German Air Superiority over the Channel

What is the relationship between naval and air superiority during the Second World War? Could Germany, for example, have rendered the Royal Navy inoperable in the channel assuming that they decisively defeated the RAF and made extensive use of torpedo bombers?

From my understanding the aircraft carrier was king precisely because, assuming air superiority could be acquired, the torpedo bomber was most effective at dispensing with even the most gargantuan capital ships. Why was this same logic not applicable to nations like Italy and Germany against the RN given the abundance of airbases with which they could operate the bombers?
 
Because carriers have got CAG that will shoot down the torpedo bombers. If they operate from a land base the carriers will simply stay away from the coast(like the channel) and far enough for only the bombers themselves to reach them, without fighter escorts.

The Germans can control the channel through the air, but not the North Sea. same goes for the Meds, though the italians won't get air superiority anywhere the british carriers are at.
 

CalBear

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A decisive defeat of the RAF would have made the Channel a no go zone for RN heavies in daylight. It effectively turns France into an aircraft carrier (mirror image of what happened IOTL). That of course wasn't air superiority, it was air supremacy. Supremacy means your troops hear plane engines and they wave, never even bother to look up.

The problem, of course, is figuring out a scenario where the RAF is knocked back that badly.
 
A decisive defeat of the RAF would have made the Channel a no go zone for RN heavies in daylight. It effectively turns France into an aircraft carrier (mirror image of what happened IOTL). That of course wasn't air superiority, it was air supremacy. Supremacy means your troops hear plane engines and they wave, never even bother to look up.

The problem, of course, is figuring out a scenario where the RAF is knocked back that badly.

Maybe the southern bases get knocked out? Would that make the range with which they had to operate on the channel too great?

Im also wondering why the Italians and Germans couldnt do something similar in the central med. to disrupt the British war effort in Egypt. I know that the Japanese learned from British bomber attacks on the Italian navy, but why didnt the Italians and Germans? Did they learn but not possess thr capacity materially, or did they simply not take anything away from those experiences?
 
Maybe the southern bases get knocked out? Would that make the range with which they had to operate on the channel too great?

Im also wondering why the Italians and Germans couldnt do something similar in the central med. to disrupt the British war effort in Egypt. I know that the Japanese learned from British bomber attacks on the Italian navy, but why didnt the Italians and Germans? Did they learn but not possess thr capacity materially, or did they simply not take anything away from those experiences?

It's hard to knock a base when all they need is fields and fuel. Southern bases being knocked means every field close to where there is fuel needs to be knocked out.

Germany moved their elite antishipping units to Norway without giving them much tume in the central med.

A torpedo attack in the Mediteranean on British bases wasn't viable because Britain didn't use Malta as a base. Germany and Italy would have had to hit Alexandria which was out of range if they wanted to do a Taranto or a Pearl Harbour.

The Med was large enough that apart from the Sicillian Narrows the Flet didn't come close enough to land based air that they could be hit by escorted strikes. Unescorted strikes of course could have been made mincemeat as the fleet almost always operated with carriers.
 
If the Luftwaffe had decisively defeated the RAF.....They didn't and probably couldn't.

The Italians had torpedoes and aircraft to successfully deliver them in 1940, but hadn't thought of putting the two together before their war started.

The Germans let the BoB pass before they started looking for functional torpedoes from the Italians, late 1940, and modified their own, for late 1941. There wasn't any point in installing external brackets to the aircraft or training aircrew before they had the weapons.

It's much like the landing craft for the invasion that weren't available until it was time to use them for evacuations.

If you're going to have a dump, you have to remember to pull down your pants ahead of time or you'll crap your drawers. Foresight and planning. It's important.
 
If Germany has air superiority over the Channel, they probably have air superiority period, I assume.

If we're talking about the Channel specifically, the only real strategic benefit of that on its own is to facilitate an invasion of England.

However:

From my understanding the aircraft carrier was king precisely because, assuming air superiority could be acquired, the torpedo bomber was most effective at dispensing with even the most gargantuan capital ships. Why was this same logic not applicable to nations like Italy and Germany against the RN given the abundance of airbases with which they could operate the bombers?

During the critical period, the Battle of Britain, Germany has neither an abundance of aircraft carriers nor an abundance of effective torpedo bombers, so even if it had air superiority over the Channel, it would have difficulty doing what you're imagining here at that time.
 
It's hard to knock a base when all they need is fields and fuel. Southern bases being knocked means every field close to where there is fuel needs to be knocked out.

Germany moved their elite antishipping units to Norway without giving them much tume in the central med.

A torpedo attack in the Mediteranean on British bases wasn't viable because Britain didn't use Malta as a base. Germany and Italy would have had to hit Alexandria which was out of range if they wanted to do a Taranto or a Pearl Harbour.

The Med was large enough that apart from the Sicillian Narrows the Flet didn't come close enough to land based air that they could be hit by escorted strikes. Unescorted strikes of course could have been made mincemeat as the fleet almost always operated with carriers.

It was my understanding that knocking out airfields is standard proceduere as the first ste, and that the German airforce was directed towards that task before the strat bombing campaigns began.

With regard to the med, do the axis have the capacity to knock out the airbase in Alexandria, or concentrate their airforce such that the RAF becomes overwhelmed in the med?
 
It was my understanding that knocking out airfields is standard proceduere as the first ste, and that the German airforce was directed towards that task before the strat bombing campaigns began.

With regard to the med, do the axis have the capacity to knock out the airbase in Alexandria, or concentrate their airforce such that the RAF becomes overwhelmed in the med?
Knocking out airfields in the battle of Britain at this time was more about trying to catch planes on the ground than actually preventing airfields from operating afaik. Yes you could take the main runway out but there was nearby relief fields.

There was no point where German forces was close enough to hit the naval base at Alexandria with a strike escorted by fighters. They could have tried a me110 escorted strike but that would have been chewed up by any defences.
 
If Germany has air superiority over the Channel, they probably have air superiority period, I assume.

If we're talking about the Channel specifically, the only real strategic benefit of that on its own is to facilitate an invasion of England.

However:



During the critical period, the Battle of Britain, Germany has neither an abundance of aircraft carriers nor an abundance of effective torpedo bombers, so even if it had air superiority over the Channel, it would have difficulty doing what you're imagining here at that time.

Im more asking if it were theoretically possible assuming that Germany had, at the very least, an effective design ready for production at the onset of the war, and some genuis making a convicing arguemnt for them.

Basically, i wanna know to what extent Germany can knock the RN out of the channel or the med given the aforementioned conditions which are in my mind feasible. My assumption is that the more maneuverable destroyers, which the RN had in abundance, wouldnt have much issue operating, but the heavier ships would.
 
I have my doubts, the Battle of the Bismarck Sea in March 1943 was the first time air attack alone had destroyed a convoy. This battle was 114 bombers and 54 fighters against 8 transports and 8 destroyers and 100 fighters, all transports and 4 destroyers were sunk in a 3 day running battle.

If this is what it takes to sink 12 unarmoured ships with 1943 planes specifically equipped and trained to attack ships, what number of specialized planes and squadrons would be required to destroy the Home Fleet's dozens of warships in 1940? Would 500 be too many, 1500 not enough given Germany had very few torpedo bombers?
 
Im more asking if it were theoretically possible assuming that Germany had, at the very least, an effective design ready for production at the onset of the war, and some genuis making a convicing arguemnt for them.

Basically, i wanna know to what extent Germany can knock the RN out of the channel or the med given the aforementioned conditions which are in my mind feasible. My assumption is that the more maneuverable destroyers, which the RN had in abundance, wouldnt have much issue operating, but the heavier ships would.
Look at the damage suffered by the Royal Navy in the battle of Crete. If the Germans have air superiority they can replicate that all day. For the med they need a much better long range fighter. For the English channel they need a he'll of a lot to change to win the battle of Britain to the extent where they have air supremacy in the channel.

Remember Germany need to also have a credible invasion threat or they royal navy can safely withdraw from the channel. So they need to win the air and be scary for an invasion.
 
Knocking out airfields in the battle of Britain at this time was more about trying to catch planes on the ground than actually preventing airfields from operating afaik. Yes you could take the main runway out but there was nearby relief fields.

There was no point where German forces was close enough to hit the naval base at Alexandria with a strike escorted by fighters. They could have tried a me110 escorted strike but that would have been chewed up by any defences.

From my understanding of the battle, the German airforce was directed towards the destruction of all military bases/production centers in Southern England so as to make the British airforce inoperable in that zone, or much less effective given that they would have to operate from airbases further away. It wasnt so much destroying the fighters of the RAF, but destroying its capacity to fly them.

Given enough concentration of air power in the med, could the axis have overwhelmed the RAF operating out of Alexandria?
 
The BoB and, later, the siege of Malta showed that you really couldn't knock out an airfield from the air. All you could do is suppress it.

You could also hope to catch the defending aircraft on the ground, as was done to one of the Club Runs (or was it Wasp?) to Malta, but a competent ground organisation and air defence system could prevent that.

AIUI the British did cede air superiority over the Channel during much of the BoB, but that was because there was nothing to defend there after the convoys were cancelled. But the fundamental problem that the Luftwaffe had with controlling the Channel was they couldn't operate at night but the RN could.
 

CalBear

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It was my understanding that knocking out airfields is standard proceduere as the first ste, and that the German airforce was directed towards that task before the strat bombing campaigns began.

With regard to the med, do the axis have the capacity to knock out the airbase in Alexandria, or concentrate their airforce such that the RAF becomes overwhelmed in the med?
The goal is to knock out airfields. That is a doable thing today, when almost everything needs a hard surface runway. In the early 1940s it was very difficult. Spitfires and Hurricanes had "rough field capabilities, all they needed was a few hundred yards of meadow.

The Axis had nowhere to fly FROM to achieve that short of effort. They also had no way to off load enough fuel to make it work.
 
What is the relationship between naval and air superiority during the Second World War? Could Germany, for example, have rendered the Royal Navy inoperable in the channel assuming that they decisively defeated the RAF and made extensive use of torpedo bombers?

From my understanding the aircraft carrier was king precisely because, assuming air superiority could be acquired, the torpedo bomber was most effective at dispensing with even the most gargantuan capital ships. Why was this same logic not applicable to nations like Italy and Germany against the RN given the abundance of airbases with which they could operate the bombers?

Your looking at it in terms of purely the Luftwaffe vs the British fleet, where all the Luftwaffe has to do is sink the other sides ships with no limitations in terms of time. But what we're actually discussing is an amphibious assault, which is more complicated as what the Luftwaffe has to do is not merely sink the RN's ships that are sent into the channel... but rather sink them all before they destroy the invasion fleet. And on that, I'll just cite a relevant post by me:

Because people realize that the Germans would not be able to inflict enough damage with the Luftwaffe to stop the RN. WW2 aircraft were limited in their "stopping power" which could become an issue when facing large, heavy surface forces. At Leyte Gulf, the American carrier fleet launched massed airstrikes against the Japanese battleships of Centre Force but while they sank the Musashi they failed to stop Kurita's ships, which would subsequently penetrate the San Bernadino Strait. A fleet of battleships blocking the strait (in the event that Halsey had formed TF 34 and parked it there) could have delivered far more firepower, and potentially defeated Kurita far more decisively.

Although not a carrier force, the battle off Crete shows a similar dynamic. Although the RN suffered heavy losses to air attack off Crete, the Luftwaffe lacked the sheer killing power to simply sweep the RN away, and instead had to keep bleeding them a ship at a time. So long as the British were willing to sustain such losses though, they could remain on station. A successful surface action however could have removed the RN presence at a stroke. Instead, British sea control meant that Italian attempts to reinforce the invasion by sea themselves led to disaster and only succeeded once the British began evacuating Crete. Even the sinking of the mere 2 capitol ships of Force Z by the Japanese required the commitment of 88 aircraft, a significant number, whose anti-ship capabilities in both craft and crew were far superior then anything the Luftwaffe had (for example, it was Japanese torpedo bombers that delivered the killing blows but the Germans in mid-1940 didn't even have any combat operational torpedo bombers). Even then, it took the Japanese multiple attempts and the light units of Force Z were unscathed. The bottom line is that surface ships could still control the sea if they were willing to pay the price against aircraft. It's this same problem which would have foredoomed any attempt by the Germans to use airpower to stop the Royal Navy from sinking the Sealion invasion force, even had they gained complete air superiority. The RN would have lost ships sailing into the channel but not nearly enough to stop it before it savaged the invasion flotilla. The LW would be able to make the RN pay a price in destroying the German invasion fleet, but that is the most they would be able to do and it would be a price the RN would be very much willing to pay.
 
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The goal is to knock out airfields. That is a doable thing today, when almost everything needs a hard surface runway. In the early 1940s it was very difficult. Spitfires and Hurricanes had "rough field capabilities, all they needed was a few hundred yards of meadow.

The Axis had nowhere to fly FROM to achieve that short of effort. They also had no way to off load enough fuel to make it work.

Repeated for emphasis.

People need to remember that when we're talking about an "airfield" ca. 1940, that's what we mean. There isn't a fancy airbase with tarmac and a runway custom-built for specialized air traffic. There is a grass field, hopefully free of dips and holes. I have been told before but cannot confirm that later Spitfires were actually reinforced to withstand the shock of landing on concrete. Whether or not that is true, the point is that you can't take out an old airfield with a couple of good hits on the runway the way you could take out a modern airbase.

Moreover the Americans at least were widely using Marston mats, essentially interlocking steel planks, to make sort of instant-built airstrips I think starting in 1941. I don't think the British had them in 1940, but the point is, ca World War II, you can put an airfield pretty much wherever you want and repair it just as easily.

Im more asking if it were theoretically possible assuming that Germany had, at the very least, an effective design ready for production at the onset of the war, and some genuis making a convicing arguemnt for them.

Basically, i wanna know to what extent Germany can knock the RN out of the channel or the med given the aforementioned conditions which are in my mind feasible. My assumption is that the more maneuverable destroyers, which the RN had in abundance, wouldnt have much issue operating, but the heavier ships would.

Your theory is correct: if the Germans have effective anti-shipping capabilities and achieve air superiority, they can deny access to the Channel to British battleships.

The things to bear in mind however are:

1.) The British don't think they need battleships to defend against a Channel invasion anyway. Their initial plans called for intervention by destroyers and smaller ships and they expected this would be enough. I think they would panic and send everything in anyways, but when you look at the frankly haphazard German invasion "flotilla," you can definitely see why the British didn't think they would need battleships. You don't really need 15" guns to sink tugboats.

2.) If the Germans invest money in new air force capabilities, presumably the British will respond by doing likewise, and the British can probably outproduce the Germans if it comes to an arms race.

I have my doubts, the Battle of the Bismarck Sea in March 1943 was the first time air attack alone had destroyed a convoy. This battle was 114 bombers and 54 fighters against 8 transports and 8 destroyers and 100 fighters, all transports and 4 destroyers were sunk in a 3 day running battle.

If this is what it takes to sink 12 unarmoured ships with 1943 planes specifically equipped and trained to attack ships, what number of specialized planes and squadrons would be required to destroy the Home Fleet's dozens of warships in 1940? Would 500 be too many, 1500 not enough given Germany had very few torpedo bombers?

So at least half the destroyers will still be afloat after three day? Great.

I wonder how many barges the Royal Navy can sink in three days.

I am quite sure the destroyer fleet would consider the sacrifice justifiable.
 
Look at the damage suffered by the Royal Navy in the battle of Crete. If the Germans have air superiority they can replicate that all day. For the med they need a much better long range fighter. For the English channel they need a he'll of a lot to change to win the battle of Britain to the extent where they have air supremacy in the channel.

Remember Germany need to also have a credible invasion threat or they royal navy can safely withdraw from the channel. So they need to win the air and be scary for an invasion.
Crete? Excellent. Let's look at Crete.

The Germans made three serious attempts to land on Crete. The RN annihilated the first one, scattered the second convoy but inflicted only light losses, and then withdrew to allow the third one to land -- all this for an unopposed beach.

Is that the model for Sea Lion, then? It's going to be a short and unhappy outing for the Germans, then. On the bright side, think how much money their navy can save on its operations budget for the next fiscal year!
 

CalBear

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Your looking at it in terms of purely the Luftwaffe vs the British fleet, where all the Luftwaffe has to do is sink the other sides ships with no limitations in terms of time. But what we're actually discussing is an amphibious assault, which is more complicated as what the Luftwaffe has to do is not merely sink the RN's ships that are sent into the channel... but rather sink them all before they destroy the invasion fleet. And on that, I'll just cite a relevant post by me:
Hey, the Airdales sank the Yamato too.

Took most of a day and around 400 aircraft, entirely unopposed, but they sank her.

:p
 
If the Luftwaffe had decisively defeated the RAF.....They didn't and probably couldn't.

The Italians had torpedoes and aircraft to successfully deliver them in 1940, but hadn't thought of putting the two together before their war started.

The Germans let the BoB pass before they started looking for functional torpedoes from the Italians, late 1940, and modified their own, for late 1941. There wasn't any point in installing external brackets to the aircraft or training aircrew before they had the weapons.

It's much like the landing craft for the invasion that weren't available until it was time to use them for evacuations.

If you're going to have a dump, you have to remember to pull down your pants ahead of time or you'll crap your drawers. Foresight and planning. It's important.
Well said, you silver-tongued devil, you!
 
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