George H. Thomas chooses Virginia?

I hope no one takes offense at the topic of this thread - I admire George H. Thomas and the dedication he displayed to his cause, and for supporting the rights of freedmen after the war.

George H. Thomas is notable as one of the best corps and army commanders of the war, and for being one of the most prominent Southerners to choose their nation over his state. He struggled over his choice, but it seems his Northern wife Frances Kellogg likely influenced his decision somewhat. But what if he never met his wife, and chose Virginia over his nation? Thomas would be one of the most senior officers to go South, and would certainly gain a major command quickly, likely in Virginia to begin with.

@Marse Lee, I thought this might interest you.
 
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Supposing Thomas joined Virginia, Thomas has the advantage of being senior to both Longstreet and Jackson, outranked by Lee and both Johnston(s) (A.S. and J.E.). Thomas may be assigned to a department early or a division in the Army of Northern Virginia. Perhaps, if everything flows up to OTL, Thomas would ascend to command the Army of Northern Virginia if Johnston is wounded at Seven Pines as OTL, with Lee remaining as Davis' military advisor. This is still the very volatile period of the ACW where a lot could happen.
Thomas would a useful asset for the Confederacy, for he was a master in the art of defense and capably organized powerful counterattacks and attacks at Mill Springs and Nashville. He was also a good trainer of men, but not an innovator, at least in things like tactics. A good example would be his order to Willich to stop employing or training “Advance Firing” and go back to the standard Casey’s manual. Supposing that Thomas led the Army of Northern Virginia well in 1864, we may not see the development of the sharpshooter battalions that served Lee well in combat. As an operationalist, Thomas seemed to favor the turning movement like Rosecrans, evinced by his suggestion to Sherman to take the Snake Creek Gap rather than have the Army of the Tennessee march to Rome, Georgia.
 
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Supposing Thomas joined Virginia, Thomas has the advantage of being senior to both Longstreet and Jackson, outranked by Lee and both Johnston(s) (A.S. and J.E.). Thomas may be assigned to a department early or a division in the Army of Northern Virginia. Perhaps, if everything flows up to OTL, Thomas would ascend to command the Army of Northern Virginia if Johnston is wounded at Seven Pines as OTL, with Lee remaining as Davis' military advisor. This is still the very volatile period of the ACW where a lot could happen.
Thomas would a useful asset for the Confederacy, for he was a master in the art of defense and capably organized powerful counterattacks and attacks at Mill Springs and Nashville. He was also a good trainer of men, but not an innovator, at least in things like tactics. A good example would be his order to Willich to stop employing or training “Advance Firing” and go back to the standard Casey’s manual. Supposing that Thomas led the Army of Northern Virginia well in 1864, we may not see the development of the sharpshooter battalions, that served Lee well in combat. As an operationalist, Thomas seemed to favor the turning movement like Rosecrans, evinced by his suggestion to Sherman to take the Snake Creek Gap rather than have the Army of the Tennessee march to Rome, Georgia.
Lee remaining Davis' military advisor might actually help Davis' strategic thinking and decision making. Lee seemed, more than almost any other general, to be able to work with Davis.

It seems Thomas was similar to Johnston in that he would only attack if he sure he faced favorable odds...very different from Lee's all or nothing gambling. Of course, we should probably mention Thomas' tendency to refuse army command due to his distaste for politics and politicians. He could turn down the command of the ANV out of respect for his friend Lee.
 
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Imagine Jackson retained semi independent command in the valley. Lee commands ANVA with Thomas and Longstreet as Corps Commanders? I don't know if you could beat that defensive command.
 
It seems Thomas was similar to Johnston in that he would only attack if he sure he faced favorable odds...very different from Lee's all or nothing gambling.
I'd argue that this is not a very accurate take on Thomas. He won Mill Springs with counterattacks launched against a larger force. At Nashville, again, he attacked. He was the best of Sherman's subordinates during the engagements of the Atlanta Campaign. While certainly he wasn't terribly aggressive more than once, at least Thomas actaully attacked.
 
I'd argue that this is not a very accurate take on Thomas. He won Mill Springs with counterattacks launched against a larger force. At Nashville, again, he attacked. He was the best of Sherman's subordinates during the engagements of the Atlanta Campaign. While certainly he wasn't terribly aggressive more than once, at least Thomas actaully attacked.
My apologies for any misconceptions on my part on Thomas, I need to get Brian Steel Wills' book on him. I will mention that Johnston did attack at Seven Pines (which was foiled by Longstreet taking the wrong road) and didn't he intend to attack at Peachtree Creek before he was sacked?
 
I will mention that Johnston did attack at Seven Pines (which was foiled by Longstreet taking the wrong road) and didn't he intend to attack at Peachtree Creek before he was sacked?
I concede that Johnston attacked at Seven Pines, albeit poorly, and at Bentonville with more success (though without any real hope of a major victory and with a major risk of being destroyed). Peach Tree Creek is more grey; according to Earl J. Hess’s “The Battle of Peach Tree Creek: Hood’s First Effort to Save Atlanta” pg. 239, Hess notes that there is no way to know if Johnston thought of conducting it at all but the scenario was highly reminiscent of Seven Pines, suggesting that Johnston could be serious. Still, it doesn’t solve the problem of McPherson being 2.5 miles east of Atlanta by the end of July 20.

In light of Wheeler's warnings and requests for reinforcements at midmorning of July 20, I believe it's likely that Johnston would have just aborted the offensive at Peach Tree Creek in favour of maneuvering to stop McPherson.
 
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I'm guessing Thomas will resign at about the same time as Longstreet (so pretty late). Thomas could get the 4th brigade (Longstreet's OTL brigade) the CS Army of the Potomac, while Longstreet gets the 5th brigade (Cocke's OTL).
 
I'm guessing Thomas will resign at about the same time as Longstreet (so pretty late). Thomas could get the 4th brigade (Longstreet's OTL brigade) the CS Army of the Potomac, while Longstreet gets the 5th brigade (Cocke's OTL).
Hmm.. that leaves Thomas to fight the first major skirmish between the Army of the Potomac (then known as the Army of Northeastern Virginia) and the Army of Northern Virginia (known as the Army of the Potomac- very confusing I know) at Blackburn’s Ford. His role in Bull Run could be enhanced if Beauregard’s plan to strike McDowell’s left was actually executed. IOTL, Longstreet’s Brigade (Thomas’ ITTL) was supposed to strike Richardson’s Brigade head on (and the odds were looking good for the Federals) while D.R. Jones received a grammatically incorrect and incredibly vague order to advance and cooperate with Longstreet and Ewell. The only reason this never took place was that Ewell never received his orders. Somehow the aide dispatched to deliver Ewell’s orders never showed up. Still, I think the Confederates were better off not attacking (at least in the morning-noon) as McDowell was so wary of being struck in the left flank that he would have aborted his own attack and defend his position.
 
Hmm.. that leaves Thomas to fight the first major skirmish between the Army of the Potomac (then known as the Army of Northeastern Virginia) and the Army of Northern Virginia (known as the Army of the Potomac- very confusing I know) at Blackburn’s Ford. His role in Bull Run could be enhanced if Beauregard’s plan to strike McDowell’s left was actually executed. IOTL, Longstreet’s Brigade (Thomas’ ITTL) was supposed to strike Richardson’s Brigade head on (and the odds were looking good for the Federals) while D.R. Jones received a grammatically incorrect and incredibly vague order to advance and cooperate with Longstreet and Ewell. The only reason this never took place was that Ewell never received his orders. Somehow the aide dispatched to deliver Ewell’s orders never showed up. Still, I think the Confederates were better off not attacking (at least in the morning-noon) as McDowell was so wary of being struck in the left flank that he would have aborted his own attack and defend his position.
IOTL, the Governor of Virginia offered him the position of Chief of Ordnance, where things would go from there I'm not sure. How Thomas being present at First Manassas could change things, I'm not sure.
 
...the Sledge of Manassas, perhaps?
I’m not too optimistic about Thomas’ role here. He faces two of Richardson’s Brigade of Tyler’s 1st Division (with two in reserve) and six guns under Major Henry J. Hunt on high ground. Richardson had deployed skirmishers on the flanks to check any flanking attempts and Miles’ 5th Division was fairly close. The odds aren’t looking pretty here.
 
Interestingly, Davis got a bill passed in early 1862 allowing generals to retain their rank should they be appointed to the cabinet, specifically to allow Robert E. Lee to assume the role of Secretary of War. It could be very interesting to see how he would perform in this role. I could see him neglecting other theaters at the expense of Virginia.
 
I could see him neglecting other theaters at the expense of Virginia.
In fairness to Lee, his objective as the commander of the Army of Northern Virginia was the preservation of the stalemate in Virginia, not the fate of other theaters. In fact, Lee monitored the entire Confederate military effort, often commenting on events in other theaters in his correspondence (and doubtless in his unrecorded private consultations) with the president and others. He read both Confederate and Northern newspapers sedulously, exchanged letters that touched on the military and political dimensions of the conflict with a range of people, and discussed the war with foreign visitors. Based on all he knew and surmised, Lee reasonably concluded that the Army of Northern Virginia operated in the most important theater, stood the best chance among all Southern forces of advancing the Confederate cause, and thus should be supported to the greatest possible degree in terms of reinforcements and materiél.

He watched the war in the West unfold as a nearly unbroken series of Confederate disasters. Forts Henry and Donelson, Pea Ridge, Shiloh, the loss of Nashville and New Orleans, the loss of Vicksburg and control of the Mississippi River, Chattanooga, Atlanta, and numerous smaller failures paraded across the pages of the newspapers he read and came up in conversation and correspondence. It’s not surprising that Lee was so opposed to detaching parts of his army to go west. In May 1863, when leaders in Richmond debated whether to weaken Lee’s army to reinforce John C. Pemberton’s force at Vicksburg or Braxton Bragg’s in Middle Tennessee. Lee opposed detaching George E. Pickett’s division for service along the Mississippi, and in a letter to the secretary of war raised the subject of ‘the uncertainty of its application’ under Pemberton. Well might Lee worry about how his troops would be applied to the Confederate defense elsewhere, as Braxton Bragg’s misuse of two divisions under James Longstreet demonstrated later in 1863.
 
In fairness to Lee, his objective as the commander of the Army of Northern Virginia was the preservation of the stalemate in Virginia, not the fate of other theaters. In fact, Lee monitored the entire Confederate military effort, often commenting on events in other theaters in his correspondence (and doubtless in his unrecorded private consultations) with the president and others. He read both Confederate and Northern newspapers sedulously, exchanged letters that touched on the military and political dimensions of the conflict with a range of people, and discussed the war with foreign visitors. Based on all he knew and surmised, Lee reasonably concluded that the Army of Northern Virginia operated in the most important theater, stood the best chance among all Southern forces of advancing the Confederate cause, and thus should be supported to the greatest possible degree in terms of reinforcements and materiél.

He watched the war in the West unfold as a nearly unbroken series of Confederate disasters. Forts Henry and Donelson, Pea Ridge, Shiloh, the loss of Nashville and New Orleans, the loss of Vicksburg and control of the Mississippi River, Chattanooga, Atlanta, and numerous smaller failures paraded across the pages of the newspapers he read and came up in conversation and correspondence. It’s not surprising that Lee was so opposed to detaching parts of his army to go west. In May 1863, when leaders in Richmond debated whether to weaken Lee’s army to reinforce John C. Pemberton’s force at Vicksburg or Braxton Bragg’s in Middle Tennessee. Lee opposed detaching George E. Pickett’s division for service along the Mississippi, and in a letter to the secretary of war raised the subject of ‘the uncertainty of its application’ under Pemberton. Well might Lee worry about how his troops would be applied to the Confederate defense elsewhere, as Braxton Bragg’s misuse of two divisions under James Longstreet demonstrated later in 1863.
Just for fun, I made an OOB for the Army of Northern Virginia in early 1862 with Thomas:

Army of Northern Virginia
GEN Robert E. Lee

First Corps
MG George H. Thomas
- MG William H. T. Walker (the "Georgia Division")
- - BG Alexander R. Lawton
- - BG Robert A. Toombs
- - Col George T. Anderson
- BG William H. C. Whiting
- - BG John B. Hood
- - Col Evander M. Law
- - Col Wade Hampton
- BG Jubal A. Early
- - Col Duncan K. McRae
- - BG Robert E. Rodes
- - BG Joseph B. Kershaw

Second Corps
MG James Longstreet
- BG D. R. Jones
- - BG James L. Kemper
- - Col Micah Jenkins
- - BG George E. Pickett
- BG D. H. Hill
- - BG Richard Griffith
- - BG Winfield S. Featherston
- - BG Cadmus M. Wilcox
- BG Richard H. Anderson
- - BG Maxcy Gregg
- - BG Thomas F. Drayton
- - BG Paul J. Semmes

Third Corps
MG Thomas J. Jackson
- BG Charles S. Winder (the "Stonewall Division")
- - Col Baylor
- - BG John R. Jones
- - BG William B. Taliaferro
- BG Richard S. Ewell
- - BG Arnold Elzey
- - BG Isaac R. Trimble
- - BG Richard Taylor
- BG A. P. Hill
- - BG William Mahone
- - BG Lawrence O. Branch
- - BG James J. Archer

Richmond Defenses
MG G. W. Smith
- BG Charles W. Field
- BG Samuel G. French
- BG John G. Walker
- BG Roswell S. Ripley

Army of the Peninsula
MG John B. Magruder
- BG Gabriel J. Rains
- BG Howell Cobb
- BG Roger A. Pryor

Dept. of Norfolk
MG John C. Pemberton
- BG Raleigh E. Colston
- BG Lewis A. Armistead
- BG Albert G. Blanchard

Dept. of North Carolina
MG Theophilus H. Holmes
- BG Thomas L. Clingman
- BG Robert Ransom
- Col Junius Daniel

I have three brigades left over, which can be made into another division:
BG Lafayette McLaws
- BG Samuel Garland
- BG Joseph R. Anderson
- BG William D. Pender
 

Marc

Donor
Please correct me if I'm wrong - this era is a secondary interest for me in American history - but I recall reading at some point that Thomas was by the sensibilities of the times very liberal about slavery while not a full out abolitionist.
Given the attitudes of the ruling class in the South, this might have ironically resulted in the same degree of mistrust he face serving the Union.
 
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@Arnold d.c: Do you have any ideas for how Thomas commanding Cocke's brigade could have changed the battle?

It could be interesting to see how the war develops if Barnard Bee and Francis Bartow survive Manassas.
 
@Arnold d.c: Do you have any ideas for how Thomas commanding Cocke's brigade could have changed the battle?

It could be interesting to see how the war develops if Barnard Bee and Francis Bartow survive Manassas.
Given that Thomas' Brigade would have been guarding Lewis' and Ball's Fords for most of the battle, Thomas' time to shine would have been the counterattack that brought about the collapse of McDowell's army at Henry Hill. Given that Cooke was virtually non-existent in this counterattack, Thomas could have made a more coordinated attack than the piecemeal attack of Cooke's regiments. Thomas could achieve great fame and inflict greater losses onto Sherman's spent brigade but his troops were too inexperienced to mount an effective pursuit.
 
@Arnold d.c: Do you have any ideas for how Thomas commanding Cocke's brigade could have changed the battle?

It could be interesting to see how the war develops if Barnard Bee and Francis Bartow survive Manassas.
Attempting to answer my own question, both Bee and Bartow died too early to make a clear assessment of either. That said, I'd say Bee did a good job rallying his brigade.
 
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