Nevertheless, Wever recognised the importance of
strategic bombing. In newly introduced doctrine,
The Conduct of the Aerial Air War in 1935, Wever rejected the theory of Douhet
[27] and outlined five key points to air strategy:
1. To destroy the enemy air force by bombing its bases and aircraft factories, and defeating enemy air forces attacking German targets.
2. To prevent the movement of large enemy ground forces to the decisive areas by destroying railways and roads, particularly bridges and tunnels, which are indispensable for the movement and supply of forces
3. To support the operations of the army formations, independent of railways, i.e, armoured forces and motorised forces, by impeding the enemy advance and participating directly in ground operations.
4. To support naval operations by attacking naval bases, protecting Germany's naval bases and participating directly in naval battles
5. To paralyse the enemy armed forces by stopping production in the armaments factories.
[28]
Wever began planning for a
strategic bomber force and sought to incorporate strategic bombing into a war strategy. He believed that
tactical aircraft should only be used as a step to developing a strategic air force. In May 1934, Wever initiated a seven-year project for the
"Ural Bomber", the bomber that would take the Luftwaffe's bombing campaign into the heart of the
Soviet Union. In 1935, this led to the
Dornier Do 19 and
Junkers Ju 89 prototypes, although both were underpowered. In April 1936, Wever ordered a requirement for 'Bomber A' which would have a range of 6,700 km (4,163 mi) with a 900 kg (1,984 lb) bomb load. However Wever's vision of a "Ural" bomber was never realised,
[29] and his emphasis on strategic aerial operations was lost,
[30] with the only design submittal for Wever's 'Bomber A' that would reach production being
Heinkel's
Projekt 1041, which became officially known on 5 November 1937 as the
Heinkel He 177.
[31]
By the late 1930s the Luftwaffe had no clear purpose. The air force was not subordinated to the army support role, and it was not given any particular strategic mission. German doctrine fell between the two concepts. The Luftwaffe was to be an organisation capable of carrying out broad and general support tasks rather than any specific mission. Mainly, this path was chosen to encourage a more flexible use of air power and offer the ground forces the right conditions for a decisive victory.
In fact, on the outbreak of war, only 15% of the Luftwaffe's aircraft was devoted to ground support operations, exposing a long-held myth that the Luftwaffe was designed for only tactical and operational missions.[32]