German election WI: 1969 - Auf den Kanzler kommt es an

[freivolk]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/West_German_federal_election,_1969

The German Federal Election of 1969 is a very significan point in the history of the Federal Republic of Germany. With Willy Brandt the SPD gained for the first time the Chancellorship and the CDU/CSU had to take for the first time the role of the opposition.Willy Brandt would start in the three years of his first term the OSTpolitik.
But the election was very close. Till the late evening the results seemed to show a absolute majority for the CDU/CSU. Richard Nixon even already congratulated Chancellor Kissinger for reelection.
WI the results hadn´t changed and the CDU/CSU had won reelection?
There would propably no OSTpolitic, at least not in the form of OTL. And I think the CDU would change the election system to FPTP.

Another scenario from this election: The right-extrem NPD came very close to win seats in the Bundestag. WI they had been succesful?

Another scenario: SPD and FDP actually do better then IOTL. So there would be propably no non-confident vot and no new election in 1972. But propably Willy Brandt would face more problems in getting reelected in 1973.

What is your opinion?

 

[hcallega]

If the Christian Democrats win yet another parliamentary majority, it's going to be bad times for the SPD. It may parallel what happened to the center-left in France, with a center-left victory a rarity generally driven by outside factors or the pitiful performance of an incumbent. It's possible the party really struggles to win any majorities for a long time.

 

[freivolk]

If the Christian Democrats win yet another parliamentary majority, it's going to be bad times for the SPD. It may parallel what happened to the center-left in France, with a center-left victory a rarity generally driven by outside factors or the pitiful performance of an incumbent. It's possible the party really struggles to win any majorities for a long time.

Actually, I just used a CDU-victory in 1969 as an example the "single party dominance thread". But I also see it is still possible, that the SPD could win in 1973. There would still be the need for some kind of Ostpolitik and Kiesinger wouldn´t be the right man for it.

 

[Boto von Ageduch]

This is a very important turning point Freivolk You're completely right in considering it as such.

WI the results hadn´t changed and the CDU/CSU had won reelection?
There would propably no OSTpolitic, at least not in the form of OTL.

This would definitely be the most important difference to OTL.

Btw, it was popular in the SPD to avoid verbal confrontation with the Warsaw Pact, and to some degree to make light of the Communist dictatorships; but hardly anybody but Brandt and his closest collaborators (like Bahr) would have initiated something distantly resembling his "Ostpolitik". So it doesn't only depend on the party, but on the persion.

The crucial point is that his Ostpolitik was very attentively (and in the end, benevolently) observed from Moscow, and it didn't only affect Germany, but it changed the structure of the Cold War as a whole.

Here again, Brandt's biography is important because it convinced the Kremlin potentates that he might be sincere with his declarations. There would have been much more distrust if somebody else would have done exactly the same things as Brandt. One plausible outcome: Moscow forbids too close contact between the Western German chancellor and GDR officials, and the *Ostpolitik would trail off.

What would CDU or the right-wing SPD people do in power in Germany?
This is relatively easy to predict: They would probably proceed with confrontation oratory, emphasize the system differences, and warn of a new World War.


What difference would that make? That's very hard to say.
I would suppose that a direct military clash between the two camps would be as unlikely as IOTL, but not even here I'm completely sure. Continuing distrust over decades in such a delicate constellation as the Cold War can trigger all sorts of events.

I would also consider whether the reforms in the Soviet Union - 15 years later - would have been possible without an Ostpolitik. Again, I don't claim it would or wouldn't. But if the Soviets always have nervous paranoia that the West is staring at them like a vulture waiting for its chance, they might have tried to purge away someone like Gorbatchev who apparently weakens the power of the regime. And yes, the Ostpolitik helped to mitigate that paranoia - on both sides.

And I think the CDU would change the election system to FPTP.

Well, the CDU can't do that alone. It requires a change in constitution, and this is only possible with 2/3 of the representatives in both houses. At any point during the existence of the FRG, this would have only been possible with the votes from CDU/CSU as well as the SPD.

The "Grand Coalition" of 66-69 had plans of implementing that system change, but eventually didn't. I'm not aware why they changed their mind; I suppose the CDU perhaps had hopes to come back to the old days when they had an easy time to form coalitions with the FDP. Moreover, both parties might have worried about annoyance in their electorate.

Anyway, this change is not going to take place either if the CDU/CSU comes into power in a coalition with the FDP, or on their own. If the Grand Coalition is continued, it depends: The SPD may still have hopes of forming a coalition with the FDP later.

Another scenario from this election: The right-extrem NPD came very close to win seats in the Bundestag. WI they had been succesful?

This would rule out any government but a grand coalition, for purely arithmetic reasons.
Now it depends on which part wins the lead.

A very interesting question would be: How far could Brandt have gone (in terms of Ostpolitik) as a leader of a grand coalition?

 

[Orrin_Knox]

It might have been nice to keep the FDP, which has struck me as a frequently opportunistic party, out of Government.

 

[Boto von Ageduch]

As far as I can see, the reproof of opportunism against the FDP only arose in 1982 when they switched camps in mid-term.

A third motivation not to introduce first-past-the-post elections:

FPTP is a big advantage for a party which can win at least slight majorities in many districts.
Dually, the system is a handicap for a party which goes strongly even where it doesn't win a majority.

It's amost sure that at least one of either CDU/CSU or SPD will feel to fall into the second category, and therefore reject that suggestion. Again, without either one, there will not be a sufficient majority.
(I suppose it would more likely be the SPD to decline, but that doesn't really matter here).

Moreover, remember that CDU and CSU are distinct parties, which have different experiences as to voting result structures. Even if SPD and CSU would be happy to embrace FPTP, the CDU probably wouldn't.

 

[freivolk]

Well, the CDU can't do that alone. It requires a change in constitution, and this is only possible with 2/3 of the representatives in both houses. At any point during the existence of the FRG, this would have only been possible with the votes from CDU/CSU as well as the SPD.



?

No, this is avery common misbelieve. The electoral system isn´t regulated in the Basic Law, it can be changed with a simple majority. Kiesinger made it clear, that he would change to FPTP, if the Union got a own majority in 1969. You can say, with this he burned the bridges to the FDP.

 

[Boto von Ageduch]

OK, you're right.

But the consequence is the same: The CDU can't achieve the change on its own.

To start with, they would need an absolute majority in Bundestag. This is very unlikely, particularly in case the NPD enters.

And don't forget about the Bundesrat: In 1969, Bavaria was the only Land with an absolute majority for CDU or CSU. If the SPD doesn't agree, Kiesinger's advance is bound to fail hopelessly.

It would be interesting though whether plurality voting could and would be implemented if
a) the grand coalition under Kiesinger were continued;
b) the SPD overtakes CDU/CSU, and Brandt leads a grand coalition.

Again, b) is much less likely, but might be an interesting scenario as well.

 

[freivolk]

OK, you're right.

But the consequence is the same: The CDU can't achieve the change on its own.

To start with, they would need an absolute majority in Bundestag. This is very unlikely, particularly in case the NPD enters.

And don't forget about the Bundesrat: In 1969, Bavaria was the only Land with an absolute majority for CDU or CSU. If the SPD doesn't agree, Kiesinger's advance is bound to fail hopelessly.

It would be interesting though whether plurality voting could and would be implemented if
a) the grand coalition under Kiesinger were continued;
b) the SPD overtakes CDU/CSU, and Brandt leads a grand coalition.

Again, b) is much less likely, but might be an interesting scenario as well.

Please remember, that my original scenario is, that the CDU wins the absolut majority.

And the federal election law is not a Zustimmungsgesetz. The worst the Bundesrat could do, would be a suspensive Veto, which could be overruled by the Bundestag. Actually it would be enough if BY vote yes and BW, SL, RP, NS and SH (Länder were the CDU is part of the goverment) give an abstention vote.
And the FDP couldn´t really put pressure like in the Fifties on the CDU in the Länder because the NPD made it mostly impossible to form goverment aoainst the CDU in the Länder I mentioned.

 

[Boto von Ageduch]

And the federal election law is not a Zustimmungsgesetz.

Wow.


On second thoughts, sort of makes sense ...

 

[freivolk]

Wow.

And now we can talk about Ostpolitik.
You brought here some interesting point. And we have to keep in mind that Brandt would propably not run again for the chancelorship. He actually said in 1965 that he wouldn´t run anymore and just the Great coalition changed that. Still I think the pressure would grow for something like Ostpolitik. 1969 - 1973 was the peak of Detente and West Germany would become more and more isolated with his cold-war-politic. I assume the SPD would run with a Ostpoltik-program in 1973. And its possible, that they will win, even with a FPTP-system. (Actually between 1969 and 1980 the SPD won in three of four federal elections the majority of the electoral districts). But still there would be something missing. There wouldn´t be something like a Warschauer Kniefall with a chancelor Helmut Schmidt. And the Ostpolitik would propably just seen as an adaption to pressure, not as genine change of heart.

 

[Boto von Ageduch]

Would it really hurt Western Germany or the rest of the NATO if Germany would keep its hardliner course? I'm comparing with just general support for detente politics, not with the actual rapprochement that followed.
That alternative seems rather incosequential to me, a least in the short run.

 

[freivolk]

Would it really hurt Western Germany or the rest of the NATO if Germany would keep its hardliner course? I'm comparing with just general support for detente politics, not with the actual rapprochement that followed.
That alternative seems rather incosequential to me, a least in the short run.

You may have a point. In OTL there was some pressure from Kennedey/Johnson and DeGaulle on the federal Goverment to be more flexibel in the German Question, but Nixon/Kissinger and Pompidou weren´t really happy about the Ostpolitik. Maybe they would prefer an reliable, hardline Germany.

 

[Michel Van]

a TL were CDU/CSU win in 1969 with younger Helmut Kohl as Kanzler?
there is no the Ostpolitik
And not the "Kniefall von Warschau" aka "Warsaw Genuflection"
Will Brand Genuflection was the most important "please forgive us" signal to East Europe
It improves allot in Germany East-west relationship and start reconciliation with Poland

but with No "Warsaw Genuflection"
East Europe remain hostile towards West Germany even in 1991

on West Germany domestic political a 1969 CDU/CSU would bring longterm problems
the still very active 1968 student movement will return to protest and even resort to violence
Against the CDU/CSU conservative politic
I think it would lead to several extreme violent left terror groups in 1970s
OTL was only the Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF) with 34 murder
imagine wat several RAF would do in Germany

Logical conclusion West Germany become until 1980s a Police state...

 

[Max Sinister]

Kohl' rise became possible only after Kiesinger and Barzel had failed against Brandt.

 

[freivolk]

a TL were CDU/CSU win in 1969 with younger Helmut Kohl as Kanzler?
there is no the Ostpolitik
And not the "Kniefall von Warschau" aka "Warsaw Genuflection"
Will Brand Genuflection was the most important "please forgive us" signal to East Europe
It improves allot in Germany East-west relationship and start reconciliation with Poland

but with No "Warsaw Genuflection"
East Europe remain hostile towards West Germany even in 1991

on West Germany domestic political a 1969 CDU/CSU would bring longterm problems
the still very active 1968 student movement will return to protest and even resort to violence
Against the CDU/CSU conservative politic
I think it would lead to several extreme violent left terror groups in 1970s
OTL was only the Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF) with 34 murder
imagine wat several RAF would do in Germany

Logical conclusion West Germany become until 1980s a Police state...

I wonder how you come up with Kohl as chancellor at this time. Okay, he was at this time already a rising star in the CDU, but it was his first year as primeminister in Rheinland-Pfalz. He would have to wait till Kiesinger retires and then he would have to fight it out with Barzel.

To your RAF-thesis: I think it possible, that terrorism will actually play a smaller ITTL. Because the student movement will stay active, radicals propably will see now need for personal terrorism and still think that the revolution will come some das from the masses. I see as an example the USA and France. In the USA Nixon came to power, who was a hate-figure for the Left comparable to Strauß, who still tried to win the Vietnam-war, with protest which lead to the shooting in Kent state, but still there was no significant left-terrorism in the USA. In France the students actually came close to topple DeGaulle in 1968, but after their failure, there was rightwing goverments in power till 1981. A serious left-terroroism in France actually just emerged, after Mitterand came to power.

 

[Hörnla]

Therewould propably no OSTpolitic, at least not in the form of OTL.

There would certainly havebeen some sort of Ostpolitik, I agree with you, and it would move away fromrather strict positions of the Adenauer-era. Even a CDU-government couldn'tignore the fact that the post-1945 bipolar-world order more and more became apermanent state of affairs, apparently in force until doomsday.

However, the CDU wouldprobably not do anything which might alienate the "Vertriebenen",especially if the NPD got into the Bundestag. So I presume that there might inthis case only be some detente with Moscow if Washington sets the same course,and everything else becomes very weak and toned down compared to OTL.

As Michael Van pointed outrightly, this might lead to a difficult relationship with Poland andCzechoslova up until now.

AndI think the CDU would change the election system to FPTP.

While, as you pointed out,legally possible, I wonder if this would gain the long-term support of the SPD?Again, with a rather pro-CDU FDP (and no "Sozialliberaler Koalition")and if the NPD gets into the Bundestag might be won. If the SPD remainssceptical, it might become a matter of discussion over the decades.

It might also prolong thelife of the APO which would (rightly) see it as a tool to prolong the dominanceof one ruling party and the Nazi-allegations would become louder, especiallyconsidering the slap-inviting Kiesinger.

Anotherscenario from this election: The right-extrem NPD came very close to win seatsin the Bundestag. WI they had been succesful?

Calculation a 5.2% NPD,taking percentages mainly off the large parties, I come to 229 CDU/CSU seats,212 SPD, FDP 29 and NPD 26. Continuation of the Grand Coalition is the onlyoption, this time with the installation of the FPTP-system inorder to kill off the NPD right along with the FDP.

However, I do not see aslightly better position of the NPD weakening the CDU so much that they have toconcede to being junior partner of a Grand Coalition. That would quite avoter-migration of 3 or 4% from the CDU to the NPD. That would mean the sh** hashit the fan.

Anotherscenario: SPD and FDP actually do better then IOTL. So there would be propablyno non-confident vot and no new election in 1972. But propably Willy Brandtwould face more problems in getting reelected in 1973.

Hmm, that might actuallylead to a one-term Sozialliberale Koalition. 1973 was not an easy year,consider the oil-crisis. And without the turmoil of the "vote of no confidence",the "Willy wählen"-mobilization of SPD-sympathizers might be a lotweaker.

Bundeskanzler RainerBarzel? 1973-...?

I would also consider whether the reforms in the Soviet Union -15 years later - would have been possible without an Ostpolitik. Again, I don'tclaim it would or wouldn't. But if the Soviets always have nervous paranoiathat the West is staring at them like a vulture waiting for its chance, theymight have tried to purge away someone like Gorbatchev who apparently weakensthe power of the regime. And yes, the Ostpolitik helped to mitigate thatparanoia - on both sides.

I don't agree here.Although it seems to make sense, we should notice that Gorbachev's ascendancyto power occured only two years after one of the most paranoid years of Sovjethistory, 1983, with their assumption of a NATO first strike being imminentduring "Able Archer".

Andnow we can talk about Ostpolitik.

You brought here someinteresting point. And we have to keep in mind that Brandt would propably notrun again for the chancelorship. [...] And its possible, that they will win,even with a FPTP-system. (Actually between 1969 and 1980 the SPD won in threeof four federal elections the majority of the electoral districts).

What would Schmidt'schances to become candidate be like, though? IIRC, he made quite a good figureon his posts as Minister from 1969-74. Without this experience and PR, wherecould he possibly be. Would somewhen in this time the position of mayor bevacant for him?

And else? I can not imagineWehner. Any MPs from the Länder?

Even if SPD and CSU would be happy to embrace FPTP, the CDUprobably wouldn't.

That is true concerning theCSU. They could usually claim most Bavarian constituencies. That means in 1969,the CSU claimed 9.9% of all seats in Bonn, but won 13.7% of all constituencies.In 1972 the percentages would have been 9.7% / 12.5%. In 1976 as well as in1980: 10.6% / 16.1%. They would be guaranteed to profit from FPTP.

The situation for the SPD is far shakier because nobody guarantuees them that the majority of FDP (and NPD) voters won't vote for CDU-candidates which would overtake the Social-Democrats. FPTP would be a risky game for them as long as they see no possibility to rule with the FDP at all.

 

[Thande]

Based on what I have seen, if Germany adopted FPTP it would effectively become a one-party state under the CDU/CSU. At least unless people's voting habits changed.

 

[freivolk]

Based on what I have seen, if Germany adopted FPTP it would effectively become a one-party state under the CDU/CSU. At least unless people's voting habits changed.

No. Like I said, in the elections of 1969, 1972 and 1980 the SPD actually won the majority of the election districts. Okay, in a pure FPTP-system, the distribution of electoral districts would be different, but in the 70s both partys, CDU and SPD would have equal chances to win a majority in a FPTP-system.

 

[freivolk]

While, as you pointed out,legally possible, I wonder if this would gain the long-term support of the SPD?Again, with a rather pro-CDU FDP (and no "Sozialliberaler Koalition")and if the NPD gets into the Bundestag might be won. If the SPD remainssceptical, it might become a matter of discussion over the decades..

I think the SPD would accept it, if it shows that she can win elections in this system.

It might also prolong thelife of the APO which would (rightly) see it as a tool to prolong the dominanceof one ruling party and the Nazi-allegations would become louder, especiallyconsidering the slap-inviting Kiesinger. .

I agree. But it is possible, that a longer active APO would butterfly away the RAF.

Hmm, that might actuallylead to a one-term Sozialliberale Koalition. 1973 was not an easy year,consider the oil-crisis. And without the turmoil of the "vote of no confidence",the "Willy wählen"-mobilization of SPD-sympathizers might be a lotweaker.

Bundeskanzler RainerBarzel? 1973-...?.

Thats my opinion too. I wonder how Barzel would actually perform as chancellor?

What would Schmidt'schances to become candidate be like, though? IIRC, he made quite a good figureon his posts as Minister from 1969-74. Without this experience and PR, wherecould he possibly be. Would somewhen in this time the position of mayor bevacant for him?

And else? I can not imagineWehner. Any MPs from the Länder?.

Schmidt was SPD-Fraktionsvorsitzender during the Great Coalition and with Brandt and Wehner part of the leading Troika of the SPD. I´m sure he would become opposition leader ITTL. The SPD was still a much more centralized Party at this time and their MP´s mostly had just regional appeal. I think Rau was actually the first candidate for the SPD, who build on this popularity as MP. And no, I´m not forgetting Brandt, but I think he was a special case, because his appeal came mostly, because the Cold War made the Bürgermeister of West Berlin an important international actor.