Gamelin treats the threat of a Ardennes attack with more seriousness

Deleted member 1487

Not clear what your point is as it has nothing to do with mine.
My point is tangentially related to yours.
You're commenting on the losses around Sedan/Stonne that we've been debating, right? That there is no way to know for sure because of the loss of records.
What I'm saying, pushing off your point related to the wider debate on historical losses, is that regardless of whatever the specific losses were in the Sedan/Stonne fighting, the casualties taken IOTL were not disabling or even potentially disabling of the German divisions that fought there, so the claim that they suffered such heavy losses around Sedan as claimed is simply not borne out by the continued combat capabilities of the divisions engaged.
 
Stonne was indeed the best chance the French had to staunch the German penetration at Sedan, the problem was the French were too passive with it... as their doctrine told them to be. Stonne was a small town on a plateau to the south of Sedan, control of which would allow the French a good position to subsequently attack down into the German bridgehead. The powerful French 3e DCR armoured division, including several of the heavy Char B1 tanks arrived outside Stonne in the early morning of the 14th of May, joining the 3rd Motorized Infantry division already in position and ready to launch a counter attack on Guderian's brideghead. Instead the commander of 3e DCR was handed the following orders:

"(a) Take up positions along the second line to the east of the Bar and contain the bottom of the pocket created by the enemy.
(b) Having contained the enemy, counter attack at the earliest in the direction of Maisoncelle-Bulson-Sedan."
-Alastair Horne, "To Lose a Battle," p.385

The problem, as Horne perceptively notes, is that these two directives directly conflict. Containment involves establishing a cordon, which involves dispersing troops along a wide front in small packets. Attacking requires concentration, with all forces gathered into a single powerful mass on a very small front. A mere two formations cannot effectively do both. Even worse, counter attacking works best when launched against an enemy while he is still disrupted from his own manuevers, something that first containing the Germans would logically prevent. The orders given to the 3e DCR were impossible to reconcile. The French command might as well have asked for a round square.

So the 3e DCR spent the 14th dispersing itself into defensive positions around Stonne, sacrificing the chance for a counter-attack on the still vulnerable bridgehead just 15km away. Guderian, making the most of a German tradition that institutionalized calculated insubordination, disobeyed directives to establish a defense and instead launched an attack to pre-empt the French. On 15 May, with the two Panzer divisions he already had across he attacked west, past the French defenses (the French had mistakenly assumed he would attack south, to outflank the Maginot Line), while sending only the elite Grossdeutschland infantry regiment south to pre-emptively seize Stonne. Caught off guard, the French committed 3e DCR and 3rd Motorized divisions piecemeal into the battle, hastily sending in one small defensive packet after another. They were unable to launch one massive blow that could have routed the badly outnumbered and outgunned German regiment, because their forces had all been previously dispersed for a defense. Control of Stonne swayed back and forth for two days before additional German reserves crossed the river and ultimately pushed the French back on the 17th, but even before it started the French had already lost. Their own deployments had squandered the chance for an immediate attack on the 14th and reduced them to an indecisive (though lethal) shoving match on the flank of the growing penetration. Even had the Grossdeutschland collapsed on the 15th, the French would have been in no condition to launch a larger counter attack down into Sedan.

Had the French actually counter-attacked, the Germans would indeed have been in serious trouble. Even a single tank division rolling up to the Meuse on 14 May would have seriously damaged the entire German plan. But as Wiking has alluded too (or at least I think alluded too) in his posts, for the French to have the mindset to counter-attack they would have first also have had to have a more aggressively minded doctrine. That requires a rather earlier PoD.

And after the German breakout on the 15th, there really was nothing more the WAllies could have done.
 
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Deleted member 1487

Had the French actually counter-attacked, the Germans would have been in serious trouble. But as Wiking has alluded too (or at least I think alluded too) in his posts, for the French to have the mindset to counter-attack they would have first also have had to have a more aggressively minded doctrine. That requires a rather earlier PoD.
Yes I was saying that this, among other issues with their doctrine and readiness, meant that the French were not in a position to do what was necessary to stop the Germans and it really required a pre-war POD that even removing Gamelin doesn't fix. There was also the issue of airpower, which the Germans had a serious advantage in at Sedan and used it heavily during the battle for Sedan.

As you say by the time the battle of Stonne happened it was already too late. Even the English language Wikipedia article specifically states that the 'missed chance' happened on the 13th-14th as a result of French defensive mindness, poor staff work, panicked reservists fleeing into the massing counterattack units, and poor intel.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Sedan_(1940)#Missed_chance
 
Of course, the tiny Belgian army can resist better than the (always inept) French. What really matters to @wiking in the end, is that the almighty German forces can't be defeated, or if they ever are on the brink of defeat, wonderwaffe will save the day. Then again, there is this https://forum.axishistory.com
It explains a lot of things. Seems we have a fanboy here...


Your as much a Fanboy as he is...just for the wrong side
 
There was also the issue of airpower, which the Germans had a serious advantage in at Sedan and used it heavily during the battle for Sedan.

I don't think air power would have necessarily saved the Germans had the French launched a heavy attack on the 13th or 14th. The main effect of air power is psychological. 3e's men was made of sterner stuff then the reservists who the Germans had crossed against at Sedan and were less likely to break in the face of an air attack, although it is still conceivable. But the question is moot all the doctrinal and readiness issues you and I mentioned basically renders the question moot.
 

Deleted member 1487

I don't think air power would have necessarily saved the Germans had the French launched a heavy attack on the 13th or 14th. The main effect of air power is psychological. 3e's men was made of sterner stuff then the reservists who the Germans had crossed against at Sedan and were less likely to break in the face of an air attack, although it is still conceivable. But the question is moot all the doctrinal and readiness issues you and I mentioned basically renders the question moot.
The French were already unable to get into position in that period, in part due to airpower and it's effects (they were inundated by fleeing reservists, psychologically broken in part by air attack).

But in terms of what air attack did achieve against a threatening French counterattack with an armored division:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_France#Central_front
The 4th DCr (de Gaulle), attempted to launch an attack from the south at Montcornet, where Guderian had his Korps headquarters and the 1st Panzer Division had its rear service areas. During the Battle of Montcornet Germans hastily improvised a defence while Guderian rushed up the 10th Panzer Division to threaten de Gaulle's flank. This flank pressure and dive-bombing by Fliegerkorps VIII (General Wolfram von Richthofen) broke up the attack. French losses on 17 May amounted to 32 tanks and armoured vehicles but the French had "inflicted loss on the Germans". On 19 May, after receiving reinforcements, de Gaulle attacked again and was repulsed with the loss of 80 of 155 vehicles.[144] Fliegerkorps VIII attacked French units massing on the German flanks and prevented most counter-attacks from starting. The defeat of the 4th DCr and the disintegration of the French Ninth Army was caused mainly by the fliegerkorps.[145] The 4th DCr had achieved a measure of success but the attacks on 17 and 19 May had only local effect.[146]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Montcornet

Basically in the same area against the 10th Panzer (fought at Stonne) a few days later.

The French needed some serious overhauls in doctrine and readiness, especially among their air force so that it could provide effective air cover and deny the Germans the use of the Stukas, to have had a fighting chance.
 

Ian_W

Banned
The French were already unable to get into position in that period, in part due to airpower and it's effects (they were inundated by fleeing reservists, psychologically broken in part by air attack).

But in terms of what air attack did achieve against a threatening French counterattack with an armored division:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_France#Central_front


https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Montcornet

Basically in the same area against the 10th Panzer (fought at Stonne) a few days later.

The French needed some serious overhauls in doctrine and readiness, especially among their air force so that it could provide effective air cover and deny the Germans the use of the Stukas, to have had a fighting chance.

Wking,

Those of us who aren't worthless fantasists have already noted the ability of decent ground troops to sustain operations under attack from the air (see also Normandy 1944).

As Obsessed Nuker has already noted, while the AAS had some issues, the problems with the French in 1940 were mostly about ground doctrine.

Anyone thinking that the problem was "especially among their air force" really needs to lay off the fantasies about the triumph of the will and look at objective conditions, which show the German Army beat the French Army on the ground.
 

Deleted member 1487

Wking,

Those of us who aren't worthless fantasists have already noted the ability of decent ground troops to sustain operations under attack from the air (see also Normandy 1944).

As Obsessed Nuker has already noted, while the AAS had some issues, the problems with the French in 1940 were mostly about ground doctrine.
You can misread history all you want, but the lesson of Normandy was that conducting offensive action in the face of enemy air superiority is impossible. You can fight defensively for a time, but you will lose.
An example of armor offensive in the face of Allied air supremacy:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Lüttich#Allied_air_strikes.E2.80.94the_offensive_stalls
Even with the majority of AFVs not being destroyed by air, the rest of the equipment was and the dispersal of attacking units to hide from air attack doomed the offensive.
Same thing happened to the French on the 17th of May 1940.

Anyone thinking that the problem was "especially among their air force" really needs to lay off the fantasies about the triumph of the will and look at objective conditions, which show the German Army beat the French Army on the ground.
You can try and bait me all you want, but your consistent ignorance to the realities of the air war show you shouldn't be commenting on things you know little about. The Luftwaffe, as with the Soviet and Wallied air forces, were critical components to the success of their ground units. Remove that air support component and the ability to win on the ground for the German in 1940 is not there. The Wallies in 1944-45 could still win without their air support, but it would have been a LOT more costly and drawn out; the Soviets too could have likely won without it, but probably would have experienced prohibitive cost. The Allied militaries didn't spend billions of dollars on their air forces on a lark.
 

Ian_W

Banned
You can misread history all you want, but the lesson of Normandy was that conducting offensive action in the face of enemy air superiority is impossible. You can fight defensively for a time, but you will lose.
An example of armor offensive in the face of Allied air supremacy:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Lüttich#Allied_air_strikes.E2.80.94the_offensive_stalls
Even with the majority of AFVs not being destroyed by air, the rest of the equipment was and the dispersal of attacking units to hide from air attack doomed the offensive.
Same thing happened to the French on the 17th of May 1940.


You can try and bait me all you want, but your consistent ignorance to the realities of the air war show you shouldn't be commenting on things you know little about. The Luftwaffe, as with the Soviet and Wallied air forces, were critical components to the success of their ground units. Remove that air support component and the ability to win on the ground for the German in 1940 is not there. The Wallies in 1944-45 could still win without their air support, but it would have been a LOT more costly and drawn out; the Soviets too could have likely won without it, but probably would have experienced prohibitive cost. The Allied militaries didn't spend billions of dollars on their air forces on a lark.

Wiking,

The weight of ordnance that could be put on the ground in 1940 was nothing compared to 1944.

And in 1944, there were still counter-offensives by the side that did not have air superiority.

"Remove that air support component and the ability to win on the ground for the German in 1940 is not there."

Yeah, ok. Lets play.

You have the Luftwaffe of 1940 and the French Army of 1940, and I have the AAS of 1940 and the German Army of 1940.

I'm punching through the Ardennes with Sickle-Cut, and you're waiting two days for the couriers to arrive with where to send the orders of where to send the air.

Have fun with that.
 
Stonne was indeed the best chance the French had to staunch the German penetration at Sedan, the problem was the French were too passive with it... as their doctrine told them to be. Stonne was a small town on a plateau to the south of Sedan, control of which would allow the French a good position to subsequently attack down into the German bridgehead. The powerful French 3e DCR armoured division, including several of the heavy Char B1 tanks arrived outside Stonne in the early morning of the 14th of May, joining the 3rd Motorized Infantry division already in position and ready to launch a counter attack on Guderian's brideghead. Instead the commander of 3e DCR was handed the following orders:

"(a) Take up positions along the second line to the east of the Bar and contain the bottom of the pocket created by the enemy.
(b) Having contained the enemy, counter attack at the earliest in the direction of Maisoncelle-Bulson-Sedan."
-Alastair Horne, "To Lose a Battle," p.385

The problem, as Horne perceptively notes, is that these two directives directly conflict. Containment involves establishing a cordon, which involves dispersing troops along a wide front in small packets. Attacking requires concentration, with all forces gathered into a single powerful mass on a very small front. A mere two formations cannot effectively do both. Even worse, counter attacking works best when launched against an enemy while he is still disrupted from his own manuevers, something that first containing the Germans would logically prevent. The orders given to the 3e DCR were impossible to reconcile. The French command might as well have asked for a round square.

So the 3e DCR spent the 14th dispersing itself into defensive positions around Stonne, sacrificing the chance for a counter-attack on the still vulnerable bridgehead just 15km away. Guderian, making the most of a German tradition that institutionalized calculated insubordination, disobeyed directives to establish a defense and instead launched an attack to pre-empt the French. On 15 May, with the two Panzer divisions he already had across he attacked west, past the French defenses (the French had mistakenly assumed he would attack south, to outflank the Maginot Line), while sending only the elite Grossdeutschland infantry regiment south to pre-emptively seize Stonne. Caught off guard, the French committed 3e DCR and 3rd Motorized divisions piecemeal into the battle, hastily sending in one small defensive packet after another. They were unable to launch one massive blow that could have routed the badly outnumbered and outgunned German regiment, because their forces had all been previously dispersed for a defense. Control of Stonne swayed back and forth for two days before additional German reserves crossed the river and ultimately pushed the French back on the 17th, but even before it started the French had already lost. Their own deployments had squandered the chance for an immediate attack on the 14th and reduced them to an indecisive (though lethal) shoving match on the flank of the growing penetration. Even had the Grossdeutschland collapsed on the 15th, the French would have been in no condition to launch a larger counter attack down into Sedan.

Had the French actually counter-attacked, the Germans would indeed have been in serious trouble. Even a single tank division rolling up to the Meuse on 14 May would have seriously damaged the entire German plan. But as Wiking has alluded too (or at least I think alluded too) in his posts, for the French to have the mindset to counter-attack they would have first also have had to have a more aggressively minded doctrine. That requires a rather earlier PoD.

And after the German breakout on the 15th, there really was nothing more the WAllies could have done.

The person you quoted didn't read the source correctly

This is what Horne says skimming through their book

In consequence, the 3rd Armoured was ordered to disperse itself defensively over a front of some twelve miles, from Omont west of the Bar to Stonne. On all tracks and potential corridors of penetration it was to form ‘corks’, each comprised one ‘B’ and two H-39 tanks. During the night this powerful, modern unit was thus broken up into a series of penny packets. ‘From then on,’ says Colonel Goutard, ‘there was a line, a few tanks but no 3rd Armoured Division. The steel lance was buried for ever, and so was the counter-attack.’ The best – and last – opportunity of administering a severe check to Guderian before he burst out of his bridgehead had been thrown away. It was a tragic error of judgement. [And it seems to end there]

...

Reacting in a manner typical of the epoch in which the Maginot Line had come to be regarded as the be-all and end-all of French military policy

...
-Alastair Horne, "To Lose a Battle,"

Which is actually a good deal less than Cold War Soviet and NATO standards in Europe [Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks], and one or more other examples I can list-- so this divisions defense sector, frontage is not necessarily abnormal in any case

However, your quote does not say where Horne or anyone else mentions the part of the quote I underlined about them throwing the division in piecemeal, or any citation that the French threw their forces into the Germans in "a series of penny packets." At least from what I gather of Horne by way of skimming, he seems to imply the opposite, in fact, when he discusses the battle of Stonne at a later point in the book. In any case, the person you quoted fails to provide any citation for the claim-- and it is something that sounds sketchy, at least to me

This is the closest I could find, but it is still not close to what is claimed

True to its training, the Grossdeutschland did not just sit still and wait to be attacked by the French. Early in the morning it was pushing forward up on to the high ground on both sides of Stonne, with orders to establish its defence line around this key village. This unexpected movement further helped throw Flavigny off balance, and he was forced to commit piecemeal in the defence of Stonne some of the tanks and infantry that were being husbanded for the afternoon’s set-piece attack.

once again another quote that proves my point in the previous thread we talked
It was very largely thanks to the impressive celerity with which the Grossdeutschland was able to deploy its anti-tank guns (once more an attribute of the excellence of Wehrmacht training, at its best, in 1940) that the regiment was not overrun at Stonne on the 15th.
 
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Ian_W

Banned
[QUOTE="hammerdin, post: 16115138, member: 107933"


Which is actually a good deal less than Cold War Soviet and NATO standards in Europe [Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks], and one or more other examples I can list-- so this divisions defense sector, frontage is not necessarily abnormal in any case
[/QUOTE]

To be fair, Inadvertant Escalation is essentially about the 1980s and 1990s, at which point we have weapons with somewhat better range than in the 1940s.
 

Archibald

Banned
The Stuka effect has been much, much overrated. It is proven in Sedan for the French 55e and 71e D.I; admittedly, the heavy bombing did scared the shit out of the reservists and some lost morale, others were seen running away.
Elsewhere, it is at best overrated.
 
It's important that while people can and do talk about tactics making a difference to the fall of France what was actually needed (and no tactical change can fix this) is doctrinal adjustment in the French air force.

If the French air force fighters can commit half their planes to the front and sortie twice a day and a third of the time when they sortie be in the right bit air space we can talk tactics. This isn't asking for a miracle. It's asking for a similar sortie rate to that achieved by the raf. It's significantly less than the sortie rate achieved by the Luftwaffe (high but they were all or nothing) drag the battle on for another 3 months and they would have over stretched their logistics and their sortie rate would have fallen.

If you can't do this then it's fun to talk tactics but no matter how much you talk tactics you will end up with the same result.
 
To be fair, Inadvertant Escalation is essentially about the 1980s and 1990s, at which point we have weapons with somewhat better range than in the 1940s.

And relatively speaking if they were remotely close to those kind of standards they would clearly be way off. (They are still off considerably I think for what was considered normal for the French)-- Eastern front on the low end for force to space ratios or operational densities would be a little higher at least, more approaching this number of 12 miles.

Standard Western defensive frontages for brigade-size units are about 10-20 kilometers...

Victory Misunderstood:
What the Gulf War Tells Us About the Future of Conflict

The divisions of these two [French] army groups held frontages of up to sixteen kilometers, more than twice the normal frontage for these units.
-Fortress France: The Maginot Line and French Defenses in World War II
 

Archibald

Banned
I agree with Naraic.

The issues with the French Air Force were simply apalling. All the way from operationaral requirement to the drawing board to combat on the frontline, french combat aircrafts were marred by a host of issues. It was a complete quagmire.
The Armée de l'Air was, supposedly, independant since 1933. But the Armée de Terre (AdT) did not cared. At all. There were four major categories of aircrafts: observation (army cooperation), reconnaissance, fighter, bombers. The observation aircrafts were the most numerous, the AdT had a crapload of them, but they were mostly obsolete death traps like Les Mureaux 117. True reconnaissance was by Potez 63s (underpowered, too slow) and MB-174.

The fighters were scattered in small groups and under authority, not only of the Armée de l'Air, but of the Army commanders (Huntziger, Corap, Georges, and others). The theory was they would call their group of fighters if the need arose, for example in case of massive attacks by Stukas. It was called "un barrage de chasse".

An example of that: on May 12, the fighter group assigned to Corap and Huntziger armies defending the Ardennes was the I/5 which had Curtiss H-75. They faced the onslaught of Stukas, 109s and He-111s that bombed Sedan. They were less than twenty, and were completely overwhelmed.

Same for bombers: fighter escort was hardly available. Plus the Amiot 143 were too slow, while the Amiot 350 and LeO 451, Breguet 693 and MB-174 all outran the MS-406s, MB-152 and H-75s supposed to escort them.
Only a solid cover of D-520s could have efficiently protected the bombers against 109s, but the Dewoitine were in scarce numbers, barely three squadrons in mid-May.
 

Archibald

Banned
Dare I say, let's give the AdA a RAF reorganization in May 1940.

Observation / artillery: Potez 63

Strategic reconnaissance: MB-174

Bomber escort: Dewoitine D-520

Assault: Breguet 693

Long range bombing, high altitude, at night: Amiot 350 and LeO-451.

Hence how would Sedan happen in this case ?

A) May 11 / May 12: Army cooperation (let's say, Corap) Potez 63s cross the Ardennes, detect the panzers, but suffer heavy losses.

B) A couple of MB-74s are send in a strategic reconnaissance mission, high speed, high height. They escape 109 patrols and bring proof of the imminent breakthrough.

C) Three groups of Curtiss H-75 are send patrolling over the Meuse river. They engage the Stukas bombing the 55e DIs and 71e DIs, although they are overwhelmed by numbers. Still their present boost the morale of the French soldiers on the ground, who see Stukas falling in flammes.

D) The German bridgehead is nonetheless established, albeit precariously. Corap ask for aerial bombardement. Breguet 693s are send with a solid escort of D-520s and bomb the bridgehead from a height of 2000 ft (not lower). They take the German by surprise, hoping over the wooden hills, and spread havoc while taking minimal losses from the Flak.

E ) More bombing is requested. As the night fall, LeO-451 and Amiot 350 will bomb the bridgehead further. Even if they miss, their harrassment will exhaust the German troops.

F) the next day, more Breguets are send. Meanwhile Corap remember the French Aeronavale has France very own Stuka: "Let's try that Loire Nieuport LN-406..."

now here is how the aircrafts I mentionned were used OTL
- D-520: too few of them
- MB-174: too few of them
- Potez 63: used for strategic reconnaissance instead of MB-174. Heavy losses.
- Breguet 693s: slaughtered in Belgium. Never really recovered, at least until June.
- LeO-451 and Amiot 350: used in the role of the Breguet - low level attacks. Heavy losses.
 
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To digress slightly. There is a overfocus on the battle at Sedan. Much of the attention there is due to Guderian presence as corps commander. On the 13th May two other armored corps crossed the Meuse river. & Broke out on the same dates as the 19th corps. The 8th Pz D actually out ran both Guderians corps and Rommel's 7th Pz Div.

Point being tactical nuances @ Sedan are not the end of it. There was a larger operational catastrophe occuring from the 10th to the 16th.
 

Archibald

Banned
Or to put it differently...
There were 10 panzer divisions.
1 was send North, crushing the Netherlands
2 made a faint in the Belgian plain in Namur, Gembloux and Hannut, and were repelled by the French (with heavy losses) "as planned"
The 7 others made the breakthrough in the Ardennes, over a 50 miles wide corridor.
3 were concentrated in Sedan, the other 4 were send in two pairs, north of Sedan.

My grandfather armored unit (based in Hirson) was send fighting one of these four panzers, north of Sedan (Philippeville) and was steamrolled.
With their vehicles destroyed, the survivors fell back to Hirson and later, to Laon. In the process, they found themselves right in the middle of the panzer corridor "rush to Abbeville" which was closing what become the dunkirk pocket. How they survived, and escaped, is some kind of miracle.
And since my mom in born in July 1943, had my grandfather been killed or taken prisonier, I wouldn't type that message :p

france-194021.jpg
 
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Or to put it differently...
There were 10 panzer divisions.
1 was send North, crushing the Netherlands
2 made a faint in the Belgian plain in Namur, Gembloux and Hannut, and were repelled by the French (with heavy losses) "as planned"
The 7 others made the breakthrough in the Ardennes, over a 50 miles wide corridor.
3 were concentrated in Sedan, the other 4 were send in two pairs, north of Sedan.

# 3 is debated. The mission of the corps attacking via the Maastrict-Gembloux axis sounds more like that of either fixing the Allied left wing in place, or disrupting it into operational impotency. i.e.: on the 12th the orders were for the corps to attack west in the direction of Gembloux and penetrate or split the Allied army there. Its been a very long time since I was shown the text of the original German order to the corps so I'm not going to try to interpret if it translated to 'penetrate' or 'split'. The tenor of the text was the armored corps & the following army were to render the Allied Army, the French 1st Army unable to maneuver or fight in place. It appeared they expected to accomplish this some 48 hours after the Belgian defense on the Meuse river north of Liege collapsed. That event came on the 11th, so it appeared the armored corps was expected to be crashing across the defense @ Gembloux on the 13th or perhaps the 14th. The aggressive or violent nature of the attack by this armored corps, from the 13th through the 16th or 17th supports the idea of this being more than a feint or similar form of a economy of force operations. Tacticaly the attacks were numerous & fast paced and driven on despite losses. The Corps lost near 25% of its tank strength 10-13 May, but continued on to close with the Fr 1st Army and made repeated attacks on that front for three more days. Losses in tanks & infantry were not trivial.

I know a lot of historians refer to the German right wing as 'the matadors cloak', & that is how it did function, tho French preconceptions created the cloak. But there is evidence this corps was to shatter rather than mere distract or feint the Fr 1st Army.
 
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