German completely adopts the defensive September 1942

This occurs on September 24th 1942 when Halder is sacked. With the failure of the last offensive in Africa, the slowdown in Russia at the grain elevator in the Caucasus, the American counteroffensive in Guadalcanal, increased Allied bombing, that the ratio of strengths has changed against them and is unlikely to become favorable (perhaps Hitler believes the intelligence reports in this TL). Hitler decides on a defensive strategy to bleed the Soviets (hoping to have successes like the early 42 Volkhov and Kharkov and to repulse any Allied attempt to invade Europe.

The immediate consequences:
1) Suspension of HE111 production, cancellation of the HE177 program, increased production of fighters. Jet development focused on Bomber destruction.
I have to point out the problems here of substantial disruptions to production while factories retool to produce a different model of aircraft, not to mention lowered productivity as factories have to learn how to efficiently build a new design.

What about completely withdrawing to the old German Soviet border? This would shorten the frontline by half approximately.
And surrender access to food and vital raw materials from the Ukraine et al. This would be a crippling blow for Germany.
 
It depends on how they handle the defensive posture. On the Eastern Front they still simply wouldn't have sufficient troops to form a proper defensive line. With adequate mobile reserves to plug gaps. The Soviets will still be able to find weak points and force breakthroughs. The Germans can bleed them but eventually the Germans will have to retreat a long distance to a new line and let the Red Army outrun its supply lines. That's when the Germans suffered most due to the lack of mobility in the infantry Divisions.
Whatever the Germans do after Stalingrad is just rearranging the deckchairs on the Titanic. Better choices (from their POV) may prolong the war a few months, worse choices may shorten it a few months. They're just too heavily outnumbered in men and material.

The numbers @TDM posted spell "defeat in spring/summer 1945".
 
my view if Leningrad had been captured, the Soviet fleet cleared from the Baltic, they could have created a little "slack" for themselves, and something like this scenario might drag on for a year or years longer.

if they avoid Stalingrad and "Tunisgrad" they are bleeding the Allies quite a bit more in Ukraine and Italy though?

It depends on how they handle the defensive posture. On the Eastern Front they still simply wouldn't have sufficient troops to form a proper defensive line. With adequate mobile reserves to plug gaps. The Soviets will still be able to find weak points and force breakthroughs. The Germans can bleed them but eventually the Germans will have to retreat a long distance to a new line and let the Red Army outrun its supply lines. That's when the Germans suffered most due to the lack of mobility in the infantry Divisions.
agree with you, not sure how clear my post was IF Leningrad had already been captured prior to this, since that is not the OP, I see little they can do other than, Houdini-like, avoid the worst debacles?

what they are going to produce in terms of armaments is up to them, possibly losing fewer guns if SPGs pushed instead of say the Panther? better defense of Europe if smaller u-boats pushed over the longer ranged types?
 
Whatever the Germans do after Stalingrad is just rearranging the deckchairs on the Titanic. Better choices (from their POV) may prolong the war a few months, worse choices may shorten it a few months. They're just too heavily outnumbered in men and material.
The OP puts his POD at well over a month before Operation Uranus.
 

CalBear

Moderator
Donor
Monthly Donor
What about completely withdrawing to the old German Soviet border? This would shorten the frontline by half approximately.

In 1945 the Soviets were also very low on manpower and started drafting 16 and 17 years olds to fill the losses.
And the Germans were sending 70 year old men and 12 year old boys out to hunt tanks with panzerfausts that they could barely manage lift in 1945. The Soviets, on the other hand, despite taking utterly insane losses for the "honor" of taking Berlin (best estimates are 75,000 KIA, 300,000 WIA) managed to throw better than 1.5 MILLION troops at the Japanese in Manchuria while keeping heavy divisions in Germany and Eastern Europe on occupation duty.

The Reich was going to run out of space to bury its dead before the Red Army was going to run out of men.
 
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Geon

Donor
Okay, here are my thoughts on this.

First on the Eastern Front:
  1. Hitler is convinced to drop his "hold at all costs" order and allow a careful tactical retreat as the Soviets begin their counter offensives.
  2. Hitler allows Paulus to attempt a break out of the 6th Army from Stalingrad.
  3. Hitler's generals talk him out of rising to the bait with the Kursk salient.
  4. The German Army retreats but they make the Russians pay for every mile they take.
In North Africa:
  1. Hitler orders a phased withdrawal of troops from North Africa. Again, no "hold to the last man" doctrine. As many troops as possible are evacuated. The Luftwaffe is used to guard the evacuation convoys. I will fully concede that with increasing British dominance of the Mediterranean at this point there is likely to be severe losses but you have thousands more troops available for the various fronts.
Battle of the Atlantic:
  1. Hitler doesn't scrap his surface navy. The surviving vessels of the surface fleet are kept in readiness for possible surface raiding.
  2. Emphasis in construction however is now on U-Boats. Make the sea lanes as treacherous as possible.
The Luftwaffe:
  1. Dump the "wonder weapons". Use the resources that would have been wasted on developing these weapons that had minimal effect toward developing jet fighters to protect German airspace.
All of these are defensive measures. How does Germany fare if they are able to accomplish these?
 
I'm pretty sure the only reason they did that was because they were able to access manpower reserves in liberated territory and continuing to draft in the other regions was having a catastrophic effect on the Soviet economy. Without the manpower from liberated territory post 43, the Soviets would have been scraping from the bottom of the barrel by 45.
The thing about 'running out of manpower' for USSR is that generation of people that were born in 1924-1927 was coming of age in 1943-45 respectively and it was larger than generations that were born in 1921-1923 (Civil war and famine generations) that become available to draft in 1940-1942. So Soviets were gaining basically several million new draftees every year.

And surrender access to food and vital raw materials from the Ukraine et al. This would be a crippling blow for Germany.
Germans never managed to extract any significant amount of raw resources (be it foodstuff or minerals) out of their Soviet conquests. The whole affair with 'securing the living space and materials for war effort' was huge debacle from the very beginning. They achieved basically nothing at that front and spent much much more on the war than they gained from it.
 
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Germans never managed to extract any significant amount of raw resources (be it foodstuff or minerals) out of their Soviet conquests. The whole affair with 'securing the living space and materials for war effort' was huge debacle from the very beginning. They achieved basically nothing at that front and spent much much more on the war than they gained from it.
I suggest you look up the 'Hunger Plan' if you really think they didn't extract significant amounts of food from the Ukraine.
 
Okay, here are my thoughts on this.

First on the Eastern Front:
  1. Hitler is convinced to drop his "hold at all costs" order and allow a careful tactical retreat as the Soviets begin their counter offensives.
  2. Hitler allows Paulus to attempt a break out of the 6th Army from Stalingrad.
I take some issues here, mainly because you're taking the POD as being after Operation Uranus starts, rather than in September like the OP states. Taking the oil was absolutely needed to continue the war, even if Germany decided to adopt a defensive posture, so just leaving the Caucuses without a major military defeat is strategically out of the question. The POD is Hitler deciding to take a defensive posture in September 1942, well over a month before Operation Uranus. If the Germans give up on taking Stalingrad and content themselves with bombarding it, redeploying their troops in a defensive layout across the front and placing their focus on eliminating the Soviet bridgeheads over the Don, they might conceivably stand a chance of repelling the Soviet attack, or at least buy enough time for a withdrawal to be conducted. The non-German Axis troops IOTL managed to initially repel the Soviet attacks, until their dismal lack of proper anti-tank guns caused them to be overrun.
 
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And surrender access to food and vital raw materials from the Ukraine et al. This would be a crippling blow for Germany.
Germans never managed to extract any significant amount of raw resources (be it foodstuff or minerals) out of their Soviet conquests. The whole affair with 'securing the living space and materials for war effort' was huge debacle from the very beginning. They achieved basically nothing at that front and spent much much more on the war than they gained from it.
I suggest you look up the 'Hunger Plan' if you really think they didn't extract significant amounts of food from the Ukraine.
I think I can see the disconnect here, the German armed forces certainly seized food (and clothes, blankets, firewood, horses, livestock, hand carts, anything with an engine etc). Basically because they ended up having to live off the land because their logistics had issues.

But a lot of that stayed with German armed forces in the occupied USSR and wasn't sent back to Germany as spoils of war. (actual spoils of war were though, they pretyy comprehensively striped valuables IIRC).

Now if the German armed forces retreat back to the old Polish/Russian border they're not living off the land in Western USSR, and their logistics back to Germany will improve. But I'd imagine they will still be a fair amount living off the land in Occupied Poland because a 3 million German troops eat a fair bit every day and Germany will prefer someone else to "pay" for that as mush as possible.

Plus I'm pretty sure the German will do scorched earth retreating back across Western Russia
 
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I think I can see the disconnect here, the German armed forces certainly seized food (and clothes, blankets, firewood, horses, livestock, hand carts, anything with an engine etc). Basically because they ended up having to live off the land because their logistics had issues.

But a lot of that stayed with German armed forces in the occupied USSR and wasn't sent back to Germany as spoils of war. (actual spoils of war were though, they pretyy comprehensively striped valuables IIRC).
That was part of the mechanics of the Hunger Plan, feed the Ostheer by stripping food from the Ukraine while at the same time stopping shipments of food from the Reich to the Ostheer. So yes little of that food reached the Reich, but it achieved its intended effect of increasing the food supply in Germany and Western Europe allowing the Reich to reverse ration cuts and to feed their 'guest workers' enough to get useful work out of them. Fall back to the pre-war border and mass starvation is inevitable.

Make no mistake the Hunger Plan was no accident of logistics, it was a deliberate scheme of mass murder every bit as calculated as the Holocaust, the difference being the Hunger Plan was carried out by the ordinary soldiers of the Wehrmacht rather than the SS.
 

Geon

Donor
The war ends in 1946 or 1947 with central europe a radioactive cinder.
With regard to this - I really wonder about the use of nuclear weapons in EuIrope.

First - a lot would depend on how far the Allies do advance - assuming the war drags into 1946 or 1947. If they have not been able to cross the Rhine (or Vistula in the case of the Russians) I could see it. Otherwise, by 1946 or 1947 we have to assume more tests have occurred of the atomic bomb and some of the dangers such as fallout may be becoming evident. I couldn't see the Manhattan Project stopping with one successful test. And I couldn't see someone like Eisenhower exposing his men to the unknowns of radioactive fallout if they have gotten into Germany. It might be more likely if the allied lines were stalled as above, otherwise I could see a lot more caution in considering using a bomb.

Secondly would the allies be "nuke happy?" I could see one nuclear weapon being used maybe on Berlin, maybe on Nuremburg. But I couldn't see mass nuclear bombings.

I know this is getting off of topic and my apologies for it. I've just noted in many threads the common idea is that "nuking Germany" would be the simple answer to a longer war. I just wonder if the circumstances aren't a bit more complex.
 
I suggest you look up the 'Hunger Plan' if you really think they didn't extract significant amounts of food from the Ukraine.
They didn't. Germans managed to extract about 18 million tons of various foodstuff from USSR during the entire war. Ukraine alone produced about ~20 million tons of grain in 1940. It was determined post-war that German invasion reduced production in the occupied areas by the factor of ten or so.
It was horrible waste from all points of view.

To put the number into perspective: Soviets sold around 1,6 million tons of grain (for 250 million reichsmarks) to Germany between 1939-41. So by conquering the Ukraine Germans doubled the amount of food they were gaining on the yearly basis from USSR but expended much much more resources for that increase. Cost of the Eastern Front was in the billions of reichsmarks.
 
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They didn't. Germans managed to extract about 18 million tons of various foodstuff from USSR during the entire war. Ukraine alone produced about ~20 million tons of grain in 1940. It was determined post-war that German invasion reduced production in the occupied areas by the factor of ten or so.
It was horrible waste from all points of view.

To put the number into perspective: Soviets sold around 1,6 million tons of grain (for 250 million reichsmarks) to Germany between 1939-41. So by conquering the Ukraine Germans doubled the amount of food they were gaining on the yearly basis from USSR but expended much much more resources for that increase. Cost of the Eastern Front was in the billions of reichsmarks.
Except as TDM pointed out most of the food they stole never left the East, it was used to feed the Ostheer instead of supplying them from Germany. Yes productivity collapsed, which didn't stop the Germans from executing the Hunger Plan to ensure adequate food supplies for Germany. The Central Government in Poland which had been a net importer of grain was ordered to export large quantities to the Reich. Again this isn't a matter of opinion, you can find details of the Hunger Plan online or its discussed at length in 'Wages of Destruction'.
 
Except as TDM pointed out most of the food they stole never left the East, it was used to feed the Ostheer instead of supplying them from Germany. Yes productivity collapsed, which didn't stop the Germans from executing the Hunger Plan to ensure adequate food supplies for Germany. The Central Government in Poland which had been a net importer of grain was ordered to export large quantities to the Reich. Again this isn't a matter of opinion, you can find details of the Hunger Plan online or its discussed at length in 'Wages of Destruction'.
My point is that conquest of the USSR was a net drain on the economy of Nazi Germany. Withdrawal from the Soviet Union (or even cancelling the invasion altogether) would not cause economic collapse or anything like that. Germans were spending on the conquest vastly more than they were gaining out of it.
 
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