German victory at the Battle of Britain

Coulsdon Eagle

Monthly Donor
As a first :
What "rules" do you talk about ? ... rather new to me that there were (or are) any such rules with juridical weight (aka written "laws")​

I wonder if it would be even necessary to do so.
However, passing a bill in the commons as well as the lords (who often enough in british history had from time to time kind of an "own" life apart from party politics) ... would require quite some time.
Maybe something else might be possible :
Couldn't the King renounce or suspend the peerage ? ... maybe only for some time ? ... kinda "leave" or "holiday" of peerage ? ... or due to the extraordinary circumstances of the "National Emergency" (of war) at hands ?​
Then it would be certainly not too problematic to find a 'safe' Tory-constituency its actual MP resigning and Halifax gets through at the following by-election, getting that way his seat in the commons.​


Hmmm the wiki article @McPherson kindly linked to sounds further down quite different. To quote the most... 'outstanding' comment : Nevertheless these notions of support for Halifax as well as such on this site are all well sourced.
What are sources for the opposite the lack of supportas stated ?

Well, from the very article you linked: "Attlee & Greenwood are unable to distinguish between the PM & Halifax and are not prepared to serve under the latter". That's the original emphasis, not mine.

If you are relying on Beaverbrook's quote, I would remind you he despised Attlee & is about as reliable & self-seeking as Boothby, whose own words appear above. Selective?

Arthur Greenwood was strongly pro-Churchill, and was at the lunch with Clem Davies when they persuaded Attlee to back Churchill and not Halifax. Boothby's quote is on the reported outcome.

Chamberlain by Graham Macklin: "Later that day Chamberlain learned that Labour wanted Churchill, leaving him with little choice but to propose Churchill's name to the King whilst tendering his resignation."

This is borne out by a letter from Chamberlain to his sister Ida on 11 May: "Sent for Attlee & Greenwood... to ask whether the labour [sic] party would join a government under me or if not under someone else. I did not name the someone else.. but I understood they favoured Halifax, and I had him in mind... Later I heard that the labour [sic] party had changed their minds and were veering towards Winston and I agreed with him & Halifax that I would put Winston's name to the King." [Sheila Lawlor: Churchill & The Politics of War 1940-1941.]

Francis Beckett in Clem Attlee: Labour's Great Reformer. "Chamberlain preferred Halifax, and among Chamberlain's friends grew the rumour that, Labour too, would prefer Halifax, because they had never forgiven Churchill for ordering troops to fire on striking Welsh miners in the early 1920s. Perhaps some Labour figures did. Hugh Dalton certainly preferred him - he said so in his diary - and he seems to think his leader did, too. But there is serious doubt about that. Major Attlee, the Gallipoli veteran, belived that Churchill's Gallipoli plan had been a brilliant strategic concept, frustrated by stupid generals unable to think beyond the idea of flinging millions of men out of Flanders trenches and into hails of German bullets. Churchill had not only been right about the last war; he had been right about this one, too, and Halifax had been wrong. 'Queer bird, Halifax,' said Attlee in one of those asides his colleagues started to treasure; 'Very humourous, all hunting and Holy Communion.'"

And Dalton soon changed his tune, referring to Churchill as: "The only man we have for this hour."

Manny Shinwell; "[Halifax] a namby-pamby Foreign Secretary who could deal with the diplomatic stuff but was not particularly capable. There was no-one else other than Winston Churchill."

John Parker: "Halifax was not acceptable to the Labour Party."

On the early evening of 9 May Margesson, the government's chief whip reported to Chamberlain that opinion among Tory MPs was "veering towards Churchill," although in fairness he did this only after Halifax's comments about the difficulties of being a peer.

Boothby: "Opinion is hardening against Halifax as Prime Minister. I am doing my best to foster this but I cannot feel he is, in any circumstances, the right man." [Leo McKinistry Attlee & Churchill: Allies in War, Adversaries in Peace."]

"I was certainly not among those Labour leaders who would have preferred Lord Halifax. To my mind, at that juncture, one requirement was imperative and overrode every consideration: we had to win the war. I was convinced that Winston Churchill stood head and shoulders above any other possible prime minister. I personally was relieved when I knew that he could have the job if he wished it. My own experience of the First World War, and my readings in history, had convinced me that the prime minister should be a man who knew what war meant, in terms of the personal suffering of the man in the line, in terms of high strategy, and in terms of that crucial issue—how the generals got on with their civilian bosses. I saw nobody around who could qualify except Winston. And I felt that he qualified superbly. " Attlee - admittedly in hindsight - on great contemporaries.

The Times 12 May 1940 reported that when the Labour Party and Liberal Party voted to join the National Government, they stated that the preferred Churchill as leader. Of course, this could be a little propaganda.

And I've not even reached Michael Foot and Guilty Men! Or located Robert Rhodes James or William Manchester's wonderful books.

Chamberlain & Halifax knew that the new PM had to have the support of Labour, even though parliamentary arithmetic gave the Tories a solid majority on paper. But Labour changed horses and there was no great cry from the government's back benches for Halifax. If there had been the latter may have put up a fight: that he did not tends to suggest any support was ebbing away.

Well, was there a groundswell of support for Halifax? If there was (which I doubt) it melted away without even a whimper if you believe the Chief Whip.

On parliamentary short-cuts from Wiki: -
"Churchill was impressed by Bevin's opposition to trade-union pacifism and his appetite for work (according to Churchill, Bevin was by 'far the most distinguished man that the Labour Party have thrown up in my time'), and appointed Bevin to the position of Minister of Labour and National Service.[14] As Bevin was not actually an MP at the time, to remove the resulting constitutional anomaly, a parliamentary position was hurriedly found for him and Bevin was elected unopposed to the House of Commons as Member of Parliament (MP) for the London constituency of Wandsworth Central.[15] "
As you suggest, under emergency powers the government could do pretty much anything. Getting around Halifax being a peer would not tax them too much if it was worth it. Given even Halifax's supporters, such as Boothby, thought he was the wrong man at the wrong time, it wasn't.
 

Coulsdon Eagle

Monthly Donor
I'm an anti-imperialist. And while he smoozed well in Washington as he was instructed by the crown governement, previously he made friends with 'the wrong crowd".



Nice ex-post facto alibi, there. (Italics... mine.).

Americans did not actually warm up to him all that well, especially the isolationists of the period. It must be remarked that Halifax had his mission and his orders, but even his "friends" on this side of the big pond were wary of him.

Untrustworthy, as his nickname "Holy Fox" implies.
Actually the nickname was for his love of fox hunting and (obviously) a phonetic play on his earldom.
 
Another little problem...

The Germans managed in their supreme competence to futz two very important things: geo-positioning of radio transmitters with X-Great precision necessary and co-ordinate matching those positions with photomapped locations of their recon runs.

Finding a runway or a flat patch of grass pastureland is nice. Finding a nest of radio transmitters in a farm village in the Midlands might be somewhat more useful and need a photo run with someone who knows what a co-locator control station GIC center looks like to ID it.

Don't figure out these little things, even with competent intel weenies and watch the targeteers bolo.

BTW. If the RAF retreats OOR, the radar line can become portable and still provide the needed minimum 15 minute warning.

The Stupid shall be KIlled.

That is 1938 on, folks.

Look at all that nice HILLY topo. See those fat ridges running SW to NE? That means especially to the NW of London, that hilltops for radar sites there are a plenty.

Typical detection times for the Germans stacking up over and to the south of Calais is still 30 minutes from there. Plenty of time for Alert FIVE ON THE GROUND to meet Mister Heinkel from bases in the Midlands.

And since many of us know the Americans in 1940 were a couple of years behind the UK in radar I will not mention that the SCR270 being monkeyed with at the time of the BOB gave warning of a FULL HOUR of inbounds and loved being driven up a road to a nice hill about 200 to 300 meters above the countryside, and was MOBILE.

So... the British can rig up something mobile (and did.) to backstop Chain Home as I just described to you.

The LW is SCREWED.
Please excuse my ignorance but I didn’t necessarily follow all your arguments here, you appear to be applying late war technology to an early war scenario in part.

So my interpretation of what you have written is as follows (please correct me if get anything wrong):

  • It was easy to locate and photograph obvious features such as airfields but not radar equipment or control centres especially as they didn’t know what they were looking for. This is especially true for such equipment based in villages in the Midlands.
  • If Fighter Command is forced to move operations to the Midlands it can rely on mobile radar to assist in early warning. The SCR 268 was contemporary with early British mobile Radar.
  • Another contemporary system from the USA was the SCR 270 which had a similar capability to the Chain Home radio direction finding equipment used by the UK. The mobile version was first deployed in 1941 and used 4 large vehicles to transport it.
  • From the high ground north of London mobile radar can be used to provide the required warning time for RAF squadrons at readiness stationed north of London to meet the Luftwaffe raids before they reach their targets mainly because the Germans took 30 minutes to form up above Calais.
Sooooooo… to reply.

  • Yes, airfields were easy to spot from the air as were the RAFs Chain Home setups, in fact they were visible from the French coast they were that big. Operations rooms were at the airfields and were so inconspicuous that the Germans, even if they knew they existed, would have struggled to pick them out from all the other offices, mess rooms, shower blocks, tool stores etc. It was always pure chance when an Operations room was damaged. I struggle to understand why you mentioned villages in the Midlands, sorry.
  • Personally, I have no doubt in my mind that a withdrawal to the Midlands would never happen. In doing so Fighter Command would NOT be able to operate effectively as the infrastructure really wouldn’t allow it. Moving north of London there is just the Debden and Duxford sectors that would be within easy range of the south coast of England and there is no way that 20-30 squadrons could be accommodated and controlled in the kind of way they were during the BoB.
  • The UK was not as far forward in Radar technology as you would imagine, it was in the use of the equipment that it excelled. Even with the Chain Home coverage only about 25% of fighter sorties resulted in an interception as the majority of sorties were still patrols. As for the UKs mobile radar equipment there was the MB1 unit which had an effective range of 50 miles, much less than the SCR 270 which was a much bigger beast.
  • Given the short range of the MB1 radar there is no way that adequate early warning could be given from positions north of London they would have to be sited within 20 miles of the coast which is actually very feasible even in an invasion scenario.
 

McPherson

Banned
Please excuse my ignorance but I didn’t necessarily follow all your arguments here, you appear to be applying late war technology to an early war scenario in part.

SWPOA 1942. Americans and Australians practice air defense in the Japanese northern Australia bombing campaign around APRIL-MAY using British 1940 IADS techniques and their own tech assets (*From circa 1938-1940 still the US SCR270 air threat detection radar, whose field trials and prototype op-eval occurred in Maryland in 1939.) So I am surprised to discover the British did not have mobile air search radars as good during the BoB, 1 year earlier for it was the SCR270 that gave air raid warning at Pearl Harbor as intended and which was IGNORED.

A whole 30 minutes. Unbelievable. And people wonder why Kimmel and Short were relieved. They were lucky not to wind up cashiered or worse.

  • Yes, airfields were easy to spot from the air as were the RAFs Chain Home setups, in fact they were visible from the French coast they were that big. Operations rooms were at the airfields and were so inconspicuous that the Germans, even if they knew they existed, would have struggled to pick them out from all the other offices, mess rooms, shower blocks, tool stores etc. It was always pure chance when an Operations room was damaged. I struggle to understand why you mentioned villages in the Midlands, sorry.
  • Personally, I have no doubt in my mind that a withdrawal to the Midlands would never happen. In doing so Fighter Command would NOT be able to operate effectively as the infrastructure really wouldn’t allow it. Moving north of London there is just the Debden and Duxford sectors that would be within easy range of the south coast of England and there is no way that 20-30 squadrons could be accommodated and controlled in the kind of way they were during the BoB.
  • The UK was not as far forward in Radar technology as you would imagine, it was in the use of the equipment that it excelled. Even with the Chain Home coverage only about 25% of fighter sorties resulted in an interception as the majority of sorties were still patrols. As for the UKs mobile radar equipment there was the MB1 unit which had an effective range of 50 miles, much less than the SCR 270 which was a much bigger beast.
  • Given the short range of the MB1 radar there is no way that adequate early warning could be given from positions north of London they would have to be sited within 20 miles of the coast which is actually very feasible even in an invasion scenario.
a. airfields are kind of obvious, but the mobile parts need not be. (This is why an air farce needs engineers and road building equipment. Sorry, Farmers; Giles, Southeby, Coxcomb, etc.: your 1400 acres south of the A45 is needed for a fighter putdown strip and a bomb dump. Defense of the realm and all that stuff.) The av-gas bowser trucks and the flatbeds with the earth graders and bulldozers and the Marston matte will displace the sheep and the corn, thereby. )
b. Hmm. Why would the radars not be field mobile? Why would GCI centers not be at least road mobile? Vans can hide in barns and under haystacks.
Artwork-showing-a-map-of-Battle-of-Britain-airfields-of-South-East-England-1940.jpg


c. This is a Bolo. (^^^)

d. That is the limit of BF109 reach BTW.

e. Proper infrastructure would have the forward RAF fields as putdowns for fuel and rearm only with the main depot and basing fields just out of BF109 reach to the NW, which the RAF, since it had accurate technical intelli8gence on German aircraft, could figure out. As long as J, K, W and G could not be Rhubarbed, the RAF is in business, no matter what nonsense the LW tries. Conversely depot fields sufficient to support the putdown strips forward should have been present in sufficient numbers. And appear no0t to have been laid out in the early part of the BoB.

f. Co-located GCI stations hidden in villages are those additional vans in barns (and haystacks) and rooms in school houses previously mentioned as desirable. Rigging up landlines off the local telephone exchanges is childs' play. It is the ground to air radio channels (4 channel setup?) that is the weak elbow in the soup, and which German RDF obviously missed. So the directors/centers do not get photo IDed and bombed. (Something which the IJNAS in northern Australia DID do=> hence the mobile nature of the Australian application of their IADS in the SWPOA in 1942.)
 
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a. airfields are kind of obvious, but the mobile parts need not be. (This is why an air farce needs engineers and road building equipment. Sorry, Farmers; Giles, Southeby, Coxcomb, etc.: your 1400 acres south of the A45 is needed for a fighter putdown strip and a bomb dump. Defense of the realm and all that stuff.) The av-gas bowser trucks and the flatbeds with the earth graders and bulldozers and the Marston matte will displace the sheep and the corn, thereby. )

b. Hmm. Why would the radars not be field mobile? Why would GCI centers not be at least road mobile? Vans can hide in barns and under haystacks.

[MAP REMOVED]

c. This is a Bolo. (^^^)

d. That is the limit of BF109 reach BTW.

e. Proper infrastructure would have the forward RAF fields as putdowns for fuel and rearm only with the main depot and basing fields just out of BF109 reach to the NW, which the RAF, since it had accurate technical intelli8gence on German aircraft, could figure out. As long as J, K, W and G could not be Rhubarbed, the RAF is in business, no matter what nonsense the LW tries. Conversely depot fields sufficient to support the putdown strips forward should have been present in sufficient numbers. And appear no0t to have been laid out in the early part of the BoB.

f. Co-located GCI stations hidden in villages are those additional vans in barns (and haystacks) and rooms in school houses previously mentioned as desirable. Rigging up landlines off the local telephone exchanges is childs' play. It is the ground to air radio channels (4 channel setup?) that is the weak elbow in the soup, and which German RDF obviously missed. So the directors/centers do not get photo IDed and bombed. (Something which the IJNAS in northern Australia DID do=> hence the mobile nature of the Australian application of their IADS in the SWPOA in 1942.)

Lets take those points in turn…

a) The Dowding system relied on fixed assets not mobile assets, it was after all a defence system and therefore didn’t need to mobile.

The available radar was Chain Home with a range of 80-100 miles which was restricted to forward facing detection only (ie out to sea) and needed data from two or more sites to calculate vector data for incoming raids. As the CH was unable to accurately plot aircraft below 5000ft the Chain Home Low sites were introduced that had a range of 30-50 miles and filled in the gaps of the CH data. To supplement these were the MB1 (and possibly MB2) mobile units that were in essence mini versions of the CH radars using a 105ft mast and command van. Again the range was 30-50 miles with limited low level detection and limited detection above 20,000ft. You can understand why, after capturing an example in France, the Germans thought British radar technology was primitive.

Radar data was passed to the Fighter Command HQ filter room to generate enemy raid plots which were sent out to the relevant Group and Sector Operations Rooms where they were combined with observer Corp information to trace the course of the raids. None of these facilities were or could be mobile as they relied on dozens of phone lines connected to an independent network. When Biggin Hill had to move its Ops Room to a local shop it took roughly a week to set up the necessary telecommunications network to allow normal operations to continue in the sector. If there’s any further questions you have about how this all worked please feel free to ask.

b) SEE ABOVE

c) The map you provided has a few errors in it, not major, just that need a little clarification. Firstly there were Sector Stations, Satellite Airfields, Forward Airfields and emergency landing grounds; the map you provided has these all mixed in together.
  • Manston was only available as an emergency landing ground for most of the battle as was Lympne,
  • Hawkinge was a Forward Airfield (Squadrons would fly there in the morning, carry out operations then return to their home field in the evening),
  • West Malling was an incomplete Satellite to Biggin Hill and as such was only used as an emergency landing ground,
  • Detling was not a Fighter Command site and as such was also used as an emergency landing ground
  • Heathrow was not used as a base and as far as I’m aware was only ever used as an emergency landing ground,
  • Eastchurch, Ford, Thorney Island, Gosport to name but a few have not been included on the map but they were all classified as emergency landing grounds

d) Raids escorted by the Bf109 could reach as far as Debden and Duxford at a push with maybe five or ten minutes combat time. Without effective RAF resistance in south east England the likelihood of attacks on these airfields would increase significantly.

e) See point C above for dispersal of airfields including ‘depot fields’ as you have called them or emergency landing grounds in RAF terminology. Note again, not all of the emergency landing grounds are present on the map you included. Also note sectors J (Coltishall), W (Filton) and K (Pembrey??) were, at 100 miles plus, too far from London and the SE to really have any effect.

f)I think this has already been covered above in various points. The Dowding system was set up to defend the British Isles and as such relied on static defences as opposed to mobile assets. They just didn’t need anything mobile and as a result the mobile assets were pretty under developed.
 

McPherson

Banned
Reference map. Source: (From "Blackout and All Clear" by Connie Willis. Additional: work by McPherson.)

BoB-8.png


Lets take those points in turn…

a) The Dowding system relied on fixed assets not mobile assets, it was after all a defence system and therefore didn’t need to mobile.

The available radar was Chain Home with a range of 80-100 miles which was restricted to forward facing detection only (ie out to sea) and needed data from two or more sites to calculate vector data for incoming raids. As the CH was unable to accurately plot aircraft below 5000ft the Chain Home Low sites were introduced that had a range of 30-50 miles and filled in the gaps of the CH data. To supplement these were the MB1 (and possibly MB2) mobile units that were in essence mini versions of the CH radars using a 105ft mast and command van. Again the range was 30-50 miles with limited low level detection and limited detection above 20,000ft. You can understand why, after capturing an example in France, the Germans thought British radar technology was primitive.

Radar data was passed to the Fighter Command HQ filter room to generate enemy raid plots which were sent out to the relevant Group and Sector Operations Rooms where they were combined with observer Corp information to trace the course of the raids. None of these facilities were or could be mobile as they relied on dozens of phone lines connected to an independent network. When Biggin Hill had to move its Ops Room to a local shop it took roughly a week to set up the necessary telecommunications network to allow normal operations to continue in the sector. If there’s any further questions you have about how this all worked please feel free to ask.

b) SEE ABOVE

c) The map you provided has a few errors in it, not major, just that need a little clarification. Firstly there were Sector Stations, Satellite Airfields, Forward Airfields and emergency landing grounds; the map you provided has these all mixed in together.
  • Manston was only available as an emergency landing ground for most of the battle as was Lympne,
  • Hawkinge was a Forward Airfield (Squadrons would fly there in the morning, carry out operations then return to their home field in the evening),
  • West Malling was an incomplete Satellite to Biggin Hill and as such was only used as an emergency landing ground,
  • Detling was not a Fighter Command site and as such was also used as an emergency landing ground
  • Heathrow was not used as a base and as far as I’m aware was only ever used as an emergency landing ground,
  • Eastchurch, Ford, Thorney Island, Gosport to name but a few have not been included on the map but they were all classified as emergency landing grounds

d) Raids escorted by the Bf109 could reach as far as Debden and Duxford at a push with maybe five or ten minutes combat time. Without effective RAF resistance in south east England the likelihood of attacks on these airfields would increase significantly.

e) See point C above for dispersal of airfields including ‘depot fields’ as you have called them or emergency landing grounds in RAF terminology. Note again, not all of the emergency landing grounds are present on the map you included. Also note sectors J (Coltishall), W (Filton) and K (Pembrey??) were, at 100 miles plus, too far from London and the SE to really have any effect.

f)I think this has already been covered above in various points. The Dowding system was set up to defend the British Isles and as such relied on static defences as opposed to mobile assets. They just didn’t need anything mobile and as a result the mobile assets were pretty under developed.

1. When the claims are made that aircraft have so many minutes aloft at such and such a place I can do the airpower circle overlays to present a visual air battle representation of the situation. In the above map: blue is based on the HE 111 with 60% carriage, and green is BF 109 with fighter loadout, air to air, no belly tanks. The measurement metric is Coventry-Calais airfield complex for the HE 111 and the BF 109 is Calais airfield complex to London with air combat time at military power at 10 minutes for each, ingress-egress at best cruise altitude (about 4,000 meters), per aircraft.

2. When I use the term "putdown strip", that refers to a grass field or something flatland plated over that a plane can set down on to be refueled and rearmed. An emergency landing field IOW. A "depot field" is a full service airbase where anything an aircraft needs from repair and maintenance to GCI control is available, including replacement pilots. For example; before General Short screwed up the air defense plan for Pearl Harbor, part of the dispersal plan was to use sections of Oahu highway as putdown strips for fighters as "dispersal fuel and rearm points". Some former sheep farms were also slated to be used and were so used Hickam and Wheeler were "depot fields".

3. Debden and Duxford look to be 5 minutes ACT not 10 as over London for a BF 109.

4. My squawk about the lack of depot fields (full service air bases) is back in the southern and eastern boundary area of FCG 12. The lack of fallback facilities in that region (I count no more than 4.), is what I find to be a battle management error as to logistics. YMMV on this.

5. This map shows radar gap coverage alleys in the vicinities of Norwich and Portsmouth. I bet the Germans exploited those gaps for Low High Low raids.

6. The HE 111s could reach as far as the Midlands, on the SE and S threat axis, with reduced bomb loads. So for those who have a complaint about the airpower circles for type, again this is based 60% carriage to Coventry from the Calais air complex and 10 minutes over target.

7. Mobile GCI systems, radars, commo and logistics support; allow the defending air farce to make adjustments in coverage. Errors in siting and gaps caused by the enemy in a fixed defense can be "plugged" this way.

8. A whole week to reconstitute Biggin Hill? Lesson learned is that the independent phone system implemented needs redundant B site and C site loci. Also a plan to piggyback off the commercial exchange might be a good idea in case the prime network goes down.

9. I still think US radar was inferior as of September 1940 as to tech characteristics and to operational command and control to British ones. US systems were still very experimental and remained so until about mid 1942. (Way too long.) OTOH, the systems being tested, were mainly "mobile". This is not prescience or a better systems approach at all. It has more to do with the expeditionary nature of the war the Americans expected to fight. They were going to bring their radars with them to the party.

10. I do have a lot of questions about when the Empire Training system started to produce a good flow of replacement pilots, and how pilot shortages affected the BoB for the RAF. AIUI from various air campaigns, it was never the numbers of aircraft, it was THE PILOTS and ground establishment who determined the air campaign of the WWII era. Kill the trained people and the 200 or so backlog planes in the standing reserve was kind of useless.
 
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