Friendly German-Polish Relationship - Averting WW2

Originally posted by tallwingedgoat
Everything about the leading up to WWII was logical and reasonable. I can certainly see why Poland was hostile to the Soviets, but the fact of the matter is the Soviets were always a lesser threat than Nazi Germany, this fact was clouded by traditional Polish-Russian rivalry.
The Soviets might be lesser evil than Nazi Germany but remmeber that until 1933 there was no Nazi Germany - only Weimar Germany, crippled and almost demilitarized. OTOH the Red Army was still a dangerous force, communism was faining followers even in the west, so in 1920s and early 1930s Poland had every reason to consider USSR a bigger threat.

Originally posted by Comte de Geneve
The problem was that the German regime was not a conventional conservative/nationalist regime but Hitler, who considered the utter destruction of Poland and the Polish people a requsite step in his domination of Eastern Europe. As a result, the Poles were, to use a technical term, screwed.
I'd like to point that even not-Nazi conservative/nationalist regime in Germany would be hostile towards Poland because of Danzig, the Corridor, Silesia and Greater Poland (Poznań/Posen). I think almost every German at the time wanted those lands back, with possible exception for Greater Poland.

The problem with OTL Poland in the late 1930's is that it was another right-wing crypto-fascist military dictatorship. The Colonels clique that succeeded Pilsudski was militantly anti-Soviet and more than willing to negotiate a modus vivendi with Germany. Basically the Smigley-Ridz regime was very similar to the Horthy regime in Hungary and more than willing to work with Germany.
Negotiating a modus vivendi with Germany did not mean an anti-Soviet alliance. Actually Germany offered Poland a place in the anti-Comintern pact in 1938 in exchange for Danzig and extreterritorial passage. They also promised possible gains in the east. Poland refused, affraid of becoming German puppet.
Polish strategy, as far as foreign policy went, was to keep equal distance to USSR and Germany.
 
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The Soviets might be lesser evil than Nazi Germany but remmeber that until 1933 there was no Nazi Germany - only Weimar Germany, crippled and almost demilitarized. OTOH the Red Army was still a dangerous force, communism was faining followers even in the west, so in 1920s and early 1930s Poland had every reason to consider USSR a bigger threat.

Except if they had read Mein Kampf, Hitler spelled out his vision of expansion to the east. Poland failed to recognize the new situation post '33, and COLLABORATED with the Nazis for the invasion of Czechoslavakia. You would think undermining your French and British allies' already weak resolve to contain German expansion would be an obviously bad idea.

Polish strategy, as far as foreign policy went, was to keep equal distance to USSR and Germany.

And ended up being partitioned down the middle. Poland was in a pretty horrible situation to be sure. There were no good choices, but they made the worst choices possible.
 
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And ended up being partitioned down the middle.
I tend to agree with seraphim74, there is little incentive for Poland to tie itself with either Russia or Germany. Both of them were more powerful than Poland and both of them would have been senior partners in such an alliance and Poland already had very recent experiences of being dominated by both of them. The main issue is that of no trust.

As for Czechoslovakia, opportunity for an alliance was wasted as Czechs grabbed Cieszyn in 1919 as Poland fought in the eastern borderlands. Thus Poland took it in 1938 as the opportunity presented itself. Manipulate the circumstances that the plebiscite goes as planned and relations between them are significantly improved.
 
How about this:

Germany does not resume its unlimited U-Boat warfare and thus the United States do not enter the Great War but continue to stay neutral. Thus the Western Front ends in a stalemate and after some time a status quo ante peace (perhaps mediated by the US) is signed. In the east the peace treaty of Brest still comes into effect and a polish buffer-state is created out of Russian territory. To gain access to the sea Poland merges with Lithuania and the combined Kingdom of Poland-Lithuania is recreated. The Poles elect (with a certain amount of German persuation) a prince from the (catholic) house of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen as their King. After being crowned King of Poland he surprises everyone by staunchly advocating polish interests and after some bickering with his Prussian relatives manages to bring about some (minor) border adjustment in favour of the Polish Kingdom. Poland also lays claim (as in OTL) to parts of Belorus and Ukraine and occupies them. The result is a Polish-Soviet war with (like in OTL) Polish successes in the beginning but an even more successful counteroffensive of the Red Army later that can only be halted short of Warsaw. Poland asks for German help which is granted (at the price of a relinquishment of any further territorial claims against Germany) and in the end the Polish-Soviet border is even more favourable for Poland than in OTL (somewhere around the eastern borders of the Polish-Lithuanian Kingdom in its 17th century heydays).
 
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That Poland is nothing more than client state of Germany, so it kind of misses the point.

Only in the sense in which modern UK or Germany are client states of USA. Sometimes you have to accept a somewhat unequal alliance as the lesser evil. The Poles need to swallow their pride just like everyone else.

Sandwiched between two strong neighbours hostile to each other, Poland has a choice between being a client state of the one and resisting the other, or the other way around. You can try for some kind of "armed neutrality" like Switzerland but it is a very expensive proposition - interwar Poland simply didn't have the money for it, and neither had they a particularly defensible terrain except the Slovakian border. A "neutral" position without the military power to successfully defend against both sides would lead to the situation in which even the slightest compromise with one of the sides will prompt the other to "preemptively" attack. And this is not even considering the possibility of a Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.
 
The POD should be more distant, middle age.. the Drag Nach oten thing may have started it all...


BTW, did the slavs peoples do the reverse at start? was there like, raid from the pagan ancestors of poles into germanic lands?


Not Poles especially, though some may have done. When the Polish principality first emerged, it had only a very short border with Germany, The area between them (covering the greater part of what would later be the GDR) was inhabited by Wends, another Slav tribe which was remaining stubbornly Pagan. The Wends copped it from both Germans and Poles.

Later, after the German conquest of the wends gave them a border with Poland, there were sometimes wars between them. Boleslav the Great conquered Lusatia for a time, but only to lose it later.
 
Originally posted by tallwingedgoat
Except if they had read Mein Kampf, Hitler spelled out his vision of expansion to the east. Poland failed to recognize the new situation post '33, and COLLABORATED with the Nazis for the invasion of Czechoslavakia. You would think undermining your French and British allies' already weak resolve to contain German expansion would be an obviously bad idea.

Well, there are some quite convincing rumours about Poland proposing France a joint preemptive strike against Germany in 1933. France refused, so Poland signed a non-aggression treaty. Neither Piłsudski, not his successors believed they could fight Germany on their own.
Also, Poland demanded Tesin region from Czechoslovakia on September 30th, the day the Munich Treaty was signed, so I don't think Poles were weakening anyone's resolve. However, I completely agree with you that Polish policy in this case was simply stupid. Warsaw should have sent a message to Prague in 1938: "You have our full support; we'd like to talk about Tesin, but right now we have your back; tell Hitler to get lost, we'll back you even in combat, if necessary".
 
In other words you expect Poles to forget the territory to which they have historic and ethnic claims and forget about thousands of their countrymen living under German oppression.

Although, since there was no propposal of a Kashubian state, and Kashubian loyalties were mixed, I am not sure you wouldn't have a majority pro-German sentiment in polling in 1919.


Better Polish-German relations might have been possible if not for German oppression of the Poles in XIXth century, not to mention participation of Prussia in partitions of Poland. OTOH, Bismarck tried to unify Germans and make them one nation, and tolerating some kind of Polish autonomy or special status would have made his job much harder. If Poles can have a special status, why not Bavarians? Or Saxons?

I kind of agree. What about a Prussia that maintains a sort of scientific absolutism, and is emphatically not a nationalist state? But that's a huge POD and requires aborting German unification.

Originally posted by tallwingedgoat
You're right, but only to some degree. Poles had no reason to trust USSR more than they trusted Germany - i.e. not at all. Both countries were quite hostile towards Poland, in many cases they were not happy with the very existence of the Polish state.

I kind of agree; while I think German hostility was not as bad (The Germans didn't want to conquer Warsaw in this period), the Russo-Polish War shows that Germany would do everything it could in order to break Poland.


1) Bad relations with Czechoslovakia - while Prague was not exactly fond of Poland, it was possible to find some common ground, insted keeping muttering about Tesin; problem was Czechoslovakia had good relations with USSR, and that made Poles suspicious.
2) Bad treatment of ethnic minorities in Poland, especially Ukrainians; instead of giving them autonomy, which Poland had promised, Warsaw tried to Polonize them.

1) Absolutely. What the hell were they thinking? 2) is, I think, more mixed; there were actually strides towards the development of Ukrainian culture in the late 1920s and early 1930s that threatened Stalin; he thought the Poles were trying to turn Galicia into a Ukrainian Piedmont to use against him.
 
Originally posted by Faeelin
2) is, I think, more mixed; there were actually strides towards the development of Ukrainian culture in the late 1920s and early 1930s that threatened Stalin; he thought the Poles were trying to turn Galicia into a Ukrainian Piedmont to use against him.

And that is precisely what Poland should have done. Create west of Lvov/Lwów one or two autonomous voivodships (like Silesian Voivodship) with Ukrainian as second official language, respect the Ukrainian Orthodox Church or even found an Ukrainian university. That would have made Poland look good in eyes of the world's public opinion and significantly reduced internal tensions in Poland.

Although, since there was no propposal of a Kashubian state, and Kashubian loyalties were mixed, I am not sure you wouldn't have a majority pro-German sentiment in polling in 1919.

Or the other way, but you're right, it might have been possible.
 
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