French Methodical Battle, Soviet Deep Battle two sides of the same coin?

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How was Germany able to get a favorable kill ratio against the Soviets during their attack at Kursk, despite giving their foe months to prepare, having no surprise, being outnumbered all all categories, and the Soviets have a better core AFV?

Superior skill and good tank ground. In 1943, the Germans were still on average better man-for-man then the Soviets. Technically, in mid-1944 they were also probably on average better man-for-man then the Soviets, even if the gap was closer still then a year earlier. It's just too bad for them that war is hardly a man-for-man contest. Still, the Germans never came even close to breaking through at Kursk despite a solid week of fighting, while in Bagration the Soviets pretty much broke through on the first day. Hell in some places, they broke through during the pre-offensive reconnaissance probes.

Did sanitary losses include permanently disabled and those that later died of wounds?
Possibly, I'll have to check. But even given the Soviets inadequate battlefield medical system, the number of permanently disabled is a small fraction of overall wounded.

Still given that the Soviets took 150k prisoners and killed about 130k men while on the major attack with superiority in all categories it was a poor showing
280K German irrecoverable losses (which is obviously you cherry-picking the lowest number) represents 48% of Army Group Center and 14% of total German forces on the Eastern Front. Soviet irrecoverable losses, which were roughly a 100K less then the Germans, represent 10% of the attacking fronts involved and 2% of total Soviet forces on the Eastern Front. In addition, the Soviets achieved a rate of advance during the operation comparable too the Germans during Barbarossa and double anything ever achieved by the Western Allies in the presence of enemy resistance.

And that is before we get into all of the other Soviet offensives that summer (Bagration was merely one of several) and how they add to the total.

Only someone who let's prejudices their color prejudices could call that a "poor showing".

Plus of course the Germans lost at Kursk and the Soviets won at Bagration.
Which, in the end, is what really matters. More so then the casualty ratio.
 
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Deleted member 1487

This mistakes the undertrained French army as the norm their doctrine was aimed at. The French politicians had the disadvantage of being fiscally prudent & not spending more on defense that the citizens could pay for. that meant spreading a lesser amount of training across a broader number of reservists. the combat methodology of 1940 reflected this accomadating a undertrained army. That doctrine was aimed at a much more capable army that would have developed as 1940 ran out. German methods were sucessfull because the deficit spending and looting of annexed nations allowed a far more through peace time training regime. As the French training program spun out it performance & doctrine would have looked a lot more like either the British or the US of 1943-44

So in proper expression of doctrine the French army would have been a match or better than of the Soviets?
 

Deleted member 1487

Superior skill and good tank ground. In 1943, the Germans were still on average better man-for-man then the Soviets. Technically, in mid-1944 they were also probably on average better man-for-man then the Soviets, even if the gap was closer still then a year earlier. It's just too bad for them that war is hardly a man-for-man contest.
Heavily fortified ground, probably the most heavily fortified in the world, is good tank country, especially filled with AT guns in bunkers and littered with minefields with more men on the defensive with more and better tanks, artillery, AT guns, fully alerted to the attack?

Possibly, I'll have to check. But even given the Soviets inadequate battlefield medical system, the number of permanently disabled is a small fraction of overall wounded.
I'm pretty curious what the Soviet medical casualty stat includes.

280K German irrecoverable losses (which is obviously you cherry-picking the lowest number)
It was modern research done into German medical casualty reports which are accurate up to 1945, then the reporting system totally broke down. Soviet numbers for casualties inflicted were almost always overstated, but POW numbers are mostly accurate but for the missing 1 million German missing that disappeared at the end of the war, and the 300k German PoWs that died in Soviet custody according to their records and they never admitted until archival research after the archives opened in the 1990s revealed it:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_casualties_in_World_War_II#German_Prisoners_of_War


represents 48% of Army Group Center and 14% of total German forces on the Eastern Front. Soviet irrecoverable losses, which were roughly a 100K less then the Germans, represent 10% of the attacking fronts involved and 2% of total Soviet forces on the Eastern Front. In addition, the Soviets achieved a rate of advance during the operation comparable too the Germans during Barbarossa and double anything ever achieved by the Western Allies in the presence of enemy resistance.
Given that they won with total surprise, total domination in all categories of weapons and manpower, and had Hitler locking his forces down in the best way for Soviet artillery preparation and attack doctrine to take advantage of, they still couldn't inflict as many casualties on the Germans as the Germans inflicted on them in far worse circumstances a year earlier when their manpower, economy, and supply situation was far better (plus the Soviets didn't have to fight partisans in their rear area during Kursk). If anything the Soviets should have done better in terms of inflicting casualties.

Only someone who lets prejudices color their perception of events could call that a "poor showing".

Which, in the end, is what really matters. More so then the casualty ratio.
Compared to what everyone else achieved on the attack (Germans, US, Brits) the Soviets underperformed on the attack in terms of being able to inflict casualties. In fact looking at all the offensives on wikipedia in 1944 other than 1 major exception (Romania switching sides) the Soviets routinely took far heavier losses on the attack than they inflicted despite heavily outnumbering and gunning their opponent whose economy was being wrecked from the air by the Wallies and was fighting on multiple other fronts and losing badly there, sucking off reserves.
 
Heavily fortified ground, probably the most heavily fortified in the world, is good tank country,

It is flat, wide-open terrain that is easily navigable for tracked vehicles. Ideal tank country. Not a mix of swamps your tank can easily sink into or claustrophobic forests that doesn't even any attempt at camouflage to set up an ambush.

I'm pretty curious what the Soviet medical casualty stat includes.
Looking into it. Thus far I've found a whole lot of stuff about Soviet units recording sanitary losses in Afghanistan which, while interesting, doesn't manage to tell me much about whether the injuries included disabled or not.

An interesting question does occur to me though: did German casualty reports include sick like the Soviets did?

It was modern research done into German medical casualty reports which are accurate up to 1945,
AKA: Wikipedia.

and had Hitler locking his forces down in the best way for Soviet artillery preparation and attack doctrine to take advantage of,
Actually, the evidence is that given the forces available to Army Group Center, the German's initial deployments were as ideal as they could get. Trying to set-up defense-in-depth would have either meant sacrificing ground to the Soviets for free (at which point, the Soviets move up and launch the offensive from there instead) or leaving both lines so weak that the Soviets could dispense with the preliminary bombardment altogether (as they actually did in some places when they found German defenses were even weaker then they imagined).

The only way the Germans could have made an alternate deployment feasible would have been to strip other sectors of the front of their forces. Which would lead the Soviets notice and alter their own plans accordingly.

they still couldn't inflict as many casualties on the Germans as the Germans inflicted on them
Actually, when looking at it proportionally (which is far more telling then absolute numbers), they did. The irrecoverable losses the Germans inflicted upon the Soviets during the entire Battle of Kursk amount to only 10% of total Soviet forces deployed. Vastly inferior to what the Soviets did to them in Bagration.

Proportionally speaking, the irrecoverable German losses in Bagration are also roughly identical to most of the irrecoverable losses the Germans managed to inflict upon the Soviets during 1941.

Germans inflicted on them in far worse circumstances a year earlier when their manpower, economy, and supply situation was far better
The Soviets economic situation was actually worse in mid-1943 then in mid-1944: they hadn't recaptured most of Ukraine and were still bringing industry from the territories recaptured in the winter back online. In manpower terms, they were about the same. Supply was also technically worse, but not in any manner which would actually be noticeable. Actually, as a proportion of the forces involved, the attacking Soviets inflicted vastly more casualties upon the Germans then the Germans had at Kursk.

If anything the Soviets should have done better in terms of inflicting casualties.
An Army Group suffering near 50% irrecoverable losses in 2 weeks is annihilation-level of casualties. You can't get much better then that.

Compared to what everyone else achieved on the attack (Germans, US, Brits) the Soviets underperformed on the attack in terms of being able to inflict casualties.
The Germans never had to face an opponent as skilled as themselves and the WAllies casualty aversion came at the price of hamstringing the tempo of their operations so much that they never really managed to inflict decisive losses upon the German ground forces.
 
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I will take time to note that Deep Operations does have one very glaring weakness when it comes to large-scale mechanized wars. But to explain it requires some background information on Soviet tactics.

Because of the Soviets training standard, they broke all larger maneuvers down into a series of rapid tactical drills which could be completed quickly and efficiently by conscript soldiers. These drills then became the building blocks for all the larger maneuvers, in which they could be combined in different configurations and sequences. That meant that at the tactical level the Soviets had relatively little flexibility compared to western forces, but at the operational level a commander would be able to put these blocks together in a number of ways, allowing him to maneuver more quickly and decisively. For example, their drills for a divisional attack from the march was more fluid than most Western states semi-equivalent, the "hasty attack" (and a lot more comprehensive as well).

Since the Soviets believed that war was won not at the tactical level, but at the operational and strategic levels (a view that has history on its side) this was seen as an acceptable trade off.

The real theoretical downside to the tactical drills was not their relatively rigid execution (people don't like to admit it, but speed and shock can defeat artistry), but that they were based on a lot of assumptions about how a war would pan out - what the Soviets called "norms." Norms were an entire (very large) field of military study in Soviet academies, and were represented by a wealth of intricate mathematical equations. The aim was not to get it exactly right, of course, but to get them close to allow the advantages to outweigh the disadvantages.

Of course, when its been decades since theory has been put into practice, its hard to know if your assumptions sill match reality. And when you've constructed reams of mathematical equations based on those norms for commanders to use to calculate attack frontages, ammunition usage, rate of advance, medical requirements, etc, if those assumptions are seriously wrong then you've got an entire establishment to reform and new drills to teach - kinda hard to do in the middle of a shooting war. The Soviet contention was that STAVKA could look at battle results with a clear eye, gather all the relevant information, make the best choices, and then feed these back down to the troops to give them the best solution.

Except when you're dealing with a lessons learned process there's the problems of incomplete reporting, conflicting data, ass covering, egos, personal reputations caught up in pet theories, the sheer inertia of changing a pre-existing intricate and comprehensive body of tactical thought... And all of it takes time to sort out. And all the while your troops in the field are still being ordered to use tactics that may be getting them slaughtered because they are not allowed to change their drills until STAVKA says so.

Now IOTL this was an issue in 1941, although any impact it might have had is kind of hard to separate from the legions upon legions of issues of other problems the Red Army had. By the time the Soviets were at a point where they could go from "okay, now... lessons learning time" the pre-war norms had already been practically jettisoned during the time where they were putting all of their attention into just making sure the Red Army survived so they could really start afresh.
 
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I will take time to note that Deep Operations does have one very glaring weakness when it comes to large-scale mechanized wars. But to explain it requires some background information on Soviet tactics.

Because of the Soviets training standard, they broke all larger maneuvers down into a series of rapid tactical drills which could be completed quickly and efficiently by conscript soldiers. These drills then became the building blocks for all the larger maneuvers, in which they could be combined in different configurations and sequences. That meant that at the tactical level the Soviets had relatively little flexibility compared to western forces, but at the operational level a commander would be able to put these blocks together in a number of ways, allowing him to maneuver more quickly and decisively. For example, their drills for a divisional attack from the march was more fluid than most Western states semi-equivalent, the "hasty attack" (and a lot more comprehensive as well).

Since the Soviets believed that war was won not at the tactical level, but at the operational and strategic levels (a view that has history on its side) this was seen as an acceptable trade off.

The real theoretical downside to the tactical drills was not their relatively rigid execution (people don't like to admit it, but speed and shock can defeat artistry), but that they were based on a lot of assumptions about how a war would pan out - what the Soviets called "norms." Norms were an entire (very large) field of military study in Soviet academies, and were represented by a wealth of intricate mathematical equations. The aim was not to get it exactly right, of course, but to get them close to allow the advantages to outweigh the disadvantages.

Of course, when its been decades since theory has been put into practice, its hard to know if your assumptions sill match reality. And when you've constructed reams of mathematical equations based on those norms for commanders to use to calculate attack frontages, ammunition usage, rate of advance, medical requirements, etc, if those assumptions are seriously wrong then you've got an entire establishment to reform and new drills to teach - kinda hard to do in the middle of a shooting war. The Soviet contention was that STAVKA could look at battle results with a clear eye, gather all the relevant information, make the best choices, and then feed these back down to the troops to give them the best solution.

Except when you're dealing with a lessons learned process there's the problems of incomplete reporting, conflicting data, ass covering, egos, personal reputations caught up in pet theories, the sheer inertia of changing a pre-existing intricate and comprehensive body of tactical thought... And all of it takes time to sort out. And all the while your troops in the field are still being ordered to use tactics that may be getting them slaughtered because they are not allowed to change their drills until STAVKA says so.

On a side note and also as research for my own TL. Would a largely conscript army that utilises a series of tactical drills have an advantage over one a largely conscript army that relies upon initiative at the lower level i.e. Junior Officer & NCO? How did the German Army prepare its largely conscript army during the Cold War to face the Soviet juggernaut?

For me it would depend upon the drills and the ability of the system to adapt quickly to changing circumstances. The Soviet model of warfare has always had a fascination for me.
 

Deleted member 1487

I will take time to note that Deep Operations does have one very glaring weakness when it comes to large-scale mechanized wars. But to explain it requires some background information on Soviet tactics.

Because of the Soviets training standard, they broke all larger maneuvers down into a series of rapid tactical drills which could be completed quickly and efficiently by conscript soldiers. These drills then became the building blocks for all the larger maneuvers, in which they could be combined in different configurations and sequences. That meant that at the tactical level the Soviets had relatively little flexibility compared to western forces, but at the operational level a commander would be able to put these blocks together in a number of ways, allowing him to maneuver more quickly and decisively. For example, their drills for a divisional attack from the march was more fluid than most Western states semi-equivalent, the "hasty attack" (and a lot more comprehensive as well).

Since the Soviets believed that war was won not at the tactical level, but at the operational and strategic levels (a view that has history on its side) this was seen as an acceptable trade off.

The real theoretical downside to the tactical drills was not their relatively rigid execution (people don't like to admit it, but speed and shock can defeat artistry), but that they were based on a lot of assumptions about how a war would pan out - what the Soviets called "norms." Norms were an entire (very large) field of military study in Soviet academies, and were represented by a wealth of intricate mathematical equations. The aim was not to get it exactly right, of course, but to get them close to allow the advantages to outweigh the disadvantages.

Of course, when its been decades since theory has been put into practice, its hard to know if your assumptions sill match reality. And when you've constructed reams of mathematical equations based on those norms for commanders to use to calculate attack frontages, ammunition usage, rate of advance, medical requirements, etc, if those assumptions are seriously wrong then you've got an entire establishment to reform and new drills to teach - kinda hard to do in the middle of a shooting war. The Soviet contention was that STAVKA could look at battle results with a clear eye, gather all the relevant information, make the best choices, and then feed these back down to the troops to give them the best solution.

Except when you're dealing with a lessons learned process there's the problems of incomplete reporting, conflicting data, ass covering, egos, personal reputations caught up in pet theories, the sheer inertia of changing a pre-existing intricate and comprehensive body of tactical thought... And all of it takes time to sort out. And all the while your troops in the field are still being ordered to use tactics that may be getting them slaughtered because they are not allowed to change their drills until STAVKA says so.

Now IOTL this was an issue in 1941, although any impact it might have had is kind of hard to separate from the legions upon legions of issues of other problems the Red Army had. By the time the Soviets were at a point where they could go from "okay, now... lessons learning time" the pre-war norms had already been practically jettisoned during the time where they were putting all of their attention into just making sure the Red Army survived so they could really start afresh.

Again this is basically the spirit of French Methodical Battle; the way the Soviets fought the winter war was not that much different than the way the French were supposed to fight a major war; it was the German victories in 1940-42 that altered the Soviet expression of their system and would have done the same for a surviving French one.
 

Deleted member 1487

On a side note and also as research for my own TL. Would a largely conscript army that utilises a series of tactical drills have an advantage over one a largely conscript army that relies upon initiative at the lower level i.e. Junior Officer & NCO? How did the German Army prepare its largely conscript army during the Cold War to face the Soviet juggernaut?

For me it would depend upon the drills and the ability of the system to adapt quickly to changing circumstances. The Soviet model of warfare has always had a fascination for me.
The Bundeswehr just used their maneuver system from WW2 basically, just made everything mechanized and integrated it with the NATO forces in Germany:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_Army#Founding_of_the_Army
http://coldwardecoded.blogspot.com/2013/06/structure-of-force-ranks-of-bundeswehr.html
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bundeswehr#Cold_War_1955.E2.80.931990
During the Cold War the Bundeswehr was the backbone of NATO's conventional defence in Central Europe. It had a strength of 495,000 military and 170,000 civilian personnel. Although Germany had smaller armed forces than France and the United States, Cold War Historian John Lewis Gaddis assesses the Bundeswehr as "perhaps world's best army".[14] The Army consisted of three corps with 12 divisions, most of them heavily armed with tanks and APCs. The Luftwaffe owned significant numbers of tactical combat aircraft and took part in NATO's integrated air defence (NATINAD). The Navy was tasked and equipped to defend the Baltic Approaches, to provide escort reinforcement and resupply shipping in the North Sea and to contain the Soviet Baltic Fleet.

http://www.vmi.edu/uploadedFiles/Ac...ter/EssayContest/20052006/TrauschweizerIF.pdf
 
Methodical Battle thought in terms of a single, static unbroken line. The moment one part of the line starts getting pushed, all of the reserves are immediately rush there to counter-attack and hold the line. In the context of World War 2, this is operationally doomed to failure as it completely hands the initiative to the enemy who can push at multiple points to force the commitment of the reserves before launching the main blow.
To be fair to the French, they had dropped this by the time Weygand took command, only weeks into the battle. Too late given the disasters already experienced, but they certainly were not slow learners.
 

Deleted member 1487

It is flat, wide-open terrain that is easily navigable for tracked vehicles. Ideal tank country. Not a mix of swamps your tank can easily sink into or claustrophobic forests that doesn't even any attempt at camouflage to set up an ambush.
Except for all the fortified lines they continually had to breakthrough with Soviet tanks armies constantly counterattacking while you're outnumbered in every way possible, especially in the air; open ground was never reached in WW2 just a lot of minefields and bunkers.

Meanwhile during Bagration once they breached the first lines they ran right into open country. German reserves were basically non-existent due to the surprise of the operation, total Soviet domination of the air interdicting what there was, Hitler ordering a not one step back order, and overwhelming Soviet AFV advantage. Plus of course their vast partisan operations in German rear areas; when the Germans moved through the area in 1941 without the advantage of partisan help they ran right through the swamps despite having inferior AFVs, few aircraft, and again much more powerful AT guns than their AFVs could handle without issue.

Looking into it. Thus far I've found a whole lot of stuff about Soviet units recording sanitary losses in Afghanistan which, while interesting, doesn't manage to tell me much about whether the injuries included disabled or not.
If you do find out I'd be interested.

An interesting question does occur to me though: did German casualty reports include sick like the Soviets did?
Not sure about WW2 casualties, WW1 reporting did if it resulted in evacuation.

AKA: Wikipedia.
Frieser, Karl-Heinz, ed. (2007). Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg – Vol. 8: Karl-Heinz Frieser, Klaus Schmider, Klaus Schönherr, Gerhard Schreiber, Kristián Ungváry, Bernd Wegner: Die Ostfront 1943/44 – Der Krieg im Osten und an den Nebenfronten. München: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt. ISBN 978-3-421-06235-2.

Actually, the evidence is that given the forces available to Army Group Center, the German's initial deployments were as ideal as they could get. Trying to set-up defense-in-depth would have either meant sacrificing ground to the Soviets for free (at which point, the Soviets move up and launch the offensive from there instead) or leaving both lines so weak that the Soviets could dispense with the preliminary bombardment altogether (as they actually did in some places when they found German defenses were even weaker then they imagined).
Idea how? You describe two system and their disadvantages compared to Soviet attack doctrine. I don't see how that makes anything the Germans had ideal.

The only way the Germans could have made an alternate deployment feasible would have been to strip other sectors of the front of their forces. Which would lead the Soviets notice and alter their own plans accordingly.
So they didn't have good defenses due to lack of numbers.

Actually, when looking at it proportionally (which is far more telling then absolute numbers), they did. The irrecoverable losses the Germans inflicted upon the Soviets during the entire Battle of Kursk amount to only 10% of total Soviet forces deployed. Vastly inferior to what the Soviets did to them in Bagration.
We aren't talking about the whole battle of Kursk, just the German attacks which inflicted over 70k irrecoverable out of 170k, so over 1/3rd of casualties inflicted during the German attack were dead/captured. I.E. 20k more dead than the Germans took in total casualties during their failed offensive. So now you're cherrypicking numbers, because of all the numbers available at the battle, nowhere near even half met the enemy in combat considering Soviet overall numbers included rear area forces that did not meet the enemy and reserve formations that didn't enter combat.

Had the Germans actually broken through at Kursk they would have taken far more prisoners than the Soviets had at Bagration, but then we are talking about casualties inflicted given force disparities on the attack, NOT overall casualties relative to the numbers committed; you're trying to reframe the discussion to cover up Soviet ineptitude on the attack despite having every advantage.

Proportionally speaking, the irrecoverable German losses in Bagration are also roughly identical to most of the irrecoverable losses the Germans managed to inflict upon the Soviets during 1941.
Again trying to reframe the debate to make the Soviet losses look better. The Soviets had every advantage and took twice as many losses as inflicted, yet when the Germans attacked in far worse circumstances they always managed to inflict heavier losses on the Soviet than they took despite being outnumbered and in 1943 totally outgunned and had no element of surprise.

The Soviets economic situation was actually worse in mid-1943 then in mid-1944: they hadn't recaptured most of Ukraine and were still bringing industry from the territories recaptured in the winter back online. In manpower terms, they were about the same.
Instead they had LL offering them more than those territories would have in real terms due to the value and quality of US and UK supplies of industrial help. Germany had none of that in 1944.

Supply was also technically worse, but not in any manner which would actually be noticeable.
That did not make any functional difference given they had months to prepare and had massive stocks on hand.


Actually, as a proportion of the forces involved, the attacking Soviets inflicted vastly more casualties upon the Germans then the Germans had at Kursk.
Given the proportion of forces involved the Soviets should have been able to inflict far more lopsided casualties on the Germans than they took, but instead suffered twice as many while at the same time the Wallies were at least scoring equal at Normandy.

An Army Group suffering near 50% irrecoverable losses in 2 weeks is annihilation-level of casualties. You can't get much better then that.
Actually you can: not take twice as many yourself to inflict those losses.

The Germans never had to face an opponent as skilled as themselves and the WAllies casualty aversion came at the price of hamstringing the tempo of their operations so much that they never really managed to inflict decisive losses upon the German ground forces.
Falaise was a pretty decisive loss causing the Germans to mostly abandon France and resume the battle on the border of the Lowlands and the German border. Operation Anvil caused the collapse of the Southern French position, even operations in Italy caused a steady retreat of the Germans up the penninsula. Tunisia was a pretty decisive defeat, as was Sicily. The Battle of the Bulge was a major defeat and saw the Wallies score better than even casualties, but when the later Spring Awakening operation happened even in defeat the Germans scored better on the Soviets than vice-versa despite the Germans being in total collapse.
 
So in proper expression of doctrine the French army would have been a match or better than of the Soviets?

Better in the sense there would have been larger & better trained staff for the commanders to lean on. There was no 'purge' and mobilization was better matched in numbers for officer/NCO training. Still not ideal but better. Beyond that the technical differences in areas like artillery or motorization/mechanization would make comparisons difficult. Ie: in artillery the French already had a huge technical advantage before they mobilized. Catching up in training would have given them the same degree of capability in 1941 the Commonwealth or US Army accquired a little later. That would have to some extent offset defects or masked differences in operational or tactical doctrine.
 

Deleted member 1487

Better in the sense there would have been larger & better trained staff for the commanders to lean on. There was no 'purge' and mobilization was better matched in numbers for officer/NCO training. Still not ideal but better. Beyond that the technical differences in areas like artillery or motorization/mechanization would make comparisons difficult. Ie: in artillery the French already had a huge technical advantage before they mobilized. Catching up in training would have given them the same degree of capability in 1941 the Commonwealth or US Army accquired a little later. That would have to some extent offset defects or masked differences in operational or tactical doctrine.
I honestly don't understand where the French army was so poorly trained with their standing army. Yes, I know the reservists were a mess, but so were most reservists for the Germans, Soviets, and Brits in 1940. In fact during the campaign of 1940 the German later wave divisions were almost useless other than holding a fixed line if they weren't attacked and would have folded just as badly as the French reservists if attacked by professionals. In many ways the French army was more prepared than the German one, its just that the Germans were able to dictate the pace and direction of the 1940 campaign by attacking first. In the air the French were completely unprepared for the fight in 1940. There is absolutely no question there, but then so was the RAF; in fact only the Luftwaffe was prepared in 1940 (and 1941 in the East). By 1941 the French would have been pretty well prepared and in fact far better prepared then anyone in the world other than the Germans. Had they fought the Soviets in 1941 they would have, as far as I can tell, have been able to pretty much smash them even when confronting superior numbers and even with the T-34. They just have the misfortune of having war thrust on them before they were ready for it.
 
In answer to the original question, yes Deep Battle and Methodical battle are opposite sides of the same coin. Both of them reflect the ‘solution’ to the issues of WW1 from the respective national positions. As does the British. The German system is geared around avoiding the issues in the first place and in particular achieving decisive victory in a single campaign.

The German conception works in Poland, France, the Balkans and AGN, AGC sectors in 41 ( to an extent) but fails in AGS ( until AGC rides to the rescue at Kiev) and just about everywhere else thereafter. Operational success yes, but never having a decisive strategic impact.

First thing to remember about deep battle is it starts with a frontal attack. Without the sophistication the French brought to that. Launching frontal attacks even series of frontal attacks really depends on a level of sophistication and command control the Russians never had if its not to be a bloodbath. See Zeimke.
Second thing is that in 41 before Moscow, 42 spring (twice) 42 winter the OMG gets annihilated. 42 Summer (Mars) and 43 ( vs AGC) the initial attacks really never get traction. Its success seems to have less to do with Soviet operational and tactical ability and more to do with the Germans not having reserves available to deal with the breakthrough.

The Allies are able to turn their operational successes from 42 on into strategic wins in NA, Sicily, Italy, NW Europe, South of France, Across the Rhine. Apart from the lack of a cool buzzword I am not sure why anyone would think that the North African (Torch Alamein and Tunisians campaign) Italian ( Sicily/Italy/Sardinia/Corsica) which together free the Med release vast amounts of shipping and the two invasions of France in 44 can be seen as anything other than a coordinated Theatre level operations. And looking in detail at the fighting in Normandy it’s a series of corps ( Sov Army) level attacks destroying the operational reserves resulting in the release of the OMG (3rd army, XXX corps and the US cavalry groups) resulting in the destruction of the entire german position in France and Belgium and the destruction of what 40 divisions.

On the issue of flexibility you might want to consider what gives more flexibility, the ability to manoeuvre freely or the ability for a company commander to call down multi regiment artillery strikes on 2- 4 minutes notice ( well 7-8 if its American) and the odd Jabo Wing when you need it. Modern NATO practice suggests that the French priorities, synchronising massed fires, deconflicting fire and movement have more legs.
 

Deleted member 1487

I guess technically there was no such thing as an OMG during WW2:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operational_manoeuvre_group

Instead this:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cavalry_mechanized_group
Tactics

Cavalry-mechanized groups were used during the second half of the Soviet-German War, following the successful breaching of a German defense. They would then be inserted to penetrate deep into the rear of the German lines and interrupt supply and reinforcement movements there. This was a risky task, shown for example by the destruction of Cavalry-Mechanized Group Pliyev during the Battle of Debrecen in Hungary, in autumn 1944.
Cavalry units in the Red Army usually fought as dismounted infantry. Only when they faced a completely disorganised enemy, for example during the battle of the Korsun Pocket in 1944, or when they were themselves in a desperate situation, such as during Operation Mars in 1942, would they undertake a traditional cavalry charge.
They were a production of experience and I think French attack doctrine would have developed something similar in the long run with a chance to develop experience and thanks to guys like de Gaulle pressing for it, its just that the French wouldn't risk going so deep that they couldn't support the attack and take losses to the degree the Soviets were totally fine with and would probably resemble more of what the Wallies ended up using in 1944-45 to conserve casualties and probably the same flexibility, which was less than the Germans, much more than the Soviets.

The Soviets were developing their doctrine during the war despite having theoretical ideas, same as the French, its just the French didn't get to flesh out their attack doctrine like the Soviets eventually did. Remember too that the Soviet doctrine ultimately was the product of German experience too starting with their success in France. Ultimately the Soviet doctrine was exactly like a Lincoln Log approach to warfare that methodical battle was: a 'scientific', really set piece, mathematically approach to combat where the military would shoehorn set pieces into a roll based on the understanding of the situation and have the pieces rigidly adhere to a plan conceived from the top down regardless of the changing situation on the ground.

As it was the Soviets then took heavy losses because of that methodology making it quite the sledgehammer approach, as even as late as 1944-45 they were still using massed charges against targets like at the Seelöwe Heights and in Romania (1st and 2nd Targu Frumos, the latter of which became the inspiration for AirLand Battle). So while strategically and operationally the Soviet doctrine wasn't just a simple attrition campaign that its often portrayed as, it was very attritional in practice because of the rigidity and methodical nature of it that allowed flexible German units to inflict hugely disproportionate losses on the Soviets and were it not for being massively outnumbered on all fronts and the economy smashed from the air, and the Soviets heavily supplied by the US/UK, the Soviet doctrine would unlikely have fared well even late in the war against the Axis because of its wastefulness. As John Ellis points out in "Brute Force" Soviet methods really were bashing attacks to produce eventual rupture to make maneuver happen no matter the circumstances or cost; its quite effective in the end if the enemy doesn't have sufficient reserves and is busy fighting on multiple fronts while deep in the USSR fighting partisans, and have their economy wrecked by blockade and strategic bombing, but it was never really tested against a fully supplied capable foe like the US, French, or British in 1944-45, or even a Axis force with full supply and no other theaters (not even in Barbarossa could we say the Axis wasn't being diminished by its other fronts, yet even then into 1942 the Axis was beating the living crap out of the Soviets and its only with US entry and applied pressure, Axis mistakes, and LL were the Soviets able to get their doctrine to work).
 
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I honestly don't understand where the French army was so poorly trained with their standing army. Yes, I know the reservists were a mess, but so were most reservists for the Germans, Soviets, and Brits in 1940. ....

Doughtys 'Seeds of Disaster addresses this. There are others as well.

The German army from circa 1934-36 & on to 1939 had roughly double the training time for their leaders, from corporal up. That was the standard allowance. From 1938 discharges from active service of NCOs & officers decreased. A increasing number were held in active service or extended reserve training. One significant difference was in the command/staff from battalion up. The German officers in the CP knew their drill - the core tasks well enough they could train at the next level where intuition starts to kick in and training for initiative & flexibility is possible. The French officer in the regiment or division HQ, or NCO in the company, was stuck at the basic level where you learn the core tasks or internalize the drill. On a few of the best and brightest were paid to improve their skills to a higher level. Hence the apparent emphasis on hyper detailed orders.

Why was this? Frances political leaders were fiscally responsible & debt was anathema. They refused to spend money the tax payers could not afford on thirty month conscript training. So a 18 months training regime was the base & all other aspects like officer staff training or advanced NCO training were reduced proportionatly. The alternatives were to either tax French business citizenry into poverty or the nazi approach of fraudulent book keeping & deficit spending.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
It really, really sucks that the reward for fiscal responsibility was not only military obliteration but everyone thinking of your nation as cowards.
 

Deleted member 1487

It really, really sucks that the reward for fiscal responsibility was not only military obliteration but everyone thinking of your nation as cowards.
It wasn't just fiscal responsibility, it was fiscal stupidity and political fracturization. They clung to the gold standard way too long out of orthodoxy which left them unable to react in 1936 and way behind come 1940, having started rearming two years later than the Brits and many have helped cause the Great Depression via their gold hoarding:
http://www.dartmouth.edu/~dirwin/Did France Cause the Great Depression.pdf
 
Except for all the fortified lines they continually had to breakthrough with Soviet tanks armies constantly counterattacking while you're outnumbered in every way possible, especially in the air; open ground was never reached in WW2 just a lot of minefields and bunkers.

Fortified open ground is still open ground. That the Soviets had the good sense to attack where the Germans were weak while the Germans did not have the sense to avoid attacking where the Soviets were strong is not a point in favor of the Germans.

Meanwhile during Bagration once they breached the first lines they ran right into open country. German reserves were basically non-existent due to the surprise of the operation, total Soviet domination of the air interdicting what there was, Hitler ordering a not one step back order, and overwhelming Soviet AFV advantage.
And the fact the Germans did not have adequate numbers to maintain a substantial reserve all along the front anyways. So they were forced to choose. In the case of Bagration, they chose very poorly.

when the Germans moved through the area in 1941 without the advantage of partisan help they ran right through the swamps despite having inferior AFVs, few aircraft, and again much more powerful AT guns than their AFVs could handle without issue.
When the Germans moved through the region they faced practically no resistance at all. The majority of Soviet troops which had been concentrated further west were already broken and the strategic reserves were further east in Smolensk. What Soviet soldiers were in the area were a disorganized mob incapable of offering resistance. By the time those who avoided capture got organized and form partisan bands, the front had already moved well too the east.

If you do find out I'd be interested.
Apparently they did. I only learned this second-hand (asked about on another forum), so take it with the relevant weight. Still, it likely does not alter the numbers substantially.

Idea how.
It maximized the concentration of scarce forces lacking any sort of reserve.

So they didn't have good defenses due to lack of numbers.
Largely, yes. And they were incapable of mustering the requisite numbers because they did not have the first clue of what the Soviets were planning. They believed, largely as a result of an extraordinarily successful Soviet deception campaign, that the Soviets would launch an assault from the L'vov direction aimed towards the Baltic States. In this, they were guilty of not only falling for Soviet deception efforts but also for mirror-imaging

We aren't talking about the whole battle of Kursk, just the German attacks which inflicted over 70k irrecoverable out of 170k, so over 1/3rd of casualties inflicted during the German attack were dead/captured. I.E. 20k more dead than the Germans took in total casualties during their failed offensive.
Ah, in that case the relevant proportion of Soviet forces is 3%.

So now you're cherrypicking numbers, because of all the numbers available at the battle,
Actually, I thought when we were talking about the Battle of Kursk we were talking about, you know, the entire battle. Not just Citadel. Because generally when people talk about a battle, they mean the entire battle.

nowhere near even half met the enemy in combat considering Soviet overall numbers included rear area forces that did not meet the enemy and reserve formations that didn't enter combat.
And the same is true for the 940,000 men the Germans had. However, we count the entire force structure because that is the strength of the forces involved. That you do not like that does not change it.

but then we are talking about casualties inflicted given force disparities on the attack, NOT overall casualties relative to the numbers committed;

Actually, we are talking about how good a doctrine is and the main measurement of that is not casualty ratios but results. And in this, Deep Battle achieved a ton more then Methodical Battle did and ultimately even more then Blitzkrieg did (given that the Soviets won WW2 and the Germans did not).

Again trying to reframe the debate to make the Soviet losses look better. The Soviets had every advantage and took twice as many losses as inflicted, yet when the Germans attacked in far worse circumstances they always managed to inflict heavier losses on the Soviet than they took despite being outnumbered and in 1943 totally outgunned and had no element of surprise.
And they achieved their objective at a sustainable cost. The Germans did not.

Instead they had LL offering them more than those territories would have in real terms due to the value and quality of US and UK supplies of industrial help.
Were the Soviets receiving more L-L in 1943 or 1944?

That did not make any functional difference given they had months to prepare and had massive stocks on hand.
Hence why I said "not in any manner which would actually be noticeable".

Given the proportion of forces involved the Soviets should have been able to inflict far more lopsided casualties on the Germans than they took, but instead suffered twice as many while at the same time the WAllies were at least scoring equal at Normandy.
And they achieved a whole lot more. Had the WAllies wanted to score as big territorial advances and as big German casualties as the Soviets in 1943-44, they would have had to fight more like the Soviets. Instead, they fought cautiously and got more modest results. for it

Actually you can: not take twice as many yourself to inflict those losses.
Why should you care that you took twice as many casualties when those casualties have no effect on your fighting capability?

Falaise was a pretty decisive loss causing the Germans to mostly abandon France and resume the battle on the border of the Lowlands and the German border. Operation Anvil caused the collapse of the Southern French position, even operations in Italy caused a steady retreat of the Germans up the penninsula. Tunisia was a pretty decisive defeat, as was Sicily. The Battle of the Bulge was a major defeat and saw the Wallies score better than even casualties, but when the later Spring Awakening operation happened even in defeat the Germans scored better on the Soviets than vice-versa despite the Germans being in total collapse.
And yet none of them were as large or decisive as either the German or Soviet defeats in the east. The WAllies set modest goals, made modest assaults, and got accordingly modest results. When they had reverses, they were also modest. The Germans and Soviets set hugely ambitious goals, made hugely ambitious assaults, and got accordingly spectacular results. But when they had reverses, they were also huge.

Again this is basically the spirit of French Methodical Battle;

Not really. The French did not embark on the same degree of scientific.

the way the Soviets fought the winter war was not that much different than the way the French were supposed to fight a major war;
Given that the Soviets had unofficially abandoned Deep Battle during the Winter War, yeah, okay.

On a side note and also as research for my own TL. Would a largely conscript army that utilises a series of tactical drills have an advantage over one a largely conscript army that relies upon initiative at the lower level i.e. Junior Officer & NCO?

That depends. Is the latter army so obsessed with initiative at the lower-level that it strips their commanders with the flexibility to make many key command decisions easily?

By 1941 the French would have been pretty well prepared and in fact far better prepared then anyone in the world other than the Germans.

Change "1941" to "1942" and "the French" to "the Soviets" and this statement would remain just as accurate. Pretty much the only people who were ready for the war when the war came were the Germans.

They just have the misfortune of having war thrust on them before they were ready for it.
And not coincidentally, so did the Soviets.

I guess technically there was no such thing as an OMG during WW2:

In a de-jure sense, no. In a de-facto sense they did though. It was the entire purpose of tank armies.

Erm... an Operational Manuever Group describes a role, not an organization like a CMG does.

The Soviets were developing their doctrine during the war despite having theoretical ideas, same as the French, its just the French didn't get to flesh out their attack doctrine like the Soviets eventually did.
Incorrect. The Soviets developed their doctrine, abandoned it for political reasons, tried to return too it, abandoned it again when war came before they were prepared to it and as an adaptation to the circumstances of mid/late-1941, and the returned too it for the final time. The French, as pdf27 noted, abandoned Methodical Battle after the Germans demonstrated how poor of a doctrine it was and never had the time to develop anything new because they were practically already defeated.

So, no, had the French survived they would not have further developed Methodical Battle. They would have instead abandoned it and developed something new. This new thing may have resembled Deep Battle, but probably with some detail changes.
 
Saying "The Soviets were incompetent because they took higher casualties" misses the point. The Soviets didn't care about casualties, so they didn't design their tactics to avoid higher casualties. It isn't incompetence if you achieve your objective with what you think are acceptable casualties, even if those casualties are objectively high. If the Soviets hadn't been able to afford these losses that would be another story, but clearly they were able to.
 
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