Germans open peace negotiations before 1918 offensives?

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With all your brilliant suggestions about what Germany should have offered, you still blind out that the Entente wouldn't negotiate.

The Americans were never a member of the Entente. They were an associated Allied Power. Wilson always reserved the right to make a separate peace.
 
The Americans were never a member of the Entente. They were an associated Allied Power. Wilson always reserved the right to make a separate peace.

This is what the Americans believe(d). Reading Koogan (The End of Neutrality), the US had effectively ceased to be neutral by April 1915 and had become part of the Entente war effort. Nice definitions of Entente and Allied powers are fine, but as the Britons were giving Wilson the full runaround, the factual difference was moot.
 

Perkeo

Banned
And why, before they had even fought a battle, would the Americans make a separate peace?

Not to fight battles and not to have their soldiers killed. Unlike most of their European colleagues, the American Generals and politicians seem to have had some wish to minimize that.

IMO a seperate peace with the US is the only hope the Germans have at 1918. Even in timelines where the spring offensives of 1918 are more successful, what is the probability that Germany knocks out all bridgeheads the American forces can use? Germany HAS to accept Wilsons 14 points as a starting position for negotiations - and start to negotiate while they still have something to negotiate about.

Wilsons 14 Points leave enough room for interpretation to end up with a peace Germany can live with.
 
Not to fight battles and not to have their soldiers killed. Unlike most of their European colleagues, the American Generals and politicians seem to have had some wish to minimize that.

IMO a seperate peace with the US is the only hope the Germans have at 1918. Even in timelines where the spring offensives of 1918 are more successful, what is the probability that Germany knocks out all bridgeheads the American forces can use? Germany HAS to accept Wilsons 14 points as a starting position for negotiations - and start to negotiate while they still have something to negotiate about.

Wilsons 14 Points leave enough room for interpretation to end up with a peace Germany can live with.
Yes to minimize, not avoid entirely. Entering a war and then making peace before you even started fighting, especially when you allied don't want to negotiate, is almost unprecedented. America knows that with them in the Allies they are going to win the war, so why leave Germany well off and still a threat?
 

Perkeo

Banned
Yes to minimize, not avoid entirely. Entering a war and then making peace before you even started fighting, especially when you allied don't want to negotiate, is almost unprecedented.

So is entering war and then taking more than a year before sending significant forces to the front while the enemy knocks out an important ally of yours. That clearly indicates to me that Wilson was not willing to use strength as a substitute for reason. So the very least I say for them is: Had their heard anything reasonable from the Germans, they would have listened. I am not saying that a truly negotiated peace is likely, but Germany's other options are even less likely to be succeed IMO.

America knows that with them in the Allies they are going to win the war, so why leave Germany well off and still a threat?

Even with the IOTL German stubbornness, France was very isolated in their wish to knock out Germany for good - which is one of the main reasons why they failed so miserably. America didn't even ratify the TOV, and Britain quickly lost it's interest in enforcing it.

Therefore, I beg to disagree that the US was on a "No negotiations when we're going to win anyway"-strategy. And if they were, Germany is doomed whatever may.
 

Perkeo

Banned
With all your brilliant suggestions about what Germany should have offered, you still blind out that the Entente wouldn't negotiate.
They didn't negotiate in 1914, nor in 1915, nor in 1916, nor in 1917, nor in 1918, nor in 1919. But in 1919, they could eventually do what they had wanted from the start: dictate the terms.

Obviously, the Entente didn't realize how improbable their victory was.

After four years of stalemate, millions of people dead, all mayor European bellingerents financially ruined, I find it hard to admire anyone who thought they'd win if they just kept on fighting. Not even those who happened to be right in the end.
 
Not to fight battles and not to have their soldiers killed. Unlike most of their European colleagues, the American Generals and politicians seem to have had some wish to minimize that.

Pershing had no intention to have his troops 'wasted away' as reinforcements of the French and British troops, true; and he got Wilson to agree to AEF operations under national command only (with some few exceptions).
That was not because he objected his troops being butchered, he only wanted to be in control of the butchering himself. The conduct of 'Meuse and Argonne' is ample proof of that.
The Germans sensed very clearly that the Americans still had 'The Spirit of 1914' (i.e. attacking without regard to losses), which they had lost already. And it frightened them.
 
So is entering war and then taking more than a year before sending significant forces to the front while the enemy knocks out an important ally of yours. That clearly indicates to me that Wilson was not willing to use strength as a substitute for reason. So the very least I say for them is: Had their heard anything reasonable from the Germans, they would have listened. I am not saying that a truly negotiated peace is likely, but Germany's other options are even less likely to be succeed IMO.

Despite having considered the likelihood of being involved in a Continental war for some years, despite having participated in numerous such wars previously, despite being just across the Channel, Britain's August 1914 contribution of forces was quite puny. It was at least a year later that we can call Britain's troops strength truly "significant". Why is it odd that America took a year to ready and dispatch significant forces across the Atlantic, when she was both far less militarily prepared, and had no prior experience or expectation of participating in a European war?
If the delay was unprecedented, so were the circumstances. America's achievement is actually rather solid, viewed under the circumstances.


Even with the IOTL German stubbornness, France was very isolated in their wish to knock out Germany for good - which is one of the main reasons why they failed so miserably. America didn't even ratify the TOV, and Britain quickly lost it's interest in enforcing it.

Agreed.

Therefore, I beg to disagree that the US was on a "No negotiations when we're going to win anyway"-strategy. And if they were, Germany is doomed whatever may.

And yet, Wilson very much wanted a dominant seat at the negotiating table, which only a very large commitment of American troops in Europe could reliably grant.
If the Entente powers were desperate enough to end the war, it won't matter. If they are less than absolutely desperate, I don't know what effect this could have, but I think it could have some. Wilson could play some dirty tricks with the outstanding loans to coerce the Entente powers to set a harder bargain than Germany was willing to meet, for example. I don't know that this would happen, but it seems at least possible. He might try to justify it on the basis that a tougher peace is needed in order to ensure self-determination for certain groups, for instance. "This proposed peace just sweeps serious issues under the rug, and stores up catastrophe for a later day."
 

Perkeo

Banned
Despite having considered the likelihood of being involved in a Continental war for some years, despite having participated in numerous such wars previously, despite being just across the Channel, Britain's August 1914 contribution of forces was quite puny. It was at least a year later that we can call Britain's troops strength truly "significant". Why is it odd that America took a year to ready and dispatch significant forces across the Atlantic, when she was both far less militarily prepared, and had no prior experience or expectation of participating in a European war?
If the delay was unprecedented, so were the circumstances. America's achievement is actually rather solid, viewed under the circumstances.

I wasn't saying the US of did something wrong. They did something right that all Europeans did wrong: They didn't rush into conflict unprepared, they had a diplomatic strategy for a honourable peace (rather than a fanciful wish list for a peace dictate).

And yet, Wilson very much wanted a dominant seat at the negotiating table, which only a very large commitment of American troops in Europe could reliably grant.
If the Entente powers were desperate enough to end the war, it won't matter. If they are less than absolutely desperate, I don't know what effect this could have, but I think it could have some. Wilson could play some dirty tricks with the outstanding loans to coerce the Entente powers to set a harder bargain than Germany was willing to meet, for example. I don't know that this would happen, but it seems at least possible. He might try to justify it on the basis that a tougher peace is needed in order to ensure self-determination for certain groups, for instance. "This proposed peace just sweeps serious issues under the rug, and stores up catastrophe for a later day."

If America is willing to fight to the end, Germany is doomed. Since the allies know that, a face-saving peace for Germany is unlikely. Additionally, a substantial changes in the German leadership are necessary to make them try that possibility. All that is undenied. However, an unlikely solution is still better than the OTL no-solution strategy. Germany has nothing to loose in 1918 and knew that. Unfortunately, they repeated the mistake that brought them into WWI in the first place by choosing military offensive over diplomac negotiation.

If OTOH Germany accepts its very own interpretation of the 14 Points. e.g.:
- No reparations
- No war guilt clause
- Referendum in A-L
- Extraterritorial access to the sea for Congress-Poland rather than the TOV borders
- Only bilateral disarmament
etc.pp.
America has to provide an answer. The above is still light years away from what the Entente(+US) have to accept, but outright rejection will give them a credibility problem. If then the German spring offensives create the illusion that Germany isn't beaten yet, a negotiating peace might be accomplished.
 
With all your brilliant suggestions about what Germany should have offered, you still blind out that the Entente wouldn't negotiate.

The Tsar didn't negotiate either. Neither did Kerenskij. But Lenin did.

I agree that we do not talk about certainties; but about last straws which would have provided a different path of events than the straw the German leadership picked, i.e. the Kaiserschlacht-offensive which squandered German reserves and ressources and whose failure destroyed the morale across the Western Front.
I therefore claim that the POD only makes sense if the negotiations do not only precede the Kaiserschlacht, but have the political effect of giving up the offensive and deliver a flexible defensive (not insisting on every possible counter-attack, but only on the most necessary and promising ones)

German never had offered negotiations which would give up what the average Entente soldier could believe he was fighting for: the liberation (and satisfaction) of Belgium and/or a perspective for Alsace-Lorraine.

Just as no side could hold the Red revolution in Russia secret, such an offer would have an impact if sold correctly (although that would need another POD: an improvement of the abysmal German public relations/propaganda)....and with 1918 not looking like 1914, but like 1915 or 1917.

***
Germany cannot offer Austro-Hungarian possessions? Karl was not too shy about offering Alsace-Lorraine. I don't belong to those who claim that the Danube monarchy was only a puppet state by 1918. But if Germany would make a peace-offer which entails possible concessions, then Karl would probably swallow the toad to offer the Trentino (but, as one should note in my enumeration, not Trieste or Istria).


The problem that everyone's eliding over I think is that Germany ended up collapsing, as are the Ottomans and Habsburgs. Sure, Russia's out of the game, but America's ramping up. Time isn't on Germany's side.

I agree. However, sparing Germany the Kaiserschlacht and using some of the squandered troops to stabilize the Italian and Balkan fronts as well as the Ukraine would do some good.

Additionally, I wonder if Turkey collapsing alone would do the Entente much good besides creating an awful quagmire sooner than in OTL.


In the west with Belgium and the French provinces, the answer is also pretty simple - if the Allies want an unconditional hand-over just so that they can use them as offensive bases for war into Germany, then they will have to take them house by house, with the area in rubble by the end of it. If the handover is only after an armistice is in place, then the area would be handed over intact.

I am sure the Belgians would read the offer very carefully.
 
If OTOH Germany accepts its very own interpretation of the 14 Points. e.g.:

....or even precede the 14 points by starting the diplomatic offensive right at the end of 1917.

OTL, Germany only started to take the 14 points seriously when they approached a state when unconditional surrender would have been inavoidable as well.

***

I also agree to the point someone has brought up before, i.e. that the German leadership at that point is completely unsuited for the endeavour we talk about. This means Wilhelm II., Ludendorff, Hindenburg, and also RK Hertling.

If I ever get around to write a timeline dealing with Germany offering peace in the winter of 1917/18, I feel forced to create an earlier POD which would allow for the replacement of these actors. Without that, I wouldn't feel it to be plausible.
 
If Germany surrendered before the starvation, Willy II could've kept his throne, no small thing to himself, no doubt, And would've saved tons of lives, including German.
 
The only effect of any 'serious' German peace offer in early 1918 would have been to convince Entente and Allies that Germany was at the end of her tether - and that one should continue as before.

With Germany switching to defensive, Sir Douglas would happily have opened the second round of slaughter in the Flanders mud (which in 1917 had cost the Germans as dear as their 1918 Michael offensive, but without any gains in territory), while Pétain would have waited for the tanks and the Americans.

That Michael would be as successful as it was, was not predictable. According to conventional wisdom it would lead to another Somme/Flanders style slaughter without decisive gains. So, there were no Ente/Allied politicians anxiously anticipating a war of movement in the Entente/Allied rear area. They would just have concluded "Look, the Huns come creeping on their bellies, let's finish them off."
 
The only effect of any 'serious' German peace offer in early 1918 would have been to convince Entente and Allies that Germany was at the end of her tether - and that one should continue as before.

With Germany switching to defensive, Sir Douglas would happily have opened the second round of slaughter in the Flanders mud (which in 1917 had cost the Germans as dear as their 1918 Michael offensive, but without any gains in territory), while Pétain would have waited for the tanks and the Americans.

That Michael would be as successful as it was, was not predictable. According to conventional wisdom it would lead to another Somme/Flanders style slaughter without decisive gains. So, there were no Ente/Allied politicians anxiously anticipating a war of movement in the Entente/Allied rear area. They would just have concluded "Look, the Huns come creeping on their bellies, let's finish them off."



So Michael comes a few weeks later, in response to a failed Allied offensive - a sort of Passchendaele II. Any difference as a result?
 
So Michael comes a few weeks later, in response to a failed Allied offensive - a sort of Passchendaele II. Any difference as a result?

Now, Entente/Allied offensives were notorious for failing on the first day already, but nevertheless being continued for months. - And Sir Douglas was none to abandon his strategy early, if at all...

There is potential here for a TL: 'Georg' staged in good dry weather, overrunning Hazebrouck and cutting off the bulk of the BEF from rail supply.
 
The only effect of any 'serious' German peace offer in early 1918 would have been to convince Entente and Allies that Germany was at the end of her tether - and that one should continue as before.

Which is not worse at all compared to what the Entente did in OTL.

With Germany switching to defensive, Sir Douglas would happily have opened the second round of slaughter in the Flanders mud (which in 1917 had cost the Germans as dear as their 1918 Michael offensive, but without any gains in territory), while Pétain would have waited for the tanks and the Americans.

The German gain in territory OTL looked amazing on a map for a while; but it amounted to nothing. Basically, the Germans got exactly as far as the British resp. French could afford, but not one step further. They never reached the Channel Ports, Amiens, or the direct vicinity of Paris. Especially the gains of the first and most forceful offensive consisted of Little more than scorched Earth.

Also, the tanks were not a magical instrument to break through the German lines.

With less emphasis on the offensive stormtrooper-tactics, the Heer could have put more effort on training tactics on how to turn (especially the British) tanks into expensive death-traps.

They would just have concluded "Look, the Huns come creeping on their bellies, let's finish them off."

That depends on how the different strategy effects German morale....
 
With Germany switching to defensive, Sir Douglas would happily have opened the second round of slaughter in the Flanders mud (which in 1917 had cost the Germans as dear as their 1918 Michael offensive

I don't think by 1918 Haig had the remaining political capital to survive another such attrition offensive.
 
I would like to add one or two thoughts:

-once negotiations are opened, or as a pre-requisite for negotiations, Germany will have to make some further concessions; however, compared to the actual armistice and Versailles those would be tame

-I am not convinced that Wilson will insist on militarily beating the Germans to a pulp. His will be contend with the view that "once the Cavalry arrives, the day is saved!"

-OTL, German morale reached a high point during the preparation of the Kaiserschlacht, when the hopes were high that this would be the final nail in the coffin of the French / British.... now that Russia is out of the way. However, the morale completely plummeted when
a) this final clash didn't lead to victory
b) over-running Entente supply depots made clear to the involved soldiers how markedly better the supply and logistics situation was for the Entente soldiers
Throughout late summer/autumn of 1918, the German soldiers increasingly lost confidence that the war could be won, or that a solution was being worked at all. They were mainly correct on both Points. Ferguson e.a. have shown that the Germans, who weren't really prone to be taken prisoner beforehands, were suddenly drastically more likely to raise their arms over their heads.

-Disciusson Point 1: How would morale be affected if the German "Landser" gets assured that he will only be requested to hold out and show strength until a honourable peace is assured? That he will not be asked to take part in futile breakthrough battles?
If the Entente seems to want an "Unconditional Surrender" and wouldn't negotiate; would that rather stiffen resistance akin to WW2?


-Discussion Point 2: how much could German support achieve during a spring offensive in Italy? Or would it be more advisable that the Austro-Hungarians ALSO don't squander their meagre possibilities and concentrate on defending the river lines (Piave in that case).

-Discussion Point 3: I do not advocate this, but could anyone imagine that, under the condition that a very moderate peace offer had come forward priorily, a different direction of the Western Offensive would have been more effective than OTL's attack?

-Discussion Point 4: If the attack is cancelled, are there points at the fronts where a planned withdrawal akin to the Siegfriedline would be favourable? The only obvious one to me is St. Mihiel.
 
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-I am not convinced that Wilson will insist on militarily beating the Germans to a pulp. His will be contend with the view that "once the Cavalry arrives, the day is saved!"

Wilson's behaviour in October 1918 is inexplicable if his intention were unconditional surrender.
 
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