Full-Scale Conventional WWIII

NomadicSky

Banned
What sparked this war?

I know one thing with this pod I surely won't be born I was born in Feb 85 so this pod prolly knocks me out of existing. My dad wouldn't be drafted though so I might be born into a very dark world.
 

burmafrd

Banned
The T-72 was not all that fast; and neither were the BMPs and other armored support vehicles. Not to mention that inthe very rigid control system that the Red Army trained under, the faster they went the more confused they got. The Commissar system was also another huge disadvantage to the Red army. here you have a politically correct, usually ill trained (in military matters) back seat driver who could change the commanders orders in a moment or have anyone shot on the spot. Great for unit cohesion and morale. The Red Army myth of invincibility would be pretty qucikly put to the test; and the corrolary to the confidence and fear that it gave would also be the kick to the natural independent instincs of the rest of the Warsaw Pact if they saw the Invincible Red Army as no longer invincible but beatable.

The fact of the matter is that the Red Army was nowhere near as formidible as many thought, and the minute it started to fail - it would be like a dam breaking.

It is true that the CIA failed miserably in the 70's and beyond in intelligence and counterspy activity-not surprising after what congress did to it in the early 70's.

However the military and NSA intelligence teams were a lot better.
It is highly unlikely that they would not correctly put the pieces together; especially as the scenario put forth is one of the main ones that we looked at during that time period.

As regards supporting terrorists; at that time there was a suspicion the Russians were doing that anyway in the real time line; there is NO chance that some evidence of this support would NOT get out if it really happened; and once it did everything the Russians did would be under a microscope. I say it again- you cannot funnel support to what would have been dozens of different terrorist groups and not have it start to get out= with that many mentally unstable types, which is what a lot of the terrorist groups are= there is just no way you can hide it for that long.
 

burmafrd

Banned
Just a little added fillet about the NSA. If you want to discuss close mouthed types, they wrote the book. I had a friend, who has since passed, who was fairly high up in the military signals group in the NSA in the early 80s, before he retired. About 5 years ago, only a couple before he passed, I managed to get him to talk a little. I had known him for 15 years, and since I have a top secret clearence as well, he was willing to give me a few general and deliberately vague hints. I asked him point blank what damage the Walkers and other soviet spies had done and he said it was a fair amount, but not as bad as CNN and the NY Times would have you believe. And then he said this "Its nothing compared to what we were able to do to the Russians." and that was all he ever said on that subject.
 
burmafrd said:
The T-72 was not all that fast; and neither were the BMPs and other armored support vehicles. Not to mention that inthe very rigid control system that the Red Army trained under, the faster they went the more confused they got.

I agree that the T72 had some serious shortcomings. In fact, I'll even grant that the Red Army was sort of like the 1927 NY Yankees: A great team in 1927, but that is no help to them in 1984. Ditto the Red Army in 1984. They were hard and nasty in 1945, but 40 years later they simply aren't the same.

The point is that for the suggested conflict, they don't need the boys who marched from Moscow to Berlin. They need to simply cover the distance between the inner German border and the Low Countries/France.

Given a two year lead up, I'm sure that the average Soviet formation could be made able to move a short distance, clobber some loosely organized forces, then sit tight.

The Red Army myth of invincibility would be pretty qucikly put to the test; and the corrolary to the confidence and fear that it gave would also be the kick to the natural independent instincs of the rest of the Warsaw Pact if they saw the Invincible Red Army as no longer invincible but beatable.

Let me be clear: In a simple sandtable match up, NATO will win and beat the WP eleven times out of ten. It's that clear and marked of a difference.

The problem is that wars are not fought on sandtables without outside considerations. If the Soviets were attempting to score an outright, settle all the bets once and for all match in 1984, they get smoked hard. The Soviets weren't stupid, they knew a straight up punching match gets them killed. So what I'm positing is that the Soviets would be aware that they can't score that global victory, but they sure can achieve a local, limited victory, defined as the elimination of West Germany as a member of NATO.

Yes, months and years after the Soviets pull this kind of operation, there will be strong indicators if not outright proof that they couldn't have gone a step further west than they did. A good parallel would be the fears of an Iraqi invasion of Saudi Arabia in 1991 after the invasion of Kuwait. After the fact, it became very obvious that the short drive by Iraq into Kuwait was pretty much the end of their logistics.

However the military and NSA intelligence teams were a lot better.
It is highly unlikely that they would not correctly put the pieces together

There are two problems with that.

First, the NSA missed the sudden collapse of the USSR as much as everybody else. The fact is that we never really got a good handle on the USSR or Russians for that matter. The KGB weren't as effective as Hollywood likes to make them sound, but they weren't pushovers either.

Second, let's give you the benefit of the doubt and say that the NSA figures out from all of the widespread indicators that the WP is about to throw a punch at NATO. They still have to convince the political leadership of all of NATO that it's going to happen. There is no naval surge. There is no obvious irritant in play. There is no evidence of activity outside of Europe. Even if they manage to put all of that to explained, what is the NATO solution? Mobilize? That would cost trillions of dollars and if the Russians don't move, they look like idiots and forms a victory for the WP in and of itself. Anything else is arranging deck chairs on the Titanic, since the only forces that will matter are the ones right in and proximal to West Germany.

especially as the scenario put forth is one of the main ones that we looked at during that time period.

Yes, I'm broadly plagarizing. It also adds some credibility to your points in that you recognized it as such.

That's why it's a much more plausible scenario than the original one in this thread. NATO spent a great deal of time looking at this as a problem because it was a real smart play on the part of the Russians and there is no easy fix against it beyond adopting a nuclear first use policy that says that the minute the first Soviet boot hits West Germany, Moscow gets cratered.

As regards supporting terrorists; at that time there was a suspicion the Russians were doing that anyway in the real time line; there is NO chance that some evidence of this support would NOT get out if it really happened; and once it did everything the Russians did would be under a microscope.

The issue isn't if the Russians were supporting terrorists. They were. Big time. They were so prolific, there are some prominent terrorist organizations from the 70's and 80's that were less involved with their ideology and more with doing the work of the KGB/GRU.

The ramp up in support could be easily explained as a reaction to the US funding of counter-Soviet forces in Afghanistan. In essence, if you're going to give Stingers to Al-Q, we're going to give SA-7s to the PIRA or FLQ.

As well, I'd like to think that the moment the Soviets started pointing ICBMs at the west, they were under the microscope.
 

burmafrd

Banned
I will grant you that convincing the political leadership is sometimes a problem. BUT you do remember who was president of the US and Prime Minister of the UK during this time period, right? They are much more likely to listen to the intelligence guys that think the USSR is about to pull something. Also during this time period, it was becoming clear to more then a few people outside of the CIA (who were the ones that really blew the call- a lot of the NSA and others correctly saw the weaknesses of the USSR) knew that time was running out on the RUssians with our defense build up that they could not match- and that a lot of the soviet equipment was getting more and more dated and that they could not afford to replace it- and the time needed to replace it was just not there. As someone who was fairly close to things at that time (I had just started to work for the DOD and was in Ammo School at that time) I was hearing how worried some people were that the USSR was going to try something soon. So I frankly do not see them getting much of a surprise going here. And we needed only 5 days to have 4 more divisions in Europe to marry with equipment there. Mobilization of troops is easy to spot- bringing up supplies in such qtys as would be needed you CANNOT hide from satelites. I believe that the scenario of Sir John Hacketts book is the one the russians would have been most likely to use. They wanted to get 4 weeks of mobilization to 2 weeks for us.
 
I will grant you that convincing the political leadership is sometimes a problem. BUT you do remember who was president of the US and Prime Minister of the UK during this time period, right? They are much more likely to listen to the intelligence guys that think the USSR is about to pull something.

Thatcher and Reagan were definitely running hawk administrations, but outside of assertions from the loony-left, they weren't paranoid. The subtle build-up of logistics in East Germany isn't going to be enough to drive them to investing the billions that a 4 division mobilization would entail.

It also paints NATO into two scenarios that are real political losers for them. The first is the lesser of two evils: They spend the dough and 4 divisions get moved to Europe for a minimum of 90 days. This leaks out obviously and when Ivan quietly runs an exercise tearing up the East German countryside, the smart intel guy who was predicting a Soviet invasion is now the physical fitness officer in some Alaskan outpost. Toss in the loony-left claims of the US occupying NATO countries and the scenario is a real political loser for NATO.

The second scenario is actually worse, in that it involves an actual shooting war. The Soviet position of them coming to the aid of a spontanous uprising to reunify Germany under a communist government is bolstered because they can then say "Hey, if the Americans can invade West Germany to try and prevent the glorious workers revolution, we can go into aid our fraternal socialist allies.".

Another thing to examine from the political dimension is the example of Able Archer. The Soviets, well, they were an absolutely paranoid regime. They had real hard and from their perspective credible concerns that NATO was planning to hit them hard and even with that, they only moderately increased readiness. If a regime as nutty as the Soviets weren't going to roll out a full mobilization, I have a hard time seeing a stable, rational government like the ones of Thatcher or Reagan doing that.

Mobilization of troops is easy to spot- bringing up supplies in such qtys as would be needed you CANNOT hide from satelites.

For a short-term surge, yes, you're right. The steady stream of trucks is a good sign that the troops there are planning a trip soon.

A longer term build up, however, does offer advantages for a short term offensive. As well, if the surge is only run for 3 days prior to jump off, even if NATO convinces their leadership of the need to mobilize in time, those extra four divisions are still not available.

Another factor to consider is that you're rightly arguing the reality of where the track meets the road, so to speak. Nobody ever said that just because the USSR would lose if they attacked West Germany in 1984 was a reason why it wouldn't happen. I was simply trying to offer up something more plausible than the USSR randomly attacking every part of the globe because they wanted to sieze Iran.
 
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