Geneva conference (1960) goes ahead?

I've recently been employing "Power in the Kremlin" (Michel Tatu) as a postprandial read. Toward the beginning,the author, a French journalist, suggested Khrushchev favored attending the 1960 Geneva conference even after the U-2 incident, perhaps in part to utilize his augmented leverage after the spyplane's downing. As it happened, he was quashed by politburo hard-liners. One of the more nuanced arguments used against attending the conference was that Soviet participation would exacerbate the brewing Sino-Soviet split.
In any event, Eisenhower was a lame duck by 1960, and even were he receptive Kennedy/Nixon would pour cold water on any agreements. That said, the confidence-building could still have proven useful.
thoughts?
 
I thought the rational best-case scenario was an agreement for further talks over Berlin's status, in lieu of OTL's 1961 crisis. Another, if slightly more tenuous possibility that occurred to me was an earlier Limited Test Ban treaty. Although in the event that agreement came to fruition in part because of the Cuban missile crisis. One topic of concurrence at future USA/USSR (UK?) talks would presumably be opposition to China's planned nuclear arsenal.
 
It was also a missed opportunity for the West and Khrushchev to team up together to blunt Chinese nuclear ambitions. How would this affect US policy of the time?
 
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