General Burnside Gets His Pontoons On Time

If Burnside were able to surprise Lee and the ANV by crossing the Rappahannock as soon as the AOP reached Falmouth how might Lee react? At that time Fredericksburg was defended by a mere 500 Confederates with much of the ANV between Gordonsville and the Shenandoah Valley, my guess is the ANV would be forced to withdraw to a defensive line behind the North Anna River. Any thoughts on what may happen and how this may affect the course of the war?
 
If Burnside were able to surprise Lee and the ANV by crossing the Rappahannock as soon as the AOP reached Falmouth how might Lee react? At that time Fredericksburg was defended by a mere 500 Confederates with much of the ANV between Gordonsville and the Shenandoah Valley, my guess is the ANV would be forced to withdraw to a defensive line behind the North Anna River. Any thoughts on what may happen and how this may affect the course of the war?

Your scenario is extremely interesting...especially if, as you surmise, Lee takes up position at the North Anna. The geography of the North Anna is such that Lee is very likely to take up the SAME defensive position which he historically took up there in May 1864. If that takes place, and if Burnside attacks Lee in that position, Lee will be granted the golden opportunity he has been waiting for to destroy the Army of the Potomac.

Basically, in order to attack the Confederate position, the Army of the Potomac would have to divide itself into 3 parts, each separated from the others by a river. The Confederates could attack and disperse the central portion of the Union army, then turn either right or left and attack one wing of the enemy before the other wing could come to the aid of their comrades. In all cases, the attacking Confederates would have significant numerical superiority over that portion of the Union army which was being attacked at any particular time.

The victory Lee could gain there would make the OTL victory at Fredericksburg pale by comparison. It might indeed be a war-winner.
 
A suggested timeline...

15 November 1862--The Army of the Potomac, under the command of Major General Ambrose Burnside, leaves Washington D.C. and advances on Fredericksburg, Virginia. Due to better organizational work by General Burnside’s staff, pontoons necessary for crossing the Rappahannock River are placed near the van of the army, rather than at the rear.

18 November 1862--The Army of the Potomac arrives at Falmouth, Virginia, across the Rappahannock from Fredericksburg. General Burnside orders the pontoons placed for an immediate crossing.

19 November 1862--General James Longstreet’s Corps of the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia arrives at Culpepper, Virginia. J.E.B. Stuart’s Cavalry Corps is at Warrenton Junction. Stonewall Jackson’s Corps is still at Winchester.

20 November 1862--The Army of the Potomac crosses the Rappahannock and takes Fredericksburg, as well as the commanding heights just outside the city. The crossing is virtually unopposed, except by a single Confederate regiment which snipes at the Union forces from concealed positions in the town. As a result, Union troops plunder the town and burn much of it to the ground. . It takes a few days to restore order to the Union Army after this outbreak of lawlessness and the natural disorganization caused by the crossing of the river, and Burnside takes a few days to sort it out.

21 November 1862--General Robert E. Lee, having learned of the federal crossing of the Rappahannock, orders the Army of Northern Virginia to concentrate at Orange Court House. With the assent of President Davis, General Lee orders all available trains to Orange Court House. General Lee has decided to make a stand at the North Anna River, and must use rail transport to get there before the Yankees.

23 November 1862--Longstreet’s Corps arrives at Orange Court House. His men begin entraining and moving to the North Anna. Lee directs them to concentrate in the area of Hanover Junction.

24 November 1862--Stonewall Jackson’s Corps arrives at Orange Court House, completing the concentration of the Army of Northern Virginia at that place. General Robert E. Lee arrives at the North Anna River and does a reconnaissance of the area. He discovers that the topography of the North Anna River is mostly unfavorable for defense, with the northern bank being higher than the southern bank, allowing the southern bank to be dominated by artillery placed on the northern bank. This holds true everywhere except at one place…Ox Ford. However, about a mile to southwest of Ox Ford is the Little River, and about a mile to the southeast is an impassable swamp. Lee orders defensive entrenchments dug southeast and southwest of Ox Ford, to be anchored on these obstacles. Longstreet’s men begin work on the entrenchments as they arrive from Orange Court House. Any Union army which seeks to attack this position must cross the river at fords several miles to the east and west of Ox Ford, thus dividing itself into 2-3 parts, each separated from the other by a river. A Confederate attack across the North Anna at Ox Ford could then cut the Union Army in two, then turn on one of the flanks and destroy it before the other could intervene. Lee has set a trap, and can only hope the enemy will fall for it.

25 November 1862--The last of General Longstreet’s troops are arriving at the North Anna. General Stuart arrives at the North Anna with the cavalry corps. General Jackson begins entraining his men at Orange Court House for the trip to the North Anna. General Burnside orders the Army of the Potomac to leave the Fredericksburg area, advancing southward toward Richmond.

26 November 1862--Stonewall Jackson’s Corps begins arriving at the North Anna. They are immediately put to work digging entrenchments. Stuart’s Cavalry Corps is sent to harass and slow down the Union advance south from Fredericksburg.

27 November 1862--The last of Stonewall Jackson’s men arrive at the North Anna. General Lee orders Longstreet to position a brigade of infantry at Chesterfield Bridge, to the east of Ox Ford. Jackson is ordered to position two brigades at Quarle’s Ford, to the west of Ox Ford. These are the most likely crossing points for any Union force seeking to outflank the Confederate position at Ox Ford. The troops stationed there are to oppose any crossing vigorously, but then make a fighting withdrawal toward the main Confederate position. This will hopefully draw the Union forces into the Confederate trap.

28 November 1862--The Army of the Potomac arrives on the north bank of the North Anna River. Due to the wooded, rolling nature of the terrain, it is impossible to see the entire Confederate position from the north bank. He does see that Ox Ford is heavily defended, and decides to look for other crossings. Burnside orders his cavalry to reconnoiter in search of other fords.

30 November 1862--Burnside receives reports that the crossings at Quarle’s Ford and Chesterfield Bridge are defended, but not as strongly as the position at Ox Ford. Burnside decides to attack across the North Anna at those places. He sends the Right Grand Division, under Major General Edwin Sumner and consisting of the II Corps (Darius Couch) and IV Corps (Orlando Wilcox) plus a cavalry division under Alfred Pleasanton, to cross Quarle’s Ford. The Left Grand Division, under Major General William Franklin, and consisting of the I Corps (John Reynolds) and the VI Corps (William Smith), plus a cavalry brigade under George Bayard, is sent to cross at Chesterfield Bridge. The Center Grand Division, under Major General Joseph Hooker is divided. The III Corps under George Stoneman, with a cavalry brigade under William Averell, is positioned north of Ox Ford, and ordered to demonstrate there in order to pin down the Confederates holding that portion of the line. The V Corps (Daniel Butterfield) is sent east, to join the attack across Chesterfield Bridge.

1 December 1862--The Battle of the North Anna River. The Union attacks at Quarle’s Ford and Chesterfield Bridge begin at dawn on December 1, 1862. The heavily outnumbered Confederate defenders are forced back, and by 9 a.m., the Union attack forces are across the North Anna. As directed, the Confederate defenders make a fighting withdrawal toward the main Confederate lines, and the Union forces take the bait, following them. They come into contact with the Confederate fortifications, manned by the steady troops of Longstreet’s Corps, at 11:00 a.m. Burnside orders an assault, which is beaten off with heavy losses. Burnside begins reforming his troops for a second assault. However, at this time, General Lee unleashes his own stroke. Stonewall Jackson’s Corps launches a devastating assault across Ox Ford. The III Corps under Stoneman, which was not expecting to be attacked, is caught unawares and, after a short, bitter struggle, is routed. General Burnside, realizing at last that he has fallen into a trap, orders an immediate withdrawal north of the North Anna River. He is too late. Jackson pivots east, and gets to the Chesterfield Bridge before the Union forces can reach it, crossing to the south side of the river. He launches an assault at the disorganized, dispirited Union troops which are retreating back toward Chesterfield Bridge. Lee orders General Longstreet to likewise attack east from the main Confederate lines. The Left Grand Division, with Butterfield’s V Corps, are caught between the hammer and the anvil, and crushed. Butterfield’s V Corps and Smith’s VI Corps are cut to pieces. Hundreds, perhaps thousands…the number will never be known…of panic stricken Union troops attempt to flee into the swamps southeast of Ox Ford, where they get caught in the bogs and drown. Thousands more throw down their arms and surrender. The I Corps, under John Reynolds, puts up a brave fight, and holds off several Confederate assaults before Reynolds himself is killed by a Confederate sniper. Following his death, morale in his Corps collapses, and the remnants surrender as the sun begins to set in the west.

Meanwhile, Sumner’s Right Grand Division has successfully retreated across the North Anna, and, ordered by General Burnside to the rescue of the beleaguered forces still on the south side of the river, was approaching Chesterfield Bridge when the sun began to sink in the west. By that time, the sound of firing on the south side of the river had almost ceased, and it was obvious that a huge disaster had befallen the Union troops there. Rather than continue a hopeless struggle and risk the complete annihilation of his army, General Burnside orders Sumner to retreat toward Washington, D.C. that very night.

It has been the bloodiest single day in American military history. The Union Army of the Potomac has lost close to 20,000 men killed or wounded, and another 5,000 or so are listed as missing, most of whom are actually dead, drowned in the swamps. Another 40,000+ men have been forced to surrender. The Confederate Army of Northern Virginia has suffered heavily too. Over 10,000 Confederates lie dead or wounded on the fields as the sun sets.

2 December 1862--General Lee orders Stuart's Cavalry to pursue the retreating Union forces, and makes his men ready to march.

So...what do you think the next moves of the campaign will be?
 
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Interesting scenario...

When I clicked on this thread I expected a quicker Union victory, not a potential Confederate one.

From the looks of it it sounds like the Army of the Potomac has just been utterly devastated. It'll probably take several months at the very least to return it to fighting shape. During this time I'd wager that Lincoln suspends actions in the west to reinforce the East.

As for the next moves, I'd say that Lee performs an AH-cliche by launching an offensive towards Gettysburg which eventually wins the war. Not sure of any other potential moves. The Union tries to counter but fails...

Might the alternate battle described above lead to foreign recognition of the Confederacy?
 

67th Tigers

Banned
Your scenario is extremely interesting...especially if, as you surmise, Lee takes up position at the North Anna. The geography of the North Anna is such that Lee is very likely to take up the SAME defensive position which he historically took up there in May 1864. If that takes place, and if Burnside attacks Lee in that position, Lee will be granted the golden opportunity he has been waiting for to destroy the Army of the Potomac.

Basically, in order to attack the Confederate position, the Army of the Potomac would have to divide itself into 3 parts, each separated from the others by a river. The Confederates could attack and disperse the central portion of the Union army, then turn either right or left and attack one wing of the enemy before the other wing could come to the aid of their comrades. In all cases, the attacking Confederates would have significant numerical superiority over that portion of the Union army which was being attacked at any particular time.

However, unless the Confederates win 3 out of 3, they've lost. If Lee allows his lines of supply and withdrawal to be cut, he's lost. If Lee stands and defends, the initiative passes to Burnside, who can simply screen Lee and move round to the south, and this is precisely what any General raised on Jomini would do.

Lee might be able to pull a Chancellorsville, leaving his defences to a screening force and hitting the main Union force moving around Lee's right, but Burnside isn't Hooker, and he's going to see what Hooker didn't, Lee was beaten and just needed one good hard push for his army to collapse.
 
However, unless the Confederates win 3 out of 3, they've lost. If Lee allows his lines of supply and withdrawal to be cut, he's lost. If Lee stands and defends, the initiative passes to Burnside, who can simply screen Lee and move round to the south, and this is precisely what any General raised on Jomini would do.

Grant didn't. Grant fell right into the trap in May 1864, and it was only the hand of God (in the form of an intestinal virus which struck Lee down at the crucial moment) that stopped something very like this from happening. And Burnside was a whole lot less competent than Grant.

Lee might be able to pull a Chancellorsville, leaving his defences to a screening force and hitting the main Union force moving around Lee's right, but Burnside isn't Hooker, and he's going to see what Hooker didn't, Lee was beaten and just needed one good hard push for his army to collapse.

The huge disparity in numbers which existed at Chancellorsville, due to Longstreet's Corps being detached to the Suffolk area at the time, doesn't exist here. The margin is much closer, strengthwise, and his army would be in no danger of collapsing from "one hard push."

And Lee's plan, by forcing the Union army to divide itself into 3 parts which cannot support each other, allows the Confederates to be superior in numbers every time they attack. Lee's plan at the North Anna in May 1864, which is basically what plays out here, was the best battle plan devised by any general of any army during the war. Indeed, had it been properly carried out, we might be talking today about this being Lee's Cannae. It was THAT good.
 
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67th Tigers

Banned
Grant didn't. Grant fell right into the trap in May 1864, and it was only the hand of God (in the form of an intestinal virus which struck Lee down at the crucial moment) that stopped something very like this from happening. And Burnside was a whole lot less competent than Grant.

I believe (and I believe the evidence backs me) Burnside was a pretty fair General who got a couple of bad breaks, while Grant was a pretty poor General who got a few good breaks.


The disparity in numbers which existed at Chancellorsville, due to Longstreet's Corps being detached to the Suffolk area at the time, doesn't exist here. The margin is much closer, strengthwise, and his army would be in no danger of collapsing from "one hard push."

Actually, it's worse. Longstreet with 15,000 men gets added the CSA, but the US gets 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 6th, 9th, 11th and 12th Corps on the field. That's nearly a 2:1 advantage in bayonets (most of Lee's victories were roughly at parity in bayonets).

And Lee's plan, by forcing the Union army to divide itself into 3 parts which cannot support each other, allows the Confederates to be superior in numbers every time they attack. Lee's plan at the North Anna in May 1864, which is basically what plays out here, was the best battle plan devised by any general of any army during the war. Indeed, had it been properly carried out, we might be talking today about this being Lee's Cannae. It was THAT good.

It is not a workable battleplan. It might work in a computer game, but not in reality.
 
I believe (and I believe the evidence backs me) Burnside was a pretty fair General who got a couple of bad breaks, while Grant was a pretty poor General who got a few good breaks.

Well, just about everyone else in the entire world disagrees with you and your nifty number crunching system that allows you to come up with these bizarre conclusions. :rolleyes:

Actually, it's worse. Longstreet with 15,000 men gets added the CSA, but the US gets 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 6th, 9th, 11th and 12th Corps on the field. That's nearly a 2:1 advantage in bayonets (most of Lee's victories were roughly at parity in bayonets).

Actually, the AOTP numbered around 106,000 at the time of Fredericksburg in OTL. The Confederates numbered about 72,000. That's a disparity of 34,000. During the Chancellorsville campaign, the AOTP numbered about 120,000, while the ANV numbered less than 50,000. That's a disparity of approximately 70,000. Even at the main battle at Chancellorsville itself, it was approximately 75,000 Union to approximately 40,000 Confederates. Maybe you do math differently than I do, but seems to me that during the Fredericksburg campaign, the numbers were more evenly matched.

It is not a workable battleplan. It might work in a computer game, but not in reality.

No, I suppose its no more workable than say, Cannae, or Austerlitz, or Cowpens...wait a minute, all those others were major victories for the commanders who planned them, weren't they? :D The fact is, it almost DID work in reality. If the attack across Ox Ford had been made in 1864, we'd be holding the North Anna right up there with those other battles which should not have worked, according to the numbers, but did work, and worked brilliantly. If all you look at is numbers, you don't get a complete picture. That, I think, is your problem.
 
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I'm going to try and be the middle ground here between Tigers and Robert on the Burnside thing.

Ambrose E. Burnside was a general who had enough ability to command an army but not enough ability to win with an army. He could manouver well, he could devise good strategies and tactics but he was unable to do so at the same time.

He showed a distinct lack of drive to be successful when he got his chances at individual command and seemed quite content to spend the whole war in command of a garrison in a fort or fortified town than command a Corps or an Army in the field.

He alowed himself, in OTL, to be dominated by his political masters when he commanded the AotP and refused to allow any flexibility to what he was told was needed to be do.

Character wise he was not an agressive man and militarilly speaking he was far better suited to command a defensive campaign but the President liked him and wanted him to command so he reluctantly agreed to command the AotP and was presured by Lincoln into being offensive.

Coincidentally Lincoln refuse to accept Burnsides resignation after Fredericksburg becuase he didn't want to lose him from the Army.

In short he was a good soldier and a good commander but he had no drive to succeed and lacked any real immagination and suffered because of it. He never thought himself worthy of being in command of an Army and refused to command the AotP twice before reluctantly taking command.

He was a good enough suboordinate but should never have commanded an Army.
 

67th Tigers

Banned
Actually, the AOTP numbered around 106,000 at the time of Fredericksburg in OTL. The Confederates numbered about 72,000. That's a disparity of 34,000. During the Chancellorsville campaign, the AOTP numbered about 120,000, while the ANV numbered less than 50,000. That's a disparity of approximately 70,000. Even at the main battle at Chancellorsville itself, it was approximately 75,000 Union to approximately 40,000 Confederates. Maybe you do math differently than I do, but seems to me that during the Fredericksburg campaign, the numbers were more evenly matched.

Again the usual misuse of numbers.

The reported CS strengths in these cases are Effectives. They exclude detachments to the wagon train, service troops, officers, and in some cases even sergeants.

The corresponding US strength is all up, including the large wagon train detachments, and sometimes even including the sick list.

When you boil it down to the number of bayonets only, it's usually pretty even.


No, I suppose its no more workable than say, Cannae, or Austerlitz, or Cowpens...wait a minute, all those others were major victories for the commanders who planned them, weren't they? :D The fact is, it almost DID work in reality. If the attack across Ox Ford had been made in 1864, we'd be holding the North Anna right up there with those other battles which should not have worked, according to the numbers, but did work, and worked brilliantly. If all you look at is numbers, you don't get a complete picture. That, I think, is your problem.

Not really, they were victories be commanders who could improvise their way out of the plan failing, usually due to simply having a much higher quality troops (or in Cowpens case, the willingness of Morgan to put volleys into his own troops).
 
Early North Anna

The lessened numerical disparity plus Jackson and Longstreet's presence would I believe Lee to have his Cannae that he couldn't quite pull off in 1864. I agree with RobertP's assessment that Lee could wreck 3 federal corps completely and put the AOP on the defensive. At this point I do not know what might happen here. I don't think the ANV can support an invasion in December due to lack of forage. So do both armies just stare at each other until the spring or can either commander do something in the interim?
 
The lessened numerical disparity plus Jackson and Longstreet's presence would I believe Lee to have his Cannae that he couldn't quite pull off in 1864. I agree with RobertP's assessment that Lee could wreck 3 federal corps completely and put the AOP on the defensive. At this point I do not know what might happen here. I don't think the ANV can support an invasion in December due to lack of forage. So do both armies just stare at each other until the spring or can either commander do something in the interim?

Well, I think that, for Lee, sitting and doing nothing is out of the question. If he does, he simply will be handing the Union time to rebuild the AOTP, which they WILL DO. Then, come next Spring, he is right back in the same boat he was in previously.

No, Lee has got to move. Ideally, if he can move quickly enough, he can bring the remnants of the AOTP to battle before they escape to Washington, and either destroy them or force their surrender. But whether or not he is able to do that, the AOTP won't be able to effectively interfere with Lee for quite some time, and this opens up a whole field of opportunities for him.


--At the minimum, he can move into Maryland or Pennsylvania, find some cozy, easily defended spot where he can threaten vital communications lines and/or Northern cities such as Baltimore, Washington, Philadelphia, Harrisburg, or even Pittsburg. He can winter his army there, living off the enemy's provender.

--He might be able to swoop into Baltimore, possibly precipitating the secession of Maryland.

--Another interesting facet of all this is that the Lincoln Administration will certainly draw troops from the Western armies in Tennessee and Mississippi to rebuild the AOTP. If that happens, Bragg might well win decisively at Murfreesboro, enabling the Confederacy to reclaim much of Tennessee (Bragg almost did win at Murfreesboro in OTL...with superiority in numbers, this becomes very likely). And the Vicksburg Campaign might have to be abandoned as well.

Even if Lee's victories and subsequent activities don't, by themselves, secure Anglo-French recognition of the Confederacy, the likely Union setbacks in the West might be enough to tip the balance. And the effects on the Congressional and state elections which were being carried out during this period could be interesting as well.
 
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burmafrd

Banned
This numbers game 67 keeps trying to play. does anyone else have something to back it up? I ignore him since his bizarre theories are really not worth a reply to.
 
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