French perform much better at Mers-el-Kébir

Deleted member 94680

All in all, it was an incredibly stupid thing to do.

Just can't resist having a dig at the Brits, can you old boy?

It was attempted to resolve the issue peacefully, but the French refused the options open to them. The French fleet wasn't handed over to the Germans and they scuttled it in '42 when that became a possibility. The attack, however distasteful, removed the Fench as a fleet in being and helped make the Med more secure. It was one less opponent (real or imagined) to worry about.

It also proved to a sceptical American public and government that the British intended to keep on fighting after the disasters of 1940. Domestically, it improved Churchill's standing with a distrustful Tory party, solidifying his position as Prime Minister.
 

Archibald

Banned
Stop quarrelling, it was a mix of what you both said.

Since May 10 events just rushed too fast for even the British (least the sclerotic French commanders) to grasp long term implications. In August 1940 Dakar was another tragedy born out of despair and miscommunication.

Just try to put yourself in the head of a military Frenchman in the summer of 1940
Warning: strong headaches ahead.

Bluntly: French commanders were completely and entirely at lost. Some rallied De Gaulle, other rallied Vichy on behalf of Spain-like neutrality (let's get out of that confusing war) and others were actually pro-Germans, but not Nazis, and some others were far right, and pro-Nazi.
There was also WWI and pacifism - Germans had equally suffered, after all. Same death toll. But the German army of 1940 was not the one of 1918 or 1914. There was that Nazi ideology that did not existed in WWI.

Don't you think things are a little messed up ? clearly they were.

In the end France had hit a situation where one has to decide by himself which side he wanted to fight with. But individual thinking in late 30's France wasn't a walk in the park. There was a crapton of ideology and politics flying everywhere.

A striking aspect of those who early rallied to the Free French was the strength of their character, and this goes far beyond De Gaulle or Leclerc. Free France veteran testimonies are all strikingly similars. Chaos was such, rallying De Gaulle in London one needed quite a strong epiphany.
To survive as a French military in the confused year 1940, one has to think pretty fast and forward. Which is not given to anybody. Hence why Free France was so little early on...

Let's take a striking example. I know the story of a French fighter pilot shot down in May, evacuated to Britain at Dunkik, then two month later founding himself on the British side - in Dakar - and then, when he landed at Dakar airfield as a scout to try and negociate, he found his former squadron there - now the ennemy since passed on Vichy side ! And he was taken prisonier. By fellow pilots. Go figure.

The British were in shock at France rapid collapse, Vichy France didn't existed (yet) and it could go either Franco or Mussolini way - with or without the Axis.
Although Sea Lion seems absurd in retrospect, as of July 1940 it was not, and this was the root cause why Britain feared Germany taking over the French fleet. Kriegsmarine + Regia Marina + French Fleet = big challenge to the RN.

One should see MEK as France own Tarento - as said, elimination of a powerful fleet in being threatening the Mediterranean.

The Navy was clearly the best prepared and equiped of all three French armies, far better than either the Army or Air Force.

If they do not press to Toulon, the only other place is first Dakar (and you what happened in August 1940 !) then the Caribbean. Or the ships could be interned in Alexandria - Lorraine actually was interned there, then handled to the Free French in 1943.
Which lead us to Some Bloke splendid TL "The Mers El Kebir resolution".
 
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TFSmith121

Banned
No, just stating fact. Attacking the French was a stupid thing to do. If the objective was to "remove the French as a fleet in being" than they pretty match failed, considering the number of warships that were concentrated in southern France, that much "closer" to being under Axis control than when they were in North Africa.

If you have a gun at your country house, and I don't want you to give it to violent criminals who have moved onto your block back in the city, then attacking your country house, failing to get the gun, and having you move back to your city apartment with the gun is pretty stupid.

Attacking the Italians or Germans would have been a more rational move, but we know that. Basically, an attack at MEK was about the most irrational decision that could have been made, especially given the efforts the British were making to try and build up French emigre resistance, from De Gaulle on down.

Whether it was by design or simple incompetence is open to interpretation.

Best,
 
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Basically, an attack at MEK was about the most irrational decision that could have been made, especially given the efforts the British were making to try and build up Fench emigre resistance, from De Gaulle on down.

Whether it was by design or simple incompetence is open to interpretation.

The attack was the last resort of the options presented to the French (not all of which were passed on to the French commander IIRC); were all the other options presented also irrational or incompetent?
 

TFSmith121

Banned
Understood, but the British knew going in that was a potential result of their demands; if the goal was to keep the French ships away from possible seizure by the Axis, they failed miserably, other than with Bretagne, considering that Dunkeque and Strasbourg both ended up closer to Axis-held territory after the attack then before...

There are reasons that "discretion is the better part of valor" is more than a random saying.

Creating an enemy where one doesn't have one is not generally seen as rational.

Best,
 
Creating an enemy where one doesn't have one is not generally seen as rational.

Best,

The alternative was trusting the French to stand up to Hitler when he started exerting pressure to amend the armistice terms. Would that have been rational?

And was the US oil etc embargo on Japan rational?:)
 
One effect of the British attack was that it impressed FDR as it showed him just how serious Churchill was about continuing on with the fight.
 

Deleted member 94680

No, just stating fact. Attacking the French was a stupid thing to do. If the objective was to "remove the French as a fleet in being" than they pretty match failed, considering the number of warships that were concentrated in southern France, that much "closer" to being under Axis control than when they were in North Africa.

If you have a gun at your country house, and I don't want you to give it to violent criminals who have moved onto your block back in the city, then attacking your country house, failing to get the gun, and having you move back to your city apartment with the gun is pretty stupid.

Attacking the Italians or Germans would have been a more rational move, but we know that. Basically, an attack at MEK was about the most irrational decision that could have been made, especially given the efforts the British were making to try and build up French emigre resistance, from De Gaulle on down.

Whether it was by design or simple incompetence is open to interpretation.

Best,

If. If. If. The French fleet didn't go German, no matter if it was geographically nearer the Germans - it's ideologically that counts. They were a fleet in being before the attack (which was a last resort after failed negotiations) and they were no threat after the attack. Job, no matter how distasteful, done.

To attempt to correct you lurid "example" it would be more akin to saying there's a guy on my block with a gun and I'm afraid he's going to join a gang and use it against me. I go over to his house and try to talk him out of using it, things go south and there's a scuffle. He runs off to another house on the block (nearer the gang if that makes you feel better) and spends the next couple of years indoors as a recluse, never using the gun against me. Have I achieved my goal? Yes. Were the methods used in the end the nicest? No. But I've achieved my goal and as a bonus the rich guy on the block thinks I'm kinda tough now and offers me a load of cheap loans and cool guns to protect myself with from the gang.
 

Archibald

Banned
given the efforts the British were making to try and build up French emigre resistance, from De Gaulle on down

As of early July 1940 De Gaulle was absolutely nobody, even to Churchill. When he flew to London on June 17, 1940, De Gaulle was in an aircraft with British diplomats. Churchill actually was angry at them because they had brought a nobody - he wanted Georges Mandel.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georges_Mandel
De Gaulle was still not a political animal: he had just ended his military career.
What was at stake was the LEGACY of the French third republic. Claim the legacy, and you got the government, the country, and the armed forces at your feets.
Guess why Pétain took the pain of being granted full powers by a (much diminished, but it doesn't mattered) National Assembly on July 10 ? Go figure the country overall situation. France was in total chaos, with deputies all the way from America to North Africa to England to Dakar. As such he could claimed continuity with the now defunct third republic. Having Mandel in London meant having a politician that knew France 3rd Republic infernal machinations - a politician that could claim legacy of 3rd Republic. That all that mattered. From the point of view of the United States (before 1943) "real" France was Vichy, not De Gaulle. Then Roosevelt tried to put General Henri Giraud in charge - but that failed.
A case can be made that diplomatically and worlwide, Free France was nothing until 1943, when the mascarade that was Vichy ended with Operation Anton.
 
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CalBear

Moderator
Donor
Monthly Donor
Note I specifically acknowledged that an All or nothing style scheme would be better than Hood's OTL armour layout.

I also note that as much as the USN apparently preferred AoN armour schemes they were not irreversibly wedded to it... Lexington's design with a vertically tapered belt demonstrates a significant deviation from the classical AoN layout.
Since a detailed analysis totally deconstructing your argument of "Limey R goez KABOOM always!" apparently went in one ear, clean through the vestigial grey matter which you pass off for a brain and out the other ear, let's try another tack:
If I was to, say, cite the OTL destruction of USS Arizona by magazine explosion as justification for claiming she (and for good measure her sister-ships) would inevitably go KABOOM! when faced with anything more potent than a BB gun would you raise a fuss? Yes? Then why the hell is your daft extrapolation of "Hood goes BOOM always" pass unchallenged?
Play the ball, not the man.

This sort of snide comment doesn't help your position.
 

hipper

Banned
There's also the reality that "much better" for the French and British is the British avoid the incident in the first place by not making the attack. The fallout of the attacks were a) terrible relations with Vichy and b) forcing the Feench withdrawal of the ships to a location where, if the French authorities had been so inclined, the ships actually could have been passed to Axis control much more easily than they could have been in North Africa.

It's also worth noting that despite the tactical situation, the British only managed to destroy one of the four capital ships.

So the entire action simply achieved coming closer to what the British feared the most than anything else.

Whereas, if the British had not been so reckless, the ships very well could have been preserved until the time of TORCH and may, repeat may, have come over to the Allies.

That's only a possibility, but making the attack eliminated the possibility and yet did nothing but put two of the most modern capital ships in the Med and their escorts and supports closer to being passed to the Axis.

All in all, it was an incredibly stupid thing to do.

Best,

Depends on Your point of view, if French ships had turned up escorting an invasion convoy in 1940 everyone would have said how silly the RN had been not to attack at Mers El Kebir. No one could guarantee that Hitlar would not seize the ships whatever his peace treaty with France said. Only Hindsight tells us it was unneeded.

besides the action guaranteed they 3 out of 4 battleships would not be in the English Channel in 1940 which was the desired result.
Anything else could be delt with.

Cheers Hipper
 
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