Except for all the fortified lines they continually had to breakthrough with Soviet tanks armies constantly counterattacking while you're outnumbered in every way possible, especially in the air; open ground was never reached in WW2 just a lot of minefields and bunkers.
Fortified open ground is still open ground. That the Soviets had the good sense to attack where the Germans were weak while the Germans did not have the sense to avoid attacking where the Soviets were strong is not a point in favor of the Germans.
Meanwhile during Bagration once they breached the first lines they ran right into open country. German reserves were basically non-existent due to the surprise of the operation, total Soviet domination of the air interdicting what there was, Hitler ordering a not one step back order, and overwhelming Soviet AFV advantage.
And the fact the Germans did not have adequate numbers to maintain a substantial reserve all along the front anyways. So they were forced to choose. In the case of Bagration, they chose very poorly.
when the Germans moved through the area in 1941 without the advantage of partisan help they ran right through the swamps despite having inferior AFVs, few aircraft, and again much more powerful AT guns than their AFVs could handle without issue.
When the Germans moved through the region they faced practically no resistance at all. The majority of Soviet troops which had been concentrated further west were already broken and the strategic reserves were further east in Smolensk. What Soviet soldiers were in the area were a disorganized mob incapable of offering resistance. By the time those who avoided capture got organized and form partisan bands, the front had already moved well too the east.
If you do find out I'd be interested.
Apparently they did. I only learned this second-hand (asked about on another forum), so take it with the relevant weight. Still, it likely does not alter the numbers substantially.
It maximized the concentration of scarce forces lacking any sort of reserve.
So they didn't have good defenses due to lack of numbers.
Largely, yes. And they were incapable of mustering the requisite numbers because they did not have the first clue of what the Soviets were planning. They believed, largely as a result of an extraordinarily successful Soviet deception campaign, that the Soviets would launch an assault from the L'vov direction aimed towards the Baltic States. In this, they were guilty of not only falling for Soviet deception efforts but also for mirror-imaging
We aren't talking about the whole battle of Kursk, just the German attacks which inflicted over 70k irrecoverable out of 170k, so over 1/3rd of casualties inflicted during the German attack were dead/captured. I.E. 20k more dead than the Germans took in total casualties during their failed offensive.
Ah, in that case the relevant proportion of Soviet forces is 3%.
So now you're cherrypicking numbers, because of all the numbers available at the battle,
Actually, I thought when we were talking about the Battle of Kursk we were talking about, you know, the entire battle. Not just Citadel. Because generally when people talk about a battle, they mean the entire battle.
nowhere near even half met the enemy in combat considering Soviet overall numbers included rear area forces that did not meet the enemy and reserve formations that didn't enter combat.
And the same is true for the 940,000 men the Germans had. However, we count the entire force structure because that is the strength of the forces involved. That you do not like that does not change it.
but then we are talking about casualties inflicted given force disparities on the attack, NOT overall casualties relative to the numbers committed;
Actually, we are talking about how good a doctrine is and the main measurement of that is not casualty ratios but
results. And in this, Deep Battle achieved a ton more then Methodical Battle did and ultimately even more then Blitzkrieg did (given that the Soviets won WW2 and the Germans did not).
Again trying to reframe the debate to make the Soviet losses look better. The Soviets had every advantage and took twice as many losses as inflicted, yet when the Germans attacked in far worse circumstances they always managed to inflict heavier losses on the Soviet than they took despite being outnumbered and in 1943 totally outgunned and had no element of surprise.
And they achieved their objective at a sustainable cost. The Germans did not.
Instead they had LL offering them more than those territories would have in real terms due to the value and quality of US and UK supplies of industrial help.
Were the Soviets receiving more L-L in 1943 or 1944?
That did not make any functional difference given they had months to prepare and had massive stocks on hand.
Hence why I said "not in any manner which would actually be noticeable".
Given the proportion of forces involved the Soviets should have been able to inflict far more lopsided casualties on the Germans than they took, but instead suffered twice as many while at the same time the WAllies were at least scoring equal at Normandy.
And they achieved a whole lot more. Had the WAllies wanted to score as big territorial advances and as big German casualties as the Soviets in 1943-44, they would have had to fight more like the Soviets. Instead, they fought cautiously and got more modest results. for it
Actually you can: not take twice as many yourself to inflict those losses.
Why should you care that you took twice as many casualties when those casualties have no effect on your fighting capability?
Falaise was a pretty decisive loss causing the Germans to mostly abandon France and resume the battle on the border of the Lowlands and the German border. Operation Anvil caused the collapse of the Southern French position, even operations in Italy caused a steady retreat of the Germans up the penninsula. Tunisia was a pretty decisive defeat, as was Sicily. The Battle of the Bulge was a major defeat and saw the Wallies score better than even casualties, but when the later Spring Awakening operation happened even in defeat the Germans scored better on the Soviets than vice-versa despite the Germans being in total collapse.
And yet none of them were
as large or decisive as either the German or Soviet defeats in the east. The WAllies set modest goals, made modest assaults, and got accordingly modest results. When they had reverses, they were also modest. The Germans and Soviets set hugely ambitious goals, made hugely ambitious assaults, and got accordingly spectacular results. But when they had reverses, they were also huge.
Again this is basically the spirit of French Methodical Battle;
Not really. The French did not embark on the same degree of scientific.
the way the Soviets fought the winter war was not that much different than the way the French were supposed to fight a major war;
Given that the Soviets had unofficially abandoned Deep Battle during the Winter War, yeah, okay.
On a side note and also as research for my own TL. Would a largely conscript army that utilises a series of tactical drills have an advantage over one a largely conscript army that relies upon initiative at the lower level i.e. Junior Officer & NCO?
That depends. Is the latter army so obsessed with initiative at the lower-level that it strips their commanders with the flexibility to make many key command decisions easily?
By 1941 the French would have been pretty well prepared and in fact far better prepared then anyone in the world other than the Germans.
Change "1941" to "1942" and "the French" to "the Soviets" and this statement would remain just as accurate. Pretty much the only people who were ready for the war when the war came were the Germans.
They just have the misfortune of having war thrust on them before they were ready for it.
And not coincidentally, so did the Soviets.
I guess technically there was no such thing as an OMG during WW2:
In a
de-jure sense, no. In a de-facto sense they did though. It was the entire purpose of tank armies.
Erm... an Operational Manuever Group describes a role, not an organization like a CMG does.
The Soviets were developing their doctrine during the war despite having theoretical ideas, same as the French, its just the French didn't get to flesh out their attack doctrine like the Soviets eventually did.
Incorrect. The Soviets developed their doctrine, abandoned it for political reasons, tried to return too it, abandoned it again when war came before they were prepared to it and as an adaptation to the circumstances of mid/late-1941, and the returned too it for the final time. The French, as pdf27 noted, abandoned Methodical Battle after the Germans demonstrated how poor of a doctrine it was and never had the time to develop anything new because they were practically already defeated.
So, no, had the French survived they would not have further developed Methodical Battle. They would have instead abandoned it and developed something new. This new thing may have resembled Deep Battle, but probably with some detail changes.