German Jets introduced in 1941.

CalBear said:
Again, I must differ with you. Any reasonable review of "Bomber Harris" and his record makes it clear that he had a stunning desire to kill German civilians, even to the point of hurting the military requirements of the allies. I would point you to he refusals to shift his attacks from German civilians to French transportation infrastructure targets in the run-up to D-Day. It was only after the most dire of warnings that he reassigned the RAF to preparation of the ground of THE INVASION OF OCCUPPIED EUROPE! The Strategic Bombing campaign was supposed to be Strategic, had Harris agreed he would have jumped at the opprotunity to help the Invasion succeed. He did not.

War is the application of force. Using the tools available in WW II large scale civilian deaths were unavoidable when that force was applied, as the American bombing campaign in the Pacific made clear. The American firebombing campaign againt Japan was acceptable only because the Japanese had decentralized it's industry into the homes of the workers, making those homes legitimate targets (although had the Allies lost the war, you can be sure that LeMay et al would have been in the Dock for genocide). Germany never did this, yet Harris firebombed area targets, without any particualar interest in concentrating on factories or other military targets, from the moment he had sufficient bombers.

As I have mentioned in other posts, additional research into this position may be helpful.

Calbear

Where do you get that from?:confused: The major reason initially that Bomber Command went for area bombing was that it lacked the accuracy, especially attacking at night, to do anything else. Partly for reasons of doctrine, partly service politics, both strategic bomber forces had to have pressure supplied by their political bosses to release forces for operations in support of the D-Day landings. Both were committed to the idea of winning the war by air power alone. Its just they went slightly different routes.

Its also the 1st I've heard about any decentralisation of Japanese industry. Seems rather unlikely as the bombing of Japan was only started late in the war so they had less incentive, as well as capacity, for spreading their industry. Never heard anything except it was bombing of urban areas becuase that was the best way to hurt the Japanese.

Steve
 

CalBear

Moderator
Donor
Monthly Donor
stevep said:
Calbear

Where do you get that from?:confused: The major reason initially that Bomber Command went for area bombing was that it lacked the accuracy, especially attacking at night, to do anything else. Partly for reasons of doctrine, partly service politics, both strategic bomber forces had to have pressure supplied by their political bosses to release forces for operations in support of the D-Day landings. Both were committed to the idea of winning the war by air power alone. Its just they went slightly different routes.

Its also the 1st I've heard about any decentralisation of Japanese industry. Seems rather unlikely as the bombing of Japan was only started late in the war so they had less incentive, as well as capacity, for spreading their industry. Never heard anything except it was bombing of urban areas becuase that was the best way to hurt the Japanese.

Steve

I absolutely do no wish to offend the English members of the board regarding my position on Air Marshall Harris. If I have done so, I am quite sorry. Truth be told, even though I firmly believe in the concept of Strategic Bombing as executed during and since WW II, I also believe that you had better be sure that you are on the winning side if you use it. If not, I can easily see Commanders who ordered bombing facing charges of war crimes.

To answer your questions:

There are references to Harris' extreme reluctance to turn away from area bombing to D-Day prep in a number of works (including, IIRC, Ambrose's last book on the Invasion). The 8th Air Force may have given some push back, but compared to Harris is was non-existant. Harris, in my view, based on my readings & clips I have seen of him discussing the Campaign post -war, seemed to revel in the casualities inflicted to a noticably greater degree than his peers.

Most of Japan's industry, even before the beginning of the 20th's Bombing Campaign, was based on small shops that were intermingled with residences, often in the same structure. As the AAF bombing began to have some effects, this "cottage industry" was increased. The area bombing of japanese cities can then be shown to have direct impacts on the Japanese Military Industries. The German's never did this kind of piece work to any great extent, at least to my knowledge, and certainly not to the extent of the Japanese.
 
CalBear said:
Again, I must differ with you. Any reasonable review of "Bomber Harris" and his record makes it clear that he had a stunning desire to kill German civilians, even to the point of hurting the military requirements of the allies. I would point you to he refusals to shift his attacks from German civilians to French transportation infrastructure targets in the run-up to D-Day. It was only after the most dire of warnings that he reassigned the RAF to preparation of the ground of THE INVASION OF OCCUPPIED EUROPE! The Strategic Bombing campaign was supposed to be Strategic, had Harris agreed he would have jumped at the opprotunity to help the Invasion succeed. He did not.

War is the application of force. Using the tools available in WW II large scale civilian deaths were unavoidable when that force was applied, as the American bombing campaign in the Pacific made clear. The American firebombing campaign againt Japan was acceptable only because the Japanese had decentralized it's industry into the homes of the workers, making those homes legitimate targets (although had the Allies lost the war, you can be sure that LeMay et al would have been in the Dock for genocide). Germany never did this, yet Harris firebombed area targets, without any particualar interest in concentrating on factories or other military targets, from the moment he had sufficient bombers.

As I have mentioned in other posts, additional research into this position may be helpful.

The strategy of area bombing had already been in place months before Bomber Harris became head of Bomber Command. A week before he got the job, Bomber Command was directed to concentrate all its efforts "on the morale of the German civil population". In short, Harris didn't implement the strategy; he simply followed orders by continuing it. Furthermore, you should also keep in mind that basically all strategic bombing in World War II, including so called "precision" bombing, was in fact area bombing. The technology for feasible, effective precision bombing simply didn't exist. The CEP for bombs in World War II was two miles! So the reality was that you had to destroy a lot of other things to destroy what you actually wanted to destroy. Firebombing was a great idea. Set fire to the city. That way you didn't have to actually hit what you wanted to destroy.
 
Last edited:

CalBear

Moderator
Donor
Monthly Donor
AMBOMB said:
The strategy of area bombing had already been in place months before Bomber Harris became head of Bomber Command. A week before he got the job, Bomber Command was directed to concentrate all its efforts "on the morale of the German civil population". In short, Harris didn't implement the strategy; he simply followed orders by continuing it. Furthermore, you should also keep in mind that basically all strategic bombing in World War II, including so called "precision" bombing, was in fact area bombing. The technology for feasible, effective precision bombing simply didn't exist. The CEP for bombs in World War II was two miles! So the reality was that you had to destroy a lot of other things to destroy what you actually wanted to destroy. Firebombing was a great idea. Set fire to the city. That way you didn't have to actually hit what you wanted to destroy.

As we have wandered far from the thread's origins, I will end my posts with this:

There are two ways to look at Strategic Bombing, whatever the era.

The 1st is that you, to the best of your ability, with the tools in hand, do your best to destroy military targets, even if you know that massive civilian casualties will result (Hiroshima & Nagasaki both contained noteworthy military targets even beyond the piecework factories in each home). This method attempts to destroy the enemy's ability to wage war by denying him the tools of war. (Although as I said earlier, this arguement only will suffice if you win the war).

The second is to intentionally kill civilians, with only passing interest in the effectiveness that the strikes have in destroying targets that are, even remotely, of military value to the enemy. The purpose of these types of attacks is to terrorize the civilian population (despite evidence ranging back for decades, including recent data from your own population, that terror bombing is singularly ineffective in achieving your goals of destroying morale), on the assumption that your enemy will cry "uncle".

Examples of the 1st method include Daylight bombing of military targets using the best bomb aiming technology available & Desert Storm.

Examples of the second include the "Blitz" attacks on England & the "War of the Cities" during the Iran/Iraq war.

I will leave it to you to decide which method is preferable from your position. I will also leave it to you to decide into which category Air Marshall Harris' tactics should be slotted.

I believe I have made my positions on the matters clear.
 
CalBear said:
As we have wandered far from the thread's origins, I will end my posts with this:

There are two ways to look at Strategic Bombing, whatever the era.

The 1st is that you, to the best of your ability, with the tools in hand, do your best to destroy military targets, even if you know that massive civilian casualties will result (Hiroshima & Nagasaki both contained noteworthy military targets even beyond the piecework factories in each home). This method attempts to destroy the enemy's ability to wage war by denying him the tools of war. (Although as I said earlier, this arguement only will suffice if you win the war).

The second is to intentionally kill civilians, with only passing interest in the effectiveness that the strikes have in destroying targets that are, even remotely, of military value to the enemy. The purpose of these types of attacks is to terrorize the civilian population (despite evidence ranging back for decades, including recent data from your own population, that terror bombing is singularly ineffective in achieving your goals of destroying morale), on the assumption that your enemy will cry "uncle".

Examples of the 1st method include Daylight bombing of military targets using the best bomb aiming technology available & Desert Storm.

Examples of the second include the "Blitz" attacks on England & the "War of the Cities" during the Iran/Iraq war.

I will leave it to you to decide which method is preferable from your position. I will also leave it to you to decide into which category Air Marshall Harris' tactics should be slotted.

I believe I have made my positions on the matters clear.

Bomber Harris was trying to destroy German morale because that's what he'd been ordered to do! But, destroying morale and destroying strategic targets are not mutually exclusive! Obviously he wanted to do both.
 
I guess the difference is the target, as Carl said. Civilians are killed all the time, but if you deliberately target them, then you are on the war crimes side. Just imagine you kill them with a machine gun instead of a bomber, and you get the picture. In war, that's just a moral point of view.
Back to the thread, I think early german jets could have stopped the bomber's offensive in 1943-mid 1944 at least. Allied jets would not matter much, as jets had not range and were not an option as escorts. This would mean more resources for the germans and, more important, an undefeated Luftwaffe in 1944. As far as I know, the allies had to defeat the german air force before attempting any landing.
 
I guess the difference is the target, as Carl said. Civilians are killed all the time, but if you deliberately target them, then you are on the war crimes side. Just imagine you kill them with a machine gun instead of a bomber, and you get the picture. In war, that's just a moral point of view.
Back to the thread, I think early german jets could have stopped the bomber's offensive in 1943-mid 1944 at least. Allied jets would not matter much, as jets had not range and were not an option as escorts. This would mean more resources for the germans and, more important, an undefeated Luftwaffe in 1944. As far as I know, the allies had to defeat the german air force before attempting any landing.
 
The bombing campaign is often excused by "what else could the allies do before D-day?".
That one really makes me crazy. It's not as if the Brits would just throw up their hands & say, "Stop the war, we want to get off." And it there never seems to be a consideration of the British response, only the benefit to Germany. So let me ask why the Brits, faced with very tough AD, don't turn to strategic ops against canals, rivers, & rail, such as this? Do you suppose German war production would have been adversely affected...?:p If German AD with jets is much stronger much earlier, I suggest Harris never becomes AoCinC BC, or at the very least never gains the political clout/prestige to demand 4-jet bombers at the expense of Snausages.:D
For those not really daring to completely give up strategic bombing I'll claim that it could have been performed with greater effect for less resources.
Agreed. Don't forget, there's a political dimension: Winston had to appear to be hitting back for his own political survival.
First initiative would be to reserve heavy four engine planes for Coastal Command and next focus on fast low flying precision bombers like the Mosquito.
Agreed. To which I'd only add, did the Mossie have the ability to carry a couple of standard air-drop mines? BTW, the Hampden could, & could carry out minelaying missons with nearly no hazard, on many more days than BC could attack cities, so the overall effect is magnified: the cumulative effect on Germany is much greater & much faster.
I'm tempted to claim that the OTL pathfinder squadrons equipped with real bombs instead of flares would have done more damage than OTL Bomber Command - almost ;)
Until '44, I'd agree.:D
My immediate suggestion would be: have a tactical airforce actually keen on and capable of supporting land forces much earlier
That sounds good on its face, but it ignores the fact RAF doctrine from 1918 or was dedicated to strategic ops; it was the excuse RAF used to survive through the '20s & '30s, in the face of suggestions it be abolished. I don't think you overcome that so easily.
In the Far East a few hundred modern fighters would alone have done the difference in Malaya
Not so sure about that, either, considering A6Ms could out-dogfight anything the Allies had in '41, & RAF FC was conditioned to dogfight. (OTL, Spit pilots tried it & had their heads handed to them.)
And it seems that Calbear has won the argument, or at least gone a very good ways to winning it.
Agreed. I think there's a fair chance of USAAF switching to night bombing, too, had daylight losses climbed high enough. I think the presumption is, tho, AD is overall better, enough to push even night ops' losses prohibitively high.
perhaps they develop something resembling an early cruise missile
They had it: the V-1. It wasn't used antiship. For which we should be thankful, IMO. Can you imagine U-boats able to shoot from outside detection range with reasonable chances of hitting? (Convoys were pretty easy targets: shoot into one, you're almost certain to hit something....) You also offer U-boats an opportunity to fire into crowded harbors. (Can you picture an ammo ship going up in Boston or New York Harbor?:eek: You think the Halifax Explosion was bad...)
 
Last edited:
Top