German unrestricted submarine warfare in WW1.

[Garrison]

The statement that the German army was on the verge of collapse in 1917 is false. Full stop.

Yeah so basically you know as little about WWI as WWII, got it.

 

[Mikestone8]

You stated the German army was on the verge of collapse in 1917. This statement is false. The German army was not on the verge of collapse in 1917.

Perhaps "had been" would be nearer the truth than "was".

What with Verdun, the Somme and the Brusilov Offensive all going on more or less together, the Germans had been very hard pressed in 1916, and as far as they could see the following year was likely to be worse. Hence their gambling on USW and the ZT. In fact, they were over the worst - neither Russia nor France would ever be the same again - but didn't know it.

 

[BlondieBC]

Assuming 450,000 tons is the maximum sustainable submarine figure, and assuming that 600,000 tons sustained is the figure to force the UK out of the war, then the other 150,000 tons per month would have to come by way of surface raiders.

Or more subs. We need about 15 more subs on patrol per day which means about 45 more need to be built, plus you have to cover losses. You get about 20 subs per capital ship on prewar budgets, so we are looking at a major refocus on building subs over capital ships. You basically need the Kaiser and Admiralty to accept the need to win this war now, and then worry about the postwar navy and budget issues, well, post peace treaty.

Interestingly enough, the Germans were regularly ordering more subs, then they were delaying or cancelling orders. It is why some of the subs have such really odd completion times compared to others with very similar numbers. The Admirals had a HUGE fear of post war budget cuts. This fear was rational due to the cost of the war. They also feared that if they had a bunch of subs, they would be forced to keep them post war. And that these heavily used subs of possibly obsolete technology would remain in the navy rolls and suck budget from the big ships. This also is not a irrational fear.

So they wanted to have "just enough" subs to win the war.

 

[Glenn239]

Perhaps "had been" would be nearer the truth than "was".

Neither is correct. The German army simply was not on the point of collapse until August or September 1918. In 1917 the German army fought in the following large battles or campaigns -

Kerensky offensive.
Arras
Passchendaele
Neville Offensive
Cambrai
Caperetto.

And it won them all. We are to believe that an army that won 6 out of 6 major battles it fought in was an army about to collapse? Had that been the case, Arras alone would have torn the whole Flanders front wide open.

Hence their gambling on USW and the ZT. In fact, they were over the worst - neither Russia nor France would ever be the same again - but didn't know it.

What was Bethmann arguing in January 1917 against USW, if not precisely that point?

IMO, there is more to it, and it goes to the general disdain and disrespect of the GGS towards political limitations in the conduct of military campaigns. In 1917, Ludendorff was repeating the same attitude towards international law as was Moltke in 1913 when contemplating Belgium; in both cases the military advantages were overestimated and the political costs were underestimated.

 

[Glenn239]

Or more subs. We need about 15 more subs on patrol per day which means about 45 more need to be built, plus you have to cover losses. You get about 20 subs per capital ship on prewar budgets, so we are looking at a major refocus on building subs over capital ships. You basically need the Kaiser and Admiralty to accept the need to win this war now, and then worry about the postwar navy and budget issues, well, post peace treaty.

The principle of combined arms warfare is that the combination of different systems adds up to more than the sum of the individual parts. So, assuming that U-boats were overrepresented in the German building program, what was missing was,

(1) long range aircraft, (technically infeasible, bases not available).
(2) Strong light cruiser build program, "Atlantic cruisers")
(3) Willingness to fight with, and lose in small battles, at least 50-75% of the battleships/battlecruisers of the HSF.
(4) Better underway North Atlantic logistics support, (ie, conversion of Mackensen into underway support ship on the slipway).
(5) Better command and control, coordinated Atlantic battle command.

Take, for example, convoys. These were the bane of U-boats, but in just a handful of 1917 raids off Norway, were shown to be easy pickings for even small surface forces. A couple of 2-4 ship hunting groups in the Western Approaches would have significantly assisted the U-boats, and vice versa.

 

[Mikestone8]

What was Bethmann arguing in January 1917 against USW, if not precisely that point?

But of course he had no ay of proving it, given thsat the Russian Revolurion was still two months in the future, and the French mutinies four months away.

The Germans in 1916 had inflicted serious injuries on the Allies, but these didn't show until it was too late.