If they withdraw to the border, the Soviets now have access to all the manpower, natural resources, industry, ect. in those areas. Germany lost the war the second they decided to declare war on the USSR.
German completely adopts the defensive September 1942
- Thread starter Catspoke
- Start date
In terms of the waste of resources invested in the Wehrmacht perhaps, but those resources are still being spent in the OPs scenario. Without the food extracted by the Hunger Plan Germany would have run out of food far sooner and they did extract iron ore and other raw materials. The troops still have to be fed, only now they have to be fed by the Reich and you are back to precisely the food crisis that sparked the Hunger Plan in the first place. The Hunger Plan allowed the Reich to reverse ration cuts that had been forced on the German people, without the plan further cuts were all but inevitable in rations that already fell far short of the minimum daily requirements, never mind the requirements of workers doing hard manual labour.
Yeah, ultimately I think the German are going to want to hold Nikopol mines for the strategic metals and the area between the Bug and Dnieper for grain. And the Crimea because Hitler was worried about the effect on Turkey, and the shale oil of Estonia at a minimum, i.e. the Panther line.
In September 42 I can see the Germans withdrawing from their most exposed places and salients, but haven't really been beaten by the Soviets before on the defense really, when prepared anyway, and the Kuban has grain and other goodies worth keeping out of Soviet hands. Plus the Germans captured 17 working wells at Krymskya and even though trashed Maikop had the promise of getting some working.
So the Germans are only going to be so flexible on the defense, even if you had a completely hands off Hitler and the military running things.
Troops that do not fight suffer much less casualties and waste much less supplies (including food) both through spoilage and enemy action. So such German army (even of the same size) would cause much smaller drain on German economy than actively fighting one.
Several hundred thousands of extra agricultural workers would probably provide Germans with much more food than they extracted out of USSR.
Yes its hard to do that in a big way, you can make different decisions going forward maybe.
That why I was thinking the He177 which never really got going anyway and the HE111 which was well past its prime would be easy targets to stop.
The JU88 was probably easy enough to transition to the C version night fighters.
The DO217 was probably the best rangy bomber for naval attacks and things so probably would have to keep that.
No I know, but my point was you and crueldwarf aren't actually disagreeing with each other. You are right in that the Germans stole a bunch of stuff (for various reasons but with the same end result that was also desired by them anyway), and Crueldwarf is right that the stuff they stole didn't significantly bolster the German economy (so not being there to steal it won't have that much of a direct negative affect on it either, although as I said they still need to eat and stay warm were ever they end up).
More importantly you are both right in ways that are not mutually exclusive with the other being right.
that's not a defendable line. The west bank of the Volga needs to be secured to guard the flank of Army Group A.
Maybe the west bank above and below Stalingrad and the high ground above the city has to be enough, instead of feeding divisions in to the city move them to the flanks, create a reserve from abandoning the worst salients on the front.
That leaves the Soviets in control of the major industrial center and regional rail and river transport hub, anchoring their own defense and providing them a bridgehead for their own offensive operations in the future. So long as the Soviets hold Stalingrad they can continually threaten to strike southwest from it down the major rail lines that lead from Stalingrad to Rostov at the mouth of the Don river, through which the main German logistical route passed. If they do so, the Germans have to withdraw from the Caucasus or face the prospect of having all the troops there cut off. Basically, taking Stalingrad and neutralizing the threat it poses, is a necessary prerequisite for continued German operations south and east of the Don.
In fact, in late August of 1942 when the Axis were still securing their line at the Don, the Soviet Stalingrad Front launched several attacks down those routes, punching across the Don and securing several bridgheads that the Germans were unable to eliminate. They would have continued such attacks had not the Germans attacked the city themselves, forcing the Front onto the defensive. Basically, Stalingrad is a continual dagger aimed at the logistical neck of Army Group A, and the Germans do indeed need to take it.
Stalingrad was never going to surrender to a bombardment, and it couldn't be properly seiged since the Soviets controlled the other side of the river. And the longer you leave it in Soviet hands, the more powerful forces the Soviets can build behind it and then cross through it and their other bridgeheads. Failing to take it means that the Axis have a continual existential threat on the left flank of their own push for the Caucasus. Not having Sixth Army balls deep in the city when the Soviet counter offensive launches may allow it to retreat intact, but in the face of the Soviet winter offensive the Germans are likely still going to have to fall back to a more defensible line at the Don river or in Ukraine.
If you admit you don't have the forces to take Stalingrad and neutralize the threat it poses, then you're tacitly admitting that the whole of Fall Blau is for eventual failure and ANY continued operations, defensive or offensive, east and south of the Don are little more than an enormous waste of resources.
Last edited:
Yes and no. They recognized it’s value, but there is no sign that ever drew the relevant conclusions of what that meant. Perhaps because they were afraid too, perhaps because for all their talent at operations and tactics, their defects at strategy blinded them to the implications. But that’s speculative.
Hitler was a bit inverted on this. He was able to draw the strategic conclusions... which is what led him to try and reject the operational reality and try to substitute his own.
Hitler was a bit inverted on this. He was able to draw the strategic conclusions... which is what led him to try and reject the operational reality and try to substitute his own.
Last edited:
Both of these are true. But it is also true that a horrific man deficit existed for a generation after the war, impacting Soviet gender and family structure, labour markets, and the millions of empty seats at tables.
The Soviet elite were masterful at organising social production towards their aims, and then at concentrating military forces for purpose. This mastery continued into 1945, but with large costs. By 1945 their first eschelon divisions were experiencing significant overuse degrading their capabilities. Their second eschelon troops had significant quality and indiscipline issues.
This is nowhere near the collapse state of the German forces, but there's a reason the cameras turn off after the frontoviks have marched by.
A longer war won't cause the Red Army's recruiting, training and staffing systems to collapse. But it will result in greater casualties than required to meet political aims. Greater casualties than even historically with all the historical inefficiencies. And the costly and unnecessary political decisions like the race to Berlin will continue. And it will result in a larger man shortage, fewer weddings, a worse 1946-7 famine and economic crisis, a far worse 1953 economic crisis, and yet more empty chairs.
Isn't that was what the Halder firing was really all about, the German offensive had pretty much played out, no one was facing reality. The OP is sort of facing reality in a Hilter sort of way, hold on to stuff but don't die there if pressed..
I heard Halder was sacked because he was delusional about the state of affairs on the ground. I believe I remember hearing a quote of Hitler saying of Halder, "He only thinks in maps."
The Soviets took 20 million deaths during the war, plus another 5-10 million during the Holodmor. Depending on whose numbers you want to take that is 20-30% of the entire population, That the society didn't simply fracture into a failed state.
There is a case to be made that the Soviets never recovered from the double-tap of Man-made famine and the most savage war since the introduction of gunpower onto the European Peninsula.
Although that will depend on the tempo a longer war is fought at, and specifically in terms of Germans killing Russians what else is going on in the war
where would they be if they kept AGS together, no move on the Caucasus?
Strategically, doomed. They had to make a push for the Caucuses. To do less would be admitting defeat. There was a slim chance for Fall Blau to succeed—slim, but if Germany was to win the war, it was a necessary throw of the dice.
but (any) Operation Uranus would face a much larger force and the Soviets might be dealt the fatal blow rather than the Axis? (were dealt at Stalingrad)
off topic a bit, but how would you rate the consequences of this happening on August 29th, and Stalingrad basically falling in the following days/weeks?