German Spring Offensive succeeds-how does President Wilson react?

[steelbrok]

Roads and railroads are still required in this case in order to transport the needed supplies from the ports to the troops on the ground.

The BEF's truck system didn't carry nearly as much capacity as the railway system, which would have been paralyzed in any case by the capture of Amiens and Hazebrouck.

Once the Channel ports managed to come within the German artillery range, supplying, let alone holding, the garrison in place would have been a rather moot point.

Yes, and the BEF will be retreating towards their supply sources (the ports). It might not be as efficient but they will still have supplies coming in.

 

[Lucius Verus]

How is it then possible that most of the BEF and AEF came to France through those ports? They need logisitical capacity to do that. It can't be both. Either they didn't came through those ports* or the ports had capacity.

He's trying to have it both ways, those ports are capable of supplying the western armies through the railheads unless Germans take them; then they aren't suddenly. Apparently taking the railheads means that the railway to the west and south of Amiens suddenly changes somehow and the ports too despite being under worse circumstances in 1914-1915, that the British can't just use the railway up to Amiens for a new line or put in new light rail like they did before from 1914-1917, that the ports are suddenly less capable of taking cargo they were unloading just a few days ago, and must vacate the ports cause reasons...

What kind of nonsense is it when retreating to a shorter supply line=worsening supply situation while your opponent somehow keeps their logistics over the same ground just fought over and with a weaker starting logistical situation? This happens to all of us, we read a few sources and think we know everything on the subject. Then surprise surprise the more we read the more differing opinions and facts we come across, and its fine as long as we don't make it our hill to die on.

 

[powerthirteen]

Yes, and the BEF will be retreating towards their supply sources (the ports). It might not be as efficient but they will still have supplies coming in.

Only if the ports don't come within the artillery range of the Germans.

 

[powerthirteen]

He's trying to have it both ways, those ports are capable of supplying the western armies through the railheads unless Germans take them; then they aren't suddenly. Apparently taking the railheads means that the railway to the west and south of Amiens suddenly changes somehow, that the British can't just use the railway up to Amiens or put in new light rail like they did before from 1914-1917 and must vacate the ports cause reasons...

Finally, German naval artillery could have been turned against the BEF's channel ports. The three so-called Paris Guns (Wilhelmgeschütze) were actually manned by naval crews. With a maximum range of 127 kilometers, they had the reach to hit the BEF's three primary northern Channel ports (Boulogne, Calais, and Dunkirk) and even Dover, if the guns had been positioned in the Fourth Army sector. But between 16 and 30 March 1918, during 140 Operation MICHAEL, they did not fire in support of the attacking Seventeenth, Second, or Eighteenth Armies. Rather, the guns were positioned in the Seventh Army sector, delivering pointless terrorizing fire against Paris. 75 At least two German coastal batteries in Flanders were capable of hitting Dunkirk and could have fired in support of ground forces during Operation GEORGETTE. But Batterie Deutschland (four 3 80mm guns) never fired against land targets, and Batterie Pommern (one 380mm gun) delivered only occasional fire against Dunkirk and the major British base at Poperinghe. A third battery, Batterie Tirpitz (four 280mm guns), had the range to hit targets in the northern quarter of the Ypres Salient, but it too never fired in support of ground operations. 76 On the other hand, "An attack towards the Channel ports would, if successful, be disastrous for the British armies. " The Channel ports were only 50 miles from the German lines, and only about 40 miles from effective heavy gunfire. The right flank of the German 193 attack would be anchored on the sea, and the left flank would be screened by a series of strong river lines. The British had no depth in Flanders, which closed off the option of an elastic defense. Besides, the British had been trained for the offense, and all their recent experience was in offense. Also, there was much resistance in BEF to adopting defense-indepth tactics. As one anonymous regular NCO is widely quoted as saying at the time, "It don't suit us. The British Army fights in line and won't do any good in these bird cages. "

Depth has both a spatial and a time component. An enemy's combat and support systems can also be attacked in depth. While the Germans probably would have accomplished more if they had focused their attacks on the Amiens and Hazebrouck rail centers, a simultaneous and sustained attack throughout the entire depth of the BEF's logistics system would have produced even greater results. As previously noted throughout this study, such an attack would have brought the full weight of the German Navy to bear on the sea-lanes and the ports on both sides of the Channel. This would have included the naval batteries on the north Flanders coast, and the Wilhelmgeschütze (the so-called Paris Guns that were actually manned by Navy crews), that could have been used to shell the Channel ports or even Dover if they were in the right position. Such an attack would not have been decisive in itself, but it certainly would have increased pressure on the British logistics system, especially if one or 579 both of the key forward rail centers fell. Reach Reach and depth are closely related concepts. The armies of World War I, and especially the German Army, had limited operational reach because of their limited mobility technology. The ability to reach to operational depth, however, is not necessarily rigidly tied to mobility and a given linear distance. If the BEF's Channel ports had been the designated objectives of MICHAEL, GEORGETTE, or HAGEN, then the Germans certainly did not have the reach to achieve those objectives in a single attack. If on the other hand Amiens and Hazebrouck had been the designated objectives, then the German Army did have the operational reach to achieve those objectives--in March and April at least. The two key rail centers were at what normally would be considered tactical depth in terms of linear distance. But in terms of the consequences that would have resulted from the British losing either or both of the rail centers, they were--or should have been--operational targets. In this specific 583 case, then, the Germans in March and April 1918 had operational reach, albeit very situationally dependent

Zabecki on just how the Channel port capacities were to German artillery capabilities.

 

[Deleted member 2186]

As for the second part of the WI, which is about how President Wilson would specifically react to this military cataclysm, @David T.

In his state, could he have a hart atack, it could happen.

 

[steelbrok]

It's a long way to bring that artillery forward over fought over ground - not to mention ammunition supply. And it presumes a bigger advance than since 1914 and against far more numerous and better equipped opposition than in 1914.
Taken the 2 railheads mentioned would have been disruptive but by no means so disastrous as to expel the BEF from France.

 

[Post]

Roads and railroads are still required in this case in order to transport the needed supplies from the ports to the troops on the ground.

The BEF's truck system didn't carry nearly as much

They don't need the hubs in Hazebrouck and Amiens if their armies are between Calais/Dunkirk/Boulogne and HazebrouckAmiens.

He's trying to have it both ways, those ports are capable of supplying the western armies through the railheads unless Germans take them; then they aren't suddenly. Apparently taking the railheads means that the railway to the west and south of Amiens suddenly changes somehow, that the British can't just use the railway up to Amiens or put in new light rail like they did before from 1914-1917 and must vacate the ports cause reasons...

That's my point.

Only if the ports don't come within the artillery range of the Germans.

It's still quite a distance from Amiens to the Channelports. Amiens-Calais is 120 km.Hazebrouck-Calais 40 km. Most artillery has a shorter range than that.

With a maximum range of 127 kilometers, they had the reach to hit the BEF's three primary northern Channel ports (Boulogne, Calais, and Dunkirk) and even Dover, if the guns had been positioned in the Fourth Army sector.

Ypres-Calais is 72 km. They could have done it from there, don't need to capture Amiens for that.

 

[Lucius Verus]

Zabecki on just how the Channel port capacities were to German artillery capabilities.

You keep swinging that around as if its holy writ, it isn't. I'm going to quote myself since you don't seem to bother addressing issues you don't like.

If anything they will just pull back while destroying all they can just like the Germans last year. How are the Germans, which were exhausted IOTL going to deal with the French counter attack on a longer, deeper, and even more poorly supplied spearhead? How are they going to bring up enough shells even further than IOTL to threaten the ports if IOTL they crossed the same land on foot and couldn't get enough food out there to avoid starving? Why would the British give up on logistics when they proved IOTL that they can supply under combat situations just fine? The land they took are poorly fortified, away from railheads, reliant on supply by foot and horse, and outside their heavy artillery coverage?

How do they hold the spearheads without heavy artillery, months to setup defenses, food, against an offensive that was planned and prepared a year prior and about to be unleash earlier given German successes?

It's a long way to bring that artillery forward over fought over ground - not to mention ammunition supply. And it presumes a bigger advance than since 1914 and against far more numerous and better equipped opposition than in 1914.
Taken the 2 railheads mentioned would have been disruptive but by no means so disastrous as to expel the BEF from France.

Not to mention the Entente was quite adept at counter battery fire by now. IOTL they advanced 40km and were starving, I wonder what else they'd have to give up to advance further ITTL.

 

[McPherson]

Finally, German naval artillery could have been turned against the BEF's channel ports. The three so-called Paris Guns (Wilhelmgeschütze) were actually manned by naval crews. With a maximum range of 127 kilometers, they had the reach to hit the BEF's three primary northern Channel ports (Boulogne, Calais, and Dunkirk) and even Dover, if the guns had been positioned in the Fourth Army sector. But between 16 and 30 March 1918, during 140 Operation MICHAEL, they did not fire in support of the attacking Seventeenth, Second, or Eighteenth Armies. Rather, the guns were positioned in the Seventh Army sector, delivering pointless terrorizing fire against Paris. 75 At least two German coastal batteries in Flanders were capable of hitting Dunkirk and could have fired in support of ground forces during Operation GEORGETTE. But Batterie Deutschland (four 3 80mm guns) never fired against land targets, and Batterie Pommern (one 380mm gun) delivered only occasional fire against Dunkirk and the major British base at Poperinghe. A third battery, Batterie Tirpitz (four 280mm guns), had the range to hit targets in the northern quarter of the Ypres Salient, but it too never fired in support of ground operations. 76

I actually find that point (^^^) ... ridiculous. Even if the bombardment rate is one shot every 12 minutes was credible, these monsters had footfall 50% into the target area measured in a radius thousands of meters. Precision strike of city sized targets was about 80%. Of a railroad roundhouse? Close to ZERO.

 

[powerthirteen]

You keep swinging that around as if its holy writ, it isn't. I'm going to quote myself since you don't seem to bother addressing issues you don't like.

Not to mention the Entente was quite adept at counter battery fire by now.

So when are you actually going to get a source in order to support all of your claims?

 

[Lucius Verus]

So, still no source to support all those wonderful claims.

Impressive.

Oh there was you just ignored it. Here's a familiar quote

Blah, blah, blah.

And you went back to quoting your Spring Offensive bible again.

 

[Cymry-Korean]

Oh there was you just ignored it. Here's a familiar quote

And you went back to quoting your Spring Offensive bible again.

The reliance on one source to the exclusion of all others is indeed impressive.

 

[powerthirteen]

Oh there was you just ignored it. Here's a familiar quote

And you went back to quoting your Spring Offensive bible again.

The reliance on one source to the exclusion of all others is indeed impressive.

The inclusion of virtually no sources at all in your claims is also extremely impressive indeed.

 

[Cymry-Korean]

The inclusion of virtually no sources at all in your claims is also extremely impressive indeed.

He did list sources, you just chose to ignore them.

 

[powerthirteen]

He did list sources, you just chose to ignore them.

Just a single article from the web.

I've actually read it, and it only serves to perpetuate further myths about the Spring Offensive that Zabecki addresses repeatedly throughout his book.

 

[Cymry-Korean]

Just a single article from the web.

I've actually read it, and it only serves to perpetuate further myths about the Spring Offensive that Zabecki addresses repeatedly throughout his book.

Well you proceeded to simply ignore the sources presented by ArtoStark, so I don't have much in the way of confidence in your overreliance on one particular scholar, especially as your claims seem to go far beyond what it seems able to support.

I let this go the first time as I assumed that (since the Somme does not exactly run North-South) that you were refering to South of the Somme. That would make sense, as Fifth army was already on the other side of German Eighteenth. By this point the entire BEF is north of the Somme. Are you suggesting that the entire BEF is going to throw its heavy equipment aside? If so, perhaps provide a screenshot of the portion of the thesis that covers this?


You are really pushing Amiens and Hazebrouk as an "I win button". As far as I can see even Zabecki does not go this far. It is much more complicated than you are making it sound.

Survival of the BEF is actually secondary to the U-boats by this point in the war. The shipping crisis was seen as a threat to British survival, rightly or wrongly. If the BEF has to suffer to keep it from getting worse, that may well be a price LLoyd-George is willing to pay.


Come on man, I have been trying very hard to work with you here. I have been debating you from your own source and I have put aside my objections to it, to consider after effects. If you are going to uncritically assert Zabecki's thesis as gospel while assuming things even further than he does, I am not sure I can continue to engage here. Particularly if you are going to be outright dismisive to posters that go against your views.

Thank you for giving me impetus to delve into a source that has been sitting in my "to read" box for a while. May you find what it is you are looking for.


And there is more while I was typing this. As someone who has read the thesis, the question is not one of ignorance of Zabecki's thesis but doubt as to his correctness. Zabecki's credentials are not in dispute but his assessment does go against that of others of equal prominence. Gary Sheffield, John Bourne, Peter Simpkins, Rob Thompson, William Saunders, even Tim Travers all present pictures of the German Spring Offensive somewhat different than Zabecki's, along with others I couldn't find as quickly. It seems therefore reasonable to question Zabecki's thesis. To me this is especially a concern due to the shallow nature of Zabecki's sources on the British Army (the OH and Tim Travers seem to be most of it).

Regardless, good luck to you. I'm afraid I must bow out.

 

[powerthirteen]

Well you proceeded to simply ignore the sources presented by ArtoStark, so I don't have much in the way of confidence in your overreliance on one particular scholar, especially as your claims seem to go far beyond what it seems able to support.

Zabecki actually addresses the claims made by the majority of the previous scholars listed above, then proceeds to either agree or disagree with them depending on the statement.

 

[Lucius Verus]

Just a single article from the web.

Just a single student PHD thesis. See how that works?

Its almost as if you expect others to read your source or shut up but not the reverse.

Whereas the article is by Alexander Watson

The author of three books, which focus on East-Central Europe, Germany and Britain during World War I. His most recent book, The Fortress: The Great Siege of Przemysl was praised by The Times newspaper as a "masterpiece". His previous book, Ring of Steel: Germany and Austria-Hungary at War, 1914-1918, won numerous awards. Currently Watson is Professor of History at Goldsmiths, University of London.

and edited by

Ute Daniel, Peter Gatrell, Oliver Janz, Heather Jones, Jennifer Keene, Alan Kramer, and Bill Nasson

Its okay if you don't recognize those historians and professors.

On a site called " The International Encyclopedia of the First World War"
With contributors and support from places like the Germand Historical Institue London

Partners | 1914-1918-Online. International Encyclopedia of the First World War (WW1)

The International Encyclopedia of the First World War (WW1) is a collaborative international research project designed to develop a virtual English-language reference work on the First World War.

encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net

But hey, what do they know compared to a student PHD thesis?

 

[powerthirteen]

Just a single student PHD thesis. See how that works?

Its almost as if you expect others to read your source or shut up but not the reverse.

Whereas the article is by Alexander Watson

The author of three books, which focus on East-Central Europe, Germany and Britain during World War I. His most recent book, The Fortress: The Great Siege of Przemysl was praised by The Times newspaper as a "masterpiece". His previous book, Ring of Steel: Germany and Austria-Hungary at War, 1914-1918, won numerous awards. Currently Watson is Professor of History at Goldsmiths, University of London.

and edited by

Ute Daniel, Peter Gatrell, Oliver Janz, Heather Jones, Jennifer Keene, Alan Kramer, and Bill Nasson

Its okay if you don't recognize those historians and professors.

On a site called " The International Encyclopedia of the First World War"
With contributors and support from places like the Germand Historical Institue London

Partners | 1914-1918-Online. International Encyclopedia of the First World War (WW1)

The International Encyclopedia of the First World War (WW1) is a collaborative international research project designed to develop a virtual English-language reference work on the First World War.

encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net

But hey, what do they know compared to a student PHD thesis?

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VIAFDEUTSCHE NATIONAL BIBLIOTHEKLIBRARY OF CONGRESS

David T. Zabecki​

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Articles by David T. Zabecki​

• Military Developments of World War I

Publications by David T. Zabecki in Bibliography​

• Zabecki, David T.: Steel wind. Colonel Georg Bruchmüller and the birth of modern artillery, Westport 1994: Praeger.
• Zabecki, David T.: The German 1918 offensives. A case study in the operational level of war, London; New York 2006: Routledge.
• Foley, Robert: Hermann von Kuhl, in: Zabecki, David T. (ed.): Chief of staff. The principal officers behind history's great commanders. Napoleonic Wars to World War I, volume 1, Annapolis 2008: Naval Institute Press, pp. 149-161.

All Partners
See your own irony here?

If not, I don't see any further merit in continuing this already vapid conversation.

 

[Finbarr the Fair]

The original question seems an interesting What IF although I'm not convinced the situation for the British Armies in France would be quite so disastrous as Zabrecki and the OP maintain.

I can see that the British would be forced to withdraw towards the Channel ports (or Le Havre for forces south of Amiens). And they would lose some supplies and heavy weapons which would hinder their offensive capability.

But why are they forced to 'scuttle' from the continent like the 1940 BEF? Germany dors not have air superiority, nor a motorised force capable of breaching defence lines or exploitation of brief gaps in them. Nor is it operating inside the British decision loop as it did in 1940.

I'm probably missing something but i don't see blind panic causing the British to throw in the towel even with the (likely temporary) loss of Amiens or Hazelbrouck.

Is this thesis available online, through JSTOR or Google Scholar? Anyone know of academic reviews of Zabrecki's book?

OK, assuming the British do run away from the Continent And the Germans are sensible enough to offer a White Peace in the West....

Then i guess Wilson might be dumb enough to at least accept an Armistice on those lines.

Good luck getting France and the UK to repay their War Loans though.