French perform much better at Mers-el-Kébir

A full on battle against the Brits politically would be pretty bad for anglo-french relations, perhaps somewhat worse even than IOTL. Not sure that's enough to get any different result from OTL: the French get angry and do pretty much nothing.

For the record, Mers El Kebir happened on July 3, 1940 while Pétain got full powers handled to him (by a much cut-down Assemblée Nationale) on July 10. I think MEK was the final nail in the coffin of the Anglo-French relationship... you'll never know, butterflies might flap their wings and prevent the old a$$hole from creating Vichy France...

not sure how it works against Petain in confused aftermath of bigger naval battle?

seems like less support for Free French side at least for a time?
 

Deleted member 1487

not sure how it works against Petain in confused aftermath of bigger naval battle?

seems like less support for Free French side at least for a time?
There was only minor support at the time anyway. The Free French only really picked up as a thing post-Torch.
 

Archibald

Banned
Problem here is that the Bretagne's were RANCID ships. They'd not been given a modernisation since WW1 save for 1 of the class which gave up her amidships turret for a catapult and hangar. Beyond that they'd not seen many changes, and whilst their gun elevation was thankfully increased they are out ranged. They were slow, their armour scheme was bad and we've no clue about French gunnery.

All wrong. They had been modernized heavily in the 30's, and were certainly less floating coffins than, say, the R-class.

Your answer is typical of that forum (heavy, and annoying) tendency to dismiss the French fleet of WWII as a bunch of all-flawed ships that can do nothing except gunnery target for (insert random uber navy here - USN, RN or Kriegsmarine)

The ships were modified several times in the interwar period. In 1919, Bretagne was equipped with a heavy tripod mast; Provence and Lorraine were given tripod masts in the early 1920s. Four of Bretagne's boilers were converted to oil-firing in 1924, and half of Provence's boilers in the rear boiler room were similarly converted in 1927. Bretagne subsequently had six new oil-fired boilers to replace the rest of the old coal-fired boilers, and her direct drive turbines were replaced with Parsons geared turbines.

In the interwar period, all three ships had their armament rearranged. In 1919–1920, Bretagne had the four forwardmost of her 138 mm guns removed, along with the 75 mm and two of the 47 mm guns. In their place, four 75 mm mle 1897 guns were installed on the forward superstructure. Twenty-four 8 mm (0.31 in) Hotchkiss machine guns were installed on the forecastle deck in 1927. The four rearmost 138 mm guns were removed during this refit, along with the 75 mm guns, which were replaced with eight 75 mm mle 1922 anti-aircraft guns. Sixteen 13.2 mm Hotchkiss machine guns, in quadruple mounts, were also added.[10] Provence had her four forward 138 mm guns removed in 1919, and was equipped similarly to Bretagne. In 1931–1934, she received the same eight 75 mm guns as Bretagne did, and in 1940, three quadruple mounts of 13.2 mm guns were fitted. Lorraine followed a similar pattern, though in 1935, her center main battery turret was removed; an aircraft catapult was fitted in its place. At this time, four 100 mm (3.9 in) Model M1930 guns were added, along with two of the 13.2 mm quadruple mounts. In 1940, the 100 mm guns were removed to arm the new battleship Richelieu, and eight 75 mm M1922 guns replaced them.
 
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They are still hoplessly obsolete, and are worse than the R's in terms or refits, but better than the Courbets. The MN never got a chance in WW2 sadly, they had some superb cruisers and their destroyers were beautiful vessels, if built for the med and only the med. The D&S were fine fine ships, but they were not built to take 15 inch rounds which they would be facing here. They were built to take 11 inch rounds and that they would have done magnificently.

The issue with the quad turrets is a real and wasn't fixed until post war on the Richelieu. In this battle the French are in a HUGE bind. They've got to get out, in broad daylight, and without air cover, against a foe that is prepared to engage them the moment they start moving.

So you've got to leave a harbour at low speed, being shot at and being unable to return fire with all your guns. You're then either going to separate your fleet and leave 3 slow vulnerable ships behind, or stick together and try and fight it out against ships who's guns have no issues with your armour and your guns have issue with the british ships. Plus air attacks.
 
Well, as history showed, it would have taken very little to sink the Hood.

"Very little" being the first of the 2 largest Battleships ever built in Europe - which was not at Mers-El-Kébir - so the French posses less than 'Very little'

As to the op's question

The 2 Dunkerques while clearly sensible and solid designs that made maximum use of their weight were intended to dominate Panzerschiffe and not intended to fight against Battleships (the majority of which they could have outrun) - so I don't see them taking out the Hood

The Bretagne class - well they were a liability in that fight

The 15" guns of the RN on the other hand are going to be dangerous at all combat ranges vs these French ships

So in order to do better the French are basically going to have to attack first and as the RN is going to see them getting up steam before they leave - already having sortied when Force H arrives but even then it's probably going to end just as badly

Perhaps the Italians might intervene - the Littorio and Vittorio Veneto had both joined the Italian fleet the previous month (although they were not officially declared operational until the 2nd Aug) - they may have forced Force H to leave ether through direct confrontation or threatening Malta?

Or a better result for everyone involved - Adm Gensoul doesn't have a hissy fit (he had a sulk because Sommerville did not meet him personally) and agrees to meets personally with Captain Holland of the Ark Royal and accepts to remove his fleet to US Waters (this had already been agreed by Darlan).
 
"Very little" being the first of the 2 largest Battleships ever built in Europe - which was not at Mers-El-Kébir - so the French posses less than 'Very little'
Or very little being a heavy cruiser.

There's a reason Anthony Preston Hood included the Hood in his book "The World's Worst Warships," along with the Bismarck. No matter if the Hood was sunk by the cruiser or the Bismarck, it's inarguable the Hood was relatively fragile when facing large guns.

So, getting back to the original post, it would not be surprising if the Hood met her doom at Mers-El-Kébir instead of the Denmark Sea.
 
Axis victory in the whole war, it changes everything. Mediterranean is now an Axis lake. Italy probably gets the coliones to take Malta when it is weak. Syria holds out against the Brits. Brits fold in Egypt after losing in Greece and Axis have better supplies going to Rommel. Vichy, with victory disease, sends an expeditionary force to Russia in 1942 to assist in Case Blue. With the French fleet intact and Egypt already in Axis hands, Axis has sufficient reserves in Africa and there is no Torch in 42 (or it fails.) This means there is an Overlord '43, which likewise fails. If Germany gets lucky at Stalingrad, which they might as the Luftwaffe avoids major attrition in Africa, we can see the USSR and Wallies sue for peace after a failed Overlord.































C'mon, someone had to go full retard on this one.
 
Or very little being a heavy cruiser.

There's a reason Anthony Preston Hood included the Hood in his book "The World's Worst Warships," along with the Bismarck. No matter if the Hood was sunk by the cruiser or the Bismarck, it's inarguable the Hood was relatively fragile when facing large guns.

So, getting back to the original post, it would not be surprising if the Hood met her doom at Mers-El-Kébir instead of the Denmark Sea.

PG was firing HE at Demark Straight and had not been firing at Hood for 3 minutes before the explosion having switched fire to HMS KGV (they didn't realise that it was actually POW) and the PGs Officers make no claim on sinking her, PGs 8" AP shells (which she was not using in the battle) in any case were incapable of penetrating to Hoods magazines - it's so improbable to the point of being impossible that the Heavy Cruiser sank her. Bismarck sank Hood not PG.

The only example I know of a Heavy 8" gunned Cruiser seriously damaging a Battleship was USS San Francisco vs Hiei (whose armour scheme even after modernisation was thinner than Hoods) at the somewhat desperate action off Guadalcanal at a much closer range (2K meters) where the US Ship hit her with 30 odd 8" shells and wrecked her steering which ultimately doomed her.

Could the French 13" guns have killed Hood? The shells are just over half the mass of Bismarck's shells (560 vs vs 800 kg)and while Hood is correctly described as being vulnerable or fragile - this is in context to the 15" and 16" shells of the day carried by the British, US and Japanese capital ships of the same period as well as the modern European 15" Battleships then entering service and not the 13" guns mounted on the French ships - Hood had about the same protection as an unmodernised QE - so while many things can happen in the chaos of war - I doubt that the French ships could realistically sink Hood in the same fashion as Bismarck did.

Back to the OP when Strasbourg made her escape one of the French Escorts (Probably the very smart looking La Fantastique class Destroyer La Terrible) made a torpedo attack on Hood which the battlecruiser avoided.......
 
Axis victory in the whole war, it changes everything. Mediterranean is now an Axis lake. Italy probably gets the coliones to take Malta when it is weak. Syria holds out against the Brits. Brits fold in Egypt after losing in Greece and Axis have better supplies going to Rommel. Vichy, with victory disease, sends an expeditionary force to Russia in 1942 to assist in Case Blue. With the French fleet intact and Egypt already in Axis hands, Axis has sufficient reserves in Africa and there is no Torch in 42 (or it fails.) This means there is an Overlord '43, which likewise fails. If Germany gets lucky at Stalingrad, which they might as the Luftwaffe avoids major attrition in Africa, we can see the USSR and Wallies sue for peace after a failed Overlord.































C'mon, someone had to go full retard on this one.

Well done that man - extra tot of rum
 
The Hood may well have been sunk by the Prinz Eugen. The HE shells of the PE may have started the fire on the boat deck or elsewhere, which led to the magazine explosion. While this is unlikely, it's possible that the PE sank the Hood.

Whatever the case, the Hood was an expensive failure--a poor design, with poor armor and poor flash protection.

PG was firing HE at Demark Straight and had not been firing at Hood for 3 minutes before the explosion having switched fire to HMS KGV (they didn't realise that it was actually POW) and the PGs Officers make no claim on sinking her, PGs 8" AP shells (which she was not using in the battle) in any case were incapable of penetrating to Hoods magazines - it's so improbable to the point of being impossible that the Heavy Cruiser sank her. Bismarck sank Hood not PG.
 
So, getting back to the original post, it would not be surprising if the Hood met her doom at Mers-El-Kébir instead of the Denmark Sea.
HMS Hood's armour scheme over her magazines sourced from http://www.navweaps.com/index_inro/INRO_Hood_p1.htm:
no21987-1920_Gunnery_trials_sketches.jpg


Deck armour: 2in upper + 3in main + 2in lower... Now, separate layers often don't work as effectively as a single homogeneous layer, but that's still the equivalent of somewhere north of 5in of total protection. The French 13in gun could punch through a 3.5in deck at around 25000 yards or a 4.3in deck at a bit over 30000 yards (going with the Navweap's "USN Emperical formula" numbers, Facehard numbers for British armour gives penetrations of 2.7-2.8in and 3.5-3.7in respectively). So, plunging fire from the French vessels is effectively incapable of causing a magazine explosion at ranges where optical fire control can reliably generate hits. Damage to more lightly armoured areas of the ship cannot be ruled out.

Belt armour: Varying between 12in and 5in inclined at about 12 degrees. Not too impressive at first glance. But, going through the 12in belt into the magazine gives angles of fall between effectively zero and about 28 degrees: angles of fall less than 10 degrees (equiv. range 18000 yards using Facehard figures) would see the 2in lower armored deck bounce the shell even if ignoring the belt and 2in sloped armour linking the main deck armour to the belt; fall angles over 16.9 degrees (equiv. range of 24000 yards) see the 12in sloped belt alone stop the incoming shell. If we assume the combination of lower deck + sloped deck to be equivalent to about an extra 3in added to the belt then there is no range at which the ship is vulnerable.

Through the 7in belt? Angle of fall between 11 and 58 degrees can potentially put a shell in the magazine (shallower and the shell flies out the other side without hitting the magazine). The belt alone is invulnerable at fall angles greater than 39 degrees (32000 yards), 2in deck, as above, bounces shots by itself at less than 10-11 degrees (18000 yards). Using the "first guess" above of sloped deck plus lower deck approximately equal to 3in of armour, we have a possible zone of vulnerability between 27000 and 29000 yards

Through the 5in belt? Fall angles greater than 17 degrees for trajectories into the magazine. The 3in deck comes into play and, by itself, bounces everything fired at ranges less than around 28000 yards (Facehard numbers), while the belt alone defeats everything fired from over 36000 yards. Given all plausible trajectories require passing through three or more of the 5in belt, 2in upper deck, 3in main deck, 2in sloped deck and 2in lower deck/magazine roof it seems reasonable to conclude the ship is effectively immune to magazine explosions arising from shells passing through the 5in belt.

TLDR: Plunging fire ineffective; fire through 12in belt ineffective; fire through 5in belt ineffective; fire through 7in belt likely ineffective, though potential weakness around 28000 yards.

Given the French 13in is generally superior to their 13.4in catastrophic and spectacular destruction of HMS Hood looks horribly unlikely. Crippling shots to the engine rooms may be possible (don't have a cross-section of the armour scheme around there at hand). But overall I see no sane reason (which "Merica FARK YAAAAH! Limey SUCK ASS!" is very much not) for your assertion.

Does this make Hood a brilliant, flawless and unsinkable ship? Certainly not. Hell! I would be the first to acknowledge that (1) by 1939 her protection was well behind the current generation of naval guns, and (2) going to an all or nothing armour layout (solid 12in belt in place of the 12in and 7in belts, 5in belt removed, upper deck removed in favour of going with thicker main and lower decks) would have been much better.

But was she a bad design by the measure of fast capital ships kicking round in 1916-1920? No, hell, no! That dubious honour has to go to the Lexington class...
 
Actually, yes it was. The U.S. all or nothing schemes had surpassed it. The obsolete armor scheme is why the U.K didn't build any more Admirals and went to using all or nothing armor schemes.

In particular, I have to say your statment, "But overall I see no sane reason (which "Merica FARK YAAAAH! Limey SUCK ASS!" is very much not) for your assertion," is projection of the worst sort--and baseless. I cited the work of Anthony Preston--an Englishman--to support the hypothesis the Hood was a failure. It's performance also supports that.


HMS Hood's armour scheme over her magazines sourced from http://www.navweaps.com/index_inro/INRO_Hood_p1.htm:
no21987-1920_Gunnery_trials_sketches.jpg


Deck armour: 2in upper + 3in main + 2in lower... Now, separate layers often don't work as effectively as a single homogeneous layer, but that's still the equivalent of somewhere north of 5in of total protection. The French 13in gun could punch through a 3.5in deck at around 25000 yards or a 4.3in deck at a bit over 30000 yards (going with the Navweap's "USN Emperical formula" numbers, Facehard numbers for British armour gives penetrations of 2.7-2.8in and 3.5-3.7in respectively). So, plunging fire from the French vessels is effectively incapable of causing a magazine explosion at ranges where optical fire control can reliably generate hits. Damage to more lightly armoured areas of the ship cannot be ruled out.

Belt armour: Varying between 12in and 5in inclined at about 12 degrees. Not too impressive at first glance. But, going through the 12in belt into the magazine gives angles of fall between effectively zero and about 28 degrees: angles of fall less than 10 degrees (equiv. range 18000 yards using Facehard figures) would see the 2in lower armored deck bounce the shell even if ignoring the belt and 2in sloped armour linking the main deck armour to the belt; fall angles over 16.9 degrees (equiv. range of 24000 yards) see the 12in sloped belt alone stop the incoming shell. If we assume the combination of lower deck + sloped deck to be equivalent to about an extra 3in added to the belt then there is no range at which the ship is vulnerable.

Through the 7in belt? Angle of fall between 11 and 58 degrees can potentially put a shell in the magazine (shallower and the shell flies out the other side without hitting the magazine). The belt alone is invulnerable at fall angles greater than 39 degrees (32000 yards), 2in deck, as above, bounces shots by itself at less than 10-11 degrees (18000 yards). Using the "first guess" above of sloped deck plus lower deck approximately equal to 3in of armour, we have a possible zone of vulnerability between 27000 and 29000 yards

Through the 5in belt? Fall angles greater than 17 degrees for trajectories into the magazine. The 3in deck comes into play and, by itself, bounces everything fired at ranges less than around 28000 yards (Facehard numbers), while the belt alone defeats everything fired from over 36000 yards. Given all plausible trajectories require passing through three or more of the 5in belt, 2in upper deck, 3in main deck, 2in sloped deck and 2in lower deck/magazine roof it seems reasonable to conclude the ship is effectively immune to magazine explosions arising from shells passing through the 5in belt.

TLDR: Plunging fire ineffective; fire through 12in belt ineffective; fire through 5in belt ineffective; fire through 7in belt likely ineffective, though potential weakness around 28000 yards.

Given the French 13in is generally superior to their 13.4in catastrophic and spectacular destruction of HMS Hood looks horribly unlikely. Crippling shots to the engine rooms may be possible (don't have a cross-section of the armour scheme around there at hand). But overall I see no sane reason (which "Merica FARK YAAAAH! Limey SUCK ASS!" is very much not) for your assertion.

Does this make Hood a brilliant, flawless and unsinkable ship? Certainly not. Hell! I would be the first to acknowledge that (1) by 1939 her protection was well behind the current generation of naval guns, and (2) going to an all or nothing armour layout (solid 12in belt in place of the 12in and 7in belts, 5in belt removed, upper deck removed in favour of going with thicker main and lower decks) would have been much better.

But was she a bad design by the measure of fast capital ships kicking round in 1916-1920? No, hell, no! That dubious honour has to go to the Lexington class...
 
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TFSmith121

Banned
what if the french put up a much better fight at Mers-el-Kébir and seriously damage the british attackers,while escaping destruction itself? What Political effects will this have on the british,and will it give more legitemacy to vichy-france?

As to how they achieve this,well i had in mind they rush to attain full combat readiness after getting the ultimatum,and having plain more luck in the interception of aircraft,achieving hits and especially not having the bretagne explode so fast.

Depends a lot on how and when the battle is fought. The RN force included three capital ships (two front line battleships and Hood), one fleet carrier with a mixed bag of aircraft, two light cruisers, and 11 destroyers. The available French ships iancluded the two modern battle cruisers, the two old battleships, a seaplane carrier, and six destroyers.

Now, it's worth noting that historically, even when the French ships were basically at anchor and immobile, the British only managed to sink one of the four French capital ships, damage two others, and pretty much missed the fourth, which made it to sea and avoided significant damage.

It is worth noting the British ships had 24 15 inch guns between them; the French had 32 main battery weapons, but some of which didn't even bear on the harbor entrance when the action began... The point being, this was not the Mediterranean Fleet of Matapan. Likewise, the French ships are not those of Casablanca, two years later, either.

So even if the French ships simply put to sea and are maneuvering, much less firing back, with the destroyers making smoke, seems unlikely the British will even do as well as they did, historically; it is entirely possible both sides suffer or neither side does, but to expect any such action to be as one-sided as the historical action seems rather sanguine.

If the French capital ships and destroyers go straight at the British, the ranges are rapidly going to close; if the two French battle cruisers and the six destroyers lead the way, and the two old battleships follow, Ark Royal is as out of place in a surface action as a little old lady in a bar fight, so she peels off at high speed with (at least) some escort (the two CLs and 2-4 destroyers, probably) and depending on the wind direction, she may or not be able to launch aircraft in the retreat; the French aircraft, operating from shore or the seaplanes from the bay, can, however.

That leaves the British with three capital ships (one of which has to operate independently of the other two to make any tactical use of her speed) and 7-9 destroyers, vs. the eight fast and two slower French ships. There are so many potential deltas it's impossible to say, other than it is unlikely the British are able to concentrate their fire and score anything close to what they did historically.

Best,
 
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Actually, yes it was. The U.S. all or nothing schemes had surpassed it. The obsolete armor scheme is why the U.K didn't build any more Admirals.
Note I specifically acknowledged that an All or nothing style scheme would be better than Hood's OTL armour layout.

I also note that as much as the USN apparently preferred AoN armour schemes they were not irreversibly wedded to it... Lexington's design with a vertically tapered belt demonstrates a significant deviation from the classical AoN layout.
Performance of the Hood in battle, of course, demonstrated the UK made the correct decision in not building any more Admirals.
Since a detailed analysis totally deconstructing your argument of "Limey R goez KABOOM always!" apparently went in one ear, clean through the vestigial grey matter which you pass off for a brain and out the other ear, let's try another tack:
If I was to, say, cite the OTL destruction of USS Arizona by magazine explosion as justification for claiming she (and for good measure her sister-ships) would inevitably go KABOOM! when faced with anything more potent than a BB gun would you raise a fuss? Yes? Then why the hell is your daft extrapolation of "Hood goes BOOM always" pass unchallenged?
 
Your arguments didn't go through one ear and out the other. I just felt they were not worth responding to because I feel they were wrong and ill-conceived. Tonight, before I posted and before you cribbed the arguments from NavWeapons, I reveiwed that article and read three other papers, along 3 or 4 of the relevant books I own that discuss the Hood's failings. Based on this and past reading, I reached a different conclusion than you did.

Further, This post and your posts are rife with logical fallacies. You bring up strawmen. You argue that because something is flawed, it makes the Hood acceptable. You attribute meanings to me without any basis. You really are bent on projecting your prejudices onto others.

You made a statement that the Hoods armor was not bad judged against contemporaries, then contradict it by noting the all or nothing is better. For the world's most expensive and largest warship, the Hood's protection scheme was bad. The badness of the protection scheme was demonstrated in that it failed catastrophically as the result being hit by a shell or shell that it should not have been able to destroy it so easily and rapidly. You seem to ignore this reality.

You bring up several strawmen. I know the Lexington had a flawed armor scheme. That has nothing to do with the matter at hand. None of the Lexington class were ever completed as a battlecruiser, let alone were they at at Mers-el-Kébir. We aren't talking about that. That the unbuilt Lexington battlecruisers were worse, that doesn't make the Hood good.

Likewise, the Arizona exploding after being hit while at anchor is another pointless comparison that has nothing to do with the Hood's flawed design. Rather, you bring up the the Arizona to reiterate your assumption as to my views about America and the UK as a whole. You're the one who made the assumption as to my views. I made no mention of the US prior to my mention of the all or nothing armor. Nor did I mention any of the other Royal Navy ships. You're so dogmatic you argue that because I hold an opinion contrary I must believe "Merica FARK YAAAAH! Limey SUCK ASS!" I would posit your post reveal that in fact you believe "LIMEYS FARK YAAAAH! 'Merica SUCK ASS," and any opinion that disagrees with your view deeply threatens you.

The bottom line is we disagree as the whether the French could have sunk the Hood by gunfire. You have your beliefs. I have mine. I think mine are correct.

Down periscope.

Note I specifically acknowledged that an All or nothing style scheme would be better than Hood's OTL armour layout.

I also note that as much as the USN apparently preferred AoN armour schemes they were not irreversibly wedded to it... Lexington's design with a vertically tapered belt demonstrates a significant deviation from the classical AoN layout.
Since a detailed analysis totally deconstructing your argument of "Limey R goez KABOOM always!" apparently went in one ear, clean through the vestigial grey matter which you pass off for a brain and out the other ear, let's try another tack:
If I was to, say, cite the OTL destruction of USS Arizona by magazine explosion as justification for claiming she (and for good measure her sister-ships) would inevitably go KABOOM! when faced with anything more potent than a BB gun would you raise a fuss? Yes? Then why the hell is your daft extrapolation of "Hood goes BOOM always" pass unchallenged?
 
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what would be "much better" for the French? (leaving aside BB duel and their respective merits)

if the Dunkerque as well as Strasbourg had escaped?
 

Archibald

Banned
But the Strasbourg actually escaped to Toulon, while the Dunkerque was not so lucky. Best case is that the two battlecruisers manage to escape and come to Toulon. But that doesn't really change Vichy France (POD too little, too late - see my earlier posts) and the scuttling of November 1942...
 

TFSmith121

Banned
But the Strasbourg actually escaped to Toulon, while the Dunkerque was not so lucky. Best case is that the two battlecruisers manage to escape and come to Toulon. But that doesn't really change Vichy France (POD too little, too late - see my earlier posts) and the scuttling of November 1942...

There's also the reality that "much better" for the French and British is the British avoid the incident in the first place by not making the attack. The fallout of the attacks were a) terrible relations with Vichy and b) forcing the Feench withdrawal of the ships to a location where, if the French authorities had been so inclined, the ships actually could have been passed to Axis control much more easily than they could have been in North Africa.

It's also worth noting that despite the tactical situation, the British only managed to destroy one of the four capital ships.

So the entire action simply achieved coming closer to what the British feared the most than anything else.

Whereas, if the British had not been so reckless, the ships very well could have been preserved until the time of TORCH and may, repeat may, have come over to the Allies.

That's only a possibility, but making the attack eliminated the possibility and yet did nothing but put two of the most modern capital ships in the Med and their escorts and supports closer to being passed to the Axis.

All in all, it was an incredibly stupid thing to do.

Best,
 

Deleted member 94680

what would be "much better" for the French? (leaving aside BB duel and their respective merits)

if the Dunkerque as well as Strasbourg had escaped?

But the Strasbourg actually escaped to Toulon, while the Dunkerque was not so lucky. Best case is that the two battlecruisers manage to escape and come to Toulon. But that doesn't really change Vichy France (POD too little, too late - see my earlier posts) and the scuttling of November 1942...

So, they escape somewhere "better"? End up in the Caribbean instead? The run would involved two or maybe three more actions, and it's even more unlikely that they would survive those as well.

Or, is the OP's intention that "better" means they inflict damage on the British during the action? Surely that would only result in a further attack with a stronger force and more French ships sunk as opposed to damaged.

Wasn't the scuttling of '42 in response to German attempts to impress the ships? Would a larger French fleet (bolstered by the 'survivors' of MeK) be impressed earlier by the Germans, or would it give Vichy a semblance of independence of action? Be used to defend Tunis or Morrocco against the Allies in '42?
 
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