he also notes that German reinforcements to Army Group B never were enough to make up for combat losses, despite the Ostheer's overall reinforcements surpassing losses from July to November 1942. By November, Stalingrad had essentially been taken, so a few thousand reinforcements could have tipped the balance. By November, Army Group B was operating with an approximate 56,000 man deficit—receiving the lowest number of reinforcements of all the army groups, despite taking the highest casualties out of all the Army Groups in that time frame. If proper attention had been given to replenishing the loses of Army Group B with fresh reinforcements, which Germany did have available, Stalingrad may well have been taken faster, and the disaster averted. Of course, it is still debated why Army Group B was given the lowest number of reinforcements despite taking the highest casualties from July to November, whether the reason was logistics, overprioritization of Army Group Center (Moscow), or just plain incompetent staff work. What could be done to improve the situation of Army Group B, depends on what caused it to receive the lowest number of reinforcements despite taking the highest losses. It does seem that Franz Halder was delusional about the poor state of affairs at Stalingrad, and that this may have been one of the reasons he was sacked.