German completely adopts the defensive September 1942

[Catspoke]

This occurs on September 24th 1942 when Halder is sacked. With the failure of the last offensive in Africa, the slowdown in Russia at the grain elevator in the Caucasus, the American counteroffensive in Guadalcanal, increased Allied bombing, that the ratio of strengths has changed against them and is unlikely to become favorable (perhaps Hitler believes the intelligence reports in this TL). Hitler decides on a defensive strategy to bleed the Soviets (hoping to have successes like the early 42 Volkhov and Kharkov and to repulse any Allied attempt to invade Europe.

The immediate consequences:
1) Suspension of HE111 production, cancellation of the HE177 program, increased production of fighters. Jet development focused on Bomber destruction.
2) Stoppage of naval production or serious repair of anything larger than a destroyer, extra dock space and workers used and ships of the Type 39 torpedo boat class size. (kind of an early scrap the fleet order).
3) Immediate evacuation of Rzhev-Vyazma Demaynsk salients to create reserves.
4) Immediate suspension of offensives in Stalingrad, on the Terek and a switch to a defensive posture. .
5) Limited withdrawals are permitted from the Terek but Hitler wants to hold Pyatigorsk, protect the Kuban, and his positions on the Volga. Will insist on holding like OTL beyond that (would agree to withdrawals a couple of days earlier than OTL situations, but still wants to hold stuff to keep his economic base).
6) Hitler wants Africa held as long as possible, but acknowledges that southern Europe is the correct place to hold. (for example would agree to Rommel's request to evacuate Africa mid march 43 in this TL, but not earlier).
7) Would agree to any compromise peace with the Soviets that allows him to keep some Soviet territory as a face saving move.
8) Suspension of bombing over England (no mini blitz or anything like it)
9) V1 and V2 development continue as a retaliatory weapon in lieu of bombers. (Gotta have some wonder weapons for the propaganda)

How long could the Reich last in such a scenario????

 

[garfieldleifrag]

Didn't they do pretty much this OTL after Stalingrad (besides a few minor offensives to try and cut off salients)? If they did it earlier it would still make some difference, but with the failure of Case Blue they'll still be facing tons of petroleum shortages, the Soviets and Americans will only continue to get better, and if they manage to hold out much longer than OTL they start getting nuked (although one or two probably wouldn't knock them out of the war, the USA had over 100 nukes by 1950 IIRC).

 

[Dolnikan]

The big problem with a defensive strategy is that defense doesn't win wars. It only stretches them out. By this time, the Germans have done plenty of things to sufficiently motivate their enemies to want to truly defeat them, and making the process a bit harder isn't going to change that. Furthermore, a more defensive posture advantages the greater industrial power of the Allies. So it just gets them ground down.

 

[Finbarr the Fair]

A defensive posture on the southern portion of the Eastern Front from September 1942 is still on very extended lines. With inadequate reserves even after the withdrawal from the Ryzhev etc. salients. The Red Army will also have troops released to reserves and not suffer the losses from holding Stalingrad.

The shift in production to fighters etc. will be minimal compared to Allied bomber and fighter strength. Especially when pilot training is still restricted by fuel shortages.

There probably would be some benefits from more flexibility in defensive tactics on the Eastern Front. But the overall picture will still be forced withdrawals.

I can't see these changes doing more than prolonging the war in Europe for more than a few months at most.

 

[AdA]

In September 1942 the German Army was trying to complete Blau in order to hold an advantageous position in the USSR, that included holding the Caucasus and a very long line along the Volga. In September Army Groups A and B cannot stop were they are, because they would have all sorts of open flanks and would have to hold a badly defined defensive line.. They have to either try to complete Blau, which was the OTL option, or pull back, which would waste all the effort on Blau and have logistic costs.
The time to decide to go on the defensive would be after the failed soviet offensive in Karkov, canceling Blau.
But that would be a very un German thing to do, and would give no path to any possible long term victorious outcome with the USA at war.

 

[Otto Kretschmer]

What about completely withdrawing to the old German Soviet border? This would shorten the frontline by half approximately.

In 1945 the Soviets were also very low on manpower and started drafting 16 and 17 years olds to fill the losses.

 

[Crueldwarf]

You cannot win a war by defending. But you can loose it. It is kinda a persistent problem with strategic defense, you allow the opponent to choose the time and place of the battle.

People sometimes misunderstand the nature of early German advantage over the Soviets. Yes, they basically always inflicted disproportionate casualties on the Red Army, but to do so they needed to consistently keep Soviets out of balance, by pushing them and forcing hasty counter-attacks. If Germans suddenly become passive, Soviets would happily wait and gather forces like they did in summer 1943 OTL.

 

[Dolnikan]

What about completely withdrawing to the old German Soviet border? This would shorten the frontline by half approximately.

In 1945 the Soviets were also very low on manpower and started drafting 16 and 17 years olds to fill the losses.

Such a withdrawal in 1942 basically means saying that they lost the war and lost it badly. Furthermore, such a move could very easily end up leading to a coup or even a popular uprising because to large parts of the population it felt like they were still winning, and now all the sacrifices are for nothing. It also means that the Soviets will indeed be spending some time to rebuild their logistics, but their next attacks will be directly at German territory, meaning a much higher cost to the fighting as well as withdrawals becoming much harder.

 

[Crueldwarf]

In 1945 the Soviets were also very low on manpower and started drafting 16 and 17 years olds to fill the losses.

No, they didn't. By 1945 Soviets did quite the opposite - they stopped draft of the youngest age groups in all regions besides freshly liberated ones.

 

[Otto Kretschmer]

.No, they didn't. By 1945 Soviets did quite the opposite - they stopped draft of the youngest age groups in all regions besides freshly liberated ones.

Thank you. I stand corrected

 

[TDM]

What about completely withdrawing to the old German Soviet border? This would shorten the frontline by half approximately.

Leaving aside the political issues with this (as others have pointed out retreating in failure from Judeo-bolshevism isn't going to sell, and in general it hands overall initiative to the USSR which is precisely the opposite of German strategic military thinking).

There are some trade offs here,

How do you do that retreat without it being a rout where the German forces are pursued across a thousand miles? Make it an ordered retreat, which is kind of what happened anyway

Assuming it is a ordered withdrawal without a rout you will in theory save your Stalingrad and Kursk losses (amongst others). But you also end hundreds of miles closer to Berlin when you do make your stand

If the Germans start to build up a fortification line on the old border in preparation for withdrawal from Russia and manning it, they have to actually divert resources to do that, and it will be blatantly obvious to everyone what they are doing and what they are planning. But if they dont build up a defensive line they better hope that what's basically going to be a fighting withdrawal from their current position in Russia back to the old border will stay at that border

In 1945 the Soviets were also very low on manpower and started drafting 16 and 17 years olds to fill the losses.

The Russian are always gong to be able to out mobilise the Germans (to say nothing of the rest of the allies)

The thing is saving German losses from Stalingrad and Kursk by not doing either works both ways here anyway. I.e there will be a lot of Soviets who don't die in them as well!

 

[GuildedAgeNostalgia]

No, they didn't. By 1945 Soviets did quite the opposite - they stopped draft of the youngest age groups in all regions besides freshly liberated ones.

I'm pretty sure the only reason they did that was because they were able to access manpower reserves in liberated territory and continuing to draft in the other regions was having a catastrophic effect on the Soviet economy. Without the manpower from liberated territory post 43, the Soviets would have been scraping from the bottom of the barrel by 45.

 

[GuildedAgeNostalgia]

Didn't they do pretty much this OTL after Stalingrad (besides a few minor offensives to try and cut off salients)? If they did it earlier it would still make some difference, but with the failure of Case Blue they'll still be facing tons of petroleum shortages, the Soviets and Americans will only continue to get better, and if they manage to hold out much longer than OTL they start getting nuked (although one or two probably wouldn't knock them out of the war, the USA had over 100 nukes by 1950 IIRC).

Kursk was a very major offensive in which the Germans lost a very significant amount of armored vehicles and aircraft, which is far more important than actual manpower..

 

[Otto Kretschmer]

I have heard several time that manpower reserves were running low in 1945 but never saw actual data to support or debunk this

 

[GuildedAgeNostalgia]

I have heard several time that manpower reserves were running low in 1945 but never saw actual data to support or debunk this

The issue if I'm not mistaken is a lot of the primary sources are in Russian and no one has taken the time to translate.

My opinion is based off the following (this is a simplistic explanation):
- A vast portion of the USSR's population was under German occupation.
- The Soviet Army was huge.
- The workforce nessecary to support the Soviet army would also need to be huge.
- A crap ton of Soviets were killed.
- Without the population of the liberated territories, it's just hard to fathom how the Soviets continue to replace their losses without destroying the economy/workforce that is nessecary to support the giant army they already have.

 

[tomo pauk]

If Germans don't loose the 6th Army as they did per OTL, that leaves them a lot better wrt. manpower, and especially in trained and experienced manpower. All together, Axis losses were around 800 thousand in the 5 months of the grind; granted, Soviet losses were even bigger, but so was their ability to make good these losses.
As for the other theatres, Germany was already in defense.

 

[TDM]

I'm pretty sure the only reason they did that was because they were able to access manpower reserves in liberated territory and continuing to draft in the other regions was having a catastrophic effect on the Soviet economy. Without the manpower from liberated territory post 43, the Soviets would have been scraping from the bottom of the barrel by 45.

I have heard several time that manpower reserves were running low in 1945 but never saw actual data to support or debunk this

even if that were true in terms of why they did it and the wider picture of the Soviets running out of mobilisation pool (and I'm not sure it is)l, in this scenario those liberated regions will be available earlier though. Plus you won't have the massive Soviet loses in Kursk and Stalingrad.

(EDIT sorry Guilded and Otto, I quoted those in the wrong order and I can't swap them over!)

The reality is that although the Soviets were losing considerably more than the Germans pretty much every year:

In terms of mobilised numbers in the eastern front the Soviets started a million behind the Germans in June 41 but over took them by the end of 1941 (while losing approx. 2.5m in the same time frame), got over 6m mobilised by Nov 1942 and stayed above 6m all the way until the end of the war. Whereas German numbers in the east start dropping rapidly from mid 1944 onwards partly due to unsustainable losses but also because they have to increasingly mobilise to face other fronts.

 

[thaddeus]

my view if Leningrad had been captured, the Soviet fleet cleared from the Baltic, they could have created a little "slack" for themselves, and something like this scenario might drag on for a year or years longer.

if they avoid Stalingrad and "Tunisgrad" they are bleeding the Allies quite a bit more in Ukraine and Italy though?

 

[Post]

In 1945 the Soviets were also very low on manpower and started drafting 16 and 17 years olds to fill the losses.

You know who were really low on manpower? The Germans. They conscripted the Hitler Jugend. Up (or down) to 13-year olds, if I'm not mistaken.
And not just the Hitlerjugend, they also conscripted elder man.

 

[Finbarr the Fair]

my view if Leningrad had been captured, the Soviet fleet cleared from the Baltic, they could have created a little "slack" for themselves, and something like this scenario might drag on for a year or years longer.

if they avoid Stalingrad and "Tunisgrad" they are bleeding the Allies quite a bit more in Ukraine and Italy though?

It depends on how they handle the defensive posture. On the Eastern Front they still simply wouldn't have sufficient troops to form a proper defensive line. With adequate mobile reserves to plug gaps. The Soviets will still be able to find weak points and force breakthroughs. The Germans can bleed them but eventually the Germans will have to retreat a long distance to a new line and let the Red Army outrun its supply lines. That's when the Germans suffered most due to the lack of mobility in the infantry Divisions.