Germans Trap Half the BEF at LIlle

[FONT=&quot]Another Hat tip to Blitzkrieg Legend, by Karl-Heinz Frieser[/FONT]
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[FONT=&quot]There has been a lot of speculation about what would have happened if the Germans had taken Dunkirk before the British got most the BEF out. The halt orders have been debated endlessly. There is another possibility though. According to Frieser, there was a realistic chance that the Germans could have cut off four of the nine BEF divisions that were headed for Dunkisk (okay, not quite half, but close), along with quite a few additional French divisions in a pocket around Lille. Historically the Germans trapped roughly 35,000-40,000 French troops in the city where the French fought to the last bullet to keep pressure off the evacuation at Dunkirk.[/FONT]
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[FONT=&quot]Let’s say the Germans close the trap around a big hunk of the BEF and a considerably larger part of the French army at Lille. Presumably the remainder of the BEF and a smaller contingent of French troops than were historically available still form a perimeter around Dunkirk. I suppose it’s possible that the BEF might launch an attempt to break through to the trapped troops, but given the demoralization of the period, I doubt that they would risk the remaining troops in that way.[/FONT]
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[FONT=&quot]So, a little over half the BEF and a smaller contingent of French troops arrives at Dunkirk. They set up a perimeter, smaller and weaker than the historic one, and the British start withdrawing troops. The evacuation probably wouldn’t have gone as well as it did historically because the perimeter would be either smaller or weaker, probably both. If the Germans can get within artillery range of the port facilities, the evacuation quickly becomes a bloody shambles. There is also going to be an irreducible minimum number of men left behind. That’s inherent in having to guard a perimeter. Historically about 30,000-40,000 French soldiers and a few British troops didn’t make it out.[/FONT]
 
[FONT=&quot]Historically, according to Wikipedia, 338,226 Allied soldiers (198,229 British and 139,997 French), were evacuated. In this scenario a maximum of around 148,000 British soldiers would be available for evacuation. Given historic British casualty figures at Dunkirk, (around 68,000 killed wounded or prisoners—though I’m not sure how much of the campaign that covers) they should be able to get out about 80,000 troops. That would be around 40% of the historic number. Depending on how the battle around the perimeter went, that figure might be a little higher or a little lower, but you’re probably talking no more than half the historic figure, with 40% as the most likely.[/FONT]​
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[FONT=&quot]So what impact does that have on the rest of the war? First, it prolongs Britain’s period of maximum vulnerability. The soldiers of the BEF provided a core of trained men. Once they were rearmed, the British were still vulnerable to a major German invasion, but not to something on the scale that the Germans could actually get ashore. With less than half the trained manpower in this scenario, the British remain vulnerable to German small-scale raids. [/FONT]​
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[FONT=&quot]Second, the British also have more difficulty raising new divisions because they have fewer officer and non-coms to train and lead them. They would be desperate for experienced military men, and would probably have to strip experienced officers and non-coms from the colonial portion of the army, probably including the British army in Egypt. That would leave them weaker in the clashes with the Italians and the other small skirmishes like the revolt in Iraq and the early fighting against the Germans in North Africa.[/FONT]​
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[FONT=&quot]Is there a chance that the British would have sued for peace? I doubt it, though the trapped British troops would put a damper on British euphoria on the evacuation.[/FONT]​
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[FONT=&quot]Is there a chance that perception of British weakness would cause a scramble to partition the British empire? At some level of British disaster at Dunkirk that could have happened. Britain in the summer of 1940 was to some extent like a fundamentally sound bank that probably couldn’t survive a big enough bank run. If enough key people in enough countries decided that the British were beaten that would have become a self-fulfilling prophecy. [/FONT]​
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[FONT=&quot]As just one example, the French official who signed large French aircraft and aircraft engine orders over to the British might have signed them over to the US instead, or cancelled them. The Japanese and Spanish might have jumped in to grab their pieces of the empire. The US might have decided to hang onto arms instead of sending them. Why fritter them away in a lost cause when they might soon be needed to resist German advances in the Atlantic. There were plenty of people in India who wanted the British out. There were plenty of people in Iran who would have been happy to grab British oil concessions The Turks wouldn’t have minded having Mosul back. The Egyptians and Iraqis would have been happy to have the British out, though they wouldn’t have anywhere close to enough power to do anything about it under normal circumstances.[/FONT]​
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[FONT=&quot]At some point British enemies would be emboldened, while the commonwealth countries and the US would be forced to look to their own defenses. I don’t think this scenario pushes things to that point, but when you’re dealing with perceptions of power that’s kind of tricky.[/FONT]
 
[FONT=&quot]Is there a chance that perception of British weakness would cause a scramble to partition the British empire? At some level of British disaster at Dunkirk that could have happened. Britain in the summer of 1940 was to some extent like a fundamentally sound bank that probably couldn’t survive a big enough bank run. If enough key people in enough countries decided that the British were beaten that would have become a self-fulfilling prophecy. [/FONT]​




[FONT=&quot]As just one example, the French official who signed large French aircraft and aircraft engine orders over to the British might have signed them over to the US instead, or cancelled them. The Japanese and Spanish might have jumped in to grab their pieces of the empire. The US might have decided to hang onto arms instead of sending them. Why fritter them away in a lost cause when they might soon be needed to resist German advances in the Atlantic. There were plenty of people in India who wanted the British out. There were plenty of people in Iran who would have been happy to grab British oil concessions The Turks wouldn’t have minded having Mosul back. The Egyptians and Iraqis would have been happy to have the British out, though they wouldn’t have anywhere close to enough power to do anything about it under normal circumstances.[/FONT]​



[FONT=&quot]At some point British enemies would be emboldened, while the commonwealth countries and the US would be forced to look to their own defenses. I don’t think this scenario pushes things to that point, but when you’re dealing with perceptions of power that’s kind of tricky.[/FONT]

In a word, no.
The Dunkirk episode drew the Empire together, you only have to look at the reaction in countries like Canada.
Minor countries trying to snip bits off the Empire? They'd get their heads handed to them sharpish.
And the Japanese were already in a sort-of-undeclared war with the USA, they'd have looked on calmly as they got stronger at the expence of the Empire...not..!
 
In a word, no.
The Dunkirk episode drew the Empire together, you only have to look at the reaction in countries like Canada.

Yes. Historically a successful evacuation that was played up as a victory did draw the empire together, though there were--had to be--pragmatic calculations going on. Essentially the Commonwealth countries were better off defense-wise if Britain remained a major power. However, if the perception in Commonwealth countries was that Britain could not survive as a major power, the Commonwealth countries then had to be concerned about their own defense, especially Australia with Japan close and threatening. Britain in peril but with a fighting chance drew the Commonwealth together, both because of the emotional ties and because of rational calculation. If Britain is perceived to be beyond saving, then that's another story.

Minor countries trying to snip bits off the Empire? They'd get their heads handed to them sharpish.

In the summer of 1940, with over half of the British army in German POW camps and the rest of it without heavy weapons--and with the Germans threatening to invade? Oh, and with about half the officers and non-coms that they historically had for rebuilding and expanding the British army? I would be interested in the details of how you think the Brits would pull that off.

And the Japanese were already in a sort-of-undeclared war with the USA, they'd have looked on calmly as they got stronger at the expence of the Empire...not..!

The Japanese were in an undeclared war with the US in the summer of 1940? That's overstating it a bit. Rivals, yes. Undeclared war, no.

Your basic point is sound and well-taken though. Yes, the US would face a dilemma, as they did historically. After the fall of France the US had to decide between its own urgent defense needs and the need to shore up the British. Both were desirable and in 1940-41 there wasn't enough production to do both. Historically the US took a calculated risk that the British could hold out given US aid, and sent them military equipment that the US could have really used for its own buildup.

Note the calculated and the risk part of that. The US perceived a risk that the British would still fold, and that equipment sent to them would be lost. They calculated (correctly) that the risk of the British getting knocked out of the war was low enough to be worth taking. If the US had perceived the risk of the British getting knocked out of the war as being too high, then the logical course of action would have been to send only minor amounts of aid that would prolong British resistance and concentrate on building up US forces for hemisphere defense.

I want to make it clear that I don't think this scenario would necessarily lead to a perception that Britain had already lost. That's possible, but not the most likely way for this to go. Now if the Brits lost the whole BEF, that's another story.
 
Yes. Historically a successful evacuation that was played up as a victory did draw the empire together, though there were--had to be--pragmatic calculations going on. Essentially the Commonwealth countries were better off defense-wise if Britain remained a major power. However, if the perception in Commonwealth countries was that Britain could not survive as a major power, the Commonwealth countries then had to be concerned about their own defense, especially Australia with Japan close and threatening. Britain in peril but with a fighting chance drew the Commonwealth together, both because of the emotional ties and because of rational calculation. If Britain is perceived to be beyond saving, then that's another story.



In the summer of 1940, with over half of the British army in German POW camps and the rest of it without heavy weapons--and with the Germans threatening to invade? Oh, and with about half the officers and non-coms that they historically had for rebuilding and expanding the British army? I would be interested in the details of how you think the Brits would pull that off.



The Japanese were in an undeclared war with the US in the summer of 1940? That's overstating it a bit. Rivals, yes. Undeclared war, no.

Your basic point is sound and well-taken though. Yes, the US would face a dilemma, as they did historically. After the fall of France the US had to decide between its own urgent defense needs and the need to shore up the British. Both were desirable and in 1940-41 there wasn't enough production to do both. Historically the US took a calculated risk that the British could hold out given US aid, and sent them military equipment that the US could have really used for its own buildup.

Note the calculated and the risk part of that. The US perceived a risk that the British would still fold, and that equipment sent to them would be lost. They calculated (correctly) that the risk of the British getting knocked out of the war was low enough to be worth taking. If the US had perceived the risk of the British getting knocked out of the war as being too high, then the logical course of action would have been to send only minor amounts of aid that would prolong British resistance and concentrate on building up US forces for hemisphere defense.

I want to make it clear that I don't think this scenario would necessarily lead to a perception that Britain had already lost. That's possible, but not the most likely way for this to go. Now if the Brits lost the whole BEF, that's another story.

A few points...

The reaction of the Empire to Dunkirk and its aftermath - in particular the percieved danger to Britain - was quite astounding. Countries like (for example) Canada, whod been supporting the war but being careful not to ruin their economy in the process (a quite reasonable caveat), changed pretty much overnight to an attitude of whatever we can we will do. With no caveats.

Minor countries who fancy taking a few bits off the Empire while Britain is preoccupied face a number of issues.
The Empire still had considerable local forces based all around the Empire.
Second is the sheer risk of tweaking the lions tail. Sure, Britain looks on the ropes. But if they arent.... it isnt worth the risk. Not considering the history of the Empire it isnt... Now if Germany invade or conquer, thats a different matter altogether.

Yes, the attitude of the USA to Japan was pretty much one of undeclared war - their actions up till PH show this, these wern't the actions of a country prepared to be conciliatory.
There is also of course the reaction of the USA to a less effective Dunkirk. Probably not too much initially, they were still looking at France. Once France feel, and the French fleet looked in danger of falling into German hands, Congress basically had a collective fit at the idea, passing an enormous peactime navy bill, basically giving the navy a blank check of any amount.
Now of they did this at the thought of part of the MN falling to Germany, just imagine the reaction to the idea of the most powerful navy in the world falling into German hands...!! It doesnt really matter if they think Britain will collapse or not, or if help they give is wasted, they simply dont have a choice but to help. national interest demands it.
 
A few points...

The reaction of the Empire to Dunkirk and its aftermath - in particular the percieved danger to Britain - was quite astounding. Countries like (for example) Canada, whod been supporting the war but being careful not to ruin their economy in the process (a quite reasonable caveat), changed pretty much overnight to an attitude of whatever we can we will do. With no caveats.

I think we're talking past each other on this one. Yes, historically the empire did pull together after Dunkirk to an extraordinary degree. The question is whether that outpouring of support would have still happened if Britain looked like a sure loser in the aftermath of Dunkirk. Would it have happened even if it was not in the best interests of the Commonwealth governments for it to happen?

Historically, supporting Britain was rational for the Commonwealth countries. Canada to some degree, and especially Australia would have been threatened if Britain had fallen. However, supporting a common empire-wide effort only made sense from the point of view of the commonwealth countries if that effort had a reasonable chance of succeeding. If the commonwealth governments felt that Britain would inevitably fall, then the rational course for those governments would have been to build up local defenses rather than waste limited manpower and armaments in a lost cause.

Are you claiming that support would have come even if giving it was irrational or perceived as irrational? If so, we'll have to agree to disagree on that one. Government and publics aren't always rational, but I'm not going to buy an argument that claims certainty that a country would react against their perceived best interest.


Minor countries who fancy taking a few bits off the Empire while Britain is preoccupied face a number of issues.
The Empire still had considerable local forces based all around the Empire.
Second is the sheer risk of tweaking the lions tail. Sure, Britain looks on the ropes. But if they arent.... it isnt worth the risk. Not considering the history of the Empire it isnt... Now if Germany invade or conquer, thats a different matter altogether.

Here, I think we're saying about the same thing in different ways. There are two issues: (1) the local balance of power between the empire and those who would have been tempted to take a chunk out of it. If you look at that balance of power in June/July of 1940, you'll see that it's pretty heavily weighed against the Brits on quite a number of potential battlefields, especially in the Far East. The British certainly wouldn't have been able to take on Japan more effectively in summer 1940 than they did in late 1941. (2) Perceptions of British power. In the years between 1783 and 1940, it was rarely a good idea to be on the other side of a war from Britain. Historically that track record kept most of the potentially hostile powers from attacking Britain at its weakest. At what point would the perception of British power crumble? As I stated, probably not at the point this scenario ends up at.

Historically, the fall of Singapore dealt British prestige in the Far East a blow it never recovered from. If Japan had entered the war in summer 1940 and done as well as it did in the it might have triggered a scramble to grab cuts of the British empire.

Yes, the attitude of the USA to Japan was pretty much one of undeclared war - their actions up till PH show this, these wern't the actions of a country prepared to be conciliatory.

Here, I think it depends on time-frame and definition of 'undeclared war". I'm talking about the period right after the fall of France and to some extent continuing until the Japanese occupation of southern IndoChina. I would be interested in hearing about US actions during that period that could be considered acts of war, declared or not. The US gave some military and economic aid to the Nationalist Chinese. Other than that, we really didn't do much. After the Japanese took the rest of Indochina (a year after the period in question) the US did take much more aggressive actions, including some that were arguably acts of war.

There is also of course the reaction of the USA to a less effective Dunkirk. Probably not too much initially, they were still looking at France. Once France feel, and the French fleet looked in danger of falling into German hands, Congress basically had a collective fit at the idea, passing an enormous peactime navy bill, basically giving the navy a blank check of any amount.
Now of they did this at the thought of part of the MN falling to Germany, just imagine the reaction to the idea of the most powerful navy in the world falling into German hands...!!

Actually, the US buildup was a reaction to fear that Britain would fall shortly after France did and that the British fleet would fall into German hands along with the French one.

It doesnt really matter if they think Britain will collapse or not, or if help they give is wasted, they simply dont have a choice but to help. national interest demands it.

I already responded to this one. Of course the US had a choice. They could either use the vast majority of the US's limited production to build up US armed forces or they could send a large hunk of that production to shore up Britain. If Britain was going to fall anyway, building up US forces made more sense, because anything sent to Britain would be lost when Britain fell. Sending arms to Britain only made sense if there was a substantial chance that those arms would tip the balance and either prevent or substantially delay the fall of Britain. Historically Roosevelt gambled that they would, and history proved him right.
 
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