When George Clinton was elected Vice-President in 1804, he was already past his prime, and his hopes to be elected President in 1808 were almost certainly predestined to fail. Two comments will suffice:
"He is old, feeble & altogether uncapable of the duty of presiding in the Senate. He has no mind--no intellect--no memory--He forgets the question mistakes it--&c not infrequently declares a vote before it's taken--& often forgets to do it after it is taken-- Takes up new business while a question is depending."--Senator William Plumer of New Hampshire. http://www.americanheritage.com/content/heartbeat-away?page=show
"It was unfortunate both for the venerable vice president and for the Senate itself, which needed an infusion of vitality, that the dashing Burr, with his outstanding abilities as a presiding officer, should have been succeeded by the prematurely aged Clinton. Clinton's seven years in the vice presidency did considerably less than nothing to enhance the old warrior's reputation, for by 1805 in his late sixties, he could make no claims to constructive statesmanship of a national variety or even to ordinary ability as a presiding officer." E. Wilder Spaulding, *His Excellency George Clinton: Critic of the Constitution* (New York: Macmillan 1938), p. 279.
But what if George Clinton had been elected Vice-President when he was younger and more vigorous (and it must be remembered that before the fiasco of 1800 which ultimately led to the Twelfth Amendment, the Vice-President was often considered the logical successor to the President)? Two possibilities are 1788-89 and 1792.
The attempts of Antifederalists to make Clinton Vice-President in the 1788-89 election were probably doomed from the start. He had no real strength outside Virginia and his own state of New York; and as New York cast no electoral votes (due to a deadlock in the state legislature over how electors should be chosen), Clinton wound up with only three votes from Antifederalist electors in Virginia (including Patrick Henry).
(The most interesting feature of the 1788-89 election was perhaps Alexander Hamilton's successful attempt to get a substantial number of Federalist electors to scatter their second votes--the first votes would of course go to George Washington--giving them to candidates other than John Adams. Hamilton said that this was not due to hostility to Adams but to his fear of the following nightmare scenario: Suppose all the Federalist electors cast their second votes for Adams. Then suppose the handful of Southern Antifederalist electors, seeing the hopelessness of Clinton's candidacy, voted for Adams too. Adams in that event would be tied with Washington! And worse still, suppose one or two electors would, out of pique, withhold a vote for Washington....This may just have been a cover for Hamilton's distrust of Adams, whom he suspected of hostility to Washington, and had only reluctantly accepted as the Federalist Vice-Presidential candidate. But in fairness, it must be said that whatever his actual motives in trying to cut Adams down to size, Hamilton was prescient in already recognizing that there was a flaw in the Constitution's original election mechanism; as he put it, "the man intended for Vice President may in fact turn up President." The election of 1800 would show how serious that problem could be. In any event, Adams in 1789 felt humiliated by his showing--only 34 electoral votes, less than half of Washington's unanimous showing, though far ahead of all other candidates. When Adams later learned of Hamilton's behind-the-scenes role in minimizing his vote, he developed a life-long grudge against the man.)
1792, however, was a different matter. The adherents of Jefferson and Madison (the latter of course had been a leading Federalist in the late 1780's), calling themselves Republicans, while accepting a second term for Washington, wanted to challenge Vice-President Adams and his "monarchical" doctrines. They actually did well in the Congressional elections that year. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_House_of_Representatives_elections,_1792 They had problems settling on a vice-presidential candidate, though. Jefferson would be the logical candidate, but because he was a Virginian, that state's electors could not vote for both him and Washington, and Republican chances for the Vice-Presidency seemed hopeless without Virginia. So by mid-1792 Clinton was the leading possibility. It is true that his former Antifederalism might be held against him by some, but his adherents argued that the adoption of the Bill of Rights had largely mooted Clinton's objections to the Constitution; as one of them put it, the issue was no longer Federalism versus anti-Federalism but Republicanism versus anti-Republicanism.
Clinton's greatest problem, however, was his very narrow and tainted victory in his April 1792 re-election as Governor of New York against Federalist candidate John Jay. Clinton won (officially by 8,457 votes to 8,315) only because the votes of a Federalist stronghold, Otsego County, were disallowed for technical reasons--New York law required that the county's ballots be delivered by the sheriff or someone deputized by the sheriff, and apparently *there was no one legally serving as sheriff* in Otsego County during the election!:
"The county was run by an iron hand by Judge William Cooper, 'the Bashaw of Otsego.' Cooper's hand-picked man, Richard R. Smith, had informed the council of appointment in January that he would not seek another appointment as sheriff after his commission expired on February 18. On March 30 the council appointed Benjamin Gilbert as Smith's successor. Gilbert's commission was given to Senator Stephen Van Rensselear on April 13. Van Rensselear gave the commission to Cooper, but for some unknown reason, Gilbert did not receive the commission until May 11. Smith continued to serve as sheriff throughout the gubernatorial elections, even though he had been elected an Otsego town supervisor during the first week in April--an office that could not legally be held by the sheriff. Smith placed the precinct ballot boxes in one large, sealed box...He then deputized a courier to deliver them to New York City." John P. Kaminski, *George Clinton: Yeoman Politician of the New Republic,* (1993) p. 221.
Anyway, the state's twelve canvassers consisted of nine Clintonians and three Federalists, and on a straight party vote they decided to disallow the returns from Otsego County. They also disallowed the votes of two smaller, probably pro-Clinton counties, but these almost certainly could not have swung the election for Clinton if Otsego County's ballots--estimated to be between 550 and 800 votes for Jay to only 150 for Clinton--had been allowed. The Federalists were of course outraged, but with a narrow Clintonian majority in the legislature there was not much they could do about it, short of revolution. (There actually was some talk of this. Ebeneezer Foote, Ulster County Federalist, warned that "Clinton must quit the chair or blood must and will be shed." Kaminski, p. 222. Hamilton cautioned against such threats. He worried that "Some folks are talking of Conventions and the Bayonet." He thought that the Federalists must show that they were the true friends of law and order. For a convention to reverse the canvassers' decision, he felt, would be like a legislature reversing the judgment of a court. Such a precedent may appeal to Federalists today, Hamilton warned, "but tomorrow we may rue its abuse." Kaminski, p. 223) It was not only Federalists who were dismayed by Clinton's dubious victory. Chancellor Livingston, Clinton's supporter, said "I confess I wish that all the votes had been counted whatever might have been the result." Thomas Jefferson thought it impossible "to defend Clinton as a just or disinterested man if he does not decline the office" and thought that Clinton's conduct would hurt "the cause of republicanism." James Monroe agreed that Clinton was "no model for imitation" but argued that he was the best New York had to offer, and that only a Virginia-New York alliance could win the vice-presidency for the Republicans.
As if this lack of enthusiasm wasn't bad enough, in September things got even worse: New York Federalists circulated reports that US Senator Aaron Burr would replace Clinton as the Republican candidate! "Burr's possible candidacy produced consternation in the ranks of the Virginia Republicans when they leaned of it in early October. Melancthon Smith and Marinus Willetts, influential New York Republicans, had sent a letter by special messenger to Madison and Monroe proposing the substitution, together with another communication indicating that Pennsylvania Republicans were prepared to back Burr. If the Virginians were unenthusiastic about Clinton, they were quite appalled by the prospect of endorsing Burr. He was, in the opinion of Monroe, 'too young, if not in point of age, yet upon the public theatre'; some person 'of more advanced life and longer standing in public trust' was required. After consulting together, Madison and Monroe wrote a diplomatic response to the New Yorkers, with whom they wished to maintain an alliance, expressing their reservations about Burr because of his modest public stature and signifying their preference for Clinton." Richard P. McCormick, *The Presidential Game: The Origins of American Presidential Politics* (1982), pp. 47-48.
The matter was finally settled at a conference in Philadelphia on October 16, 1792. Prominent Republicans were present from New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and South Carolina. "The Virginia view prevailed; Clinton would be the Republican candidate. Melancthon Smith told the conferees that New York would give the bulk of its votes to Clinton and that he would personally undertake to solicit support in Vermont and Rhode Island. He urged that Monroe should persuade Patrick Henry to exert his influence in North Carolina. In this remarkably simple, informal manner, a roomful of Republican managers [the first "smoke-filled room"?--DT] determined their vice-presidential candidate and plotted their campaign strategy less than three weeks before the states would begin to choose their electors." McCormick, p. 48.
It must not be thought that the vice-presidential race created great interest among the public. For one thing, in nine of the fifteen states the choice of electors would be made exclusively by the legislatures. In only three states--Vermont, New Hampshire, and Pennsylvania--were electors chosen by the popular vote on a general ticket. (Massachusetts, Virginia, and Kentucky used variants of the district method.) Even in the states where the electors were popularly chosen, public interest was limited. For example, one would expect greater public attention to the race in Pennsylvania, because of the vigorously partisan press in Philadelphia, and because of the commitment of leading Republican politicians in the state to work with their associates in New York and Virginia for the election of Clinton. Yet in fact interest was minimal, and only about four thousand votes were cast, whereas 35,000 Pennsylvanians had voted a month earlier in the congressional election!
In view of all Clinton's disadvantages--his Antifederalist record, the dubiousness of his 1792 gubernatorial victory, the lateness of the Republicans in endorsing him (Kaminski, p. 236, remarks on the logistical difficulties of Clinton's candidacy: "Presidential electors were elected in mid-to-late fall and were required to cast their ballots on December 5. To inform all of these electors that Clinton was the designated Republican candidate was nearly impossible."), the nonexistence of any but the loosest party organization on a national scale--the surprising thing is that "With their low-keyed, behind-the-scenes activity, the Republicans came close to upsetting Adams. Although Washington was again the unanimous choice of 132 electors--two electors from Maryland and one from Vermont did not vote--Adams had only seventy-seven votes. Clinton, with all the votes of Virginia, New York, North Carolina, and Georgia, and a single vote from Pennsylvania, had a total of fifty. Kentucky cast four votes for Jefferson, and South Carolina produced one vote for Burr. *Had Pennsylvania swung to Clinton, he would have defeated Adams.*" McCormick, p. 49. (Emphasis added.) (Incidentally, Congressman John Brown had earlier given assurances that the Kentucky electors were committed to Clinton. So maybe these, rather than Samuel Miles in 1796, were the first "faithless electors" but it seems dubious to call them such. Whatever assurances Brown had given the Clinton camp, my guess is that these electors were simply elected as Republicans at a time when it was not clear who the Republican candidate would be. In any event, voting for Jefferson instead of Clinton did not involve crossing party lines, and thus differs from voting for Jefferson instead of Adams as the Federalist
Miles did in 1796. http://groups.google.com/group/soc.history.what-if/msg/655f7646c71ced47)
My POD is to have Clinton score a narrow but undisputed victory in the 1792 New York gubernatorial election--either have Jay refuse to run and the Federalists put up a weaker candidate (although Jay had weaknesses of his own--his abolitionism was not universally popular...) or else have Jay and his supporters make some mistake during the campaign. In any event, make it so that *even with Otsego County counted* Clinton scores a victory. In that event, Republicans are likely to rally behind him earlier than in OTL, there is less talk of Burr or other alternatives, and the Federalists are deprived of one of their major arguments in favor of Adams and against Clinton. (The argument that Clinton was still an Antifederalist was often grouped together with the argument that he stole the 1792 gubernatorial election: "Federalist William Wilcocks disputed Clinton's political conversion and the Republican claim 'that the spirit of antifederalism is extinct.' Such transformations were as likely as 'a whale on horse-back'...Referring to the dispute over his reelection as governor, Wilcocks declared that it was preposterous to believe that Clinton, 'who holds the first office in a state in open contempt and violation of a Constitution he pretends to respect,' would 'be faithful as Vice President in the support of the Constitution he abhors.' Massachusetts Congressman Fisher Ames reported that 'The *antis* have joined to set up Clinton against John Adams. They seem to wish he may have the singular chance to mar two constitutions." Kaminski, p. 235)
So let's say that with this POD Clinton gets enough extra votes in Pennsylvania (and perhaps elsewhere) to defeat Adams. Consequences?
(1) Does Adams quit politics once and for all, as he often threatened to do? If so, who will the Federalist candidate for President be in 1796? The problem with Hamilton is obvious: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maria_Reynolds Maybe one of the Pinckneys? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thomas_Pinckney https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charles_Cotesworth_Pinckney
(2) Does Clinton insist on being Republican candidate for President in 1796 or is he willing to accept being Jefferson's running mate? Even if he says he is is willing, there is the embarrassing fact that if Republican electors vote solidly for both men and if they both outscore whoever the Federalists nominate--well, we could get the equivalent of the 1800 fiasco, four years earlier, with Clinton rather than Burr as the candidate who could hope to convince some Federalists that he was the lesser evil than Jefferson...
"He is old, feeble & altogether uncapable of the duty of presiding in the Senate. He has no mind--no intellect--no memory--He forgets the question mistakes it--&c not infrequently declares a vote before it's taken--& often forgets to do it after it is taken-- Takes up new business while a question is depending."--Senator William Plumer of New Hampshire. http://www.americanheritage.com/content/heartbeat-away?page=show
"It was unfortunate both for the venerable vice president and for the Senate itself, which needed an infusion of vitality, that the dashing Burr, with his outstanding abilities as a presiding officer, should have been succeeded by the prematurely aged Clinton. Clinton's seven years in the vice presidency did considerably less than nothing to enhance the old warrior's reputation, for by 1805 in his late sixties, he could make no claims to constructive statesmanship of a national variety or even to ordinary ability as a presiding officer." E. Wilder Spaulding, *His Excellency George Clinton: Critic of the Constitution* (New York: Macmillan 1938), p. 279.
But what if George Clinton had been elected Vice-President when he was younger and more vigorous (and it must be remembered that before the fiasco of 1800 which ultimately led to the Twelfth Amendment, the Vice-President was often considered the logical successor to the President)? Two possibilities are 1788-89 and 1792.
The attempts of Antifederalists to make Clinton Vice-President in the 1788-89 election were probably doomed from the start. He had no real strength outside Virginia and his own state of New York; and as New York cast no electoral votes (due to a deadlock in the state legislature over how electors should be chosen), Clinton wound up with only three votes from Antifederalist electors in Virginia (including Patrick Henry).
(The most interesting feature of the 1788-89 election was perhaps Alexander Hamilton's successful attempt to get a substantial number of Federalist electors to scatter their second votes--the first votes would of course go to George Washington--giving them to candidates other than John Adams. Hamilton said that this was not due to hostility to Adams but to his fear of the following nightmare scenario: Suppose all the Federalist electors cast their second votes for Adams. Then suppose the handful of Southern Antifederalist electors, seeing the hopelessness of Clinton's candidacy, voted for Adams too. Adams in that event would be tied with Washington! And worse still, suppose one or two electors would, out of pique, withhold a vote for Washington....This may just have been a cover for Hamilton's distrust of Adams, whom he suspected of hostility to Washington, and had only reluctantly accepted as the Federalist Vice-Presidential candidate. But in fairness, it must be said that whatever his actual motives in trying to cut Adams down to size, Hamilton was prescient in already recognizing that there was a flaw in the Constitution's original election mechanism; as he put it, "the man intended for Vice President may in fact turn up President." The election of 1800 would show how serious that problem could be. In any event, Adams in 1789 felt humiliated by his showing--only 34 electoral votes, less than half of Washington's unanimous showing, though far ahead of all other candidates. When Adams later learned of Hamilton's behind-the-scenes role in minimizing his vote, he developed a life-long grudge against the man.)
1792, however, was a different matter. The adherents of Jefferson and Madison (the latter of course had been a leading Federalist in the late 1780's), calling themselves Republicans, while accepting a second term for Washington, wanted to challenge Vice-President Adams and his "monarchical" doctrines. They actually did well in the Congressional elections that year. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_House_of_Representatives_elections,_1792 They had problems settling on a vice-presidential candidate, though. Jefferson would be the logical candidate, but because he was a Virginian, that state's electors could not vote for both him and Washington, and Republican chances for the Vice-Presidency seemed hopeless without Virginia. So by mid-1792 Clinton was the leading possibility. It is true that his former Antifederalism might be held against him by some, but his adherents argued that the adoption of the Bill of Rights had largely mooted Clinton's objections to the Constitution; as one of them put it, the issue was no longer Federalism versus anti-Federalism but Republicanism versus anti-Republicanism.
Clinton's greatest problem, however, was his very narrow and tainted victory in his April 1792 re-election as Governor of New York against Federalist candidate John Jay. Clinton won (officially by 8,457 votes to 8,315) only because the votes of a Federalist stronghold, Otsego County, were disallowed for technical reasons--New York law required that the county's ballots be delivered by the sheriff or someone deputized by the sheriff, and apparently *there was no one legally serving as sheriff* in Otsego County during the election!:
"The county was run by an iron hand by Judge William Cooper, 'the Bashaw of Otsego.' Cooper's hand-picked man, Richard R. Smith, had informed the council of appointment in January that he would not seek another appointment as sheriff after his commission expired on February 18. On March 30 the council appointed Benjamin Gilbert as Smith's successor. Gilbert's commission was given to Senator Stephen Van Rensselear on April 13. Van Rensselear gave the commission to Cooper, but for some unknown reason, Gilbert did not receive the commission until May 11. Smith continued to serve as sheriff throughout the gubernatorial elections, even though he had been elected an Otsego town supervisor during the first week in April--an office that could not legally be held by the sheriff. Smith placed the precinct ballot boxes in one large, sealed box...He then deputized a courier to deliver them to New York City." John P. Kaminski, *George Clinton: Yeoman Politician of the New Republic,* (1993) p. 221.
Anyway, the state's twelve canvassers consisted of nine Clintonians and three Federalists, and on a straight party vote they decided to disallow the returns from Otsego County. They also disallowed the votes of two smaller, probably pro-Clinton counties, but these almost certainly could not have swung the election for Clinton if Otsego County's ballots--estimated to be between 550 and 800 votes for Jay to only 150 for Clinton--had been allowed. The Federalists were of course outraged, but with a narrow Clintonian majority in the legislature there was not much they could do about it, short of revolution. (There actually was some talk of this. Ebeneezer Foote, Ulster County Federalist, warned that "Clinton must quit the chair or blood must and will be shed." Kaminski, p. 222. Hamilton cautioned against such threats. He worried that "Some folks are talking of Conventions and the Bayonet." He thought that the Federalists must show that they were the true friends of law and order. For a convention to reverse the canvassers' decision, he felt, would be like a legislature reversing the judgment of a court. Such a precedent may appeal to Federalists today, Hamilton warned, "but tomorrow we may rue its abuse." Kaminski, p. 223) It was not only Federalists who were dismayed by Clinton's dubious victory. Chancellor Livingston, Clinton's supporter, said "I confess I wish that all the votes had been counted whatever might have been the result." Thomas Jefferson thought it impossible "to defend Clinton as a just or disinterested man if he does not decline the office" and thought that Clinton's conduct would hurt "the cause of republicanism." James Monroe agreed that Clinton was "no model for imitation" but argued that he was the best New York had to offer, and that only a Virginia-New York alliance could win the vice-presidency for the Republicans.
As if this lack of enthusiasm wasn't bad enough, in September things got even worse: New York Federalists circulated reports that US Senator Aaron Burr would replace Clinton as the Republican candidate! "Burr's possible candidacy produced consternation in the ranks of the Virginia Republicans when they leaned of it in early October. Melancthon Smith and Marinus Willetts, influential New York Republicans, had sent a letter by special messenger to Madison and Monroe proposing the substitution, together with another communication indicating that Pennsylvania Republicans were prepared to back Burr. If the Virginians were unenthusiastic about Clinton, they were quite appalled by the prospect of endorsing Burr. He was, in the opinion of Monroe, 'too young, if not in point of age, yet upon the public theatre'; some person 'of more advanced life and longer standing in public trust' was required. After consulting together, Madison and Monroe wrote a diplomatic response to the New Yorkers, with whom they wished to maintain an alliance, expressing their reservations about Burr because of his modest public stature and signifying their preference for Clinton." Richard P. McCormick, *The Presidential Game: The Origins of American Presidential Politics* (1982), pp. 47-48.
The matter was finally settled at a conference in Philadelphia on October 16, 1792. Prominent Republicans were present from New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and South Carolina. "The Virginia view prevailed; Clinton would be the Republican candidate. Melancthon Smith told the conferees that New York would give the bulk of its votes to Clinton and that he would personally undertake to solicit support in Vermont and Rhode Island. He urged that Monroe should persuade Patrick Henry to exert his influence in North Carolina. In this remarkably simple, informal manner, a roomful of Republican managers [the first "smoke-filled room"?--DT] determined their vice-presidential candidate and plotted their campaign strategy less than three weeks before the states would begin to choose their electors." McCormick, p. 48.
It must not be thought that the vice-presidential race created great interest among the public. For one thing, in nine of the fifteen states the choice of electors would be made exclusively by the legislatures. In only three states--Vermont, New Hampshire, and Pennsylvania--were electors chosen by the popular vote on a general ticket. (Massachusetts, Virginia, and Kentucky used variants of the district method.) Even in the states where the electors were popularly chosen, public interest was limited. For example, one would expect greater public attention to the race in Pennsylvania, because of the vigorously partisan press in Philadelphia, and because of the commitment of leading Republican politicians in the state to work with their associates in New York and Virginia for the election of Clinton. Yet in fact interest was minimal, and only about four thousand votes were cast, whereas 35,000 Pennsylvanians had voted a month earlier in the congressional election!
In view of all Clinton's disadvantages--his Antifederalist record, the dubiousness of his 1792 gubernatorial victory, the lateness of the Republicans in endorsing him (Kaminski, p. 236, remarks on the logistical difficulties of Clinton's candidacy: "Presidential electors were elected in mid-to-late fall and were required to cast their ballots on December 5. To inform all of these electors that Clinton was the designated Republican candidate was nearly impossible."), the nonexistence of any but the loosest party organization on a national scale--the surprising thing is that "With their low-keyed, behind-the-scenes activity, the Republicans came close to upsetting Adams. Although Washington was again the unanimous choice of 132 electors--two electors from Maryland and one from Vermont did not vote--Adams had only seventy-seven votes. Clinton, with all the votes of Virginia, New York, North Carolina, and Georgia, and a single vote from Pennsylvania, had a total of fifty. Kentucky cast four votes for Jefferson, and South Carolina produced one vote for Burr. *Had Pennsylvania swung to Clinton, he would have defeated Adams.*" McCormick, p. 49. (Emphasis added.) (Incidentally, Congressman John Brown had earlier given assurances that the Kentucky electors were committed to Clinton. So maybe these, rather than Samuel Miles in 1796, were the first "faithless electors" but it seems dubious to call them such. Whatever assurances Brown had given the Clinton camp, my guess is that these electors were simply elected as Republicans at a time when it was not clear who the Republican candidate would be. In any event, voting for Jefferson instead of Clinton did not involve crossing party lines, and thus differs from voting for Jefferson instead of Adams as the Federalist
Miles did in 1796. http://groups.google.com/group/soc.history.what-if/msg/655f7646c71ced47)
My POD is to have Clinton score a narrow but undisputed victory in the 1792 New York gubernatorial election--either have Jay refuse to run and the Federalists put up a weaker candidate (although Jay had weaknesses of his own--his abolitionism was not universally popular...) or else have Jay and his supporters make some mistake during the campaign. In any event, make it so that *even with Otsego County counted* Clinton scores a victory. In that event, Republicans are likely to rally behind him earlier than in OTL, there is less talk of Burr or other alternatives, and the Federalists are deprived of one of their major arguments in favor of Adams and against Clinton. (The argument that Clinton was still an Antifederalist was often grouped together with the argument that he stole the 1792 gubernatorial election: "Federalist William Wilcocks disputed Clinton's political conversion and the Republican claim 'that the spirit of antifederalism is extinct.' Such transformations were as likely as 'a whale on horse-back'...Referring to the dispute over his reelection as governor, Wilcocks declared that it was preposterous to believe that Clinton, 'who holds the first office in a state in open contempt and violation of a Constitution he pretends to respect,' would 'be faithful as Vice President in the support of the Constitution he abhors.' Massachusetts Congressman Fisher Ames reported that 'The *antis* have joined to set up Clinton against John Adams. They seem to wish he may have the singular chance to mar two constitutions." Kaminski, p. 235)
So let's say that with this POD Clinton gets enough extra votes in Pennsylvania (and perhaps elsewhere) to defeat Adams. Consequences?
(1) Does Adams quit politics once and for all, as he often threatened to do? If so, who will the Federalist candidate for President be in 1796? The problem with Hamilton is obvious: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maria_Reynolds Maybe one of the Pinckneys? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thomas_Pinckney https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charles_Cotesworth_Pinckney
(2) Does Clinton insist on being Republican candidate for President in 1796 or is he willing to accept being Jefferson's running mate? Even if he says he is is willing, there is the embarrassing fact that if Republican electors vote solidly for both men and if they both outscore whoever the Federalists nominate--well, we could get the equivalent of the 1800 fiasco, four years earlier, with Clinton rather than Burr as the candidate who could hope to convince some Federalists that he was the lesser evil than Jefferson...