the people who think that the Germans were tactical incompetents (when they were world leaders) and who think that a combined air superiority fighter/torpedo bomber was possible with 1940s technology!

Thanks for that.
 

amphibulous

Banned
The DB601 was only entering mass production in 1940. It was technically ready in November 1937 for serial production, but the lines didn't really produce more than a few hundred units until 1940, while the British and Americans were producing +1000hp engines in the thousands in 1940.

However, your belief that expanding the number of craftsmen was the key to expanding production does seem counter-historical. Peak German aircraft consumption came in '44 and was achieved through type reduction and the massive use of (not very skilled) slave labour.
 

Deleted member 1487

However, your belief that expanding the number of craftsmen was the key to expanding production does seem counter-historical. Peak German aircraft consumption came in '44 and was achieved through type reduction and the massive use of (not very skilled) slave labour.

I never said it was the key, nor did I advocate for the expansion of that system. What I said was that it was inefficient and even if that system were maintained it could have become much more efficient even without mass production techniques used later in the war or in the US.
Given the power of labor unions early in the Nazi years, its hard to imagine Germany being able to push to 1944 levels of low skilled production without causing a major strike, of which they had several when trying to regulate labor prewar.
 
850 Me-109s were produced in the first 8 months of 1939, all fitted with DB-601 engines. The Gemshagen plant produced 2249 engines in 1939. The machine tools chosen required skilled craftsmen, but had greater versatility than single-purpose tools.

Roy Fedden took a pre-war trip to Germany and discussed sleeve-valve engines. They were not interested, because the BMW 801 was showing such promise. The Germans mentioned jet engines under development, which Fedden mentioned to Air Ministry officials, who showed a lack of interest.

Werner Moelders taught fighter tactics learned in Spain. Sailor Malan didn't teach fighter tactics until mid-BoB.

Wolfram von Richthofen taught combined operations methods, learned in Spain. British adoption was in the Western Desert 1942, occasionally forgotten when egos clashed.

What did Britain, France, and the US learn in the 1920s that the Germans didn't adopt in the thirties?

The DB-601 had superior supercharging to the 1940 Merlin, Allison and Hispano-Suiza.

The DB-601 had fuel injection in 1939

The Hispano-Suiza (12Z) didn't get a 4-valve head until the Germans were in town. Likewise, the Gnome-Rhone radial 14R development.

If it wasn't for 100 octane gas, promoted by Roy Fedden, Allied engines would have fared worse.
 

Deleted member 1487

850 Me-109s were produced in the first 8 months of 1939, all fitted with DB-601 engines. The Gemshagen plant produced 2249 engines in 1939. The machine tools chosen required skilled craftsmen, but had greater versatility than single-purpose tools.

Were all of the engines DB601s? Also what about the engines used for the Bf110, He111, Do17, and Ju88 that all used the DB601, especially because the Jumo wasn't nearly was useful until its 1940 overhaul.
 

Cook

Banned
Which, of course, is why the Germans entered WW2 with a fleet of poorly armed and armored twin-engined bombers like the He-111 and Do-17 they believed could outrun fighter opposition.
The He-111 was another aircraft that first flew in 1935 and entered service shortly afterwards, it was never meant to ‘outrun fighter opposition’, although with a maximum speed of 440 km/hr it certainly could outrun the biplane fighters in service in many other European countries. Far from being poorly armed, it had 7 x 7.92mm machine guns for defensive armament.

By comparison the British Vickers Wellington, which first flew a year later and only entered operational service in 1938, had a maximum speed of 378 km/hr, significantly less than its German rival and had defensive armament consisting of 6 x .303 (7.69mm) Browning Machine guns. The He-111 also had a slightly larger bomb load.

It is also worth considering the primary ground attack or light bomber of each side at the start of the war, the German Stuka Ju-87 and the British Fairey Battle.

The Ju-97, with a crew of two, had a top speed of 390 km/hr, carried a bomb load of one 250 kg bomb and 4 x 50 kg bombs and was fitted with 2 x 7.92mm machine guns firing forward for straffing and 1 x 7.92mm gun rearward for defence.

The Fairey Battle, with a crew of 3, had a top speed of 413 km/hr and carried 4 x 110 kg bombs internally and 230 kg of bombs externally and was armed with 1 x 0.303 in. machine gun firing forward from the right wing and 1 x 0.303 in. machine gun firing rearward for defence. The significant difference between the two was in their accuracy; the dive bombing Ju-87 was far more accurate than the horizontally bombing Battle.

During the battles in northern France in May 1940, the RAF sent battles to attack the German crossings of the Meuse unescorted, from which almost none returned. They also sent them with fighter escorts; the Boulton Paul Defiant.

The Defiant’s top speed wasn’t much faster than the Battles they were escorting and a full 150 km/hr slower than the Bf-109 that they were meant to defend against; the German fighters could fly past them as though they were standing still. Not that a Defiant could have done much even if it could have caught a Messerchmitt, it didn’t have forward facing guns. The Defiant’s 4 x 0.303 in. machine guns were mounted in a turret behind the pilot. The Defiant first flew two years after the Hurricane, in 1937.

So, far from entering World War Two with bombers that were ‘poorly armed and armoured’, the Luftwaffe fielded a fleet of bombers that were faster and equal or better armed than the RAF's bombers and they had a lot more of them.
 
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Were all of the engines DB601s? Also what about the engines used for the Bf110, He111, Do17, and Ju88 that all used the DB601, especially because the Jumo wasn't nearly was useful until its 1940 overhaul.

I don't understand the question. The Heinkel used the Jumo 211, the Do-17Z used a Bramo 323, the Ju-88 used Jumo 211, followed by everything else. I missed out on the Jumo 1940 overhaul. How does any of this relate to Germany being allowed fighters at Versailles? In what way could Germany have done better by operating tube-and-rag biplane fighters in the 1920s?
 
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