German army groups before ww1

BooNZ

Banned
I'd point out that Britain wasn't the primary driver of the war, she was one of 5 major powers. Indeed this thread about German Army groups shows the limitation of Britain in 1914; more effective action against the 5 French armies could drastically limit the influence of Britain on the long war.
Like ignoring Belgium altogether...
 
I may be mis-remembering, but I understand the Germans had a solid source the Anglo-Russian talks were scheduled to take place. Grey was questioned and initially denied everything, which totally discredited Grey in the eyes of German diplomacy. From that point onward, no one in Berlin believed anything the British said. I understand Lichnowsky was in the dark regarding the German information and source, so his continued positive spin of Grey's assurances likely also undermined his influence/inteligence on German decision makers.

I daresay the German distrust of British diplomacy and thier own man in London would not have helped their OTL decision making - not that there were ultimately many decisions to make, since Moltke only saw fit to prepare one f**king plan for every conceivable scenario. - and oh, what a plan!

Close enough!

Outside the British admiralty and foreign office, most of the British decision makers were very keen for a reconciliation with Germany. The hold outs, Churchill and Grey, enjoyed very little support in the British Liberal Party. OTL Grey was on notice for threatening Anglo-German relations and subsequently forced to work with his French couterparts in the the shadows. OTL in late 1914 Churchill was contemplating party hopping (again), due to his lack of influence over the British Liberal Party.

Notwithstanding the above, there were also persons in Germany with a track record of sabotaging Anglo-German relations - for example, Holstein's reign and diplomatic assessments were a disaster for Anglo-German relations.
Dint forget the prime minister was not only a close alliy to gray but also probably knew what he was doing and supported him.
 
Like ignoring Belgium altogether...

How much impact did Belgium have on the assassination of Franz Ferdinand? Or the Russian partial mobilisation? Or France extending its conscription term to 3 years and planning to buy a lot of heavy artillery? Or any of the other events which lead to WW1?
 

BooNZ

Banned
Dint forget the prime minister was not only a close alliy to gray but also probably knew what he was doing and supported him.
Asquith was a Liberal man first, a dove second and a whatever you want third - Grey enjoyed the support of Asquith to the extent Grey was a close friend and Grey was assumed to be persuing peace. It is plausible Asquith was familar with the activities of Churchill and Grey, but his support for anti-german or pro-french interests ahead of Britain or the Liberal party are far less likely.

How much impact did Belgium have on the assassination of Franz Ferdinand? Or the Russian partial mobilisation? Or France extending its conscription term to 3 years and planning to buy a lot of heavy artillery? Or any of the other events which lead to WW1?
None at all, and Moltke's intent to invade Belgium never wavered during his tenure despite those and many, many other matters that rendered the cunning plan almost obsolete at is inception. The absence of the Germans in Belgium would have kept the BEF off the continent and severely restricted the French military's offensive 'flare'. I'm almost certain we have covered this subject before...
 
Outside the British admiralty and foreign office, most of the British decision makers were very keen for a reconciliation with Germany. The hold outs, Churchill and Grey, enjoyed very little support in the British Liberal Party. OTL Grey was on notice for threatening Anglo-German relations and subsequently forced to work with his French couterparts in the the shadows. OTL in late 1914 Churchill was contemplating party hopping (again), due to his lack of influence over the British Liberal Party.

The problem is that those liberal-imperialist "hold-outs" held virtually all the power in the Liberal Party as they saw it fit to threaten to resign and bring down the whole government whenever it seemed likely that they wouldn't get their way (of course only as long as the possibility of a coalition with the conservatives was open).

From The Sleepwalkers

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Notwithstanding the above, there were also persons in Germany with a track record of sabotaging Anglo-German relations - for example, Holstein's reign and diplomatic assessments were a disaster for Anglo-German relations.

By 1914 Holstein's reign was long over and nearly all influential persons in the German government, including the Kaiser (and especially Bethmann) were looking for an understanding with Britain. Grey and Asquith didn't care (although much of the Liberal party sought better relations with Germany).

It seems that although the majority of the Liberal party was either germanophilic or non-interventionist they had very little power at the end of the day.
 

BooNZ

Banned
The problem is that those liberal-imperialist "hold-outs" held virtually all the power in the Liberal Party as they saw it fit to threaten to resign and bring down the whole government whenever it seemed likely that they wouldn't get their way (of course only as long as the possibility of a coalition with the conservatives was open).
No. As previously mentioned, circa 1912 Grey was put on notice by the British Cabinet it was not acceptable for his pro-french policies to put Anglo-German relations at risk. Grey and Churchill exercised power to the extent the rest of the British Cabinet did not perceive a threat of war. Grey's OTL threat to resign is not an expression of power, but a demonstration of weakness and lack of influence in the Liberal Party - and the outcome of the threat only extended to policing the English Channel, not British entry into the war.

There was never a realistic prospect of a coalition with the conservatives, who were also struggling for a consensus for war without the Germans in Belgium. It was only being contemplated by the hawks in the case of the British doves enforcing peace in the face of serious provications such as Belgium. Again, Churchill's back-door dealings with his former conservative colleagues illustrates his weakness and lack of influence within the British Liberal party, when attempting to sell the war.

By 1914 Holstein's reign was long over and nearly all influential persons in the German government, including the Kaiser (and especially Bethmann) were looking for an understanding with Britain. Grey and Asquith didn't care (although much of the Liberal party sought better relations with Germany).
Looking for is not the same thing as demanding. I suspect the continued lack of German flexibilty contributed to the overall failure of the Haldane mission in 1912. I'm not sure where you get the bit about Grey and Asquith 'not caring' - I don't recall their exact position, but I'm certain the status Anglo-German relations was considered by most a big deal.

It seems that although the majority of the Liberal party was either germanophilic or non-interventionist they had very little power at the end of the day.
At the end of July 1914, British doves and non-interventionists dominated the British Cabinet. It was the ill conceived German invaison of Belgium that made British neutrality impossible.
 
No. As previously mentioned, circa 1912 Grey was put on notice by the British Cabinet it was not acceptable for his pro-french policies to put Anglo-German relations at risk. Grey and Churchill exercised power to the extent the rest of the British Cabinet did not perceive a threat of war. Grey's OTL threat to resign is not an expression of power, but a demonstration of weakness and lack of influence in the Liberal Party - and the outcome of the threat only extended to policing the English Channel, not British entry into the war.

There was never a realistic prospect of a coalition with the conservatives, who were also struggling for a consensus for war without the Germans in Belgium. It was only being contemplated by the hawks in the case of the British doves enforcing peace in the face of serious provications such as Belgium. Again, Churchill's back-door dealings with his former conservative colleagues illustrates his weakness and lack of influence within the British Liberal party, when attempting to sell the war.

"The 'pro-German' lobby in Britain failed to dislodge Grey or his policy." Like Clark says, the anti-Grey and anti-Entente backlash was ultimately unsuccessful, all they were able to accomplish was to muddy the waters and force Grey to work behind their backs. I think it's fair to judge power and influence by what happened and not popularity. Grey, Asquith, and Churchill and their shared interventionist policy was by no means popular within the Liberal Party (and perhaps not with the general public either), but at almost every turn, in particular during the July Crisis, they came out on top of the non-interventionists and were able to inch Britain to war.

Do you have some more information/sources for the Conservatives being torn about intervention if Germany didn't invade Belgium? It's not that I don't believe you rather I'd like to know more.

I suspect the continued lack of German flexibilty contributed to the overall failure of the Haldane mission in 1912.
The problem was that there was simply no reason for the British to give everything up since they were hands down winning the naval race. Why trade something for nothing?

At the end of July 1914, British doves and non-interventionists dominated the British Cabinet.
Yet they were entirely ineffective in keeping Britain out of the war, likely even before Germany invaded Belgium.

'm not sure where you get the bit about Grey and Asquith 'not caring'
From their enthusiastic endorsement of military planning with France and entangling Britain in secret commitments to defend the French. They were more concerned with making sure that the French and Russians came out on top in a future war with Germany than preventing said war in the first place.
 
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BooNZ

Banned
"The 'pro-German' lobby in Britain failed to dislodge Grey or his policy." Like Clark says, the anti-Grey and anti-Entente backlash was ultimately unsuccessful, all they were able to accomplish was to muddy the waters and force Grey to work behind their backs.

I was not aware there was a pro-German lobby. As it happens the isolationists, non-interventionists and pacifists who made up the majority of British cabinet did not hold portfolio responsibility or oversight over the navy or foreign affairs. However, as previously stated, I understand in 1912 the British Cabinet put Grey on notice not to threaten Anglo-German relations with his French infatuations.

What exactly did Grey accomplish in the shadows? In the days before the war, even Grey acknowledged Britain had a free hand i.e. there was no British committment to France. In July 1914 there was no obvious path the British hawks could ahve pulled Britain into the war without the Germans being in

I think it's fair to judge power and influence by what happened and not popularity. Grey, Asquith, and Churchill and their shared interventionist policy was by no means popular within the Liberal Party (and perhaps not with the general public either), but at almost every turn, in particular during the July Crisis, they came out on top of the non-interventionists and were able to inch Britain to war.
From what I have read, I am not convinced Asquith was an intervenist, actually quite the contrary. From memory, I don't even think Asquith had appointed a War Minster (or similar) and there was actually uncertainty how Britiain was to go about the formality of going to war.

The only reason the hawks came out on top was because their position was premised on the correct prediction the Germans would violate Belgium neutrality. It is a well known fact that after spending the best part of a day harranging his fellow Cabinet members, Churchil didn't move the British Cabinet one inch towards war. It was the German invasion of Belgium that discredited the doves and won the day for the hawks.

Do you have some more information/sources for the Conservatives being torn about intervention if Germany didn't invade Belgium? It's not that I don't believe you rather I'd like to know more.
I suspect I first read it in Dreadnaught by Massie, where Grey would keep the leader of the opposition Bonar Law appraised of developments, and Bonar Law was on record as stating conservative support for war was uncertain without a German invaision of Belgium.

The problem was that there was simply no reason for the British to give everything up since they were hands down winning the naval race. Why trade something for nothing?
Yet the Germans insisted with demands - a legacy of Holstein's assumption an Anglo-German settlement was inevitable.

Yet they were entirely ineffective in keeping Britain out of the war, likely even before Germany invaded Belgium.
No, the hawks efforts had been futile until the German invaison of Belgium.

From their enthusiastic endorsement of military planning with France and entangling Britain in secret commitments to defend the French. They were more concerned with making sure that the French and Russians came out on top in a future war with Germany than preventing said war in the first place.
Enthusiastic? How so?
 
So, I managed to get my hands on Afflerbachs and Jessens books. The Prittwitz episode was not in there, I will have to do some searching to see where I read that.

That said, while neither Afflerbach nor Jessen go into detail on Moltkes health it doesn't look promising.

Moltke was already extremly nervous according to Falkenhayn on July 27th and didn't get better all the way to August 1st. Than he has his shouting match with Wilhelm and after that, well, Moltke described himself as broken to Falkenhayn. Upon arriving back at the Generalstaff building Moltke had red and blue spots in his face and broke down crying in his office. Even after Wilhelm gave him permission to execute his plan later that day Moltke didn't pull himself back together.

His wife Eliza worried that he might have suffered a mild stroke and requested permission to travel with him so that she could nurse him back to health. Wilhelm objected but his wife intervend and so Eliza von Moltke travelled with her husband to Koblenz to take care of him. By August 27th Moltke was in such bad shape that Eliza arranged a meeting between him and the family friend Rudolf Steiner. Things only got worse from there on with Moltke close to a nervous breakdown and seemingly incapable of making a decisive decision up until after the Marne when he ordered the retreat of the the 3. 4. and 5. army on the 12th of September.

Moltke was in no shape to lead Germany's armies. I don't think he would have done much better than Bülow. In fact he might have just dropped with a stroke at the worst possible moment. Best case scenario is probably him actually having a stroke during his argument with Wilhelm and being replaced by Falkenhayn.
 
Wiking has him dying in his TL, and Falkenhayen taking over and using closer command, with better results than OTL.

Perhaps the strain of high command would have killed or otherwise ruined him, but war is a stressful thing, IIRC even the German General Staff prologue says it demands the most of the physical, intellectual and moral strength. Joffre ran around sacking incompetent generals of promoting competent ones, the same shouid have happened to Motlke.
 
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