Future of Finland in a WW2 where Leningrad and Murmansk fall

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trurle

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If the Germans had managed to take Leningrad early, hold of the counter-attacks, their following offensive AGN would be South-East - to participate in the offensive against Moscow, and east - to at very least cut the railway link to Murmansk. The Finns OTL did not want take too much part in the attack on Leningrad - I think they were very reluctant to link up with AGN to surround the city, however if Leningrad is taken I think it plausible that they would give some support to the move east - though it my be half-hearted!
Volunteer corps in non-combat roles at most. See how Finns treated Danish volunteers. Kept them in rear for all war, even when Soviets were breaking through in 1945. The fear of international political ramifications was much more severe compared to fear of military defeat.
 
Taking into account the strategic importance of Murmansk and the area's terrain which greatly supports defensive warfare, the city falling to Finnish-German forces would mean that something's going seriously wrong with Soviet war effort in other fronts. Finns themselves weren't that exited when it came to all these "Fox" operations up north (Arctic Fox, Platinum Fox and Silver Fox) due to all expected military diffculties. I think the Finnish military even tried to warn Germans about this. There was of course also political problems as Finland hoped to maintain relations with the Allies. That was one of the reasons why Finland didn't advance further east or put more effort to keep the Murmansk railway cut. Thus we can assume that a scenario where Murmansk falls is also the scenario where Germans are doing significantly better in their general war effort.
 

Deleted member 1487

Certain WW2 scenarios where Germany does better on the northern front of operations vs. the USSR get me thinking- what would Finland do if Leningrad, Karelia and Murmansk were secured? Would it mean they withdraw from offensive operations in the East? What about helping Germany in the fight versus the Western Allies (assuming that war still goes on)?
Depends when it happens, but in 1941-42 that would be a very painful loss to the USSR and potentially start the unraveling of the USSR. At very least the Soviets will not be in a position to touch the Finns for a long time, perhaps not until 1945 or later if ever. They might get a separate peace even. So much depends on how the rest of the war then goes, because if the Soviets are in a position to win eventually they will come back and get revenge. The problem for the Soviets is that losing that LL via Murmansk, plus the huge loss of equipment and factories in Leningrad, plus probably a million soldiers, while freeing up at least 500k Germans for operations elsewhere and naval/air forces interdicting the Arctic Route of Lend-Lease gives the Axis a HUGE boost which really badly impacts them going forward. It is a lot worse if Leningrad falls in 1941, but in 1942 it is really bad too. 1943 is too late for a POD. So pick a date and I'll come up with a scenario about how that impacts the rest of the war in the East and give you an answer about what happens to Finland then.

If the Germans had managed to take Leningrad early, hold of the counter-attacks, their following offensive AGN would be South-East - to participate in the offensive against Moscow, and east - to at very least cut the railway link to Murmansk. The Finns OTL did not want take too much part in the attack on Leningrad - I think they were very reluctant to link up with AGN to surround the city, however if Leningrad is taken I think it plausible that they would give some support to the move east - though it my be half-hearted!
If Leningrad falls early in 1941, say August or September, then the Soviets are really screwed because the Finns then have little or no recourse to stop their own civilian ambitions for wanting greater Finland, while the Germans will put all the necessary pressure on the Finns to take Murmansk and capture the RR link to the rest of the USSR. Finland is then along for the ride, but then their front shuts down in 1941 and the Germans largely leave, because they need those troops on other fronts. That doesn't mean that Moscow falls in 1941 per se, but the Soviet will be in a pretty bad situation for 1942 given that AG-North now can hold with a fraction of the troops, the Demyansk/Kholm stuff can't happen, Rzhev won't likely form, and Moscow is a lot closer to the front line, while the Soviets have a lot less people to use and the Germans a lot more. Plus due to the political history of Leningrad as the origin of the Revolution Stalin will need to launch huge, wasteful counterattacks to take it back from 1942 on to prop up morale. With Leningrad then a German supply base and it's airfields in German hands, plus nothing coming in from Murmansk, the Soviet ability to actually attack across the Volkhov to get to Leningrad will be nil.

I don't see the Finns being able to contribute any men, but for those that are locked down occupying Greater Finland, which is a big enough job itself, the Germans will just be happy to be able to remove men from that sector and not have to continue to sent weapons and materials to Finland, while getting Finnish raw materials like Nickel anyway. Plus the Finns will be very occupied helping deal with the mine situation in the Gulf of Finland and helping process the captured Soviet Baltic Fleet (or refloating scuttled ships to help get the scrap metal from them).

In that case then the Germans will have the manpower to hold their positions in the North and Central Fronts and give a maximum effort to AG-South with all the reinforcements it needs, plus make advances in the Center on Moscow, doing what they wanted to IOTL but lacked the firepower and manpower to try, which was lop off Soviet armies here and there around Rzhev to straighten the line and bleed out Soviet Fronts bit by bit on the cheap. IMHO the loss of Leningrad and Murmansk in 1941 creates the preconditions for the defeat of the USSR in 1942-43. If the USSR then loses, but the Wallies stay in the war to the bitter end and win, then Finland probably will remain untouched and keeps their gains.
 
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Would the loss of the KV-1 production in Leningrad be sufficient to blunt the winter offensive. Afterwards i could see the KV to be pressed into service with Finish forces and Germany's allies . Maybe a surplus could be converted into semi static defenses.
 

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Taking into account the strategic importance of Murmansk and the area's terrain which greatly supports defensive warfare, the city falling to Finnish-German forces would mean that something's going seriously wrong with Soviet war effort in other fronts. Finns themselves weren't that exited when it came to all these "Fox" operations up north (Arctic Fox, Platinum Fox and Silver Fox) due to all expected military diffculties. I think the Finnish military even tried to warn Germans about this. There was of course also political problems as Finland hoped to maintain relations with the Allies. That was one of the reasons why Finland didn't advance further east or put more effort to keep the Murmansk railway cut. Thus we can assume that a scenario where Murmansk falls is also the scenario where Germans are doing significantly better in their general war effort.

This is exactly the problem with capturing Murmansk - the terrain up north favours the defender quite heavily, as the Germans learned IOTL. There are certain very strict limits on overland supply in these conditions, even in the summer. Simply sending more men and hardware does not help, as that will only increase the supply problems in an almost exponential fashion. It may look like only 50-100 km on the map, but the roadless, stony tundra speckled with small lakes and ponds is a nighmare to cross for major units in any conditions - especially if someone is shooting at you from fortified positions, enjoying from functional lines of supply.

So, the two most plausible ways for the Axis to get Murmansk are 1) like you said, the Soviets screwing up in some major way or 2) an attack from the south along the Murmansk railway. The latter pretty much requires to take Leningrad at first to succeed, as merely cutting the Leningrad branch of the line is not enough to stop railway communication to Murmansk. It can be done then through the northern Belomorsk - Obozersky line that was completed in 1941 and links Murmansk with Moscow. This of course allows the Soviet supply and reinforcements reach the Karelian and Kola area, as much as the flow of weapons, etc, to the USSR through Murmansk - as evidenced by the OTL events. For logistics, the railway is the one superior conduit in the wilderness conditions of the area.
 
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Deleted member 1487

This is exactly the problem with capturing Murmansk - the terrain up north favours the defender quite heavily, as the Germans learned IOTL. There are certain very strict limits on overland supply in these conditions, even in the summer. Simply sending more men and hardware does not help, as that will only increase the supply problems in an almost exponential fashion. It may look like only 50-100 km on the map, but the roadless, stony tundra speckled with small lakes and ponds is a nighmare to cross for major units in any conditions - especially if someone is shooting at you from fortified positions, enjoying from functional lines of supply.

So, the two most plausible ways for the Axis to get Murmansk are 1) like you said, the Soviets screwing up in some major way or 2) an attack from the south along the Murmansk railway. The latter pretty much requires to take Leningrad at first to succeed, as merely cutting the Leningrad branch of the line is not enough to stop railway communication to Murmansk. It can be done then through the northern Belomorsk - Obozersky line that was completed in 1941 and links Murmansk with Moscow. This of course allows the Soviet supply and reinforcements reach the Karelian and Kola area, as much as the flow of weapons, etc, to the USSR through Murmansk - as evidenced by the OTL events. For logistics, the railway is the one superior conduit in the wilderness conditions of the area.
Isn't the assumption that with the fall of Leningrad any offensive would then proceed up the Murmansk rail road? The addition men for the offensive would drive along the RR via Medvedzhegorsk north to Belomorsk, severing all land communications, and then proceeding north. That was the 2nd part of Operation Nordlicht after the Fall of Leningrad IOTL AFAIK, using the freed up Finnish troops that were guarding the Isthmus north of Leningrad.
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Isn't the assumption that with the fall of Leningrad any offensive would then proceed up the Murmansk rail road? The addition men for the offensive would drive along the RR via Medvedzhegorsk north to Belomorsk, severing all land communications, and then proceeding north. That was the 2nd part of Operation Nordlicht after the Fall of Leningrad IOTL AFAIK, using the freed up Finnish troops that were guarding the Isthmus north of Leningrad.

Well, quite so. My point is that taking Murmansk would have to happen after taking Leningrad, not the other way around, or these two objectives being pursued independent of each other. That is all. The Finns are only likely to really join the attack on Murmansk after Leningrad falls, and like we know, the Finns will not go against Leningrad itself. So, it is all hanging on the Germans taking Leningrad, with only limited help from the Finns.

And then, even against Murmansk, the Finns would not commit big forces, as it was not easy to supply the troops they had IOTL in Eastern Karelia as it was. The fall of Leningrad would be a signal for the Finns to wind down offensive operations and to consolidate their quite extensive gains - like you indeed point out yourself. The Finns would have all the incentive to stay on the defensive and humor the Germans only as much as they really need to, in terms of committing any real resources for further operations.
 

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Well, quite so. My point is that taking Murmansk would have to happen after taking Leningrad, not the other way around, or these two objectives being pursued independent of each other. That is all. The Finns are only likely to really join the attack on Murmansk after Leningrad falls, and like we know, the Finns will not go against Leningrad itself. So, it is all hanging on the Germans taking Leningrad, with only limited help from the Finns.

And then, even against Murmansk, the Finns would not commit big forces, as it was not easy to supply the troops they had IOTL in Eastern Karelia as it was. The fall of Leningrad would be a signal for the Finns to wind down offensive operations and to consolidate their quite extensive gains - like you indeed point out yourself. The Finns would have all the incentive to stay on the defensive and humor the Germans only as much as they really need to, in terms of committing any real resources for further operations.
Didn't they have rail supply in Eastern Karelia? why would it be hard to supply them within 50km of the rail line? Of course with Leningrad fallen the Germans would be maximum pressure on the Finns to cut the Murmansk RR at a minimum even if there wasn't an attack on the city itself, probably leveraging food shipments if needed, because with Leningrad down there is no excuse now to.
Now domestically within Finland there is the issue of the civilian government seeing Greater Finland being an option, because with Leningrad down, they really only have Eastern Karelia as an ongoing front and cutting the Murmansk RR would effectively shut down their part of the war other than the outstanding situation around Murmansk itself.
 
Didn't they have rail supply in Eastern Karelia? why would it be hard to supply them within 50km of the rail line? Of course with Leningrad fallen the Germans would be maximum pressure on the Finns to cut the Murmansk RR at a minimum even if there wasn't an attack on the city itself, probably leveraging food shipments if needed, because with Leningrad down there is no excuse now to.
Now domestically within Finland there is the issue of the civilian government seeing Greater Finland being an option, because with Leningrad down, they really only have Eastern Karelia as an ongoing front and cutting the Murmansk RR would effectively shut down their part of the war other than the outstanding situation around Murmansk itself.

They had rail supply in the southern part of Eastern Karelia, up to a bit north of Karhumäki (Medvedzhegorsk) at the northern end of Lake Onega. North of there, no rail lines outside the prewar Finnish area. So, apart of the Murmansk railway, most of the area of Viena Karelia would be almost entirely dependent on road transport or aircraft. Outside the northern tundra and the Alpine area, this might be some of the most difficult terrain the Axis troops had to tackle in continental Europe, as outside a couple of dry summer months, the few roads here were either made of mud or blocked with snow.

A typical East Karelian road in April 1942:

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A better sort of road in August 1941:

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The Finnish railways were after the Winter War short of rolling stock, over 10% down from peace time as a lot of locomotives and carriages had to be handed over to the Soviets in 1940. Wartime acquisitions could not replenish the stock to adequate levels. What little was captured from the Soviets in 1941 was often in very poor condition. The Soviets had damaged a lot of their lines and infrastructure when they withdrew, and repairing these was a major challenge for the Finnish railway units, as well as maintaining the lines in difficult conditions was anyway.

All through the advance phase in 1941, the railways were experiencing major difficulties. Only during the static phase of the war, since 1942, could they get the situation somewhat under control, and even then the demands of the military in Karelia were hard to satisfy as Finland has predominately just single-track rail lines, and often major bottlenecks were formed, tens of empty carriages would accumulate on certain stations as they could not be sent west due to the eastbound traffic. Moving a carriage of goods from Western Finland to Eastern Karelia by rail could take two weeks - and that is only to the railhead.

Water transport was of course used on the Ladoga and Onega, but even there the shortage of suitable vessels was significant. On the Onega, for example, captured old paddle steamers were used as auxiliary gunboats in the absense of more appropriate ships.

The Finnish military simply had too much men in arms in 41-44 to supply effectively on the advance, given the conditions in Karelia and the Finnish transport resources and rail network (which had to supply German units in the north as well). And any more men Finland has in arms, not doing vital civilian work on the home front, the more Finland would be dependent on Germany. So - one of the main objectives of the Finnish government would be to demobilize as much of the military as possible, in case the Soviet threat has diminished. Farms need tending, forests need harvesting and factories need skilled hands. The occupied areas would still need to be occupied, and that alone would mean a lot of men need to stay in uniform anyway. The Finnish logistics system was not capable of supporting a major attack towards the Murmansk railway without crippling (or at least hobbling) the nation in some way and making Finland much more prone to German pressure.

To me this means that the government would commit as little active troops to an attack towards Murmansk as it would think it can get away with. This would not be due to an "excuse" not to attack, but very real logistical, economic and political reasons. Finland is not going out of its way to suck up to the Nazis in a way that hurts national interests, even if the Nazis are winning - as long as the OTL "inner ring" of politicians and soldiers have any say about it.

My estimate is that the Germans would still need to commit significant resources for the attack against Murmansk, as Finland would not commit enough troops to be the major partner in such an effort. This would be the general picture - we can of course haggle over the realistic troop numbers the Finns might send, also in terms of what promises and threats Berlin is ready to make to goad the Finns into taking a bigger role.

Let us consider using the troops on the Karelian Isthmus in an attack against Murmansk. In terms of logistics, the Isthmus is superior to Viena Karelia. A direct and short rail line to southern Finland. A good road network. A number of usable ports on the coast, not least around Viipuri itself. Supplying a force made of even one of the Finnish corps on the Isthmus in 1941, say 2-3 infantry divisions as the main force (plus artillery and engineers, possibly some armor) and a couple of regiments (etc) as a reserve would be much more difficult in Eastern Karelia. All the supply formations would have to be supplied as well, and what ever air assets would be sent to the area. Of course, this does not even take into account what ever troops the Germans would send, or the Finnish troops already in the area. All this at the end of a single rail line, and then just wilderness and poor roads.

Then there is of course the point to be made that the troops that fought initially north of the Ladoga were more suitable for battles in the wilderness than the troops sent to the Isthmus - it is a real concern whether such troops can be found from the three Finnish corps on the Isthmus that could be used in those conditions without risking worse losses than would be acceptable.

There would be the question of morale as well, as many of these men came from the towns in southern Finland and many were Social Democrats or even more left, for example. Meny had already protested crossing the 1920 border in 1941. Now sending them to conquer a frozen Soviet port behind hundreds of kilometers of roadless wilderness could well cause serious morale problems, if not actual mutinies in several units.

As far as I see it, much of the troops that attacked towards Eastern Karelia initially were made of either men from such parts of the country that had roughly similar terrain (Savo and North Karelia) or from areas that were "ideologically trustworthy" (the Ostrobothnian coast and countryside). This is not entirely accidental.
 
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When Finland threw in the sponge, the USSR took more land, to say nothing of other reparations. Unless the Germans win the war, or beat the Soviets and end up with a semi-armistice/stalemate against the western Allies there is no way Stalin will give back one inch of territory they took from the Finns in the fighting of the Winter War. The future of Finland, and its borders are basically up to what happens to the USSR in the wider war. No matter how far Finnish troops advance, if, in the end, Germany loses they are screwed and I would suggest the better they do the more Stalin will want to punish them.

In a "Germany wins" scenario there is no reason that you would not see a Greater Finland. A good deal of this new territory is pretty empty and has a large ethnic Finnish population. The Germans certainly won't care if the Finns decide to ethnically cleanse any non-Finnish (and non-Sammi) elements from this territory. The Germans really have no desire to "own" Murmansk/Kola, at most they will want to be able to have shared bases. The location of Leningrad is strategic, so they may not let the Finns get closer than the pre-1938 border.
 
Now domestically within Finland there is the issue of the civilian government seeing Greater Finland being an option, because with Leningrad down, they really only have Eastern Karelia as an ongoing front and cutting the Murmansk RR would effectively shut down their part of the war other than the outstanding situation around Murmansk itself.

While the "Greater Finland" ideology did exist, its role shouldn't be overemphasized. While there were many people in Finland who dreamed of Eastern Karealia belonging to Finland, that wasn't the reason why Finland joined the war. Some people in the government were even ready to withdraw from Eastern Karelia if the Soviet Union was to give back territories it took in 1940. This isn't to say that Finland wouldn't take Eastern Karelia if the USSR collapsed or some sort of peace negotiations between Soviets and Germans allowed that but it wasn't the driving factor in the Finnish war effort. DrakonFin also already mentioned some issues in the Finnish politics which could cause troubles if Finland continued to advance towards east.

So - one of the main objectives of the Finnish government would be to demobilize as much of the military as possible, in case the Soviet threat has diminished. Farms need tending, forests need harvesting and factories need skilled hands.

This is an extremely important point. Finland was one of the most mobilized societies during the war, probably one of the reason why it was able to punch above its weight. I have seen even estimates that only the Soviet Union achieved higher the level of mobilization of population and economy than Finland did. This also meant however that the Finnish civilian economy suffered greatly as farmers and workers were in the army and economic productivity suffered. If Leningrad falls, Finland could just well decide to use it as an excuse for partial de-mobilization of its forces in order to ease its economic troubles. (Not un-seen during the Continuation War.)

The future of Finland, and its borders are basically up to what happens to the USSR in the wider war. No matter how far Finnish troops advance, if, in the end, Germany loses they are screwed and I would suggest the better they do the more Stalin will want to punish them.

I think this is actually quite close to the Finnish thinking during the war. Finnish attitude was very much wait-and-see and even the fall of Leningrad wouldn't necessarily force any change to that attitude. Some people in the military leadership (most importantly Mannerheim) had became disillusioned with the German war effort in East already as early as by fall 1941 and even Leningrad falling wouldn't necessarily force any changes to that thinking.
 
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