German nationalism without the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars

Thande

Donor
AKA a thread in which Susano argues with people ;)

But seriously, I was thinking - German nationalism, or to be more accurate German nationalism in the form which we know it, is often said to be an effect of the War of Wars:

  • The contagious national awakening from the early French Revolution: if legally complex, mediaevally structured France can be centralised as a single unitary state, why not Germany?
  • French annexation of the Rhineland and vassalisation of the states of the Confederation of the Rhine sparked popular resentment against how disunited Germany could be rolled over by outside powers - already a factor in the 18th century wars and indeed as far back as the Thirty Years' War, but now really blown into overdrive
  • Prussia's role in the war led to it ending up in a very advantageous position to go on to create a Kleindeutschland with itself at the head

So, let's say the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars are avoided somehow. The reforms of the early part of the revolution are enacted and Louis XVI becomes King of the French, but there is no violent overthrow, revolutionary republic, or major European war. France sits there struggling with reform and rebellious nobles for twenty years or so, then comes through its difficult period and perhaps the pattern of 18th century wars resumes.

But what happens over in the Holy Roman Empire? When and how would German nationalism come to prominence, and what form would it take? Perhaps copying the French to produce a reformed HRE led either by a modern-minded Hapsburg Emperor or by a Prussian King who accepted the imperial dignity as Frederick William IV refused it in OTL after the 1848 revolutions? A Germany much less dominated by a single state than OTL's Second Reich?

Discuss.
 
A Germany much less dominated by a single state than OTL's Second Reich?
Well, it would be less dominant, but there will be a primus inter pares state, probably Prussia or 'Austria', or perhaps both. I don't think those two would easily concede their position.
 
We are looking at the part in history where, for the last time, the title Emperor actually meant something. That also means that a lot of it hinges on wether emperor Leopold II dies as suddenly and unexpectadly as OTL.

His successor, Francis II was an archconservative, while Leopold was a capable ruler and more inclined towards constitutionalism than his despotic successors. His contemporaries were considerable weaklings. If anybody could moderatly recentralise the HRE at the dawn of the 19th century, it would be him. Friedrich Wilhelm III of Prussia certainly wasn't capable to do it. Neither was anybody else, as OTLs Napoleonic wars showed.
 
It seems since we are dealing with the POD no French Revolution, it depends on how the French Monarchy relates to the German states. France as a monarchy would be close to the Austrians because of their royal ties. The Monarchy of France still might invade the Germany and fulfill similar criteria of Napoleon's change.
 

Thande

Donor
It seems since we are dealing with the POD no French Revolution, it depends on how the French Monarchy relates to the German states. France as a monarchy would be close to the Austrians because of their royal ties. The Monarchy of France still might invade the Germany and fulfill similar criteria of Napoleon's change.

While France was close to Austria in the 1790s, your language suggests you don't have a full understanding of the situation, no offence intended.
 
While France was close to Austria in the 1790s, your language suggests you don't have a full understanding of the situation, no offence intended.

No, I think what he is saying is that the relations of France and German states post POD will be an important factor; similarly the flux nature of alliances of the 18th century means that going from concertrating on an alliance with Austria one day and Prussia the next isn't difficult
 

Thande

Donor
No, I think what he is saying is that the relations of France and German states post POD will be an important factor; similarly the flux nature of alliances of the 18th century means that going from concertrating on an alliance with Austria one day and Prussia the next isn't difficult
Well - it did and would happen - but it would be dramatic and would shake the world, it wouldn't be casual; have you ever heard of the Diplomatic Revolution?
 

Deleted member 1487

Well, Germany won't be a stomping ground for that generation's European conflict, which means a number of important things don't happen. Prussia does not reform its military along Scharnhorst's suggestions and we don't get Clausewitz, his writings, or a military revolution in Europe, which all have enormous knock on effects.

Also, Germany is not destroyed again along the same lines of the 30 years war (which many contemporary writers drew parallels between to incite German popular sentiment, which wasn't helped by the French shooting civilian dissidents), it would be economically stronger and more populous.

Finally, the internal political divisions within Germany are not highlighted by having certain states (Bavaria to name one) fighting alongside France willingly.

All this likely also makes the popular revolutions of 1848 unlikely and more sedate reforms occur over a longer period. There is also unlikely to be a strong desire for Grossdeutschland, as much of the popular sentiment was based on patriotic feelings stirred up on the battlefield and stoked by student regiments that shed their blood for the idea of German unity.

Basically, I see a series of Germanic statlets with little reason to pull together politically unless an event pops up that threatens the people in a similar way to the Napoleonic wars. The feelings that were stirred up were latent in the people, but they needed a catalyst to draw them out. Without that spark, the Germanic peoples would go on with passive nationalism, probably resulting in a Zollverein-like agreement that may make a 19th or 20th century polticial de-facto union on federal lines occur. However, this all presupposes a peaceful era, which is unlikely given French aggressiveness that wasn't really tempered until the Napoleonic wars cost the French over a million lives. So I do see another war down the line, which, if it included the German states, something very likely, then it would have a similar effect to the Napoleonic wars.
 

Thande

Donor
Basically, I see a series of Germanic statlets with little reason to pull together politically unless an event pops up that threatens the people in a similar way to the Napoleonic wars. The feelings that were stirred up were latent in the people, but they needed a catalyst to draw them out. Without that spark, the Germanic peoples would go on with passive nationalism, probably resulting in a Zollverein-like agreement that may make a 19th or 20th century polticial de-facto union on federal lines occur. However, this all presupposes a peaceful era, which is unlikely given French aggressiveness that wasn't really tempered until the Napoleonic wars cost the French over a million lives. So I do see another war down the line, which, if it included the German states, something very likely, then it would have a similar effect to the Napoleonic wars.

I agree with this.

See, I think we need to find a middle ground here between Anglo authors' tendency to assume "Germany will remain small states forever with no inclination to get together, if the exact situation that led to unification in OTL is averted" and Susano's "every German peasant has had the burning heart's desire for a unified German nation state since 1648!"

German nationalism will always exist - the question is whether it will be fervent enough to actually have an impact on what happens.
 
We are looking at the part in history where, for the last time, the title Emperor actually meant something. That also means that a lot of it hinges on wether emperor Leopold II dies as suddenly and unexpectadly as OTL.

His successor, Francis II was an archconservative, while Leopold was a capable ruler and more inclined towards constitutionalism than his despotic successors. His contemporaries were considerable weaklings. If anybody could moderatly recentralise the HRE at the dawn of the 19th century, it would be him. Friedrich Wilhelm III of Prussia certainly wasn't capable to do it. Neither was anybody else, as OTLs Napoleonic wars showed.
*Habsburg/Austrophile enters the room*

I tend to like this POD of Leopold II surviving for a bit longer, largely for the reasons listed above.

However back to the French Revolution POD... If the Napoleonic Wars are butterflied away from history as many have pointed out Prussia will likely not see the military reforms that eventually led her to dominance over Austria, or at least they will come later. Likewise Austria will come out better having not bore the brunt of the French Military for all those years. This leaves the Habsburgs in a position of, if not military superiority, then at least strength to deal with the affairs of "Germany"/HRE. This however also butterflies away Metternich and thats a whole other can of worms.
 
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Deleted member 1487

*Habsburg/Austrophile enters the room*

I tend to like this POD of Leopold II surviving for a bit longer, largely for the reasons listed above.

However back to the French Revolution POD... If the Napoleonic Wars are butterflied away from history as many have pointed out Prussia will likely not see the military reforms that eventually led her to dominance over Austria, or at least they will come later. Likewise Austria will come out better having not born the brunt of the French Military for all those years. This leaves the Habsburgs in a position of, if not military superiority, then at least strength to deal with the affairs of "Germany"/HRE. This however also butterflies away Metternich and thats a whole other can of worms.

Ultimately this is going to be the major reason that Germany won't unite. Austria was critically weakened by the war while Prussia gained certain advantages that allowed her to pull ahead. Here the two states are going to be much more balanced with Austria likely to pull ahead in someways, as, at this time, they were the most developed/richest part of the Germanic states.

Of course this will change rapidly as the other states won't be smashed up by the wars and can pull ahead earlier. This will also keep disunity up, as the bigger states will get richer and economically dominant the smaller statelets around them. Eventually power is going to consolidate around several bases, which will give both Austria and the unenlarged Prussia competition.

The Rhineland is likely to be one of these areas for obvious reasons, but Bavaria and Saxony are likely to be rising quickly. Austria will maintain a distinct advantage until the late 19th century solely due to it size, natural resource, and industry/population advantage over the small Germanic states.

Honestly, without the Napoleonic wars or some analogue later on, I see the Germanic states competing and perhaps fighting one another as power concentrates in the hands of several medium strength (think Netherlands) states that will economically dominate their weak neighbors and probably eventually work out a customs union within the framework of the HRE.

The HRE will continue to exist if only for tradition, but will probably become revitalized as a means of working out deals between the power brokers within the Germanic coalition that makes up its members. A mini-EU that will prevent a centralized Germany, but will facilitate trade and other cooperation, probably military.

There will be the eventual spectre of rising liberalism, though at a slower, less dramatic, and probably more influential and effective than the historic 1848 drive. It won't be based on German nationalism as much as a more liberal platform that will be state based. It is going to probably be that much more effective as statelets are focused on by their populations rather than hinging on a united German nation for success.

So by 1900 we probably see a Germanic coalition in the middle of Europe that is much more confederate and liberal than the Kaiserreich. It won't be as powerful militarily, but could very well be more stable and richer without the influence of the Junkers and noble economic interests which hobbled international trade agreements.

Austria-Hungary is going to be much more interesting without Prussia fighting them. The dual monarchy won't be formed, which will have massive consequences for the state, mostly positive. It will likely be much more liberal but will have to fight the Hungarians repeatedly to maintain the empire, probably keeping that state de-industrialized. I don't know if Austria will have as much interest in Italy without gaining territories there, or if they will fight the French for political control. Italy will probably try to unify under the French auspices, though it will be interesting how that will turn out with a stronger Austria. The Austrians will also have larger holdings in "Germany" without the Napoleonic wars, though who knows if that will be important later on.

One issue of importance that hasn't been touched on except for generally is French expansionist interests "Germany" and the Austrian Netherlands (Belgium) which will still be strong without the wars to diminish their power. War will probably come at some point, which makes me wonder if the French will do better or worse and how many coalitions will be formed to fight the French invaders. Will the Bavarians still fight with them or will pan-Germanic sentiments turn the conflict(s) into a Franco-Prussian-esque unification struggle/defense of the HRE?

The most likely outcome IMHO is that wars will continue in greater frequency than historically, but without the same size or brutality, as the nobility will still have their conceptions of honor. Eventually aggressive France will either piss off the German states enough that they unify or pull tighter together in the framework of the HRE, likely with some states fighting with France to gain at their neighbor's expense, but find that the Germanic coalition is stronger than France and get in turn beat down and have important territories removed and given to other states that in turn become more powerful as a result.

There is the issue of Prussia that will have a much large Polish population and the effects that will have on their politics, but I have written too much already. So anyone else, thoughts?
 
I think that "Germany" will be heavily shaped by the personalities that are in power in the 19th century, particularly in Austria. As I noted before this butterflies away the Metternich we know. I'm not saying he won't come to power, but he won't be the Reactionary/Arch-Conservative we know and love. Perhaps he could even promote a Pan-German platform under the Habsburgs. It will also be interesting to see if Ferdinand is elected Holy Roman Emperor and then if he is, how long he stays on the throne. Franz Joseph becomes a total wild card.

I can see Franco-Austrian tensions over the Low Countries and Italy, however if Franz II and his successors are pragmatic they will align themselves with Britain and the Netherlands as they did historically to keep the French out of the Austrian Netherlands. I could even see this a possibly Austria's Franco-Prussian war, though in the end it is likely in order to "unify" (in whatever sense that comes to mean) Germany, Austria will likely have to give up Belgium at least to a cadet branch.
 
So anyone else, thoughts?
Yes, please stop using "germanic", it's really grating.

In addition, an avoided French revolutions opens up a whole can of butterflies on Poland-Lithuania. I think it wouldn't be partitioned again (I can see Leopold II propping up a revitalised Commonwealth to keep Russia in check and counter Prussia's rising influence), which would leave Prussia without the large Polish population you postulate.
 

Valdemar II

Banned
I agree with this.

See, I think we need to find a middle ground here between Anglo authors' tendency to assume "Germany will remain small states forever with no inclination to get together, if the exact situation that led to unification in OTL is averted" and Susano's "every German peasant has had the burning heart's desire for a unified German nation state since 1648!"

German nationalism will always exist - the question is whether it will be fervent enough to actually have an impact on what happens.

I agree a important aspect are that the pre-Napoleon Wars German nationalism, which did exist was enlighten, while the post Wars nationalism was romantic. Of course some of this development was already seen before the wars, but it was much more turned toward the monarchs, and likely if we avoid these wars, we will see two kind of nationalism among the Germans, one toward their states which will be much stronger and one toward "pan-Germanism". In the bigger state we will likely see the first one dominate while in the smaller states the later one will likely grow to dominans. So in westen Germany we will likely see a strong unification movement while in the east and north we will see the old states survive.

Beside that we have a few interesting aspect with a surviving France in mild anarchy, some of the primary opposition to the Republic came from the semi autonome provinces. Which likely will happen too in TTL that may result in a federalised France as a compromise rather than OTL centralised one.

Beside that we will likely see a 2nd War of Bavarian Succesion in 1804, and here's the Prussians a lot weaker, and few outsiders are able or have incentiment to join the fray.
 

Valdemar II

Banned
I think that "Germany" will be heavily shaped by the personalities that are in power in the 19th century, particularly in Austria. As I noted before this butterflies away the Metternich we know. I'm not saying he won't come to power, but he won't be the Reactionary/Arch-Conservative we know and love. Perhaps he could even promote a Pan-German platform under the Habsburgs. It will also be interesting to see if Ferdinand is elected Holy Roman Emperor and then if he is, how long he stays on the throne. Franz Joseph becomes a total wild card.

Neither Metternich nor Francis II will be the reactionaries of OTL, Francis was turned into reactionary by the Wars, and seing a lot of relatives murdered by the forces of liberalism, while Metternich only became such to gain power, Francis wasn't interested in any liberal in his adminstrations.
 

Redbeard

Banned
I believe the underlying factor behind nationalism was the increasing role of the petit burgeois leading to increased self-esteem, emancipation and demand for power etc.

Without the French revolution and the Napoleonic wars all this would still have worked up - slower, but also with no safety valve in the form of popular involvement in the liberation wars. This also means that basically conservatime regimes like the Prussian has lost an opportunity to be seen as carriers of the new nationalist ideas.

So when it comes to 1848 like unrest it is likely to more volatile and with nationalism being reserved for the burgeois rebels and the Monarchs anti-nationalists. Could see a great German revolutionary war somewhen in 19th century where the neighboring Monarchs send in armies to fight the revolutionaries, but soon show to be giants on clay feet themselves.

BTW I think USA in this ATL even more than in OTL will be seen as an ideal for the European burgeois, and the exodus to USA will be even larger. If the anti-nationalist Monarchies survive until USA has become a great power, we might see a global conflict where USA aggressively oppose the conservative European powers and their colonial empires.

Regards

Steffen Redbeard
 

Valdemar II

Banned
I believe the underlying factor behind nationalism was the increasing role of the petit burgeois leading to increased self-esteem, emancipation and demand for power etc.

Without the French revolution and the Napoleonic wars all this would still have worked up - slower, but also with no safety valve in the form of popular involvement in the liberation wars. This also means that basically conservatime regimes like the Prussian has lost an opportunity to be seen as carriers of the new nationalist ideas.

So when it comes to 1848 like unrest it is likely to more volatile and with nationalism being reserved for the burgeois rebels and the Monarchs anti-nationalists. Could see a great German revolutionary war somewhen in 19th century where the neighboring Monarchs send in armies to fight the revolutionaries, but soon show to be giants on clay feet themselves.

BTW I think USA in this ATL even more than in OTL will be seen as an ideal for the European burgeois, and the exodus to USA will be even larger. If the anti-nationalist Monarchies survive until USA has become a great power, we might see a global conflict where USA aggressively oppose the conservative European powers and their colonial empires.

Regards

Steffen Redbeard

Likely from 1790ties to around 1840 much of the emigration to USA slowed down significant, especially from Germany. A continued German emigration top USA without a 50 year pause are going to be quite interesting.
 

Thande

Donor
On the other hand, would the USA still turn more radical (universal male suffrage etc) without the example of the French Revolution, or would it remain a more stratified, aristocratic republic?
 

Valdemar II

Banned
On the other hand, would the USA still turn more radical (universal male suffrage etc) without the example of the French Revolution, or would it remain a more stratified, aristocratic republic?

I thinks it's almost unavoidable, the times seems to go toward a expanded suffrage, and if the American elite doesn't accept that, they may have a new revolution on their hands. Of course we may see USA evolve much more like Britain.
 
One interesting effect of a no French revolution and no Napoleon timeline would be that the prince-bishoprics (much disliked as they are on AH.com) would still exist, although I must admit that I do not know what effect they would have on German unification.
 
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