German 1914 army with years to plan Eastern strategy

Russia agrees that whatever happens in the Balkans and Turkey and Persia isn't her business, grain shipments, oil shipments, reparations etc are fine, but leave the borders at 1914, leave the harsh peace to the French and British. Dont force on the Russians the need to continue the war at some level with a Kerensky type government because there is no other good choice than some harsh OTL like dictated German peace.

I agree that German diplomacy was an epic fail from 1890-1945. But IMHO keeping Status quo borders is Not the Point in going East. The German aim has to Be Breaking up the Strategic Dilemma of being locked between two potentially Hostile Great Powers, One of them a Potential superpower.

Defensive in the West Makes Sense, on that Short border. So does fighting for the 1914 borders. It is Not Realistic to carve much more out of France. But poland or Lithiania are Great opportunities. Such a cordon sanitaire would Be what Germany Needs to relax a Little.
I agree that Germany shouldn't Annex anything from the Russian Empire. Alas, they would Be dumb enough.

BTW, bother on persia? London will do that if russia Gets Beaten.
 
I agree that German diplomacy was an epic fail from 1890-1945. But IMHO keeping Status quo borders is Not the Point in going East. The German aim has to Be Breaking up the Strategic Dilemma of being locked between two potentially Hostile Great Powers, One of them a Potential superpower.

BTW, bother on persia? London will do that if russia Gets Beaten.

Germany and Russia don't have any real reason to be involved in permanent conflict, a short undisputed border, both occupying Polish lands, no real colonial conflicts, this peace just puts a barrier to further Russian expansion in the west, keeps the Austrian empire afloat and breaks up the French-Russian alliance.

I would wonder if harsh terms like loss of Poland, Lithuania etc.. would only allow some Russian government to carry on the fight, either now or later, leaving Germany with hard to control territory and a permament enemy bent on revenge.

Germany could assume a Tirpitzian foreign policy goal of overseas colonies and limitations on French army sizes and weapons to ensure peace.

On Persia: I am assuming if Turkey is Central Powers at this point and Britain Allied that Germany would try to dominate Persia with the aim of controling oil fields, destabilizing India etc.. and would want some Russian acknowledgement of her involvment there.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
So what happens when the French realize that they will have an extremely hard Time getting to there Rhine despite only facing 50% of the German war machine? Will that Be before or After the tsar gave up Warsaw?

I do Not contradict you that it would Be Wise to withdraw delayingly into Firm positions. But I doubt that this strategy will survive the political Stress of a war looking Bad.

You seem to think this shocking scenario, but I am not sure why. You need to provide more details.

IOTL, the Battles in the west became bloody and indecisive by 1/1/1915. ITTL, the French will have indecisive battles a few weeks to a couple months earlier, so I guess it would move up French innovation by few months, maybe. You likely have some bloody Verdun/Somme like battles in 1915 and 1916 by the French. The locations will be the different, and France will always be the attacker. France will have more material due to keeping its industrial areas, so it can fight harder and longer.

UK will eventually try to enter the war or otherwise keep Germany from dominating Europe, but not on the first days of the war. Germany also has more material early in the war.

Warsaw falls long before the French reach the Rhine, if the French ever reach the Rhine. I lean towards Germany will keep enough troops there to stalemate any major French operations. Russia is is pretty dire shape by middle of 1916 assuming Ottomans enter war to gain land, which seems likely. Serbia falls in 1914 or early 1915. Bulgaria enters in Spring of 1915 at latest. Italy likely stays out barring some huge Conrad blunder.

Also, I am not arguing "wise", I am stating the most likely course of action for the Tsar's army. We know the War Plan, and normally countries execute some variation of the War Plan in the first days/months of the war.
 
Warsaw falls long before the French reach the Rhine, if the French ever reach the Rhine. I lean towards Germany will keep enough troops there to stalemate any major French operations.

Yes - any long term east strategy means probably the fortress system in the Masurian lakes and around Koningsburg gets put in the west instead (Belfort gap area for starters?, make Mulhouse a fortress maybe). 50% percent of the German army seems reasonable to hold such a line, even allowing for a reserve to counter a French move through a neutral Belgium to widen the front.

I wonder though if Russia, seeing the German intensions via fortress and rail construction elects to build more railroads instead of fortresses. Completing the Murmansk railway earlier before the war would greatly ease the delivery of western supplies to Russia.
 
You seem to think this shocking scenario, but I am not sure why. You need to provide more details.

IOTL, the Battles in the west became bloody and indecisive by 1/1/1915. ITTL, the French will have indecisive battles a few weeks to a couple months earlier, so I guess it would move up French innovation by few months, maybe. You likely have some bloody Verdun/Somme like battles in 1915 and 1916 by the French. The locations will be the different, and France will always be the attacker. France will have more material due to keeping its industrial areas, so it can fight harder and longer.

UK will eventually try to enter the war or otherwise keep Germany from dominating Europe, but not on the first days of the war. Germany also has more material early in the war.

Warsaw falls long before the French reach the Rhine, if the French ever reach the Rhine. I lean towards Germany will keep enough troops there to stalemate any major French operations. Russia is is pretty dire shape by middle of 1916 assuming Ottomans enter war to gain land, which seems likely. Serbia falls in 1914 or early 1915. Bulgaria enters in Spring of 1915 at latest. Italy likely stays out barring some huge Conrad blunder.

Also, I am not arguing "wise", I am stating the most likely course of action for the Tsar's army. We know the War Plan, and normally countries execute some variation of the War Plan in the first days/months of the war.


If France's 1915 artois and champange offensives are any indication they certainly wouldn't be getting anywhere. Admittedly they would have less shell shortage; but they would still have a tremendous bottleneck in heavy guns that wouldn't be overcome so quickly

IRL their first successful offensive was the Fayolle subsidiery offensive at the Somme in summer 1916
 
The Baltic islands were too well fortified to risk attacking until the Russian Revolution destroyed the Russian army's morale.
With worries about the British navy, I doubt the German navy is going to risk losing many ships in risky Baltic operations.

Not according to "Operation Albion" (author Michael B. Barrett, published 2008).

My summary (all errors mine):

When the war started the islands were basically undefended because the main / central Russian naval defense line in the Gulf of Finland was Reval (Tallinn) - Helsingfors (Helsinki). And that defense plan was only adopted in 1911/1912. And calling for 14", 12" and 8" guns as coastal defense there.
So obviously - given the short time period from 1912 to 1914 - there´s not much left over for the Baltic islands.

In late 1914 - when no serious German naval attacks materialized - the Russians deployed some artillery units to the islands (two batteries of 6" guns and several smaller caliber gun batteries.
In 1915 five 10" coastal defense guns were installed (Moon island, to protect the forward Shildau naval anchorage) and three battalions of naval infantry were deployed to the island.
Only in late 1916 were the Baltic islands declared a fortified position. With the addition of several 12" guns as coastal artillery (Dagö and Ösel islands) in 1916 and the laying of thousands of mines.
Plus of course in both years additional smaller gun batteries.
And only in 1916 was Hango / Abo (Finland) and Dagö /Ösel / Moon (Estonia) declared the new outer (defense) position of the Gulf of Finland (and the Russian capital). With an infantry division consisting of 4 regiments responsible for defending the islands.

So basically the Russian Baltic fleet waited to see what the Germans would do. When it turned out that the main focus of the HSF was the North Sea they gradually moved forward and fortified their new "outer position". Finished around late 1916.

Summary:
In late 1914 the islands were basically defenseless.
In 1915 (and maybe early 1916) an amphibious invasion supported by the HSF would have had a reasonable chance to succeed.
In late 1916 / early 1917 the islands were too well fortified to attack them.
In late 1917 with the Russian army morale broken it was once again possible.

So the period of late 1914 to early 1916 is the interesting time period here.
 
You seem to think this shocking scenario, but I am not sure why. You need to provide more details.
{...}
Also, I am not arguing "wise", I am stating the most likely course of action for the Tsar's army. We know the War Plan, and normally countries execute some variation of the War Plan in the first days/months of the war.

OTL, Plan No. 19 in 1910 changed the whole Russian war plan and broke with the defensive tradition. I argue that the French knowledge of the Schlieffen plan is only one factor in this decision. Between 1905 and 1914, Russian strength grew far more rapidly than Germany's, "artificially" due to recovery from the desaster of 1904/05, but also due to a solid economical growth which allowed to keep pace in the European arms race. Along with that grew the necessity not to give up important economically strong areas. 1914 is different from 1812 as well as 1941...giving way would be a dangerous game.
The French presentation of Plan XVI acknowledged the positive Russian development: « L’entente cordiale donne à la France toute sécurité sur son front de mer ; elle lui fait même espérer l’appui de forces militaires anglaises. La mobilisation et la concentration russes ont été sensiblement améliorées »

Furthermore I argue that the lack of the Schlieffen-plan increases the need for a Russian offensive, as British involvement with all its beneficial factors remains much more of an incertainty. With the UK in the war (and the ensuing blockade), Entente planners could (to a good degree justifiably so) predict that economic pressure would weaken the CP over time decisively so that victory was certain. Without it, there is more need to apply the advantages of being on the outer rim of a two front war plus enjoying numerical superiority. This is NOT relaxing one front in order to allow the "central party" to shuffle its troops according to its needs, but to apply pressure on as many points as possible. This is what the Entente IOTL tried in 1914 as well as in 1916.

I do not argue that Russia would ITTL go to war with exactly the same plan as in OTL. Not every plan is as fixed as the German folly called "Schlieffen-plan", anyways. Even the much deriled French plan XVII was actually not much more than a mobilisation scheme which left it to the executing generals what to do with it. Despite being confronted with the bulk of the German army (and knowing it), they decided to stage a massive attack instead of letting Russia decide the war.

I also do not argue that Russia couldn't act flexibly on the Westernmost Polish border. It actually would give them the freedom to concentrate on the flanks: attacking East Prussia would shorten the front in a more positive way, and pushing against Austria-Hungary would give the chance to cripple the weaker partner of the Central Powers while liberating unhappy Ruthenes and Ukrainians.

IOTL, the Battles in the west became bloody and indecisive by 1/1/1915. ITTL, the French will have indecisive battles a few weeks to a couple months earlier, so I guess it would move up French innovation by few months, maybe. You likely have some bloody Verdun/Somme like battles in 1915 and 1916 by the French.

75,000 dead Poilus during the very first month of war, to a good deal during the bloody and indecisive attack against Alsace-Lorraine, was a good foretaste IOTL. They'll learn faster, though, because there will be no "miracle on the Marne" giving 1914 a positive outlook.
I'd say that considering the often hilly terrain, Verdun will be a good analogy to what is to be expected on that frontier.

UK will eventually try to enter the war or otherwise keep Germany from dominating Europe, but not on the first days of the war. Germany also has more material early in the war.

I think that is one of the decisive "if"'s. My hope would be that British neutrality keeps the Germans away from demanding to much in exchange for peace. Then Britain could broker peace, safe the Tsar and get out of the bloodbath unscathed. There is also the possibility that if news of the attrition battles reach the British public relatively uncensored, there might be a surge of sudden "really splendid isolation"ism.
The later Britain enters, the larger the advantage for the Germans. Every month of unhindered access to the global markets is worth millions and millions for the German war effort. How fast would British mobilization be under the changed circumstances? How long would it take until they have reached the effecivity they displayed in the 2nd half of the war?
An interesting point to discuss is the effect on the US. If they do not stick to neutrality completey (without Belgian atrocities, with a later U-Boot-war, with a more balanced economical interest), their entry might be even more delayed. I am up to guessing here, though.

Warsaw falls long before the French reach the Rhine, if the French ever reach the Rhine. I lean towards Germany will keep enough troops there to stalemate any major French operations. Russia is is pretty dire shape by middle of 1916 assuming Ottomans enter war to gain land, which seems likely. Serbia falls in 1914 or early 1915. Bulgaria enters in Spring of 1915 at latest. Italy likely stays out barring some huge Conrad blunder.

Now that is the funny thing here. Whatever we assume as direct consequence of a German war plan East, we are fairly similar concerning the chain of events following a start of war following the July crisis. I would sign each of your sentences here, though I would amend that as soon as Britain would enter the war, a time-fuse on Italian participation is lit, too. Also I would like to add that Bulgaria might remain neutral if not needed against Serbia (or bribed afterwards). Perhaps Romania remains neutral, too - or joins on the CP side as soon as the Austrians move deeper into Ukraine.

In the end, I think the main opinion here is that Russia defaults a few months earlier, maximum. If that helps the CP in the end depends on other variables. So the question actually rather boils down to "how long would Britain remain neutral if Belgian neutrality is not violated (by Germany)".


I wonder though if Russia, seeing the German intensions via fortress and rail construction elects to build more railroads instead of fortresses. Completing the Murmansk railway earlier before the war would greatly ease the delivery of western supplies to Russia.

Russia was already working hard to improve its railroad network. IMHO, expecting a large scale invasion could, but doesn't necessarily lead to less emphasis on key fortifications.

Germany and Russia don't have any real reason to be involved in permanent conflict, a short undisputed border, both occupying Polish lands, no real colonial conflicts, this peace just puts a barrier to further Russian expansion in the west, keeps the Austrian empire afloat and breaks up the French-Russian alliance.

I juxtapose: heightened perception of a Germano-Slav-conflict in chauvinist circles on both sides, a by now very deeply settled Russo-French alliance causing huge diplomatic headache for Germany. And there is no guarantee that the Entente isn't back five minutes after a treaty is signed. A short border in Russian terms; in German terms its second-longest. Russian long-term goals of securing the straits which endangers German interest in the Near-East.

I would wonder if harsh terms like loss of Poland, Lithuania etc.. would only allow some Russian government to carry on the fight, either now or later, leaving Germany with hard to control territory and a permament enemy bent on revenge.

OTL's 2012 borders for Russia are harsh terms. Losing Poland would be a blessing in disguise for Russia. Even as a puppet, it would be a matter of time before it becomes a nuisance to its masters. A Kingdom of Poland would have huge territorial demands directed against Germany and, moreso, Cisleithania.

Germany could assume a Tirpitzian foreign policy goal of overseas colonies and limitations on French army sizes and weapons to ensure peace.

Yes, colonies are a cool burden around your neck and all, but are nothing the Russians can give to Germany. As in OTL, I do not expect that there is one general peace conference, but that France(+perhaps Britain) is still very well in the fight. And if Russia is beaten, France is rather the nation which needs to be offered a status quo ante peace.

Limitations on France....didn't work that well already in 1871, when Germany/Prussia tried to cripple France for decades by imposing huge reparations. Same problem with arms-control. They don't take care of themselves (the way the Poles would to a certain degree).

On Persia: I am assuming if Turkey is Central Powers at this point and Britain Allied that Germany would try to dominate Persia with the aim of controling oil fields, destabilizing India etc.. and would want some Russian acknowledgement of her involvment there.

Yes, perhaps. But still a rather hypothetical situation given German and Turkish abilities to project power over there. If the UK is within the war, Persia is out of reach. If the UK is still neutral, messing around there is an unnecessary provocation towards London.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
Furthermore I argue that the lack of the Schlieffen-plan increases the need for a Russian offensive, as British involvement with all its beneficial factors remains much more of an incertainty. With the UK in the war (and the ensuing blockade), Entente planners could (to a good degree justifiably so) predict that economic pressure would weaken the CP over time decisively so that victory was certain. Without it, there is more need to apply the advantages of being on the outer rim of a two front war plus enjoying numerical superiority. This is NOT relaxing one front in order to allow the "central party" to shuffle its troops according to its needs, but to apply pressure on as many points as possible. This is what the Entente IOTL tried in 1914 as well as in 1916.

The problem here is that the Central Powers will always have enough troops. All the troops fighting Belgium or British units, or just stationed against them will be free to be used in the east. Conrad will not have the horrible losses in Galicia in 1914/15 that cost full armies. Serbia will be knocked out within the first few months freeing up more units. Russia will want to attack after completing full mobilization, and will do some major attacks, but overall, Germany/A-H will be the on the offensive in the east.

Russia will have less freedom of action since it will be facing larger and better forces. A-H army improves drastically without the loss of its NCO corp.


I'd say that considering the often hilly terrain, Verdun will be a good analogy to what is to be expected on that frontier.

One long, never ending Verdun sounds about right. Or something like the Italians where the French launch another major offensive every 6 weeks or so into tough terrain, until the French run out of men.

I think that is one of the decisive "if"'s. My hope would be that British neutrality keeps the Germans away from demanding to much in exchange for peace. Then Britain could broker peace, safe the Tsar and get out of the bloodbath unscathed. There is also the possibility that if news of the attrition battles reach the British public relatively uncensored, there might be a surge of sudden "really splendid isolation"ism.
The later Britain enters, the larger the advantage for the Germans. Every month of unhindered access to the global markets is worth millions and millions for the German war effort. How fast would British mobilization be under the changed circumstances? How long would it take until they have reached the effecivity they displayed in the 2nd half of the war?
An interesting point to discuss is the effect on the US. If they do not stick to neutrality completey (without Belgian atrocities, with a later U-Boot-war, with a more balanced economical interest), their entry might be even more delayed. I am up to guessing here, though.

Baring something bizarre, the USA will not enter the war or seriously think about it.

And in most scenarios, the UK will never field an effective army. The war is likely over by Spring 1917, and the UK took longer than that IOTL to be effective. Delay the mobilization by 6 months, and the odds start to decline towards nil for an effective UK army. It is not even clear it will be a large army. With tales of the horrible losses in battle for France and without conscription, I am not sure we ever see 30, much less 60 divisions.

Now that is the funny thing here. Whatever we assume as direct consequence of a German war plan East, we are fairly similar concerning the chain of events following a start of war following the July crisis. I would sign each of your sentences here, though I would amend that as soon as Britain would enter the war, a time-fuse on Italian participation is lit, too. Also I would like to add that Bulgaria might remain neutral if not needed against Serbia (or bribed afterwards). Perhaps Romania remains neutral, too - or joins on the CP side as soon as the Austrians move deeper into Ukraine.

If Serbia falls fast to the second army, which is possible, then the CP may merely want Bulgaria to allow shipments of arms. Bulgaria will want southern Serbia back, and from an A-H perspective, it makes sense. Weakening Serbia without having to garrison the place. Romania will remain neutral baring something odd.

Italy is a harder call. IMO, they are very unlikely to enter unless it looks like A-H is about to collapse like OTL. More likely they milk the crisis for economic and diplomatic gains.

In the end, I think the main opinion here is that Russia defaults a few months earlier, maximum. If that helps the CP in the end depends on other variables. So the question actually rather boils down to "how long would Britain remain neutral if Belgian neutrality is not violated (by Germany)".

Russia fell apart more due to lack of food. Due to the seasonal nature of harvest, the collapse is either weeks (2-9) early than OTL or a year earlier. Food riots don't occur right after harvest, and once the gardens start producing by early June or late May, the odds of food shortages decline. Now if the CP took large portions of the Ukraine in 1915, the war will end faster.

OTL's 2012 borders for Russia are harsh terms. Losing Poland would be a blessing in disguise for Russia. Even as a puppet, it would be a matter of time before it becomes a nuisance to its masters. A Kingdom of Poland would have huge territorial demands directed against Germany and, moreso, Cisleithania.

Russia nationalist would still have claims against Poland. But your analysis is correct for a "rational" Russia who would see losing Poland as a strategic gain as a buffer state. And if Russia and Germany no longer share a common border, Russia life becomes even easier.

Yes, colonies are a cool burden around your neck and all, but are nothing the Russians can give to Germany. As in OTL, I do not expect that there is one general peace conference, but that France(+perhaps Britain) is still very well in the fight. And if Russia is beaten, France is rather the nation which needs to be offered a status quo ante peace.

With France probably gaining a little ground in A-L with the many attacks, France should not lose any land in a peace deal, unless France fights on until collapse. Maybe some colonial concessions one way or another.
 
The problem here is that the Central Powers will always have enough troops. All the troops fighting Belgium or British units, or just stationed against them will be free to be used in the east.

Yes, it is either "Britain or Bust". Once they find out they cannot get Britain on board, they should seriously look for an exit strategy.
With Britain, the picture might not change as much as in OTL, but the perception of it would.

Baring something bizarre, the USA will not enter the war or seriously think about it.

That is well possible, especially if the UK enters late or not at all. Concerning the British Army, you are right, they might have to skip the "volunteer"-phase and draft earlier. This change might lead to a different level of unrest. Nothing serious, rather something grumbling.

Russia fell apart more due to lack of food. Due to the seasonal nature of harvest, the collapse is either weeks (2-9) early than OTL or a year earlier. Food riots don't occur right after harvest, and once the gardens start producing by early June or late May, the odds of food shortages decline. Now if the CP took large portions of the Ukraine in 1915, the war will end faster.

You are right, I didn't think of that timetable. Going into Ukraine in 1915? That would be too optimistic, I would say.

Russia nationalist would still have claims against Poland. But your analysis is correct for a "rational" Russia who would see losing Poland as a strategic gain as a buffer state. And if Russia and Germany no longer share a common border, Russia life becomes even easier.

Really one of the few imaginable scenarios in which Poland voluntarily ends up in an Alliance with Russia.

With France probably gaining a little ground in A-L with the many attacks, France should not lose any land in a peace deal, unless France fights on until collapse. Maybe some colonial concessions one way or another.

I agree here completely. Perhaps a coaling station in West Africa would make sense, to shorten the way to Germany's African possessions. However, with Germany still in the "great game", Britain perhaps unweakened and no mandates post-war, the Colonial Era might last a good deal longer ITTL. (Not a good service for Germany, losing the colonies was the only good thing about Versailles)
 
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