Georgy Malenkov led the USSR?

[Vinization]

For a brief time after Stalin's death in 1953, Georgy Malenkov was the most powerful man in the Soviet Union, holding the positions of Premier and General Secretary of the CPSU at the same time. However, this much power concentrated in the hands of one man alarmed the Politburo, which forced him to resign from the latter position while allowing him to stay as Premier. In the next two years, he was locked and defeated in a power struggle against Nikita Khrushchev, the new General Secretary, who in time would hold both titles simultaneously.

Was there any way Malenkov could've held on to both positions or, if that wasn't possible, resign from the premiership but stay as General Secretary, a stronger position considering that party>state in the USSR?

What would've been his policies assuming he was able to enact them from a position of strength rather than being secondary to Khrushchev? I assume we'd still see a downsizing of the previous Stalinist tyranny, but to a smaller extent than Khrushchev did. Would things like the Hungarian Revolution and Gomulka Thaw in Poland still happen? Would he handle agriculture better? Could that awful pseudoscientist Trofim Lysenko, responsible for so many deaths from starvation, be sidelined earlier?

Also, Wikipedia (I know, I know) says he was in favor of investing in consumer goods rather than heavy industry and the military, as well as against the nuclear arms race. Could we see an earlier détente rise from this?

@alexmilman @David T

 

[Vinization]

Would the Berlin Wall still be built? Could Walter Ulbricht's New Economic System be more successful with a (potentially) more sympathetic Soviet government, rather than one which supported the opposition and Erich Honecker's takeover?

 

[Vinization]

Alright, last question. What about the splits with China and Albania?

@alexmilman @David T @marathag

 

[alexmilman]

Alright, last question. What about the splits with China and Albania?

@alexmilman @David T @marathag

Probably some kind of a split with China would happen as soon as it strong enough and does not want to remind “younger brother” forever.

Sorry, but simply can’t say anything meaningful about Malenkov besides that he probably had a better grasp on economy than Nikita who was by that point a strictly Party figure.

 

[marathag]

Albania would still split, since they considered themselves the most pure Marxists around.

 

[Vinization]

Probably some kind of a split with China would happen as soon as it strong enough and does not want to remind “younger brother” forever.

Sorry, but simply can’t say anything meaningful about Malenkov besides that he probably had a better grasp on economy than Nikita who was by that point a strictly Party figure.

Oh, I see. Sorry for calling you so many times then.

 

[gaitskellitebevanite]

The important factor was as the OP says, Malenkov resigned from the secretariat (and as de facto General/First Secretary) in order to retain the premiership, and he'd failed to appreciate that control of the party machinery was much more important that the state bureaucracy. The trouble is though the state bureaucracy was where Malenkov's power base was, he was the archetypal ruthless technocrat - the closest thing to a Soviet Albert Speer - but he wasn't a creature of the party like Khrushchev was. Stalin, Khrushchev and Brezhnev, the three leaders for the overwhelming majority of the USSR's existence were all partycrats, ruthless backroom men who used their influence to take over much of the party apparatus and use that apparatus to further increase their influence and power. Malenkov never really did that, and so failed in his bid for the leadership (the same thing occurred with Kosygin in the 60s).

Had Malenkov risen to the leadership - lets assume he is able to outflank Khrushchev in March 1953 with Molotov becoming Premier and Malenkov General Secretary - the Soviet Union would have gone down a significantly different path. There would have been no explicit de-Stalinisation, much more likely the CPSU would eventually have dealt with Stalin the same way the CPC dealt with Mao's legacy, "70% good, 30% bad" or something along those lines, Stalin's statues remain, his body remains embalmed alongside Lenin's but the terror is eased. Beria is purged and executed and carries the can for Stalin's crimes, Stalin is associated with the five year plans and economic development. Malenkov would certainly have avoided Khrushchev's disastrous Virgin Lands Campaign and Khrushchev's obsession with the development of heavy industry and would have been much more focused on economic development mechanizing agriculture and a rise in living standards. Soviet economic policy would have been led by Malenkov protege's like Saburov and Perkukhin, and would have stuck more to centralized planning than Khrushchev's decentralizing approach, which is likely to present problems. Malenkov is probably dynamic enough to adopt economic reforms earlier though, he's unlikely to follow Brezhnev's approach and quash economic reforms to preserve party unity.
Theres the old quote (i forget who from) that dealing with Khrushchev was like playing draughts whilst dealing with Malenkov was like playing chess, Malenkov was much more complex, much less likely to commit major diplomatic blunders. Malenkov wouldn't have send missiles to Cuba, and he did float the idea of a unified, neutral Germany - something NATO would never have agreed to anyway. The Cold War would be a bit cooler as a consequence, and detente would allow the USA and USSR to reduce their military budgets as in OTL.
If Malenkov is able to remove Khrushchev then his rule is relatively stable. It took year of discontent for the plotters against Khrushchev to finally decide to remove him in OTL, and some of Khrushchev's greatest blunders - the Virgin Lands Campaign, Cuba, radical changes in economic policy - are going to be butterflied away. Malenkov's leadership style is much more stable, and over time he is able to establish himself as a much more powerful leader than OTL Khrushchev or Brezhnev were, no collective leadership. He might even be able to achieve the position of simultaneously serving as Chairman of the Soviet (Head of State), General Secretary (Head of the Party) and Premier (Head of Government), something not even Brezhnev managed to quite pull off in OTL. With steady economic reforms, a stable leadership and a well organised professional bureaucracy the stagnation of the Brezhnev years would be butterflied away, and while the USSR would not have been an economic powerhouse like China it would have been a stable superpower.

 

[Gukpard]

Now into the fun stuff!

He was the main technocrat on the soviet government, so could we see him doing some technological megaprojects?

 

[Vinization]

The important factor was as the OP says, Malenkov resigned from the secretariat (and as de facto General/First Secretary) in order to retain the premiership, and he'd failed to appreciate that control of the party machinery was much more important that the state bureaucracy. The trouble is though the state bureaucracy was where Malenkov's power base was, he was the archetypal ruthless technocrat - the closest thing to a Soviet Albert Speer - but he wasn't a creature of the party like Khrushchev was. Stalin, Khrushchev and Brezhnev, the three leaders for the overwhelming majority of the USSR's existence were all partycrats, ruthless backroom men who used their influence to take over much of the party apparatus and use that apparatus to further increase their influence and power. Malenkov never really did that, and so failed in his bid for the leadership (the same thing occurred with Kosygin in the 60s).

Had Malenkov risen to the leadership - lets assume he is able to outflank Khrushchev in March 1953 with Molotov becoming Premier and Malenkov General Secretary - the Soviet Union would have gone down a significantly different path. There would have been no explicit de-Stalinisation, much more likely the CPSU would eventually have dealt with Stalin the same way the CPC dealt with Mao's legacy, "70% good, 30% bad" or something along those lines, Stalin's statues remain, his body remains embalmed alongside Lenin's but the terror is eased. Beria is purged and executed and carries the can for Stalin's crimes, Stalin is associated with the five year plans and economic development. Malenkov would certainly have avoided Khrushchev's disastrous Virgin Lands Campaign and Khrushchev's obsession with the development of heavy industry and would have been much more focused on economic development mechanizing agriculture and a rise in living standards. Soviet economic policy would have been led by Malenkov protege's like Saburov and Perkukhin, and would have stuck more to centralized planning than Khrushchev's decentralizing approach, which is likely to present problems. Malenkov is probably dynamic enough to adopt economic reforms earlier though, he's unlikely to follow Brezhnev's approach and quash economic reforms to preserve party unity.
Theres the old quote (i forget who from) that dealing with Khrushchev was like playing draughts whilst dealing with Malenkov was like playing chess, Malenkov was much more complex, much less likely to commit major diplomatic blunders. Malenkov wouldn't have send missiles to Cuba, and he did float the idea of a unified, neutral Germany - something NATO would never have agreed to anyway. The Cold War would be a bit cooler as a consequence, and detente would allow the USA and USSR to reduce their military budgets as in OTL.
If Malenkov is able to remove Khrushchev then his rule is relatively stable. It took year of discontent for the plotters against Khrushchev to finally decide to remove him in OTL, and some of Khrushchev's greatest blunders - the Virgin Lands Campaign, Cuba, radical changes in economic policy - are going to be butterflied away. Malenkov's leadership style is much more stable, and over time he is able to establish himself as a much more powerful leader than OTL Khrushchev or Brezhnev were, no collective leadership. He might even be able to achieve the position of simultaneously serving as Chairman of the Soviet (Head of State), General Secretary (Head of the Party) and Premier (Head of Government), something not even Brezhnev managed to quite pull off in OTL. With steady economic reforms, a stable leadership and a well organised professional bureaucracy the stagnation of the Brezhnev years would be butterflied away, and while the USSR would not have been an economic powerhouse like China it would have been a stable superpower.

Considering Malenkov was closer to the state bureaucracy than to the party apparatus, could he try to very gradually empower the former at the expense of the latter? Could we see something like the Liberman reform but executed years earlier? Finally, what about Lysenko?

 

[gaitskellitebevanite]

Considering Malenkov was closer to the state bureaucracy than to the party apparatus, could he try to very gradually empower the former at the expense of the latter? Could we see something like the Liberman reform but executed years earlier? Finally, what about Lysenko?

I think in any Communist state a leader is going to need a base of support in the party apparatus, but the kind of state decay that happened under Brezhnev would be avoided. Regional party figures are likely to be much more professional, and better administrators.
Some kind of economic reform is going to be needed by the 60s or 70s, and Malenkov is both intelligent enough to know that its needed and savvy enough to know that swift, radical reforms are going to experience strong resistance from conservatives. No botched reforms like those proposed by Khrushchev that simply mobilised conservatives against him. Kosygin himself was a Khrushchev protege so almost certainly to be purged once Malenkov is strong enough. Reform might happen later than 1965, but when it happens its going to be more permanent.

 

[fasquardon]

Malenkov never really did that, and so failed in his bid for the leadership (the same thing occurred with Kosygin in the 60s).

So far as I can tell, Kosygin didn't want the top job.

Soviet economic policy would have been led by Malenkov protege's like Saburov and Perkukhin, and would have stuck more to centralized planning than Khrushchev's decentralizing approach, which is likely to present problems.

Given how much of a failure Khrushchev's decentralization of planning was, I suspect that continued central planning would be a good thing for the USSR.

There would have been no explicit de-Stalinisation, much more likely the CPSU would eventually have dealt with Stalin the same way the CPC dealt with Mao's legacy, "70% good, 30% bad" or something along those lines, Stalin's statues remain, his body remains embalmed alongside Lenin's but the terror is eased.

Which will likely be a huge help to Sino-Soviet relations. If Mao also sees Malenkov as a strong leader, there's a good chance that the Sino-Soviet split is avoided (though Sino-Soviet relations would still have plenty of tension) which really changes how the Cold War plays out.

If the Mao-Malenkov personal chemistry is poor, it probably happens anyway though.

Would things like the Hungarian Revolution and Gomulka Thaw in Poland still happen?

I think the answer to both is "probably" - the biggest factor in lighting off the Hungarian revolution was Austria being re-united as a neutral country, and the Hungarians wanted in on that. I suspect that Malenkov would be even more keen to neutralize Austria than Khrushchev.

I can't think of any particular reason why the Gomułka thaw wouldn't happen under Malenkov.

Finally, what about Lysenko?

I suspect his influence would drop off faster (if memory serves, Khrushchev had worked with Lysenko back when he was working on the ideas that worked, and thus had a positive view of the man).

On the other hand, I don't see why Lysenko would be an important thing for Malenkov to be concerned about.

Some questions that occur to me:

Would there be something like the Prague Spring under Malenkov?

What would Malenkov's push for light industry look like?

Would Malenkov take Khrushchev's path and make political struggles in the Party less bloody, or would he continue that particular Stalinist tradition?

fasquardon

 

[David T]

The important factor was as the OP says, Malenkov resigned from the secretariat (and as de facto General/First Secretary) in order to retain the premiership, and he'd failed to appreciate that control of the party machinery was much more important that the state bureaucracy.

I don't think it's so much a matter of failing to realize the importance of the secretariat as it is that after the brief cult of Malenkov's personality--exemplified by the notorious photo showing Malenkov with Stalin and Mao--the other members of the Presidium (inlcuding not only Khrushchev but Beria, who had been Malenkov's ally) decided Malenkov's dual position was just too dangerous.

And anyway Khrushchev's position as leading party secretary would not necessarily have doomed Malenkov had the latter been able to keep the support of the majority of the Presidium. But Malenkov's positions in 1954-5--favoring more attention to consumer goods vis-a-vis heavy industry, saying that nuclear war would mean the end of world civilization, showing some openness to German unification--were just what was needed to drive the "Stalinists" on the Presidium (especially Molotov and Kaganovich) into Khrushchev's arms.

 

[Vinization]

On the other hand, I don't see why Lysenko would be an important thing for Malenkov to be concerned about.

Well, allowing him to retain a position of influence would only hurt Soviet agriculture further.

 

[gaitskellitebevanite]

So far as I can tell, Kosygin didn't want the top job.

Given how much of a failure Khrushchev's decentralization of planning was, I suspect that continued central planning would be a good thing for the USSR.

Which will likely be a huge help to Sino-Soviet relations. If Mao also sees Malenkov as a strong leader, there's a good chance that the Sino-Soviet split is avoided (though Sino-Soviet relations would still have plenty of tension) which really changes how the Cold War plays out.

If the Mao-Malenkov personal chemistry is poor, it probably happens anyway though.

Kosygin didnt particularly want to be General Secretary, but his influence did decline significantly after 1968. From 1964-68 Brezhnev and Kosygin were about equal in standing, indeed it was Kosygin, not Brezhnev, who met LBJ at Glassboro.

Khrushchev's decentralizing reforms weren't failures in themselves, they were destabilizing because of the way he forced them through.

Agree about Sino-Soviet relations, Khrushchev himself was responsible for much of the split, his own personality and in particular the Secret Speech. However Mao did use the split for his own domestic political ends, Mao's xenophobia and "anti-revisionism" of the cultural revolution to purge potential opponents. Mao was a paranoid psychopath, and would probably have caused some kind of split. Without Khrushchev though this split would probably have occurred a few years later.

 

[fasquardon]

Well, allowing him to retain a position of influence would only hurt Soviet agriculture further.

Sure, but will the people at the top really care? There's a chance that things are as OTL, and Lysenko's influence slowly declines after Stalin's death.

The thing that may make a difference is Malenkov's consumer goods focus. By far the most important consumer goods in the USSR in the 50s were agricultural products or produced from agricultural products.

Kosygin didnt particularly want to be General Secretary, but his influence did decline significantly after 1968. From 1964-68 Brezhnev and Kosygin were about equal in standing, indeed it was Kosygin, not Brezhnev, who met LBJ at Glassboro.

Right, but I'm not sure how you can say that he made the same mistake as Malenkov when he never wanted the top job and was pushed away from the jobs he DID want as the Brezhnevites consolidated their power. Since Kosygin wanted different things, I would say he made different mistakes.

Khrushchev's decentralizing reforms weren't failures in themselves, they were destabilizing because of the way he forced them through.

None of my books go into Khrushchev's decentralization in terribly gruesome detail, they all say words to the effect of "and Khrushchev tried to change things but his ideas didn't work so weren't really implemented/didn't have time to be implemented".

Agree about Sino-Soviet relations, Khrushchev himself was responsible for much of the split, his own personality and in particular the Secret Speech. However Mao did use the split for his own domestic political ends, Mao's xenophobia and "anti-revisionism" of the cultural revolution to purge potential opponents. Mao was a paranoid psychopath, and would probably have caused some kind of split. Without Khrushchev though this split would probably have occurred a few years later.

Would there have been a Cultural Revolution without a split? If the USSR was still "on the revolutionary path", would Mao become so concerned that China might lose its revolutionary fervor?

Well, probably Mao would be almost as concerned. There's some chance that things are wildly different however.

Still, even if the Cultural Revolution did occur, would it necessarily involve a split? Certainly it would be a nadir of Sino-Soviet relations, but there will be voices in the Soviet politburo (such as Suslov, who favoured cooperating with more liberal and more hardline Communist leaders to present a solid opposition to the US alliance) who will push to keep quiet while the Chinese sort themselves out, and I can see Mao in an alternate world seeing the Cultural Revolution as a way to one-up the Soviets while remaining an ally to them.

And if there is a Sino-Soviet split, is it so brief that the US can't take advantage of it?

IMO the most likely outcome of "Stalin not denounced/Mao respects the next Soviet leader" is "later and more shallow Sino-Soviet rift that closes before the West really notices" but this can go many different ways depending on small details. If Mao really doesn't like Malenkov, we could even see an earlier and deeper split.

fasquardon

 

[Aghasverov]

Ok, so here's something that I don't think has been asked yet... in OTL, Malenkov lived to the ripe old age of 86, not dying until 1988 (amazing how long people in the Soviet hierarchy could live once Stalin was gone ) .... who would've replaced him?

 

[Johnrankins]

Would there have been a Cultural Revolution without a split? If the USSR was still "on the revolutionary path", would Mao become so concerned that China might lose its revolutionary fervor?

Well, probably Mao would be almost as concerned. There's some chance that things are wildly different however.

Still, even if the Cultural Revolution did occur, would it necessarily involve a split? Certainly it would be a nadir of Sino-Soviet relations, but there will be voices in the Soviet politburo (such as Suslov, who favoured cooperating with more liberal and more hardline Communist leaders to present a solid opposition to the US alliance) who will push to keep quiet while the Chinese sort themselves out, and I can see Mao in an alternate world seeing the Cultural Revolution as a way to one-up the Soviets while remaining an ally to them.

And if there is a Sino-Soviet split, is it so brief that the US can't take advantage of it?

IMO the most likely outcome of "Stalin not denounced/Mao respects the next Soviet leader" is "later and more shallow Sino-Soviet rift that closes before the West really notices" but this can go many different ways depending on small details. If Mao really doesn't like Malenkov, we could even see an earlier and deeper split.

fasquardon

The biggest reason for the split is that there can only be one #1! China and the USSR were eventually going to battle for the top spot as China didn't want to play second fiddle forever and Russia didn't want to give up its power and prestige.

 

[Vinization]

Ok, so here's something that I don't think has been asked yet... in OTL, Malenkov lived to the ripe old age of 86, not dying until 1988 (amazing how long people in the Soviet hierarchy could live once Stalin was gone ) .... who would've replaced him?

I thought about asking that question too, but there are so many factors involved I decided not to.

• He could've genuinely retired from politics in the late seventies/early eighties.
• Assuming he didn't, he would've probably died earlier from the stress of governing such a heavily centralized state and all that.
• Blah blah blah.

My guess is some technocrat I never heard of takes over.

Maybe Ryzhkov becomes a member of the Politburo earlier (say in the late 70s rather than 1981) and leads the USSR from, say, 1985 onward, starting a slow transition to democracy (the sources I read said he was basically a smarter Gorbachev who agreed with most of the man's policies except his stupider ones, such as the anti-alcohol campaign).

 

[Aghasverov]

I thought about asking that question too, but there are so many factors involved I decided not to.

• He could've genuinely retired from politics in the late seventies/early eighties.
• Assuming he didn't, he would've probably died earlier from the stress of governing such a heavily centralized state and all that.
• Blah blah blah.

My guess is some technocrat I never heard of takes over.

Maybe Ryzhkov becomes a member of the Politburo earlier (say in the late 70s rather than 1981) and leads the USSR from, say, 1985 onward, starting a slow transition to democracy (the sources I read said he was basically a smarter Gorbachev who agreed with most of the man's policies except his stupider ones, such as the anti-alcohol campaign).

I wasn't that familiar with Ryzhkov until he featured in someone else's thread a few months back... he did show a lot of promise... and he certainly had/has staying power, considering he's still alive and has never left Russian politics completely....

 

[Vinization]

I don't think it's so much a matter of failing to realize the importance of the secretariat as it is that after the brief cult of Malenkov's personality--exemplified by the notorious photo showing Malenkov with Stalin and Mao--the other members of the Presidium (inlcuding not only Khrushchev but Beria, who had been Malenkov's ally) decided Malenkov's dual position was just too dangerous.

And anyway Khrushchev's position as leading party secretary would not necessarily have doomed Malenkov had the latter been able to keep the support of the majority of the Presidium. But Malenkov's positions in 1954-5--favoring more attention to consumer goods vis-a-vis heavy industry, saying that nuclear war would mean the end of world civilization, showing some openness to German unification--were just what was needed to drive the "Stalinists" on the Presidium (especially Molotov and Kaganovich) into Khrushchev's arms.

View attachment 618608

Do you think Malenkov could've retained both positions had that doctored photo not been published? I can definitely see why such a gesture would scare the Politburo.

I assume having Beria executed earlier (it's honestly amazing that he survived until December 1953 IOTL) would help too?