German 5th army sticks to Falkenhayn's battle plan at Verdun

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http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Verdun
What if the German army stuck to the plan of attrition that Falkenhayn envisioned for the attack at Verdun? Falkenhayn wanted to maintain von Mudra's tactics in the Argonne on a wider scale, by tying the infantry advance to the pace of the artillery. However, as soon as the French collapsed in the first few days of the offensive, the 5th army had their infantry advance as quickly as they could and their artillery lagged far behind for several crucial days, forcing the infantry to fight without support and were bloodied rather badly until the artillery caught up. So what if instead of allowing the infantry to advance and focus on capturing ground, instead the advance was tied to the pace of the artillery?
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/c6/Verdun_and_Vincinity_-_Map.jpg

Obviously this means several of the early successes wouldn't have occurred easily, like the capture of Ft. Douaumont and later the village of the same name. But then the French would be fighting further forward in a fire sack covered on 3 sides by German artillery. Also the Germans would not experience being enfiladed in their advance by French artillery batteries across the Meuse. By focusing on using their artillery to grind up the French and force them to fight as far forward as possible across the East bank of the Meuse, the French would be most vulnerable to attrition.

OTL the Germans did not operate on these principles and paid the price in blood for the goal of capturing ground. Will what I am suggesting increase the French casualty ratio to the German one or will it make a difference?

http://books.google.com/books?id=sO...&resnum=1&ved=0CCgQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q&f=false

Based on information from this book, it seems likely that this would be so, at least until the French completed their rail connection to the city itself. At that point it would make sense to wrap up the campaign. Obviously lower losses would bolster Falkenhayn's position and willingness to wrap up the campaign may have saved his job if he had done so. This obviously had knock on effects of the rest of the year and war, but would it make difference in the campaign at the time?
 
ahh mudra, amongst my favorite topics (still on my back burner)

two points to consider

1. Mudra's attacks where VERY munitions intensive, to have the infantry slow their pace for displacement, is to also slow for restocking... one of the German's greatest advantages at the opening stages of Verdun was how poorly manned, both in infantry and guns the position was; slowing the pace of the attack, whilst probably saving bodies in a few of the initial assaults, but in the long run it probably bogs the attack down due to being outnumbered and counter battery fire (and the ground taken was valuable... people thought it was worth the body count... I'm not sure if I disagree)

2. Mudra's attacks don't work as well in the open as they did in the argonne wilderness... the trees did an excellent job screening mudra's guns from counter battery fire and preventing the french from getting good artillery spotting. Also the trees did a good job screening Mudra's corps infantry; the french couldn't see them massing for attacks, so surprise was achieved in nearly every single assault

You can't apply them exactly to Verdun and expect the same result
 
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Deleted member 1487

ahh mudra, amongst my favorite topics (still on my back burner)

two points to consider

1. Mudra's attacks where VERY munitions intensive, to have the infantry slow their pace for displacement, is to also slow for restocking... one of the German's greatest advantages at the opening stages of Verdun was how poorly manned, both in infantry and guns the position was; slowing the pace of the attack, whilst probably saving bodies in a few of the initial assaults, but in the long run it probably bogs the attack down due to being outnumbered and counter battery fire (and the ground taken was valuable... people thought it was worth the body count... I'm not sure if I disagree)

2. Mudra's attacks don't work as well in the open as they did in the argonne wilderness... the trees did an excellent job screening mudra's guns from counter battery fire and preventing the french from getting good artillery spotting. Also the trees did a good job screening Mudra's corps infantry; the french couldn't see them massing for attacks, so surprise was achieved in nearly every single assault

You can't apply them exactly to Verdun and expect the same result

Granted, but massed infantry attacks in the open are suicide. I can understand trying to expand into the gap left by the French, but once they hit a wall, it makes much more sense to hold and wait for their artillery. Perhaps even pull out infantry and engage the French in an artillery duel with the vast superiority in artillery while it exists and launch small infantry raids with massive artillery support to keep the pressure on and draw out the French.

Obviously once the Somme starts, it makes no sense to keep fighting at Verdun, especially as it was after the French got their rail line to Verdun online. In fact one of the primary reasons that Falkenhayn thought that Verdun was vulnerable was that there was no functional rail line to Verdun thanks to German operations in 1914. Once that line opens, the French have better supply than do the Germans. Its time to end the operation, but historically Falkenhayn had become obsessed with maintaining it, because he believed he was inflicting 3:1 losses on his foe, and refused to cancel what he thought was a successful plan. It would be interesting to see what an earlier end to Verdun would mean for the Somme and what a better loss ratio would mean for the war.
 
Granted, but massed infantry attacks in the open are suicide. I can understand trying to expand into the gap left by the French, but once they hit a wall, it makes much more sense to hold and wait for their artillery. Perhaps even pull out infantry and engage the French in an artillery duel with the vast superiority in artillery while it exists and launch small infantry raids with massive artillery support to keep the pressure on and draw out the French.

Obviously once the Somme starts, it makes no sense to keep fighting at Verdun, especially as it was after the French got their rail line to Verdun online. In fact one of the primary reasons that Falkenhayn thought that Verdun was vulnerable was that there was no functional rail line to Verdun thanks to German operations in 1914. Once that line opens, the French have better supply than do the Germans. Its time to end the operation, but historically Falkenhayn had become obsessed with maintaining it, because he believed he was inflicting 3:1 losses on his foe, and refused to cancel what he thought was a successful plan. It would be interesting to see what an earlier end to Verdun would mean for the Somme and what a better loss ratio would mean for the war.


An interesting POD within the same scale of the assault is to have elite divisions used in the first assault...... IIRC the formations used where mostly Bavarian landwehr, instead of the regular Prussian divisions or foot guards; this could have made a significant difference I think
 

Deleted member 1487

An interesting POD within the same scale of the assault is to have elite divisions used in the first assault...... IIRC the formations used where mostly Bavarian landwehr, instead of the regular Prussian divisions or foot guards; this could have made a significant difference I think

Not sure if that would make as much of a difference as the following:
the storm that lasted 10 days before the offensive is either butteflied away or the Germans don't move into their Stollen until after the storm. The soldiers were sickened by having to stay in their unheated up-off bunkers for 10 days in a blizzard. Had that not happened, they would have been in much finer shape for an offensive.

Also their orders. The infantry were not actually ordered to make a major effort on the first day. Instead they were only supposed to recon for the artillery so it could hit the French better after the initial bombardment. Little did the Germans realize at that time, but the French were pretty much broken by the initial bombardment. They could have rolled up their foe, but the timidity from high command, due to the directive to use firepower and save lives, delayed the offensive for at least 24-48 hrs. The attack could have actually swept away the French while they were stunned from the initial, more powerful bombardment. Instead the less heavy follow on shelling only allowed the French time to recover and consolidate the best they could. Change the orders and the outcome could be different.
Plus there were elite flammenwerfer assault troops used too, so a number of very high quality infantry were present as it was.
 
Remembering the original point of the exercise

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Verdun
What if the German army stuck to the plan of attrition that Falkenhayn envisioned for the attack at Verdun? Falkenhayn wanted to maintain von Mudra's tactics in the Argonne on a wider scale, by tying the infantry advance to the pace of the artillery. However, as soon as the French collapsed in the first few days of the offensive, the 5th army had their infantry advance as quickly as they could and their artillery lagged far behind for several crucial days, forcing the infantry to fight without support and were bloodied rather badly until the artillery caught up. So what if instead of allowing the infantry to advance and focus on capturing ground, instead the advance was tied to the pace of the artillery?
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/c6/Verdun_and_Vincinity_-_Map.jpg

Obviously this means several of the early successes wouldn't have occurred easily, like the capture of Ft. Douaumont and later the village of the same name. But then the French would be fighting further forward in a fire sack covered on 3 sides by German artillery. Also the Germans would not experience being enfiladed in their advance by French artillery batteries across the Meuse. By focusing on using their artillery to grind up the French and force them to fight as far forward as possible across the East bank of the Meuse, the French would be most vulnerable to attrition.

OTL the Germans did not operate on these principles and paid the price in blood for the goal of capturing ground. Will what I am suggesting increase the French casualty ratio to the German one or will it make a difference?

http://books.google.com/books?id=sO...&resnum=1&ved=0CCgQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q&f=false

Based on information from this book, it seems likely that this would be so, at least until the French completed their rail connection to the city itself. At that point it would make sense to wrap up the campaign. Obviously lower losses would bolster Falkenhayn's position and willingness to wrap up the campaign may have saved his job if he had done so. This obviously had knock on effects of the rest of the year and war, but would it make difference in the campaign at the time?

My understanding it that the original point of the Verdun offensive was to turn Verdun into a killing ground by subjecting the French Army to massed artillery NOT to gain ground as such. Yes, the German infantry would end up inching (millimetring?) forward as the youth of La Belle France was turned into chutney but the point of the exercise was large bodycounts with high kill ratio's. Obviously not with that wording, but still...

Therefore the problem was 5th Army losing track of the point of the exercise. Gaining no ground at all at Verdun because the French kept refilling the smashed defences with fresh troops would have been better than what happened, given the strategic justification for the attack.

Or at least that is how the accounts I have heard put it.
 

Deleted member 1487

My understanding it that the original point of the Verdun offensive was to turn Verdun into a killing ground by subjecting the French Army to massed artillery NOT to gain ground as such. Yes, the German infantry would end up inching (millimetring?) forward as the youth of La Belle France was turned into chutney but the point of the exercise was large bodycounts with high kill ratio's. Obviously not with that wording, but still...

Therefore the problem was 5th Army losing track of the point of the exercise. Gaining no ground at all at Verdun because the French kept refilling the smashed defences with fresh troops would have been better than what happened, given the strategic justification for the attack.

Or at least that is how the accounts I have heard put it.

Pretty much von Mudra offensive on a larger scale. Still infantry attacks are needed to keep pressure on the enemy. The gaining of ground is either for tactical purposes or just to keep pressure on the enemy to force him to defend or sacrifice ground, something the French could not do at Verdun for morale reasons.

I agree with your proposal, but gaining some ground is necessary for tactical purposes. Of course its hard to sell to the German army that has had the doctrine of annihilating, decisive battle as the sole strategy for generations. Falkenhayn didn't sell this idea well, nor could he for propaganda reasons to the nation, especially while his position was under threat from the Easterners and their political ally/dupe Bethmann-Holweg.

Furthermore Falkenhayn was laboring under the pressure of the reality that economically speaking Germany could not really fight past the winter of 1916 without experience a collapse in production and being forced to deal with a increasing Entente advantage at the same time. Basically it was time to force the Entente to fight in situations that benefited the Germans to force them to negotiate. Too bad Bethmann-Holweg wasn't on board with this and more focused on saving his career than doing what was best for the nation. Plus the Easterners had no idea about German problems at home, nor did they care. In fact they were deluded enough to believe that they could still outright win the war and campaigned against Falkenhayn on based on these delusions (which the public believed, as they had only been told of victories until this point), while Falkenhayn had to deal with reality.

Any discussion of Verdun cannot ignore the political pressures on the military and its execution of Falkenhayn's strategy.
 
Basically, von Knobelsdorf's view was sounder than von Falkenhayn's (who had no inkling of tactical necessities): Take the high ground east of the Meuse as quickly as possible - and kill off the French when they try to regain it from the other bank. If they are unable to achieve this, they either have to endure another Ypres - or withdraw from the Verdun pocket.

Von Mudra's methods might work opposite a French camp retranché like Verdun; but they would take an immense amount of time. Thus, what happened to Verdun when the Somme commenced would see the Germans still far away from the dominating heights on the east bank.
 
Pretty much von Mudra offensive on a larger scale. Still infantry attacks are needed to keep pressure on the enemy. The gaining of ground is either for tactical purposes or just to keep pressure on the enemy to force him to defend or sacrifice ground, something the French could not do at Verdun for morale reasons.

I agree with your proposal, but gaining some ground is necessary for tactical purposes. Of course its hard to sell to the German army that has had the doctrine of annihilating, decisive battle as the sole strategy for generations. Falkenhayn didn't sell this idea well, nor could he for propaganda reasons to the nation, especially while his position was under threat from the Easterners and their political ally/dupe Bethmann-Holweg.

Furthermore Falkenhayn was laboring under the pressure of the reality that economically speaking Germany could not really fight past the winter of 1916 without experience a collapse in production and being forced to deal with a increasing Entente advantage at the same time. Basically it was time to force the Entente to fight in situations that benefited the Germans to force them to negotiate. Too bad Bethmann-Holweg wasn't on board with this and more focused on saving his career than doing what was best for the nation. Plus the Easterners had no idea about German problems at home, nor did they care. In fact they were deluded enough to believe that they could still outright win the war and campaigned against Falkenhayn on based on these delusions (which the public believed, as they had only been told of victories until this point), while Falkenhayn had to deal with reality.

Any discussion of Verdun cannot ignore the political pressures on the military and its execution of Falkenhayn's strategy.


Mudra's attacks did take ground though in otl in the argonne... he wasn't just inflicting body count (crushing the french 1st or 3rd army i forget which)... his troops where taking about 1 kilometer a month on an overall fairly wide front and pushed out of the core of the forest which is no mean feat

not attacking on both banks squandered a precious oppoturnity... that and the infantry didn't do enough screening or operate in skirmish lines properly when they attacked in driant's sector which delayed their general advance

although (you and I have may have discussed this before?) I think the germans had a higher chance of knifing through to the coast out of ypres than they did rolling up verdun
 
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Deleted member 1487

Mudra's attacks did take ground though in otl in the argonne... he wasn't just inflicting body count (crushing the french 1st or 3rd army i forget which)... his troops where taking about 1 kilometer a month on an overall fairly wide front and pushed out of the core of the forest which is no mean feat

not attacking on both banks squandered a precious oppoturnity... that and the infantry didn't do enough screening or operate in skirmish lines properly when they attacked in driant's sector which delayed their general advance

although (you and I have may have discussed this before?) I think the germans had a higher chance of knifing through to the coast out of ypres than they did rolling up verdun

Actually, I think they could have seized the East Bank quite easily if they had started by attacking the West bank too. Petain was adamant that the East Bank was indefensible, so they needed to withdraw and defend from the West, but was overruled by Poincare (IIRC). If they had attacked Morte Homme and Cote 304 in the first wave, they could have avoided a whole host of problems that immediately popped up, such as flanking fire from those two hills, and also convinced Poincare that the East Bank was lost. If not, then the attempts to take it by force would be greatly aided by the seizure of the West Bank defenses early on (especially as these defenses were very rudimentary and poorly defended in February).

The Ypres issue, which I don't think we've discussed before, isn't as easy, nor does it offer as much of a cost-favorable attrition battle that Verdun does. Just as the Entente discovered in 1918, the enemy will only collapse when his reserves are used up (granted other factors played a role in the 1918 situation), which Verdun offered the best chance to do.

Now I do wonder if the French would try and take back the East Bank once forced to withdraw, but once the Germans have the heights of the Meuse, they can dominate the area for miles in just about any direction, making artillery spotting a cinch.


Basically, von Knobelsdorf's view was sounder than von Falkenhayn's (who had no inkling of tactical necessities): Take the high ground east of the Meuse as quickly as possible - and kill off the French when they try to regain it from the other bank. If they are unable to achieve this, they either have to endure another Ypres - or withdraw from the Verdun pocket.

Von Mudra's methods might work opposite a French camp retranché like Verdun; but they would take an immense amount of time. Thus, what happened to Verdun when the Somme commenced would see the Germans still far away from the dominating heights on the east bank.
If possible you're right, Knobelsdorf was very right. But was it possible given the forces available? It would mean taking offensive on both banks at the same time, which Falkenhayn didn't think possible given the forces available.
 
Actually, I think they could have seized the East Bank quite easily if they had started by attacking the West bank too. Petain was adamant that the East Bank was indefensible, so they needed to withdraw and defend from the West, but was overruled by Poincare (IIRC). If they had attacked Morte Homme and Cote 304 in the first wave, they could have avoided a whole host of problems that immediately popped up, such as flanking fire from those two hills, and also convinced Poincare that the East Bank was lost. If not, then the attempts to take it by force would be greatly aided by the seizure of the West Bank defenses early on (especially as these defenses were very rudimentary and poorly defended in February).

The Ypres issue, which I don't think we've discussed before, isn't as easy, nor does it offer as much of a cost-favorable attrition battle that Verdun does. Just as the Entente discovered in 1918, the enemy will only collapse when his reserves are used up (granted other factors played a role in the 1918 situation), which Verdun offered the best chance to do.

Now I do wonder if the French would try and take back the East Bank once forced to withdraw, but once the Germans have the heights of the Meuse, they can dominate the area for miles in just about any direction, making artillery spotting a cinch.



If possible you're right, Knobelsdorf was very right. But was it possible given the forces available? It would mean taking offensive on both banks at the same time, which Falkenhayn didn't think possible given the forces available.


The french trying to take back the east bank depends on how long petain remains in charge... he was pragmatic and far less prone to waste his men in foolish assaults. Petain wouldn't do it; BUT once he gets kicked upstairs Nivelle or Mangin, wouldn't be adverse to trying and high body counts never bothered them... if they persist in them without petain being able to direct the scripts or call them off (as he did after the disasterous ladder scaling exercises at duomont) you might see the french munitny come at verdun instead of 1917

the ypres position was a useful fire sack however, knifing through to the coast isolates units north, and capturing the channel ports SEVERELY disrupts the BEF supply net, heavily reducing the effectivness of British units to the south; which would allow subsidiary offensives to capture a lot of ground
 

Deleted member 1487

The french trying to take back the east bank depends on how long petain remains in charge... he was pragmatic and far less prone to waste his men in foolish assaults. Petain wouldn't do it; BUT once he gets kicked upstairs Nivelle or Mangin, wouldn't be adverse to trying and high body counts never bothered them... if they persist in them without petain being able to direct the scripts or call them off (as he did after the disasterous ladder scaling exercises at duomont) you might see the french munitny come at verdun instead of 1917
Exactly what Falkenhayn was going for. A more heavy body count for the French could change everything, but I doubt we'd get a negotiation so early on.


the ypres position was a useful fire sack however, knifing through to the coast isolates units north, and capturing the channel ports SEVERELY disrupts the BEF supply net, heavily reducing the effectivness of British units to the south; which would allow subsidiary offensives to capture a lot of ground

The Germans tried to break through in 1918 and didn't have much luck, even with the Portuguese fleeing and leaving a major gap in the British lines. Its just too far of a distance to achieve a breakthrough all the way to the channel or any port for that matter. Hazebrouck, perhaps. But after 1915 that isn't going to happen, because the defenses are so stout.

The best bet for such an attack is just the same place the Entente attacked in 1916: the Somme. A thorough study by the Germans prior to going after Russia in 1915 cited the area between Arras and the Somme as having average to below average defenses, a rail line along the route of advance, and favorable terrain (few forests, cities, hills, any place where a defense could coalesce) all the way to the objective, the city of Doullens, the rail hub and major supply artery leading north of the Somme River.
 
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