German territorial gains in the West in the event of a German WWI victory?

CaliGuy

Banned
Had Germany and the Central Powers won WWI, which territories--other than iron ore-rich Briey and Longwy--would they have annexed in the West?
 
Had Germany and the Central Powers won WWI, which territories--other than iron ore-rich Briey and Longwy--would they have annexed in the West?

Arthur Link's *Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era* discuses (p. 259) Germany's peace terms as of 1916:

"On December 12, therefore, the Chancellor announced to an excited Reichstag that the Imperial government was ready to join with its enemies to end the war. 18 He said nothing about the German terms, which, if they had been disclosed, would have shocked the world. They included, in the East, establishment of the Kingdom of Poland and German annexation of the Baltic provinces of Courland and Lithuania; in the West, "guarantees in Belgium" or the annexation of Liege and "corresponding areas," annexation of Luxemburg and the French territories of Briey and Longwy, which contained great iron deposits, strategic boundary adjustments in Alsace-Lorraine, and indemnities; overseas, the return of German colonies, except Kiaochow, the Carolines, and the Marianas, and acquisition of all or part of the Belgian Congo.... These were the terms agreed upon by the Emperor, Hindenburg, and Bethmann-Hollweg. See Official German Documents, II, 1059-1062, 1064. For an excellent discussion see Hans W. Gatzke, Germany's Drive to the West (Baltimore, 1950), pp. 139-144." https://archive.org/stream/woodrowwilsonand007665mbp#page/n301/mode/2up/

So apart from the areas you mention, Liege and Luxembourg seem the most likely annexations in the West. Note that Count Monts, former ambassador to Rome, a regular contributor to the *Berliner Tageblatt* and a relative moderate who believed that Germany must eventually make peace with Britain (since both nations had more to fear from the Russian "colossus" than from each other) "suggested that Britain might be persuaded to accept German annexation of the Belgian border town of Liege. Other demands might include the French railways in Turkish Anatolia, a war indemnity, and the iron fields of Briey in exchange for Thann. At the very least, Monts believed, Germany would need to annex Liege and Luxembourg in order to guarantee the future security of the Rhineland industrial area..." https://books.google.com/books?id=iCGEPwGvqVUC&pg=PA122
 

CaliGuy

Banned
Arthur Link's *Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era* discuses (p. 259) Germany's peace terms as of 1916:

"On December 12, therefore, the Chancellor announced to an excited Reichstag that the Imperial government was ready to join with its enemies to end the war. 18 He said nothing about the German terms, which, if they had been disclosed, would have shocked the world. They included, in the East, establishment of the Kingdom of Poland and German annexation of the Baltic provinces of Courland and Lithuania; in the West, "guarantees in Belgium" or the annexation of Liege and "corresponding areas," annexation of Luxemburg and the French territories of Briey and Longwy, which contained great iron deposits, strategic boundary adjustments in Alsace-Lorraine, and indemnities; overseas, the return of German colonies, except Kiaochow, the Carolines, and the Marianas, and acquisition of all or part of the Belgian Congo.... These were the terms agreed upon by the Emperor, Hindenburg, and Bethmann-Hollweg. See Official German Documents, II, 1059-1062, 1064. For an excellent discussion see Hans W. Gatzke, Germany's Drive to the West (Baltimore, 1950), pp. 139-144." https://archive.org/stream/woodrowwilsonand007665mbp#page/n301/mode/2up/

So apart from the areas you mention, Liege and Luxembourg seem the most likely annexations in the West. Note that Count Monts, former ambassador to Rome, a regular contributor to the *Berliner Tageblatt* and a relative moderate who believed that Germany must eventually make peace with Britain (since both nations had more to fear from the Russian "colossus" than from each other) "suggested that Britain might be persuaded to accept German annexation of the Belgian border town of Liege. Other demands might include the French railways in Turkish Anatolia, a war indemnity, and the iron fields of Briey in exchange for Thann. At the very least, Monts believed, Germany would need to annex Liege and Luxembourg in order to guarantee the future security of the Rhineland industrial area..." https://books.google.com/books?id=iCGEPwGvqVUC&pg=PA122
Why exactly was Count Monts willing to give up Thann, though?
 
Most everything has already been said but there might be a small readjustment around the Vosges in addition to what's been mentioned. The actual square footage of the western gains would be pretty low.
 
As usual the answer is 'it depends'. The 1914 September programme wish list only set in stone Briey, all the other stuff like Belgium and Northern France was negotiable, not surprising given it was put together by politicians and economic figures. By 1915 Germany was prepared to recognise Belgian sovereignty, but hardened its stance in 1916 and Belgium was to be a protectorate. By December 1916 "the Chancellor was prepared to accept a return to the status quo in the West, even the annexation of Briey was no longer an absolute imperative for him." http://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/war_aims_and_war_aims_discussions By mid 1917 the politics in Germany had swung that the Reichstag would accept peace without annexations and indemnities.

So basically it depends on a lot of things, such as the balance of political power in Germany at the time and how the course of the war affected that balance of power. We could get anything from the annexation of all of Belgium to no annexations in the west at all, or we could even get a dictated peace from the military that the politicians loosen 6 months later, like the Treaty of Berlin in the east.
 
Why exactly was Count Monts willing to give up Thann, though?

Because it was already in French hands, having been overrun in the initial campaign of August 1914. He was willing to let them keep it, in return for the much more valuable Longwy-Briey.
 

CaliGuy

Banned
Because it was already in French hands, having been overrun in the initial campaign of August 1914. He was willing to let them keep it, in return for the much more valuable Longwy-Briey.
Why didn't Germany recapture Thann during the Battle of the Frontiers, though?
 
As usual the answer is 'it depends'. The 1914 September programme wish list only set in stone Briey, all the other stuff like Belgium and Northern France was negotiable, not surprising given it was put together by politicians and economic figures. By 1915 Germany was prepared to recognise Belgian sovereignty, but hardened its stance in 1916 and Belgium was to be a protectorate. By December 1916 "the Chancellor was prepared to accept a return to the status quo in the West, even the annexation of Briey was no longer an absolute imperative for him." http://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/war_aims_and_war_aims_discussions By mid 1917 the politics in Germany had swung that the Reichstag would accept peace without annexations and indemnities.

So basically it depends on a lot of things, such as the balance of political power in Germany at the time and how the course of the war affected that balance of power. We could get anything from the annexation of all of Belgium to no annexations in the west at all, or we could even get a dictated peace from the military that the politicians loosen 6 months later, like the Treaty of Berlin in the east.
This is very true. While the *scare chord* Septemberprogramm was mooted, it was never the set-in-stone policy or diktat some members of this board make it out to be.
Ultimately, imperial gains in the west would depend on:
  • Who surrenders (i.e. only the French, the Allies as a whole, Britain+France see further prosecution of the war as useless and leave Russia twisting in the wind)
  • When is the surrender? 1914 or 1917 make a huge difference.
  • Why is there a surrender? Is there a general peace of exhaustion? Did the US decide to broker peace?
  • What is the internal political situation? Are the generals in control? The politicians? The kaiser? Who has the most say? SPD? Junkers?
Depending on those factors, everything between status quo ante and a land grab is in the cards.
 
This is very true. While the *scare chord* Septemberprogramm was mooted, it was never the set-in-stone policy or diktat some members of this board make it out to be.
Ultimately, imperial gains in the west would depend on:
  • Who surrenders (i.e. only the French, the Allies as a whole, Britain+France see further prosecution of the war as useless and leave Russia twisting in the wind)
  • When is the surrender? 1914 or 1917 make a huge difference.
  • Why is there a surrender? Is there a general peace of exhaustion? Did the US decide to broker peace?
  • What is the internal political situation? Are the generals in control? The politicians? The kaiser? Who has the most say? SPD? Junkers?
Depending on those factors, everything between status quo ante and a land grab is in the cards.

I'd never really given it much thought until recently but by late 1916 the political mood in Germany was turning, the December 1916 Peace Proposal could have been quite serious and the things in it a basis for negotiation rather than a list of conqueror demands. By Easter 1917 the Kaiser had given a speech announcing the intention to revoke the Prussian 3 class franchise after the war, illustrating the mood for domestic political change and by mid 1917 the Reichstag majority had changed from the 'war aims' Domestic Truce (Burgfrieden) to a “Peace Resolution” that rejected annexations by force.

Of course by this time Hindy and Ludy had invoked the 1851 Prussian Siege Law which gave Corps district commanders great powers, and by coordinating these Corps districts had taken control of the country to a large extent and marginalised the Reichstag in the process.
 
I'd never really given it much thought until recently but by late 1916 the political mood in Germany was turning, the December 1916 Peace Proposal could have been quite serious and the things in it a basis for negotiation rather than a list of conqueror demands. By Easter 1917 the Kaiser had given a speech announcing the intention to revoke the Prussian 3 class franchise after the war, illustrating the mood for domestic political change and by mid 1917 the Reichstag majority had changed from the 'war aims' Domestic Truce (Burgfrieden) to a “Peace Resolution” that rejected annexations by force.

Of course by this time Hindy and Ludy had invoked the 1851 Prussian Siege Law which gave Corps district commanders great powers, and by coordinating these Corps districts had taken control of the country to a large extent and marginalised the Reichstag in the process.
I'd chalk that up to the (sorry) Anglosphere tendency to lump Imperial and Nazi Germany together. One of these days I am going to start a thread "People who should have suffered a Conveniently Timed Heart Attack throughout history", just to vent my frustrations with how OTL is currently turning out.

So, in summa, the question in the beginning is far to wide. More limited questions are better here (e.g. What if Operation Michael succeeds?).
 
I'd chalk that up to the (sorry) Anglosphere tendency to lump Imperial and Nazi Germany together.

Yes that's true, people love cherry picking evidence to make that fit.

Do non English speaking historians have other interpretations and historiography?
 

Perkeo

Banned
I think there are but 2 scenarions:
1) Germany is content with status quo ante bellum in the west and Brest-Litowsk in the east.
2) Germany does not win WWI. They cannot outperform the French and British - let alone American - economy and break their ability to fight on - all they can hope for is breaking their will.
 
The only thing I really think would always get annexed in any type of CP victory scenario is Briey-Longwy. Everything else depends on when and how they win. But all in all I don't think the western annexations would really be that large.
 
Do non English speaking historians have other interpretations and historiography?
Afaik and with admitted bias, german historians tend to do the same. I can't speak for french, scandinavian and other historians. Although here Fischer has lost much credibility after the british and french openend their archives. Previously, they liked to draw a deterministic line from 1871 directly to 1945. I'd speculate on their motives, but you have to be careful what you say as a german in regards to history. It has been overused for political ends, and I am sick of it.

Here's hoping that we get through next year with only a close call and not the other extreme.
I think there are but 2 scenarions:
1) Germany is content with status quo ante bellum in the west and Brest-Litowsk in the east.
2) Germany does not win WWI. They cannot outperform the French and British - let alone American - economy and break their ability to fight on - all they can hope for is breaking their will.
In regards to 1):
Dig in, retain strategic offense with tactical defense (paradox, I know). Bleed the british and french white, with (almost) no casualties of your own. Somewhere on this very board is an illuminating essay and reasoning for that, but I can't remember where. Although I am quite certain @wiking wrote it. Once they have been bled and the states are in turmoil, walk in and take what you want. In this case, either physically take it or extort the governments with military action. An army/navy used to suppress internal dissent can't well be used on the front lines.

In regards to 2):
I think you buy a bit much into the RIGHTEOUS ALLIED DETERMINATION™ myth here. The french very nearly broke, and the british only plugged that by nearly breaking themselves. Of course, if the US comes in they'll simply drown the Central Powers in men and materiél. An interesting question in this case would be what happens if the americans would have to deal with more than token resistance. Afaik, the wardec was not exactly uncontroversial so if enough Americans die in Flanders' fields, I'd question their ability to ram that war through to the bloody conclusion.
 

Deleted member 1487

Dig in, retain strategic offense with tactical defense (paradox, I know). Bleed the british and french white, with (almost) no casualties of your own. Somewhere on this very board is an illuminating essay and reasoning for that, but I can't remember where. Although I am quite certain @wiking wrote it. Once they have been bled and the states are in turmoil, walk in and take what you want. In this case, either physically take it or extort the governments with military action. An army/navy used to suppress internal dissent can't well be used on the front lines.
Not sure if I wrote it, but that was the idea beyond Verdun initially. Plus also Sherman's Atlanta offensive in 1864:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atlanta_Campaign
 
They cannot outperform the French and British - let alone American - economy and break their ability to fight on - all they can hope for is breaking their will.

The invasion/occupation of France was a huge blow to their economy and the uboat/naval campaign was a significant impediment to the British economy, despite both being significantly underdone compared to their potential. If these campaigns were done a bit better then the economic balance would have shifted in Germany's favour, perhaps enough to win them the war.
 
Yes that's true, people love cherry picking evidence to make that fit.

Do non English speaking historians have other interpretations and historiography?
Not sure about historians, but Dutch school histories basically consider Imperial Germany an 'also there' country on par with 1850-on France (i.e. hardly mentioned). We didn't fight in WW1, so if the story comes up there's plenty of attention for British perfidy in regards to the blockade to balance out the bad things Germany did in Belgium.

It took me until my mid teens to even figure out what the *2nd* reich was that made Nazi Germany the third (the HRE at least gets a mention due to Charles V being Emperor of it, and the Peace of Münster being co-signed with the Peace of Westfalen).
 

Deleted member 94680

Of course by this time Hindy and Ludy had invoked the 1851 Prussian Siege Law which gave Corps district commanders great powers, and by coordinating these Corps districts had taken control of the country to a large extent and marginalised the Reichstag in the process.

Wasn't the more moderate tone of the Reichstag by this point an attempt to highlight differences between the military and the politicians? With at least one eye on the post-War peace settlement (from either a losing or victorious position)?
 
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