German strategy in 1942 if AGC is crushed in the Battle of Moscow

Deleted member 1487

It just saw it's most powerful army wiped out, along with another one and several Allied armies, and was force to retreat all the way back to its 1942 borders just to survive...
Axis ally armies aren't German armies, 6th Army isn't AG-Center, 1941 is not 1942, and 1941 borders are not 1942 offensive start lines. It would be even more shocking as the German army has not known defeat yet or defeat like on that scale.

Not gonna be much different IATL.
Depends on whether there is anyone different involved.

Doubt the list would be any different IATL.
Depends how Hitler reacts and who he alienates
 
Axis ally armies aren't German armies, 6th Army isn't AG-Center, 1941 is not 1942, and 1941 borders are not 1942 offensive start lines. It would be even more shocking as the German army has not known defeat yet or defeat like on that scale.

Except it pretty much is. The only difference is the scale and timing of the disaster, but all the surrounding circumstances and repercussions are similar... almost identical even. Yes, Germany had not known defeat on that scale yet, but so it was at Stalingrad too. So it was when Germany did know defeat on that scale in the years to follow.

Depends on whether there is anyone different involved.

Depends how Hitler reacts and who he alienates

You don't seem to get that, outside of those small circles, the German military was wholly behind Hitler as Fuhrer. They might have argued with him, they might have bucked those orders they disagreed with, they might have grumbled behind his back, they might express dissatisfaction with him but trying to kill him and/or overthrow him? Not just unthinkable to them, but unconscionable as well given their twisted sense of honor. Even the men who Hitler had humiliated and scapegoated were perfectly willing to serve him again when given the opportunity. Even when faced with circumstances grossly more dire then IATLs 1942 (that is, OTLs 1944) the men in the military leadership eagerly passed on Hitler's increasingly extreme directives against any form of surrender without question and did not just do so passively, but also actively took steps to ensure they were followed... usually involving frequent use of the death penalty. In the face of that degree of loyalty, I just don't see things being that different.

I mean, if these Army leadership was as disloyal to Hitler as you are suggesting then they would have overthrown Hitler back in 1934, when the Fuhrer had no real successes to his name and was had a number of their compatriots murdered as part of the Night of the Long Knives. Instead, they would go on to assist Hitler in driving out those of theirs who opposed him during the course of 1936-38.

Now if the guys who made up the resistance OTL manage do manage to kill Hitler through luck IATL, then yeah anything goes. The Wehrmacht leaderships loyalty was to Hitler, not to the Nazi party or the Nazi state (except in so far as the Nazi state was the German state of the time). Even if this all happens in '42, though, Allied terms are not liable to be much different then IOTL... even if they (initially) might phrase them differently.
 
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My initial thoughts would be lots and LOTS of "Ach! Gott in himmel's!" With AGC gone, the Germans don't really have the troops to cover a front of that size. I'd assume that the Russians would still run out of steam, the Moscow counter offensive was really just a huge local offensive, they didn't have the logistics to go much further and gobbling up AGC would take time and cost lives. But in the long and short term the Germans would be up shit creek without a paddle.
 

CaliGuy

Banned
Depends on what happens after. If he tries to follow up and gets smacked down hard in return, then perhaps not.

OK.

No, because the sort of people that would be in charge of the military recognize just how weak their position is and that Stalin is going to break the peace eventually.

Just how eager would Stalin be to break a peace which he has recently concluded, though?
 

Deleted member 1487

Except it pretty much is. The only difference is the scale and timing of the disaster, but all the surrounding circumstances and repercussions are similar... almost identical even. Yes, Germany had not known defeat on that scale yet, but so it was at Stalingrad too. So it was when Germany did know defeat on that scale in the years to follow.
Similar on a FAR smaller scale, which didn't fully break the power Hitler had, though it turned a lot more officers over to resistance as they thought Hitler was losing them the war. Also you're forgetting that IOTL in 1941 the 'Hitler was right to order stand fast' during the winter counteroffensives plus the success of 1942 did even more to enhance his power within minds of the officer class, while his removal of officers that failed, like Guderian and von Brauchitsch (or at least he could claim that with a straight face) enhanced his power and removed dissenting voices withing the military (later too von Bock and Halder). By late 1942-early 1943 Hitler's reputation had been enhanced by battlefield results and the officer corps winnowed of people that were turning on Hitler or at least could be scapegoated for failures or at least the failures to comply with his will.

You don't seem to get that, outside of those small circles, the German military was wholly behind Hitler as Fuhrer. They might have argued with him, they might have bucked those orders they disagreed with, they might have grumbled behind his back, they might express dissatisfaction with him but trying to kill him and/or overthrow him? Not just unthinkable to them, but unconscionable as well given their twisted sense of honor. Even the men who Hitler had humiliated and scapegoated were perfectly willing to serve him again when given the opportunity. Even when faced with circumstances grossly more dire then IATLs 1942 (that is, OTLs 1944) the men in the military leadership eagerly passed on Hitler's increasingly extreme directives against any form of surrender without question and did not just do so passively, but also actively took steps to ensure they were followed... usually involving frequent use of the death penalty. In the face of that degree of loyalty, I just don't see things being that different.
Its overly reductionist to simply state that. It was a far more complex situation and their loyalty was largely circumstantial. Of course the German officer class was corrupt as fuck and were being bribed in one way or another (some outright, others with the promise of getting promotions thanks to the expansion of the military, some ideologically aligned with Hitler). I don't really buy the honor argument, that really seems to be more of a post-war rationalization to cover up the bribes issue, going along with a perceived winner, so weird father related emotional issues that Hitler helped fulfill, and their own cowardice to actually act against him. If you buy Halder's talk of wanting to shoot Hitler, he wimped out in the end.

In the case of guys that Hitler fired and brought back, I think it was less an issue of serving Hitler and more one of personal pride of being called back to service, not having to maintain their forced retirement in disgrace, having the ability to continue their profession, and even something as base as getting paid again. The thing was Hitler had a mystique of success that far outweighed his failures when IOTL disaster started cropping up in 1942-43; even in 1941 Hitler was able to get lucky enough to turn into a 'he was right again' moment by going with von Bock's stand fast recommendation. So when set backs like Stalingrad happened, not only had Hitler already taken over OKH, he had winnowed the officer corps even more (von bock and halder were gone by then), expanded the SS, at the end of the debacle the Allies had issued the unconditional surrender proclaimation, and Hitler had more successes than failures on his ledger. There was still hope of a neogotiated peace through strength, so enough officers stuck with him until too late, but even then there were numerous assassination plots that failed in 1943, while the July 20th plotters were putting together and a post-Nazi government.

In 1941 Hitler doesn't control OKH yet, he doesn't have the 'stand fast' success on his side, AG-Center suffers probably at least 1 million casualties (worse than Bagration), 1/3rd of the entire eastern army as a result of the stand fast order, victory is off the table, Hitler had ordered them into the eastern war that went so bad, Hitler probably turns on the army and hamhandedly goes nuts firing people, the public is going to turn on him and the war, while peace post-Hitler is still possible without the US in the war and the unconditional surrender proclamation. I don't think you're figuring the magnitude of the sort of defeat that OP is proposing here in to your views about Hitler political and probably psychological stability here, the German military IOTL wouldn't have suffered a defeat in a single battle of that scale until 1945; the SS and alternatives to the Heer aren't nearly as powerful in 1941 as they were in 1943-45 yet either.

I mean, if these Army leadership was as disloyal to Hitler as you are suggesting then they would have overthrown Hitler back in 1934, when the Fuhrer had no real successes to his name and was had a number of their compatriots murdered as part of the Night of the Long Knives. Instead, they would go on to assist Hitler in driving out those of theirs who opposed him during the course of 1936-38.
Strawman. They didn't do that out of a sense of personal loyalty, they did it because supporting Hitler meant promotion opportunities, increasing military funding, often bribes for upper level officials, crack down on communists/leftists, national stability (even at the point of a bayonet) which tends to be a core conservative principle, and a musclar foreign policy, while the murder of SA thugs in the Night of Long Knives was actually what the army wanted and proved to them that Hitler was a guy that was willing to work with them against their enemies.

A defeat that wipes out 1/3rd of the army based on the orders of Hitler in a campaign that he ordered (officers have a tendency to forget their own complicity in though sorts of things; victory has a 1000 fathers, defeat is an orphan...or Hitler's baby in this situation) shatters the mystique of Hitler being right in a big way and his freak out and relatiation against the officer corps will be outsizes as he tried to blame them for his failures and likely provokes a backlash. The 1934 situation is exactly the opposite to a 1941 scenario as proposed by OP.

Now if the guys who made up the resistance OTL manage do manage to kill Hitler through luck IATL, then yeah anything goes. The Wehrmacht leaderships loyalty was to Hitler, not to the Nazi party or the Nazi state (except in so far as the Nazi state was the German state of the time). Even if this all happens in '42, though, Allied terms are not liable to be much different then IOTL... even if they (initially) might phrase them differently.
Yeah the Nazi have no hope in hell at this point. They were tolerated because of the association with Hitler. I'm not so sure that the terms would be that different if a post-Nazi government is willing to make major concessions, because the Allies aren't really as confident of total victory at an acceptable price.

Just how eager would Stalin be to break a peace which he has recently concluded, though?
If they think they can profit from it, yeah. Revenge.
 
Similar on a FAR smaller scale, which didn't fully break the power Hitler had, though it turned a lot more officers over to resistance as they thought Hitler was losing them the war.

No it didn't. Pretty much all of the officers involved in the Valkyrie Plot were against Hitler well before Stalingrad or even the more recent disasters.

while his removal of officers that failed, like Guderian and von Brauchitsch (or at least he could claim that with a straight face) enhanced his power and removed dissenting voices withing the military (later too von Bock and Halder).

And that will have already been the case IATL.

By late 1942-early 1943 Hitler's reputation had been enhanced by battlefield results and the officer corps winnowed of people that were turning on Hitler or at least could be scapegoated for failures or at least the failures to comply with his will.

And your forgetting that was already the case in by the turn of 1941/1942. Hitler already had a massive string of almost unbroken successes under his belt by then. The mystique was already firmly entrenched by the winter of '41-'42.

Its overly reductionist to simply state that. It was a far more complex situation and their loyalty was largely circumstantial. Of course the German officer class was corrupt as fuck and were being bribed in one way or another (some outright, others with the promise of getting promotions thanks to the expansion of the military, some ideologically aligned with Hitler). I don't really buy the honor argument, that really seems to be more of a post-war rationalization to cover up the bribes issue, going along with a perceived winner, so weird father related emotional issues that Hitler helped fulfill, and their own cowardice to actually act against him. If you buy Halder's talk of wanting to shoot Hitler, he wimped out in the end.

You say I'm reductionist for noting the motivation of their loyalty stemmed from a complex series of personal, structural, and ideological views and then you turn around and basically say "It was because they were bribed." Yeah, sure Virginia.

In the case of guys that Hitler fired and brought back, I think it was less an issue of serving Hitler and more one of personal pride of being called back to service, not having to maintain their forced retirements ment in disgrace, having the ability to continue their profession, and even something as base as getting paid again.

Or it was because they respected and were loyal to Hitler and a number of principles he stood for, as they said at the time. After the war, they denied it of course because admitting they actually admired and respected Hitler was no bueno in the post-WW2 environment.

In 1941 Hitler doesn't control OKH yet,

Actually, he does. The encirclement and destruction takes place in the course of January-March 1942, according to the OP. Hitler took control of OKH in December 1941 when he realized the Army wasn't obeying his standfast orders.

he doesn't have the 'stand fast' success on his side,

What he does still have are the successes of Kiev, the initial triumphs in Barbarossa, France and the Low Countries, Scandinavia, Poland, and Munich. This is still quite a formidable repertoire. Furthermore, he can easily dilute responsibility by noting that the army disobeyed his stand fast order at the start and had they obeyed him from the start, everything would have worked out.

AG-Center suffers probably at least 1 million casualties (worse than Bagration),

Actually about as bad, if we consider the totality of the 1944 Soviet Summer Offensive from June to August of which Bagration was merely one part.

1/3rd of the entire eastern army as a result of the stand fast order, victory is off the table, Hitler had ordered them into the eastern war that went so bad, Hitler probably turns on the army and hamhandedly goes nuts firing people, the public is going to turn on him and the war, while peace post-Hitler is still possible without the US in the war and the unconditional surrender proclamation.

Military's response to 1/3rd of the Eastern Army being wiped out in the summer of '44 was to continue backing Hitler, Victory being off the table was the case OTL yet the German military kept backing Hitler, military was complicit in the Eastern War as Hitler liked to remind them, public turned on him and the war OTL and it didn't change anything, US already entered the war in December, unconditional surrender pretty much is already Allied policy in all but name.

I don't think you're figuring the magnitude of the sort of defeat that OP is proposing here in to your views about

No, I'm perfectly aware of the magnitude of the defeat here. I just think you're unaware of what the
German military's response to such defeats actually was historically.

Hitler political and probably psychological stability here, the German military IOTL wouldn't have suffered a defeat in a single battle of that scale until 1945;

1944, actually.

Strawman. They didn't do that out of a sense of personal loyalty, they did it because supporting Hitler meant promotion opportunities, increasing military funding, often bribes for upper level officials, crack down on communists/leftists, national stability (even at the point of a bayonet) which tends to be a core conservative principle, and a musclar foreign policy, while the murder of SA thugs in the Night of Long Knives was actually what the army wanted and proved to them that Hitler was a guy that was willing to work with them against their enemies.

Reductionist. German officers loyalty to Hitler was based on a much more complex combination of delusion, fatalism, military discipline, and honour, not anything so simple as just simple personal gain and self-interest. Had that been the case, they positively would have flocked to the Valkyrie conspirators banner in the aftermath of Kursk, at the latest, out of a sense of self-preservation.

A defeat that wipes out 1/3rd of the army based on the orders of Hitler in a campaign that he ordered (officers have a tendency to forget their own complicity in though sorts of things; victory has a 1000 fathers, defeat is an orphan...or Hitler's baby in this situation)

German officers didn't forget their complicity until after 1945, which is the earliest they could forget. This was mainly because Hitler wouldn't let them forget and was quite effective in reminding them of their own complicity. Such will be the case IATL.

shatters the mystique of Hitler being right in a big way and his freak out and relatiation against the officer corps will be outsizes as he tried to blame them for his failures and likely provokes a backlash.

All this happened OTL, multiple times. Every time, the response of the military was to double down in their support of Hitler's demands for absolute obedience without exception.

Yeah the Nazi have no hope in hell at this point. They were tolerated because of the association with Hitler. I'm not so sure that the terms would be that different if a post-Nazi government is willing to make major concessions, because the Allies aren't really as confident of total victory at an acceptable price.

No, the terms will be the same. The entire ideological-political impetus for unconditional surrender was already there in 1942, even if it hadn't been given expression in a single coherent policy. Plus, the Allies quite succinctly remember, or believe they remember, that letting the Germans walk away with just major concessions led to the current mess in the first place and are determined to prevent a repeat. And why wouldn't the Allies be as confident of total victory at an acceptable price? The Soviets just murderized AGC, as you yourself have pointed out, dealing a defeat that Germany OTL wouldn't experience until 1944. If anything, the Allies are gonna be even surer of that then they were OTL 1942 or even OTL 1943. Hell, just the fact that the Germans are coming to them and begging for terms is gonna be more then enough indication.
 
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