German Empire Broken Apart

Two parts to this one.

A. What are the circumstances that would lead to Germany being broken up post 1918

B. The economic/political results for the next couple decades.

My main interest is in the second item. Since Prussia was regarded by many people as the core of the 'German problem' I am thinking France might tolerate some sort of Rhine or west German confederation.
 
In regards to A wasn't it kinda done OTL? If your're talking a complete breakup though I suggest Calbears Anglo/American-Nazi TL.
 

Deleted member 1487

Could be one avenue. I was thinking Entente action. A break up trading off against less harsh conditions in the peace treaty.
How is breaking up less harsh? Really the only way this is possible is if the Entente win big early before they were took weak to pull it off. Probably in 1915 or something before the British are strong enough to moderate the French and Russians. Have the French actually break through in 1915 when German reserves are in the East, causing them to break off that offensive and give the Russians breathing room to go on the offensive themselves after a recovery. Italy and Romania join in and by some point in 1916 Germany throws in the towel.
 
Could be one avenue. I was thinking Entente action. A break up trading off against less harsh conditions in the peace treaty.

It's hard to see what could be harsher that breaking up the nation entirely.

Cristopher Clark mentions that in the Tsar's court occasional throw away comments on the lines of "destroying Germany" and "fragmenting Germany into small states" circulated.
Have Russia performing better in WWI, so that the Tsar remains in charge.
Germany would probably collapse earlier (say, Spring 1918) but more thoroughly. A division might be considered, but I don't see the Entente willing to reduce reparations demanded on the successor states, for purely financial reasons.
 
How is breaking up less harsh? ...

Reduce the reparations & related economic effects in the Versailles treaty. Poltically the imperialists represented by the Kaiser can be blamed, not the German people. Maybe the Prussian state can be slapped around a bit worse than the others.

The compensation policy of the 1919 peace treaty was badly thought through & largely set by politicians with abysmal understanding of economics. Had a bit more sense been applied at the Versailles confrence other solutions might have been chosen.
 

Deleted member 1487

Reduce the reparations & related economic effects in the Versailles treaty. Poltically the imperialists represented by the Kaiser can be blamed, not the German people. Maybe the Prussian state can be slapped around a bit worse than the others.

The compensation policy of the 1919 peace treaty was badly thought through & largely set by politicians with abysmal understanding of economics. Had a bit more sense been applied at the Versailles confrence other solutions might have been chosen.
France cannot afford to give up reparations because of how badly damaged they were. If they had to choose between breaking up Germany and getting reparations they wanted the money.
 
France cannot afford to give up reparations because of how badly damaged they were. If they had to choose between breaking up Germany and getting reparations they wanted the money.

Certainly, but I did not propose "give up", but reduce. France in fact collected very little of the gross reparations schedule. The totals in the treaty were established without any real refrence to economic damage & were intended to be both punative and to cripple Germany economicaly. While they threatened to cripple Germany they failed in the end to do so. The collapse of the post war Entente & French policy towards reparations as represented by the Ruhr Occupation 1923-24 illustrates the overall failure of the Reparations gambit. A smaller more viable reparations schedule coupled with seperation of at least Prussia from the other German states may have come closer to French goals.
 

Deleted member 1487

Certainly, but I did not propose "give up", but reduce. France in fact collected very little of the gross reparations schedule. The totals in the treaty were established without any real refrence to economic damage & were intended to be both punative and to cripple Germany economicaly. While they threatened to cripple Germany they failed in the end to do so. The collapse of the post war Entente & French policy towards reparations as represented by the Ruhr Occupation 1923-24 illustrates the overall failure of the Reparations gambit. A smaller more viable reparations schedule coupled with seperation of at least Prussia from the other German states may have come closer to French goals.
In terms of hard currency they got little because there was little to be had; instead they took a lot of goods and raw materials like coal as payment instead and undervalued it as payment, something Germany and France repeatedly disagreed on. I would like to question too the value of the coal taken from the Saar for the 15 years it was occupied IOTL.

The treaty totals IIRC were actually calculated exactly on the cost of what was damaged/destroyed, though perhaps overvalued.

In terms of French politics I don't think they could have accepted any amount less that what was levied and didn't have the power to occupy all of Germany long enough to ensure that it was broken up, nor deal with the international fallout from the US and Britain for trying to do so; you'd need an early victory with a lot of Russian participation, as they wanted the Polish bits of Prussia and Slavic parts of A-H. France could probably grab the Saar if they were strong enough and use Russia to dismember Eastern Germany. The question is whether Russia would economically/politically stable enough to pull that off, same with France.

Reparations were far cheaper to extract and more certain/less politically costly than breaking up Germany. If the goal were the rebuild France and economically prosper in the peace deal, going with a costly major occupation is not going to be viable politically or economically.
 
I'll read that one more.



Could be one avenue. I was thinking Entente action. A break up trading off against less harsh conditions in the peace treaty.

The obvious breakup would be a catholic state in the south and west taking in most of the former kingdoms(maybe they remain kingdoms?) and a Protestant one taking in the north, east and East Prussia.
 
In terms of hard currency they got little because there was little to be had; instead they took a lot of goods and raw materials like coal as payment instead and undervalued it as payment, something Germany and France repeatedly disagreed on. I would like to question too the value of the coal taken from the Saar for the 15 years it was occupied IOTL.

The treaty totals IIRC were actually calculated exactly on the cost of what was damaged/destroyed, though perhaps overvalued.

I recall other claims from the scholarship covered in the courses I took circa 1980-81. Unfortunatly have not retained much of the text or notes from then. The other point I took away then was how the reparations payment system fell apart during the 1920s. France could not risk the political consequences of another enforcement effort & the German leaders knew thi, leading to a game of chicken in delivery vs demand and how the deliveries were valued.


...

Reparations were far cheaper to extract and more certain/less politically costly than breaking up Germany. If the goal were the rebuild France and economically prosper in the peace deal, going with a costly major occupation is not going to be viable politically or economically.

Considering that one of the costs of reparations was the contribution to the break up of the Entente & France having no effective allies by 1930 the political cost seems very high. I understand there were a lot of other reasons for the position France found itself in, but the PoS shaped into the Versailles Treaty & the reparations were a important part of it.
 

Deleted member 1487

I recall other claims from the scholarship covered in the courses I took circa 1980-81. Unfortunatly have not retained much of the text or notes from then. The other point I took away then was how the reparations payment system fell apart during the 1920s. France could not risk the political consequences of another enforcement effort & the German leaders knew thi, leading to a game of chicken in delivery vs demand and how the deliveries were valued. .
In 1924 the US stepped in with the Young or Dawes Plan to provide loans to replace the demand for raw materials or gold because it was way too damaging to the world economy to restage the French occupation again. Then Germany paid Britain and France regularly until 1929 and US loans were cut off. The point is that in the situation that existed in 1919 and on to 1924 the French stripped Germany bare and that was the expectation until the US stepped in. Had the US not done that they French would have kept at it. So any peace deal made is going to be structured from the 1919 mindset, especially if the US isn't around to do the deal. Unless of course Wilson finds a way to negotiate the peace deal, then he is definitely not going to allow a break up of Germany.


Considering that one of the costs of reparations was the contribution to the break up of the Entente & France having no effective allies by 1930 the political cost seems very high. I understand there were a lot of other reasons for the position France found itself in, but the PoS shaped into the Versailles Treaty & the reparations were a important part of it.
If you think the cost of reparations is going to be bad, the fall out of breaking Germany up with be 1000 times worse. Britain CANNOT afford to let the Franco-Russian alliance dominate Central Europe, nor can the Americans allow the massive economic disruption that would stem from that, hence their stepping in over the French occupation of the Ruhr in 1923. So OTL treaty was a less disruptive version of what a break up of Germany would have been.
 
The obvious breakup would be a catholic state in the south and west taking in most of the former kingdoms(maybe they remain kingdoms?) and a Protestant one taking in the north, east and East Prussia.

Not sure if any of the German kings had viable kingly careers post war. Bavaria actually elected a Communist government & the old regime was in disrepute in much of Germany.

A Catholic confederation is one possibility. However else it falls out I'm guessing Prussia will be neither large nor connected to the other nations. East Prussia might take on a different character & status.
 

Deleted member 1487

Not sure if any of the German kings had viable kingly careers post war. Bavaria actually elected a Communist government & the old regime was in disrepute in much of Germany.

A Catholic confederation is one possibility. However else it falls out I'm guessing Prussia will be neither large nor connected to the other nations. East Prussia might take on a different character & status.
Your best bet to break up Germany would be to make an Austro-Bavaria after the war, as that was more economically acceptable than breaking Germany into parts; it keeps the German divided on cultural grounds and makes Austria more viable, while keeping Germany significantly weaker.

The trick though is making it happen via French occupation; if they were willing to move into Bavaria to topple the BSR and unify Austro-Bavaria based on their military strength that might be possible provided they are willing to pay the price and stick around.
 
There is the incentive approach. "If you guys abandon that nasty empire thing you can pay just a little reparations. Or... you can stick with those nasty Prussians. Just look at what they are going to pay ;) "
 
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