German aerial bombadment of Moscow - 1941+

All,

A bit of a hard one to gain any 'real' information on.

In essence, we are talking a 'blitz' on Moscow. It is apparent that some sort of strategic bombing was carried out, but the targets (transport, Kremlin etc) were hardly touched.

It is also apparent that the air defense was well-developed with both AAA and fighters (of the most modern composition).

I have found some info on http://www.bergstrom. BUT again, it is sketchy.

1) Could Germany have initiated a 'real' blitz on Moscow?
2) Could it have impacted the Battle of Moscow in any way?
3) A 'natural' target would be transport. However hard it is to bomb a shunting yard, could something serious have happened?
4) Tactical bombers (He-111/Ju-88/etc) were hardly up to the task, but what else could have been used?
5) What was the quality of the Moscow air defense in 1941 (not as it became later).

In essence: IF Germany had diverted resources could it have made a difference? After all, the London Blitz was not trivial.

Ivan
 
I think the best way for to get this would be to have no Battle of Britain, which would essentially double Luftwaffe strength for 1941.
 
I had that in the back of my head, and just took a look at Wiki for bit more info. Indeed Luftwaffe was reduced to just one third stregth by the end of the year, and were stretched along all the front. So probably there were less than 1000 aircraft of all types operational, with the bombers being only a few hundreds presumably.

Avoiding the crippling losses from the Battle of Britain somehow would have of course vastly improve their situation, 2000 aircraft and most of their pilots worth their weight in gold.
 
By the commencement of typhoon had less than 600 aircraft in support of AGC. These were badly needed for tactical support, so, in short, no.
 
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Saphroneth

Banned
Shunting yards are hard, tricky targets. Mainly because you need to get a direct hit on a given rail to actually put it out of action.

This is not quite of the right time period, but it was considered necessary to get a direct hit on a shunting yard with a nuclear bomb in order to damage them. A nuke goes off 500 yards away and the shunting yard is still able to operate.
 
Sorry about the link. fixed up below.

I also found a RAND Corp report. Unfortunately, it has next to nothing on the bombing campaign in 1941.

It seems that infra-structure bombing was a no-go until 1943, in which case it became a bit late in the day.

It is also a matter of distance I believe.

At the time where it could make an impact, the distance (and back) from Moscow must have been a problem with the bombers available ( He-111 etc).

He-111 with a max range of 2,300 km with full fuel load (and limited bomb load?) sounds impressive.

It still takes a bit of time to prepare an airfield for bombers, so Minsk might be an option. That is some 600 km from Moscow, which makes a round trip 1,200 km. Add a bit for flying around and ducking AAA, it is at the edge.

Smolensk was only captured late July, so an early start date would be end August at a stretch.

Combine this with the other priorities LW had, makes it somewhat difficult.

All said: If they had focused on the task, made plans early on, what would it have entailed?

Could it impact anything after all?

Here is the link. Sorry:
http://www.bergstrombooks.elknet.pl/bc-rs/raid.html

and the RAND Corp report:

https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_memoranda/2006/RM6206.pdf
(German air attacks against industry and railroads in Russia 1941-1945).


Ivan
 

Saphroneth

Banned
Level bomber attacks with no fighter escort in daytime tend to take horrible casualties.
At night they tend to just plain miss.

It's fighter escort you need, really, and that's a problem at those distances.
 
Level bomber attacks with no fighter escort in daytime tend to take horrible casualties.
At night they tend to just plain miss.

It's fighter escort you need, really, and that's a problem at those distances.

Does anyone know whether the Russians could jam the Luftwaffe's blind navigation devices? Mass night raids might be more effective if the Luftwaffe was able to use them.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
Does anyone know whether the Russians could jam the Luftwaffe's blind navigation devices? Mass night raids might be more effective if the Luftwaffe was able to use them.
Things like x-gerat?

I'm not sure, but I suspect that those needed to be placed with a wide angle between them to work. And it's actually possible that - if the British discover they're being used - they send over help.

I imagine the Luftwaffe would be able to launch at least a few successful raids, but I don't think it would be a months-long successful bombardment.

Really, though, the problem for the Germans would be a tradeoff. I suspect (but cannot prove without a source) that the level bombers at this time were mostly involved in helping German land forces prosecute the war - since the bombers are the artillery of blitzkrieg.

It wouldn't lead to a complete reversal of fortunes for the Russians if those bombers are instead blasting Moscow - but it would show up in lots of little things. Positions holding longer, inflicting more casualties, withdrawing in better order.
 
Things like x-gerat?

I'm not sure, but I suspect that those needed to be placed with a wide angle between them to work. And it's actually possible that - if the British discover they're being used - they send over help.

Yes, those were the devices that I was thinking of.

I don't know whether the British told the Russians about them and the countermeasures that had been developed IOTL. However, the Soviets might have received the information anyway through their spy networks.
 

Andre27

Banned
As i see it the two biggest problems are bomber capacity and escort capacity.

To perform strategic bombing you need considerable bomb load and the ability to drop it accurately.

To drop it accurately you need daylight and in daylight you need fighter escort.

Going with the existing bombers and fighters in the luftwaffe arsenal and both are found lacking in conventional daylight bombing raids.

Night bombing gives better survivability, but less accuracy and thus less effective bombing. The only way i see a viable strategic bombing campaign against Moscow in 1941 is by the use of poison gas, perhaps nerve agents, and even then the effects with 1941 assets are limited.
 
The concept is absurd.

At a point where the germans are unable to provide sufficient fuel and ammunition to meet daily requirements for even the panzer divisions ( see the KTB for every panzer division and corps that survive) the idea that they could supply the manpower, material, ordnance and fuel to maintain anything but a trivial series of air attacks aimed at providing movie footage is ludicrous.
 
It is all a matter of priorities (and abilities).

IF Germany had believed in the value of a strategic bombing campaign, the abilities might have been explored successfully.

... and that is where the sticky part comes in: Did Germany possess the capability in 1941?

Next is the reference in the Rand Corp report: Germany was not too keen on smashing things they wanted to use after an 'easy' victory.

All of this must be reversed if a campaign should be decided on.

Would it a) be possible? b) what impact?

I see that the majority vote is that it would not be possible. However, with a few changes leading up to Barbarossa?

Ivan
 
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