French/Russian "Nazism" in CP-victorious TL

I never said it would be inevitable, only a likely possibility. And for the record, post-1871 France almost went proto-fascist with Boulanger.

Hmmm, I think calling old-guard reactionaries "fascists" is perhaps stretching the term. Would you consider Salazar a fascist? I guess you could say yes, although it seems perhaps a tad simplistic if you start naming any reactionary regime as fascist.

All in all I guess an authoritarian right-wing nationalist government is the most likely outcome. It may adopt broadly fascist economic policies, so heavy industry and a pursuit of autarky, in so much as it doesn't want to rely upon Germany and Britain for reasons of patriotism. On the otherhand France has always had that left-wing republican streak, so its hard to see any government pleasing everyone, they are just too divided. Then again your reverse-Versailles might push everyone to the right, especially if there is no real communist power to speak off once the Bolsheviks are crushed.
 

General Zod

Banned
Hmmm, I think calling old-guard reactionaries "fascists" is perhaps stretching the term. Would you consider Salazar a fascist? I guess you could say yes, although it seems perhaps a tad simplistic if you start naming any reactionary regime as fascist.

All in all I guess an authoritarian right-wing nationalist government is the most likely outcome. It may adopt broadly fascist economic policies, so heavy industry and a pursuit of autarky, in so much as it doesn't want to rely upon Germany and Britain for reasons of patriotism. On the otherhand France has always had that left-wing republican streak, so its hard to see any government pleasing everyone, they are just too divided. Then again your reverse-Versailles might push everyone to the right, especially if there is no real communist power to speak off once the Bolsheviks are crushed.

I suppose a Boulanger-like regime might not be strictly defined fascist. However, neither it would be an old-guard reactionary regime a la Salazar or Pinochet. It would be an authoritarian right-wing nationalist, expansionist-revanchist regime, likely headed by a charismatic strongman with a military background, which would follow broadly fascist economic policies and use broadly fascist ideology and propaganda. Primacy of the State, privileged destiny of the nation, military expansionism, hatemongering.
 
About this, I would agree with Earling's analysis. It may be done, no doubt, but it is also quite possible that at some point, a progressive Reichstag would force the withdrawl of troops from Russia proper.

I suppose that is so.

Heh. About this, I would see the Anglo-Germans as willing to offer slightly more generous terms to the Anti-Bolshevisk. For one, victorious Germans would be more willing to keep the commies away from power in an area that directly borders their Eastern European empire. Also, if the Anglo-Germans manage to win the war with less effort than OTL Entente, as it is likely, they would be rather more willing and able to gut the bloody Bolsheviks. This would be also true if the UK stays neutral.

If the war is quickly won, the terms will likely be less punitive; possibly, there will not be any (successful) revolution in the first place. I was working under the assumption that the Eastern War would still be a drawn-out affair.

Heh. Georgia now has a snowball's chance in Hell if joining NATO. Ukraine, I would deem it a definite possibility, if the new USA Administration plays their cards right and Old Europe doesn't get too much of cold feet. Ukraine is too big and strong for Putin to crush in a limited war. Anyway, this is arather interesting issue, but probably fit for another thread.

Right. Suffice it to say that I doubt France would let them in.

Yep, but Stalin's precedent shows that a ruthless Russian dictatorship can bootstrap an effective industrial base from scratch. Quite likely not as big as Soviet Union, since they would miss Ukraine's resources.

Stalin was also presiding over a sovereign country that did not have massive debts (Lenin wrote them off unilaterally, a major reason for Soviet Russia going unrecognised for quite some time). As such, the Communist government also had an altogether different degree of control over the economy, something that I suspect the Germans would frown upon their "friendly" Russia assuming. And they cannot sell Baku oil or Ukrainian grain to finance the heavy equipment.

Oh, sure, as you point out, it's just the issue of long-term political will. Germany needs to stay dtermined to pay the economic, political, and military prices of long-term occupation of Russia. It can be done, but it's not a given. Esp. since post-war Germany will be largely democratic, probably with a constitution and political system akin to monarchical Gaullism, albeit imperialist. A crossbreed of Britain and Sweden.

That depends; a glorious victory might give the monarchy the prestige it needs to remain in power.


And the Centre Party. Exactly.

They would, however, be more sympathetic to the monarchy, especially after seeing the Bolshevik example (assuming, once again, that there was a Revolution).

An effective solution, but it needs to be politically feasible, since this Germany will be imperialist but democratic, like the USA or Britain, and also they need to manage the exaction successfully: the USA, tried, and failed, in Iraq.

France was democratic when they occupied the Ruhr. People in this time and age were much less squeamish abut such matters than is the case today.

I'll reread it. Pressently such a detail escapes my memory of the book, but I suppose it would be in the Germany WWI victory scenario. It has been some time since I read it. Good book, but it has the main defect of many "true" historians writing AH: they get cold feet about their subject, so they spend 90% of the time discussing factual history or justifying the PoD, 10% discussing what would actually happen in the counterfactual scenario. Rather boring, for the AH buff. ;)

Right. There was some interesting stuff there, though.
 

General Zod

Banned
If the war is quickly won, the terms will likely be less punitive; possibly, there will not be any (successful) revolution in the first place. I was working under the assumption that the Eastern War would still be a drawn-out affair.

According to previous and ongoing discussions on the duration of the war, we may assume that the war would be significantly shorter than OTL, certainly not 4 years. How much shorter essentially depends on the role of UK, whether active belligerant on the Alliance's (especially if from the start) or friendly neutral. Personal estimations are in the range of 1-2 years, most of it to subdue Russia, indeed. Even in the worst scenario, I highly doubt Russia can stand more than a couple years, although.

Since it would be a total defeat, with huge loss of territory, a revolution is highly likely, proabaly successful in ending autocracy (Feb. 1917), not necessarily to put radical revolutionaries into power (Oct. 1917), that's subject to butterflies.

As it concerns peace terms, IMO the duration of the war essentially reflects in the degree of punitive viciousness reparations go into. No matter the duration, peace terms would be highly punitive as territories and colonies go. Russia gets a Brest-Litovsk deal, France loses the rest of Alsace-Lorraine, French Flanders, Italy's claims, large part or all of her colonial empire (how much depends on British colonial greed). That kind of punitive peace was Germany's war aim, and Italy would be quite greedy to feast on French booty.


Stalin was also presiding over a sovereign country that did not have massive debts (Lenin wrote them off unilaterally, a major reason for Soviet Russia going unrecognised for quite some time). As such, the Communist government also had an altogether different degree of control over the economy, something that I suspect the Germans would frown upon their "friendly" Russia assuming. And they cannot sell Baku oil or Ukrainian grain to finance the heavy equipment.

According to the Nazi precedent, it is not a given nor unplausible that Germany and her allies may fall into complacency and let a resurgent Russian nationalist leadership repudiate the debt. It is true that a Russia proper cannot rely on natural resources of Caucasus or Ukraine to finance the debt. They can exploit the resources of Siberia and Central Asia for that. But since they need to be developed, it is correct to assume TTL Russian industrialization will be somewhat slower and reduced than OTL. Likely still enough to rebuild Russia as a great power, although.


That depends; a glorious victory might give the monarchy the prestige it needs to remain in power.

Oh, I have no doubt that in a victorious German Empire the prestige of the monarchy will be boosted enough to establish it for the foreseeable future. But I have also severe doubts that it will remain the semi-autocratic compomise it was under Bismarck. I picture a democratization either/both before the war (a successful CP suggests a more politically wise pre-war leadership, if they gain British friendship for good, and that heavily suggest some form of democratization) and/or after it, as the mass parties claim full constitunalization and greater power share as the price of their loyalty during the war.

I do not visualize full British parliamentarism as necessary or likely, rather abolition of the Prussian unequal electoral system, and a government both responsible to the Reichstag and the Kaiser, with the latter keeping vast reserve powers in foreign and defense policy, legislative initiative for the Reichstag, but veto power for the Kaiser. A constitution rather similar to a monarchical French Fifth Republic.

France was democratic when they occupied the Ruhr. People in this time and age were much less squeamish abut such matters than is the case today.

And good for them. Pacifism is the senile illness of democracy. :mad::eek:
 
According to previous and ongoing discussions on the duration of the war, we may assume that the war would be significantly shorter than OTL, certainly not 4 years. How much shorter essentially depends on the role of UK, whether active belligerant on the Alliance's (especially if from the start) or friendly neutral. Personal estimations are in the range of 1-2 years, most of it to subdue Russia, indeed. Even in the worst scenario, I highly doubt Russia can stand more than a couple years, although.

Since it would be a total defeat, with huge loss of territory, a revolution is highly likely, proabaly successful in ending autocracy (Feb. 1917), not necessarily to put radical revolutionaries into power (Oct. 1917), that's subject to butterflies.

As it concerns peace terms, IMO the duration of the war essentially reflects in the degree of punitive viciousness reparations go into. No matter the duration, peace terms would be highly punitive as territories and colonies go. Russia gets a Brest-Litovsk deal, France loses the rest of Alsace-Lorraine, French Flanders, Italy's claims, large part or all of her colonial empire (how much depends on British colonial greed). That kind of punitive peace was Germany's war aim, and Italy would be quite greedy to feast on French booty.

All right, I can go with this.

According to the Nazi precedent, it is not a given nor unplausible that Germany and her allies may fall into complacency and let a resurgent Russian nationalist leadership repudiate the debt. It is true that a Russia proper cannot rely on natural resources of Caucasus or Ukraine to finance the debt. They can exploit the resources of Siberia and Central Asia for that. But since they need to be developed, it is correct to assume TTL Russian industrialization will be somewhat slower and reduced than OTL. Likely still enough to rebuild Russia as a great power, although.

Depending on Japanese involvement, they might also face trouble in the Far East. Depends on how far out of hand Britain (and America) allows them to get.

I still doubt Russia on its own would have the capital for a Stalin-like industrialisation. They would not be able to seriously challenge the German industrial base, although if we do posit a complacent, Socialist Reich, they may well give them an initial scare and bloodied nose.

Oh, I have no doubt that in a victorious German Empire the prestige of the monarchy will be boosted enough to establish it for the foreseeable future. But I have also severe doubts that it will remain the semi-autocratic compomise it was under Bismarck. I picture a democratization either/both before the war (a successful CP suggests a more politically wise pre-war leadership, if they gain British friendship for good, and that heavily suggest some form of democratization) and/or after it, as the mass parties claim full constitunalization and greater power share as the price of their loyalty during the war.

I do not visualize full British parliamentarism as necessary or likely, rather abolition of the Prussian unequal electoral system, and a government both responsible to the Reichstag and the Kaiser, with the latter keeping vast reserve powers in foreign and defense policy, legislative initiative for the Reichstag, but veto power for the Kaiser. A constitution rather similar to a monarchical French Fifth Republic.

I'm not good enough at '20s German politics to make any educated guesses on details of how such a compromise solution would play out, especially with the various butterflies from an earlier victory and different wartime alliance system; quite possibly, total war will not be required for any length of time, and casualties will not be as horrible as IOTL, making the populace less sceptical to the government. There is also the matter of the Army's own political power and increased prestige, and perhaps also the incorporation of German Austrian areas to consider.

And good for them. Pacifism is the senile illness of democracy. :mad::eek:

Not necessarily, but pacifism has been a trend for half a century or so now.
 

General Zod

Banned
All right, I can go with this.

Of course, a radical revolution attempt is still quite possible in France and Russia just after the war, due to the combined effects of ongoing Allied naval blockade, total military defeat, and severe territorial losses.


Depending on Japanese involvement, they might also face trouble in the Far East. Depends on how far out of hand Britain (and America) allows them to get.

OH, IMO by all means they will grab the Outer Manchuria, nor I can see UK or USA begrudging them that land. If they get greedy for all Russian Far East, UK or USA might get alarmed, or they might just be happy to redirect Japanese ambitions there instead of China proper, which is their real interest. Anyway, Far East and South East Asia are the big geopolitical post-WWI hot spot ITTL. A meery dance between UK, USA, Japan, and Russia here, and I absolutely foresee some kind of really big war exploding here in the 1920s-1940s. Leadership of Asia absolutely needs to be settled for good among global superpowers (UK and USA) and regional great powers (Russia and Japan). The only certainety is that Germany will sit it out: they are far too busy managing their empire on the other side of Eurasia. However, this Asian Great War may or may not get conflated with France and Russia seeking a rematch in Europe.

They would not be able to seriously challenge the German industrial base, although if we do posit a complacent, Socialist Reich, they may well give them an initial scare and bloodied nose.

Oh, this is just what might be needed to have a second European great war. TTL likely could and would still get its World Wars, only they do not really need to grow as destructive as OTL. Which is all for the good.


I'm not good enough at '20s German politics to make any educated guesses on details of how such a compromise solution would play out, especially with the various butterflies from an earlier victory and different wartime alliance system; quite possibly, total war will not be required for any length of time, and casualties will not be as horrible as IOTL, making the populace less sceptical to the government. There is also the matter of the Army's own political power and increased prestige, and perhaps also the incorporation of German Austrian areas to consider.

OTL '20s German politics are as different from TTL as day and night. No defeat, no revanchism, no revolution, no hyperinflation. However, the different alliance system both assumes and favors a moderate shift towards democratization before the war. The Center and Social Democrats had been steadily climbing towards full partecipation in the political system before the war, and their wartime loyalty only makes the case stronger for moderate reform. Essentially, the German Empire needs three basic things to stabilize its political system: abolition of the unfair Prussian electoral system, some kind of parliamentary responsibility for the government, and expansion of the welfare system. All these things are quite feasible with a decent leadership of the Empire before and after the war. This is entirely compatible with strengthened prestige and vast reserve powers of the Kaiser and the Army. Quite probably, they claim a vast swath of influence in foreign and defense issues, and the Army stays as venerated socially as OTL USA or Israel. The main effect of the incorporation of German Austrian areas will be to make the Center party stronger. The Czechs will follow the path of the Poles and the French minorities. The German Empire is far too strong and compact for them to have any realistic chance of breaking away, barring a collapse as total as OTL 1918. So they will be slowly assimilated, the sting of Germanization being lessened by economic prosperity and the pride of belonging to one of the world's superpowers.
 
I'm not good enough at '20s German politics to make any educated guesses on details of how such a compromise solution would play out, especially with the various butterflies from an earlier victory and different wartime alliance system; quite possibly, total war will not be required for any length of time, and casualties will not be as horrible as IOTL, making the populace less sceptical to the government. There is also the matter of the Army's own political power and increased prestige, and perhaps also the incorporation of German Austrian areas to consider.

Why would Austria be incorporated?

Anyway, we need more details on how and when the war ends, or this is a bit hard to talk about. Like, does anyone seriously imagine the Silent Dictatorship stepping down for the Socialists?

How will they pay for the war? Handwaving about reparations aside...
 
Haha, that's about the same thing my new TL covers. But it'll be a fascist alliance between France/Spain/Italy and Portugal + Russia who's a bit pissed about British/German dominance.
 
Why would Austria be incorporated?

Anyway, we need more details on how and when the war ends, or this is a bit hard to talk about. Like, does anyone seriously imagine the Silent Dictatorship stepping down for the Socialists?

How will they pay for the war? Handwaving about reparations aside...
If enough German (and, vitally, Austrian) leaders gets into their heads that Austria-Hungary isn't salvageable, then the primary impetus for not unifying in the last fourty years is gone. Since they just won the Great War, the other Great Powers could be expected to not protest overly;). But, only if Austria-Hungary isn't salvageable in some form (at least, if salvageing operations would be too costly, and draining, for victorious, but war-tired Germany).

The Silent Dictatorship wouldn't want to, but... how much could they get away with? They essentially got into power on 'winning the war', with the war won, what motivations, other then 'keep the Socialists out' could they come up with? There's probably, even in the more Conservative portions of German society, a great deal of support for, at the very least, returning to a pre-Great War 'business as usual', so their position may not be strong enough to keep in power. And if the economy crashes (due to your next point) when they still keep on to power, that's not so good for them, either.

Paying for the war is a big issue. Er... I guess they would try to do something like OTL, only not burdened by having to pay reparations (only loans), and there being no need to break Versailles. So... problems ahead for Germany. Which, depending on the sequence of events, could either be good for German democracy, or bad.
 
The Silent Dictatorship wouldn't want to, but... how much could they get away with? They essentially got into power on 'winning the war', with the war won, what motivations, other then 'keep the Socialists out' could they come up with?

Perpetual war for perpetual peace; there's the intervention in Russia, for instance. And all that unrest postwar. Ludendorff et al. don't strike me as the type to back down on their own.
 

General Zod

Banned
Well. A-H being partitioned just after the war is a nifty and entirely likely way for Germany to deal with the intractable internal problems of A-H instead of wasting time and effort to keep the Hapsburg in charge. But my big idea is that a victorious CP TL arises from A-H getting partitioned before the war, in 1866-1870. This solves a lot of the weaknesse of the CPs: Ther Germans may uses the resources of Cisleithania (and keep the Czech in line) much better than the Hapsburg, the Hungarians go from unruly minority to proud owners of their own middle power, the Italians are made an ironclad ally of Germany by being given their eastern claims. Provided the Ottomans don't go Entente, these changes are more than enough to let the CP win. I also hypothesize that a more intelligent German leadership causes the British to stay a friendly neutral or ally with the CPs. Also the USA never enter the war since Germany wins too early (or is never subject to naval blockage thanks to British friendship or alliance)

The position of the British greately influences the duration of the war. I assume a SuperGermany-Hungary-Italy-Ottoman Empire team can win WWI by 1917 if UK is in the Entente. If UK is neutral or allied to the CPs they can do it by 1916. You can find ideas about this TL in the "Reverse Versailles" thread.

A shorter war also means that Germany will be in a rather better shape at the end of the conflict, especially if they aren't subject to British blockade throughout. Yep, Ludendorff and Hindenburg will try to keep the power and influence they developed during the war, but they do not need to go into a naked dictatorship. Provided they are able to stabilize the economy, and are smart enough to allow the Center party and the Social Democrats some long-needed internal reforms (assuming they were not implemented before the war, as a conseguence of the PoD), they will be enourmously popular and can stay into power in a democratic way. They have saved Germany from its implacable enemies in its most dangerous hour and won it an Empire. Again, provided they can provided the necessary political compromises and manage the economy, they can be easily voted into power and become Chancellor or Minister of War or of Foreign Affairs or whatever scheme they can concoct to share power between the two of them. They will have their hands full for some years managing the peace treaties, stabilizing the situation in the Central and Eastern Europe vassals, wiping out the Bolsheviks, keeping France subdued, etc.

They just need to give the German people some tangible political and social reward for the war effort (expansion of the welfare system, universal suffrage in Prussia, a government responsible both to the Reichstag and to the Kaiser) and they can get all the popular support to stay in power democratically. They were very, very popular during the war.
 
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