Germania not Britannia

Septimius Severus was most certainly trying to conquer Caledonia. Anyway, so was Agricola, and if Domitian didn't recall him, he could have finished off his conquest of it. To say the Romans had no interest in securing the whole island (if only to have the whole island and remove one enemy which would cause at most, only 1 more legion to be stationed in Britannia, if any more legions at all) just doesn't blend well with the the facts.

Similarly, the Romans withdrew from Germania because they believed it wasn't worth the effort yes, but that was only after 3 legions were massacred at a time when Roman manpower was so overstretched (thanks to the Great Illyrian revolt) that Augustus had to purchase and recruit slaves into his army. Rome has to suffer a serious military setback first like Teutoberg before they say its not worth it. Hell, Augustus had been planning to conquer even further, into Marcomannia, when the Great Illyrian Revolt broke out. That sounds like an emperor that has an intention to stay in the region for keeps.

I said this on the last thread too, if you have an emperor Drusus who had (and would continue to since his death would be butterflied away obviously in that scenario) put extensive effort himself into the conquest, he will stay there, and then likely will Germanicus as well. And before someone brings up Hadrian, remember, Hadrian abandoned an area that was literally still in the process of being conquered and had not been subdued at all. A province Rome hadn't even had for a full year, that was in open revolt. He also needed to focus on securing his position as emperor. So it was logical for him to pull out and consolidate.

This is a totally different scenario. A region that has been under Roman control for 3 successive emperors, and if Gaul and Britannia are templates to go by for how long serious resistance lasts, has been quiet for a while for the most part. At that point also, the prestige loss and loss of face the emperor that pulls out would be too great to risk (Hadrian took a hit with his pull out of Mesopotamia and like I said, that hadnt even been fully subdued).


Now I am not saying I disagree with you that 1st century Germania didn't have much of anything economically worthwhile for the Romans, but that is not the only factor to consider.
 
Not saying myself that I disagreeing with your reasoning per se, it's a really good one, more about implications: wouldn't an emperor sitting of Germania would increase the risks of usurpator rise or revolts in other parts of the empire?
In this scenario, the Rhenan legions (much politically overlooked OTL) would gain a great influence and some others could try to fight back : an emperor as you describe could still most possibly win but at the expense of its presence in Germania (which suffer from being separated from Italy by Alps that are pretty much uncrossable except by Gaul or Pannonia for great armies).

The political factor can work both ways, facilitating Germania romanisation (understood as a creolisation, not an assimilation) critically if germans are integrated as OTL to roman armies (as where Gauls earlier) but leading to more room for possible revolts elsewhere. A skilled emperor could master it, I'm more doubtful for an entire line.
 
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You make a good point. As for usurpations, it will certainly make it more interesting- while it would be easier to usurp and the news would take longer to get to Rome, it will also take a lot longer for the legions to move to take their usurper to make good on his claim giving the emperor in Rome time to prepare by gathering legions himself.
 

katchen

Banned
The Roman Germania stuff was done to death here.

No roman conquest wasn't due to defeat, it was due to a deep lack of interest.

First, the gold mines found and more importantly exploited in MA were because of a more dense and more cohesive structure.
You had richer, closer and more exploitable mines in Mediterranea.

Second, at the exception of southern Germania, the land was badly adapted for mediterranean agriculture (due to climatic optium, it reached a more important nothern limit than nowadays). Lands as Northern Gaul, to not speak of Britain, looked quite underpopulated compared to what was South.
Of course, trade and critically military control managed to make these holdable and eventually to create a structure strong enough to secure these conquests. It costed much ressources however, and wasn't made for giggles (hell, Romans could have taken Caledonia OTL, and they didn't because they didn't gave a shit about it).

Now, portions of Germania could be directly under Roman rule : Northern Danube basin, maybe Rhineland. But they would have been really vulnerable to attacks and when they were actually conquered as OTL (Dortmund, by exemple) they were abandoned eventually as making agreements with bordering germanic statelets and tribes was far more stable and less ressource/time consuming.

Regarding Elbe, to not speak of the highly implausible Vistula river, the issue is that the land is contrary to others provinces, mostly a big foresty swamp, underpopulated with relativly few nodes allowing a better control. It's not Gaul were the presence of confederations and trade roads (but also continuuous Roman influence thanks to diplomacy and trade) allowed a quick integration.
It was the roman equivalent of "Here there be wyrms" where useful and luxury products came from (Amber, Furs, Slaves) that were eventually quite easy to take from trade, not calling for a conquest.

And eventually, when they had to give ressources to inner stability, campaigns for more richer and defensible lands or actual real threats, Germania didn't looked as a valuable asset.
Less to offer and full of forests and swamps with low populations. Hmmm...
That dosen't look like much to a Roman Emperor faced with dealing with Parthia to the East but if Drusus or Germanicus know enough about the North to know about ALL of the North and East's great rivers one of those emperors might see some distinct assets in the North. All he needs to know is that the mighty Rha River (which we know as the Volga begins it's course just a short and marshy portage from a great lake (Onega) reached by a great river the Svir and then the Neva via Lake Ladoga navigable by triremes through the Baltic from the Mare Germanicus (North Sea). If the portage to the Rha is not feasible for Roman ships or more importantly, a canal to the Rha to make it feasible is not feasible, there is ample wood along that stretch of the Rha to build a flotilla that can accommodate several legions. Which there is not at that other known portage to the Rha, the 50 mile (what is that in stadia?) portage from the Tanais and the Mare Euxinus (Black Sea) which is in uncontrollable steppe country where there is no wood to build vessels.
And if one can build a large enough flotilla on the Rha, one can sail those vessels down to the Tanais portage where it can take on supplies brought by horseback. Protecting that supply line from Tanais long enough to supply such a flotilla probably IS feasible. And then that flotilla can be oared and sailed into the Mare Hyrcanus (Caspian Sea) to land on the south shore and attack not only the Parthian Empire but Parthia Proper and Albania (now known as Azerbijan and Media. (We can't get there from here! But we can get there from there.) Thus providing a way to conquer and perhaps even hold Parthia as a Roman province and opening a new way or two to the East, to Han Serica.
Because profitable trade and conquest routes to places that Rome DOES want to get to easy are a powerful incentive for Rome to conquer, at least to some degree, places in northern and eastern Europe it otherwise might not be interested in at all. And that conquest need not take up too much in the way of resources if the population being subjugated is relatively low. More like forts (yes, slavic locals will probably call them kremlins;)) at strategic places along rivers that also function as trading posts for the locals. Think the way the Russians subdued Siberia from the 16th to the 18th Century with just a few trading posts. Or for that matter, how the Varangian Russ established their control over the Slavs IOTL. The Romans can do it too. Down the Tir (Oder) or Vistillus to the Mare Suebicum (Baltic Sea then up the Daughava or Neva to portages to the Rha River. Then down the Rha. Small forts every few miles, but not too many Roman troops. No more than the land can support. The land can't support many barbarian Venedae and Eesti either. And yes, Sarmatia does have to be incorporated into the Empire for this scenario to work.
As time goes on, population will increase as technology for agriculture in the North improves. Rye farming. Horse (and/or moose and reindeer) collars. Mouldboard plows. Maybe even moose domestication. Familiarity with Romans breeds civilization but also contempt. Rome's hold finally weakens by the 3rd or 4th Century from the Langobards to the Heruli to the Chuds to the Saami to the Venedae to the threatening Huns and Goturks and Hepthalites.
 
An increased usurpation due to further expansion is an important point. Perhaps this was the reason why Augustus advised his successors not to expand any further (if he ever did)?

An offensive roman exercitus was usually 6-8 (4-12) legions strong plus attached auxilia. The principes tried to lead such big armies themselves, in order to avoid usurpations or just honor & glory for somebody else, who could afterwards become dangerous in the political arena. Augustus was in a rather good situation with loyal friends like Agrippa or trusted family members like Drusus and Tiberius. Later emperors often mistrusted every senator/legate or family member, if not the designated heir himself. If he had and adult heir at all.

But for an offensive strategy and also for a more effective defensive strategy you need big regional field armies led by competent commanders. The romans implemented that after Constantin with the big field armies in Gallia, Pannonia, Moesia and Syria. They actually had something comparable in the first half of the 1st century until Claudius or Domitian. Then they started to spread the units along the borders and split commands as much as possible. More by political reasons and justified paranoia, than by military reasons.

So if you like to establish a timeline with a more offensive roman empire, you better change the political system of the principate first, in order to allow such big army-groups without a high risk for usurpation. Don't ask me how that could work exactly.

Actually I don't believe, that a border Elbe - Sudeten Mountains - Carpatian Mountains, which was perhaps Augustus' grand strategy is that different from the Rhine - Danube border. You need perhaps the same amount of legions you had before. The border is about 20% shorter, but you have an increased effort to avoid revolts in the first century of pacification as always. The distance from the lower Elbe to the Alpes is about 2 days with horse relay, assuming the romans establish streets as usual. And Hamburg is not further afar from Rome than London anyways.

In the East the situation might be much more dangerous. Imagine 6-8 legions in a province Media Magna controlling the Client Kings in Persis, Parthia, Susiana and Charakene and supporting the new roman governors in Mesopotamia and Armenia which have perhaps just 1-2 legions. This guy is far away from Rome, has a ton of money due to these rich provinces and is under permanent influence of powerful and rich oriental nobles. I bet, some roman legate would not resist to become the new King of Kings by himself; not neccessarily marching on Rome like usual. The romans never had to deal with strong separatism, now they have to.

Just to repeat my point: In a timeline with a more offensive Rome, you have to change the roman political system first. This is perhaps more critical in the East, than in the North.
 
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