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1942 had a number of dramatic last German forward lunges that came close but didn't take their objectives. What if they took all of them? Are there really any lasting effects?
Lets say the Germans actually take all the objectives that were with in their grasp in 1942, that they were close to OTL (less than 30 miles or so).
Alexandria in September 42 (assume the British consolidate around and hold at Cairo)
Tupase in October 1942 (But not Batum or Sokhumi)
Ordzhonikidze in early November 1942 (But not Grozny)
Stalingrad in late October 1942 (they take the few bits on the west side of the Volga they didn't OTL)
For a POD: assume General Wever lives, the JU88 is introduced as a level bomber from the start and the 1941 ME210 fiasco is avoided and ME110 production is not ramped down early. The cumulative effects are by 1942 allow a larger Luftwaffe by a few hundred planes and some better aircraft are available to their allies which allows them to take these places. (some other cumulative effects of more air-power are less merchant losses in the med and a more effective air effort assisting the ground force in Winter 41 in the Soviet Union). Reasonable positive changes leading to greater 1942 strength (but nothing overwhelming).
Perhaps:
a) The additional success has some effect on Vichy attitudes (hardened resistance to Torch landings)
b) If the Germans reach the Volga can they remove troops from the Stalingrad area to a reserve?
c) Does taking Tupase and Ordzhonikidze mean the Germans are less pressed on these fronts and can send an extra couple of divisions to Stalingrad relief in December?
d) Does taking Alexandria and the workshops and supply dumps around and the naval base itself delay the British counteroffensive significantly?