Germany Accepts One of the Soviet Peace Deals - WWII

wormyguy

Banned
I've heard that Stalin offered three peace deals to the Germans - I'm not sure if it's true, but for the purposes of this thread, we'll assume it is.

The three deals offered (and ignored by the Germans in OTL) were:

1942, after the start of the German summer offensive: Brest-Litovsk borders.

1943, after the surrender at Stalingrad: 1939 borders.

1944, right before D-Day and Bagration: 1914 borders.

I also heard that the Germans seriously considered the 1943 and 1944 proposals, but decided they could stall for time and a better strategic position. After Bagration, the Soviets cut off all communications to Germany, thus dooming them.

It's theorized that Stalin may merely have been attempting to sow discord among the German army, due to their necessarily more realist view of the battlefield than Hitler (and indeed the rejection of the proposals, especially the 1943 one, added several conspirators to the July assassination plot). However, we'll assume he was genuine in offering a peace deal, but the war would begin anew when the Soviets thought they had rearmed enough.

What would be the effects of the Germans accepting each of the proposals?
 
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I've heard that Stalin offered three peace deals to the Germans - I'm not sure if it's true, but for the purposes of this thread, we'll assume it is.

The three deals offered (and ignored by the Germans in OTL) were:

1942, after the start of the German summer offensive: Brest-Litovsk borders.

1943, after the surrender at Stalingrad: 1939 borders.

1944, right before D-Day and Bagration: 1914 borders.

I also heard that the Germans seriously considered the 1943 and 1944 proposals, but decided they could stall for time and a better strategic position. After Bagration, the Soviets cut off all communications to Germany, thus dooming them.

It's theorized that Stalin may merely have been attempting to sow discord among the German army, due to their necessarily more realist view of the battlefield than Hitler (and indeed the rejection of the proposals, especially the 1943 one, added several conspirators to the July assassination plot). However, we'll assume he was genuine in offering a peace deal, but the war would begin anew when the Soviets thought they had rearmed enough.

What would be the effects of the Germans accepting each of the proposals?


There are also reports that the Soviets proposed a deal with Germany in October 1941, ceding the Ukraine to the Nazis in return for peace.
 
1942 is obviously best for Germany since they can clearly announce victory, occupy territories, set up their own governments, and sit back and rearm themselves as well

1943 looks as if it would doom the Nazis, or at least Hitler as its accepting peace on the back of a stunning defeat. It might still be good for Germany, Spring 1943 etc. If peace means a shift of forces it might also save Italy, or even allow offensives to push on in Tunisia

1944 looks too late, since with the opening of the Second Front I would think that any Soviet peace agreement would collapse and they would resume the offensive as they don't want the Western Allies to be the ones to get to Berlin

Best Regards
Grey Wolf
 
1942 stands out as the obvious choice, since it would appear to be a German victory, and would give them breathing space to consolidate their gains, arm further and deploy men and equipment to other theatres of operation.

However it would also give the Soviets time to re-organise, re-arm and then launch their own counter invasion. I cant see a situation where by Stalin allows a strong Germany to exist so it would merely be a delay before a clash of greater slaughter could occur.
 
1944 looks like ASB and I have never heard of it. The 1943 proposal I have heard of, but cannot imagine Germany accepting. Or at least not Hitler.
 
1942, after the start of the German summer offensive: Brest-Litovsk borders.

Well, a definite coup for Corp. Fool. He can claim the ultimate vindication of the post-WW1 humiliation of Germany. He's taken back the German territories, occupied and defeated France for good, and even has now claimed the territories rightfully won in battle on the WW1 Eastern front. Such a peace would be renounced by the West, but I think such a peace and the subsequent actions by a now greatly empowered Germany would have a huge effect on the governments and public of the remaining Allies.

1943, after the surrender at Stalingrad: 1939 borders.

Again, in hindsight this would be a Godsend for the Germans, but illusions of his enemies and his own forces probably make it difficult to accept. If they can paint a picture in the press of some type of victory then it might be possible. Perhaps stating they have removed the Soviet threat to Germany or something. Spinning Stalingrad is going going to take a lot of work. I think the Nazi's would be unhinged in the public, at least below the surface. Perhaps making the battle seem like the event that forced Stalin to accept German power or something. I think such a peace is one that is definitely temporary. The West is going to be even more upset and unnerved at the news. Germany while having been bleed, and having lost a large corp of their experience officers can still turn their full attention elsewhere with new technologies, entact Armored forces (Those not wasted in Citadel) and while leaving large forces in the East, can allocate much military power to repelling any invasion and depending on the time salvaging the ME campaign.


1944, right before D-Day and Bagration: 1914 borders.

Again, a perfect situation and a get out of jail free card for Germany. Highly unlikely, but I suppose I can see how the Soviets might want to guarantee control and annexation of the Eastern states ... something still in doubt perhaps at this time. An interesting Western Front thus developes. Again, I think Stalin most likely just waiting for a chance to pounce.

I also heard that the Germans seriously considered the 1943 and 1944 proposals, but decided they could stall for time and a better strategic position. After Bagration, the Soviets cut off all communications to Germany, thus dooming them.

I'm skeptical of all those proposals as anything other than possible rumors or things mentioned within government circles. Perhaps the initial offer, but I just don't see any chance of both the Soviets offering and the German agreeing. Of course, Germany should have jumped at any and all the offers, and the Soviets probably would have preferred to outright annexation of Poland and parts of Romania to just fighting for political control with Churchill and other Western nations.

It's theorized that Stalin may merely have been attempting to sow discord among the German army, due to their necessarily more realist view of the battlefield than Hitler

That seems more likely than any such offers actually taking place. The image of a 3-way Cold War always intrigues me.
 
One possible way to spin 1943 would be to get all the prisoners back - hundreds of thousands were lost at Stalingrad, and the impact was felt in every part of the Reich. If they are returned, and especially if all other German POWs are returned quickly enough, then its not so hard a sell at home at all

Best Regards
Grey Wolf
 

LittleSpeer

Monthly Donor
as soon as Hitler went after the SU, he was done for without a lot of changes before that. Even if they took the peace for Ukraine in October of '41, its still the end. Stalin will be gearing up for war then and then will attack in a few years anyway
 

wormyguy

Banned
One possible way to spin 1943 would be to get all the prisoners back - hundreds of thousands were lost at Stalingrad, and the impact was felt in every part of the Reich. If they are returned, and especially if all other German POWs are returned quickly enough, then its not so hard a sell at home at all

Best Regards
Grey Wolf
That's an interesting idea. The great Fuhrer cares about his brave German soldiers that he is willing to abandon a victorious war to save them from the gulags of Siberia.

I think that if they accept the 1943 or 1944 deals, they might attempt a little historical revisionism. Germany didn't invade the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union tried to invade Germany. However, they have repelled the limitless hordes of Bolshevism so that they may never again threaten the fair heart of Europe, and they have thus won a great victory.

I also think that if they accepted either of those deals, they would devote much of their resources to creating extensive and redundant lines of fortifications on the Soviet border, in order so that they can both station fewer of their limited forces there, and discourage a future Soviet invasion. Whether this would be successful is debatable, I think it would merely prove Patton's point that fixed fortifications are a monument to the stupidity of man.
 

Eurofed

Banned
as soon as Hitler went after the SU, he was done for without a lot of changes before that. Even if they took the peace for Ukraine in October of '41, its still the end. Stalin will be gearing up for war then and then will attack in a few years anyway

He may well attack again in a few years. But Germany shall have recouped its own losses and stabilized control over its Empire by then. A 1992-like Russia shall have terrible difficulties getting any real ground in those conditions.
 

Eurofed

Banned
I also think that if they accepted either of those deals, they would devote much of their resources to creating extensive and redundant lines of fortifications on the Soviet border, in order so that they can both station fewer of their limited forces there, and discourage a future Soviet invasion. Whether this would be successful is debatable, I think it would merely prove Patton's point that fixed fortifications are a monument to the stupidity of man.

If Stalin can't rely on a Western second front, I would not make bets on the chance of the Red Army pulling a strategic breakthrough in thse conditions.
 
He may well attack again in a few years. But Germany shall have recouped its own losses and stabilized control over its Empire by then. A 1992-like Russia shall have terrible difficulties getting any real ground in those conditions.

Atomic bombs, as a rule, are not agents of stability.
 

Tellus

Banned
I wasnt aware of any serious contacts after Kursk, but its not impossible considering the shadowy nature of negotiations during a war.

There were contacts throughout 1942 as well, though. I think the best times for Germany to accept a deal would be late 1941 or summer 42, obviously, since its when they have the most momentum and can extract the most concessions.

Lets say the deal gives Germany the Baltics, Bielorussia, and most of the Ukraine, including Kiev and Crimea. The most immediate considerations include whether the Western allies feel so betrayed that they cut off lend-lease, or whether they accept Stalin's line, which would be that his country was on the verge of collapse, that this is a temporary truce, and that he needs arms to fight again two years down the line. I'd err on the side that the US would reluctantly continue to provide aid whilst pushing for renewed hostilities.

The second question is; is America in the war yet. If it happens in 41, before Pearl Harbor, its back to Britain vs Germany, and Hitler is less likely to want to declare war on the US if he believes that the blow he delivered to the Soviets (who look militarily incompetant at best) might encourage London to negociate. Whilst I really doubt it, unless its paired with great victories in the Mediteranean, its very much how Hitler thought. He produced tons of documents and citations regarding how defeating the Soviets was critical to bring Britain to the peace table. I believe he was mostly rationalizing his burning desire for an eastern war, and wanted to sell this idea despite the German fear of a two-front war.

The third question is how long this peace lasts. Though the Soviet contacts were very real if ill-documented, it was plain for all this was a truce and not a lasting peace. There's an Hitler quote regarding this, as well, in which he said to his generals that if he signed a truce, he would "want to attack the Soviet Union again the next day". The Germans saw the Soviet ouvertures as a way to gain time and improve the battle lines, for the most part, so they didnt want to sacrifice much land with this in mind.

A fourth question is PoWs. A 41/42 truce means that Germany has millions (6-8 of them!) of Soviet PoWs whilst Moscow has only thousands of German prisonners. Releasing them is essentially a no-go for Berlin, as they represent too much combat power. Fortunately for our hypothetical truce, Stalin apparently never asked for them, said they were traitors to the motherland, and said to his generals that they were all to be shot (!) if they were returned because they all surrendered without authorization. This was the Soviet SOP during most of the war for any recaptured prisoners. Stalin's orders were merciless and nobody dared disobey - though it admittedly helped discourage his troops from surrendering as well. I'm guessing that the most likely scenario is no prisoner exchange. But I have to imagine for a minute what would happen if the Soviets tried to execute immense amounts of returning prisoners like this. I just can't imagine how much trauma an holocaust-sized shooting squad would generate for the country, nor that Stalin would survive that order long.

So, my guess on all this?

A 1941 truce is initially good for Germany, which has a much less rigorous winter-41 experience, and can temporarily focus on Britain again. However sometime in 42, Roosevelt gets a DoW against Germany even if Hitler's DoW is butterflied away. From that point on, things are only marginally better for the Axis. Lend-lease shipments resume to the Soviets, and are attacked by u-boats just as much as before, which can provide the casus-belli to resume hostilities once Stalin feels ready. Since this was his plan all along, in late spring 1943, he WILL attack again (unless the western allies are doing incredibly poorly), though German positions and resistance will be much stiffer than in OTL. Also, in the meantime, vast available German ressources could have lead to the fall of Suez in 42. However, since by then America is at war, this doesn't trigger Churchill's fall, and Egypt will be retaken soon after. The Axis is thus still likely to lose in 45, probably a few months late.

What this can open up, as a low-probability scenario, is the possibility that Hitler can use the psychological impact of a victorious peace in the East to encourage the UK to come to terms pre US-entry. With Churchill in power, its as unlikely as ever, but there would be greater pressure than before to consider it. Coupled with the right concessions in the west, who knows. Theres certainly going to be a level of gloom and doom in London that has never been seen before, with Hitler lording from Brest to Rostov. It could open opportunities that we tend to dismiss since they never arose in OTL. I read a book in French with another quote attributed to Hitler regarding this. One of his diplomats was suggesting that a deal with either the Soviets or the Allies could be leveraged to bring the other party to peace as well, and he is said to have replied "This is all politics. And politics bore me now. I don't do politics anymore."

With that kind of mindset from Germany's leader, getting anything worthwhile out of a truce is really a long shot.

Finally, back to lend-lease; if the US considers Stalin's truce too much of a betrayal to grant lend-lease, theres a strong possibility that the USSR would not recover well enough to mount an offensive against the Nazis again, period. Many strategic resources essential to Russia were in the western territories that would be lost in this land-swap, and lend-lease filled critical gaps that would have brought Soviet industry to it's knees in 42/43. The value of Ukraine, Bielorussia and the Baltics cannot be understated from a Russian POV. There are thus viable scenarios to consider there.
 
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LittleSpeer

Monthly Donor
I wasnt aware of any serious contacts after Kursk, but its not impossible considering the shadowy nature of negotiations during a war.

There were contacts throughout 1942 as well, though. I think the best times for Germany to accept a deal would be late 1941 or summer 42, obviously, since its when they have the most momentum and can extract the most concessions.

Lets say the deal gives Germany the Baltics, Bielorussia, and most of the Ukraine, including Kiev and Crimea. The most immediate considerations include whether the Western allies feel so betrayed that they cut off lend-lease, or whether they accept Stalin's line, which would be that his country was on the verge of collapse, that this is a temporary truce, and that he needs arms to fight again two years down the line. I'd err on the side that the US would reluctantly continue to provide aid whilst pushing for renewed hostilities.

The second question is; is America in the war yet. If it happens in 41, before Pearl Harbor, its back to Britain vs Germany, and Hitler is less likely to want to declare war on the US if he believes that the blow he delivered to the Soviets (who look militarily incompetant at best) might encourage London to negociate. Whilst I really doubt it, unless its paired with great victories in the Mediteranean, its very much how Hitler thought. He produced tons of documents and citations regarding how defeating the Soviets was critical to bring Britain to the peace table. I believe he was mostly rationalizing his burning desire for an eastern war, and wanted to sell this idea despite the German fear of a two-front war.

The third question is how long this peace lasts. Though the Soviet contacts were very real if ill-documented, it was plain for all this was a truce and not a lasting peace. There's an Hitler quote regarding this, as well, in which he said to his generals that if he signed a truce, he would "want to attack the Soviet Union again the next day". The Germans saw the Soviet ouvertures as a way to gain time and improve the battle lines, for the most part, so they didnt want to sacrifice much land with this in mind.

A fourth question is PoWs. A 41/42 truce means that Germany has millions (6-8 of them!) of Soviet PoWs whilst Moscow has only thousands of German prisonners. Releasing them is essentially a no-go for Berlin, as they represent too much combat power. Fortunately for our hypothetical truce, Stalin apparently never asked for them, said they were traitors to the motherland, and said to his generals that they were all to be shot (!) if they were returned because they all surrendered without authorization. This was the Soviet SOP during most of the war for any recaptured prisoners. Stalin's orders were merciless and nobody dared disobey - though it admittedly helped discourage his troops from surrendering as well. I'm guessing that the most likely scenario is no prisoner exchange. But I have to imagine for a minute what would happen if the Soviets tried to execute immense amounts of returning prisoners like this. I just can't imagine how much trauma an holocaust-sized shooting squad would generate for the country, nor that Stalin would survive that order long.

So, my guess on all this?

A 1941 truce is initially good for Germany, which has a much less rigorous winter-41 experience, and can temporarily focus on Britain again. However sometime in 42, Roosevelt gets a DoW against Germany even if Hitler's DoW is butterflied away. From that point on, things are only marginally better for the Axis. Lend-lease shipments resume to the Soviets, and are attacked by u-boats just as much as before, which can provide the casus-belli to resume hostilities once Stalin feels ready. Since this was his plan all along, in late spring 1943, he WILL attack again (unless the western allies are doing incredibly poorly), though German positions and resistance will be much stiffer than in OTL. Also, in the meantime, vast available German ressources could have lead to the fall of Suez in 42. However, since by then America is at war, this doesn't trigger Churchill's fall, and Egypt will be retaken soon after. The Axis is thus still likely to lose in 45, probably a few months late.

What this can open up, as a low-probability scenario, is the possibility that Hitler can use the psychological impact of a victorious peace in the East to encourage the UK to come to terms pre US-entry. With Churchill in power, its as unlikely as ever, but there would be greater pressure than before to consider it. Coupled with the right concessions in the west, who knows. Theres certainly going to be a level of gloom and doom in London that has never been seen before, with Hitler lording from Brest to Rostov. It could open opportunities that we tend to dismiss since they never arose in OTL. I read a book in French with another quote attributed to Hitler regarding this. One of his diplomats was suggesting that a deal with either the Soviets or the Allies could be leveraged to bring the other party to peace as well, and he is said to have replied "This is all politics. And politics bore me now. I don't do politics anymore."

With that kind of mindset from Germany's leader, getting anything worthwhile out of a truce is really a long shot.

Finally, back to lend-lease; if the US considers Stalin's truce too much of a betrayal to grant lend-lease, theres a strong possibility that the USSR would not recover well enough to mount an offensive against the Nazis again, period. Many strategic resources essential to Russia were in the western territories that would be lost in this land-swap, and lend-lease filled critical gaps that would have brought Soviet industry to it's knees in 42/43. The value of Ukraine, Bielorussia and the Baltics cannot be understated from a Russian POV. There are thus viable scenarios to consider there.
This sounds like it could happen the most. For Germany to even think that it could at least get a good ceasefire agreement, they have to make some huge changes as soon as Hitler steps into power.
 

Thande

Donor
I believe the 1943 one was the one Turtledove used as the basis for his "Ready for the Fatherland" scenario, although the Nazis only accepted it because Manstein assassinated Hitler (in a moment of rage at the front, not in a preplanned conspiracy) and led a coup.

The 1944 one sounds rather unlikely to be anything other than an attempt to sow division to me, but I could believe the others. The question is whether the Soviets had any intention of honouring them any longer than it took them to regroup and resume the war.
 
I believe the 1943 one was the one Turtledove used as the basis for his "Ready for the Fatherland" scenario, although the Nazis only accepted it because Manstein assassinated Hitler (in a moment of rage at the front, not in a preplanned conspiracy) and led a coup.

The 1944 one sounds rather unlikely to be anything other than an attempt to sow division to me, but I could believe the others. The question is whether the Soviets had any intention of honouring them any longer than it took them to regroup and resume the war.

I think all of them would have led to Soviets attacking again at an oppurtune moment.

In my mind the the only slightly sincere one was the July 1941 one and even that was in Stalin's words "to buy time"
 
I totally agree with your opinion. Any deal reached with Stalin was subject to being broken the minute that the Russians felt it was in their interest.
 
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