French Methodical Battle, Soviet Deep Battle two sides of the same coin?

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Deleted member 1487

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Reading about the two systems they seems remarkably similar in methodology in that they rely on a lot of staff planning and sophisticated preparations and systemic logic, just from different angles; Soviet Deep Battle is more focused on the offensive, French Methodical Battle on the defensive. They took their experiences of WW1 and just honed them into a methodical doctrine of top down command-push with little flexibility, but very sophisticated methodology. The Soviets were able to survive until they could use their to greatest effect due to their virtually unlimited space and manpower relative to the enemy, plus of course Lend-Lease supply, while the French had too little space, external supply, and prepared units to survive the initial German onslaught. Had they survived and continued it would seem to me that they would have developed a Soviet-style attack doctrine of the Soviet shock armies to break their opponents in depth with artillery, air power, and armor (Red God of War style), using material to minimize losses in a methodical advance until they could exploit with a highly organized and somewhat inflexible advance schedule.

Soviet tactics though were worse than the professional French army due to having sustained such horrific casualties early on and being unable to get enough breathing room to really train up a sophisticated tactical element or accumulate enough survivors with experience to really avoid the losses caused by the inflexibility of the operational methodical doctrine until the last year of the war (or so). I doubt the French would have developed something as far reaching in terms of exploitation as the Soviets due to their lack of space and casualty averseness and lack of material relative to their main enemy to sustain it, but the elements to me seem quite similar even if the expression of it was somewhat different due to experience/opportunity.

Thoughts?
 
Deep Battle is a maneuver warfare doctrine: the purpose of the Shock Armies is to create a breach in the enemy line for the maneuver groups (cavalry armies during the Civil War, mechanized corps during the interwar period, tank Aamies during the WW2 and Cold War years) to exploit into the enemies depth* and thereby cause a break down among the oppositions command and control system similar to Blitzkrieg. Methodical Battle doesn't feature this at all...

*Hence the name "Deep Battle".
 
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Saphroneth

Banned
Yes, as I understand it methodical battle is "Push the enemy back on a broad front and keep pushing", whereas deep battle is "Break the line and then launch an offensive there".

If Blitzkrieg is a rapier and Deep Battle is sword-and-dagger, then Methodical Battle is a steamroller.
Wait, that's a terrible analogy.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
Or, to put it another way...

In Blitzkrieg, breaking the line is the whole point. The strategy doesn't work without it, and against a peer enemy you must do this for Blitzkrieg or you're stuffed.
In Deep Battle, breaking the line is very helpful but you can do without it. The Shock Armies can just rip into the enemy, but once the line breaks you're all ready to go and expand the battlespace.
In Methodical Battle, breaking the line is just something that can happen. You don't really plan for it at all, you just want to apply steady pressure and all a broken line means is that your advance is a bit faster.
(And in American AirLand Battle, the Line is where enemy soldiers stand while you dump explosives on their heads.)


Of course that's just my characterization.
 

Deleted member 1487

Deep Battle is a maneuver warfare doctrine: the purpose of the Shock Armies is to create a breach in the enemy line for the maneuver groups (cavalry armies during the Civil War, mechanized corps during the interwar period, tank Aamies during the WW2 and Cold War years) to exploit into the enemies depth* and thereby cause a break down among the oppositions command and control system similar to Blitzkrieg. Methodical Battle doesn't feature this at all...

*Hence the name "Deep Battle".
It is a methodical, preplanned version of maneuver warfare, but doesn't fit the essence of decentralized command that the Germans and to a lesser degree the US used in WW2. It was just a deeper version of methodical battle from what I can tell, as it constrained tactical elements heavily and expected them to adhere to the plan no matter what, only offering a bit of flexibility as time went on.

I think a better analogy is this:

Blitzkrieg is a rapier.
Deep Battle is a battle axe.
Methodical Battle is a grinder.
Blitzkrieg is probably more a saber
Deep Battle is a sledgehammer (at least in WW2)
and Methodical Battle is a chainsaw in 1940, but with development might well end up closer to deep battle as reality influenced doctrine, rather than theory.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
Quick question. So the French and Russians devise their operational plans; if so what were the strategies for Italy, the UK, US, etc? Did none exist or were they too vague to be considered characteristic?
The UK plans in early WW2 were pretty much the same as the French, except with more explosives and mechanized vehicles to keep up the pressure. AIUI.
 

Deleted member 1487

Quick question. So the French and Russians devise their operational plans; if so what were the strategies for Italy, the UK, US, etc? Did none exist or were they too vague to be considered characteristic?

The US doctrine was based on French WW1 doctrine, but it evolved into a more free form offensive doctrine during the war to the point that the British characterized attacking US troops as marauding pirates looking for loot almost in a Kelly's Heroes fashion. The UK was also a version of methodical battle, just less rigid than the French and IIRC more trusting of NCOs. Of course the French would have evolved during the war if they survived longer and did have a quite different doctrine among the Free French in 1944-45 than in 1940. The Italians IIRC did also do a more methodical approach. Really the German maneuver model with a large degree of operational/tactical freedom down to the NCO level was pretty unique, really only matched by the US Marine Corps. Postwar the Soviets, finally having room to train better than during the war, developed better tactical methods and more flexibility, especially with elite units, but strategic/operational methodology remained highly rigid to conform to the plan and was somewhat hamstrung by large usage of 2 year conscripts with limited education levels.
 
Aah, I get it now. Better NCO training means less methodical war doctrine.
BTW, are there any good books on Italian war strategy/operation plans? I'm trying to make a war doctrine for ATL interwar Korea and both are peninsulas, so I gathered I could start out from there.
 

Deleted member 1487

Aah, I get it now. Better NCO training means less methodical war doctrine.
BTW, are there any good books on Italian war strategy/operation plans? I'm trying to make a war doctrine for ATL interwar Korea and both are peninsulas, so I gathered I could start out from there.
As far as the Italians I do not unfortunately. Generally good NCOs make for more decentralized authority, but not always; the Brits generally had good NCOs, but their class system and general conception of military authority prevented them from taking advantage for the fighting in Europe, but from what I gather than low level officers and NCOs had a wide latitude when fighting in the colonies, same with the French to a lesser degree
 
It is a methodical, preplanned version of maneuver warfare, but doesn't fit the essence of decentralized command that the Germans and to a lesser degree the US used in WW2. It was just a deeper version of methodical battle from what I can tell, as it constrained tactical elements heavily and expected them to adhere to the plan no matter what, only offering a bit of flexibility as time went on.

Um... no. The command and control of the maneuver forces, once released into the enemy rear areas, was quite decentralized. These officers were basically given as much info on their objectives as possible, handed their forces, and turned loose. David Glantz says it explicitly:

When Titans Clashed said:
Although the tank armies and separate mobile corps were large formations commanded by experienced general officers, much of their tactical success depended on the work of young captains and majors who commanded the leading forward detachments. These highly mobile, combined-arms groups of 800 to 2,000 soldiers avoided pitched battle whenever possible, bypassing German defenders in order to establish large encirclements, and seize the bridgeheads for the next offensive. Follow-on forces, supported by the increasingly powerful Red Air Force, then reduced the German encirclements, while the mobile forces continued their exploitation. Throughout these offensives, the Rear Services performed prodigious feats of improvisation to keep the spearheads supplied even 400 kilometers behind enemy lines.

Blitzkrieg is probably more a saber
Deep Battle is a sledgehammer (at least in WW2)
and Methodical Battle is a chainsaw in 1940,
I have no real comment on saber, but sledgehammer is quite an inappropriate analogy: like Deep Battle, a battleaxe still leaves quite a bit of room for finesse that a sledgehammer lacks. Chainsaw also indicates a remaining degree of momentum that the overwhelmingly positional Methodical Battle lacks.

with development might well end up closer to deep battle as reality influenced doctrine, rather than theory.
But then it is no longer methodical battle, but "methodical battle with the stuff the French learned during the war added on".
 
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Aah, I get it now. Better NCO training means less methodical war doctrine.
BTW, are there any good books on Italian war strategy/operation plans? I'm trying to make a war doctrine for ATL interwar Korea and both are peninsulas, so I gathered I could start out from there.
You can try Military Effectiveness: Volume 2, The Interwar and Military Innovation in the Interwar Period.
 
Aah, I get it now. Better NCO training means less methodical war doctrine.
BTW, are there any good books on Italian war strategy/operation plans? I'm trying to make a war doctrine for ATL interwar Korea and both are peninsulas, so I gathered I could start out from there.


http://www.comandosupremo.com/italianarmy.html

This isn't a book and I haven't read the whole thing, but I recall somebody mentioning it as useful… several years ago. I think it was discussing then how the idea of strategic reconnaissance divisions was a rather poor idea.

Also probably a bad idea to base on the Italians just because Korea is a peninsula, there are huge differences in their enemies, geography (though doesn't Korea have its fair share of mountains? That sort of matches the Italians, but they're also differentiated by the region of location), industry, economics/industry, culture, ect. ect.
 

Deleted member 1487

Um... no. The command and control of the maneuver forces, once released into the enemy rear areas, was quite decentralized. These officers were basically given as much info on their objectives as possible, handed their forces, and turned loose. David Glantz says it explicitly:
Originally Posted by When Titans Clashed, Pg 289
Although the tank armies and separate mobile corps were large formations commanded by experienced general officers, much of their tactical success depended on the work of young captains and majors who commanded the leading forward detachments. These highly mobile, combined-arms groups of 800 to 2,000 soldiers avoided pitched battle whenever possible, bypassing German defenders in order to establish large encirclements, and seize the bridgeheads for the next offensive. Follow-on forces, supported by the increasingly powerful Red Air Force, then reduced the German encirclements, while the mobile forces continued their exploitation. Throughout these offensives, the Rear Services performed prodigious feats of improvisation to keep the spearheads supplied even 400 kilometers behind enemy lines.
.
I fail to see how that quote proves your point; it says units were ordered to seize objectives demanded by higher commanders without giving battles as part of an orchestrated, methodical system. Each element was given a task and told to accomplish it rigidly, not deviating. Really the only improvisation or initiative was taken by the logistics elements who were to keep them supplied according to the above.

How was such a flexible system as Deep Battle producing twice the casualties received as inflicted despite massive numerical advantage at it best expression, Operation Bagration, while the Germans in 1941-43 were inflicting heavier losses on the defenders than they were taking on the operational/strategic attack?
 
I fail to see how that quote proves your point; it says units were ordered to seize objectives demanded by higher commanders without giving battles as part of an orchestrated, methodical system.

Which really isn't different then how the Germans did it. Unless you don't think German high commanders gave their forces objectives, that sometimes these objectives involved avoiding giving battle, and that staff work was orchestrated and methodical (at least on the tactical and operational level, strategically they really did fall down).

Each element was given a task and told to accomplish it rigidly, not deviating.
Yes, each element was given a task and told to accomplish it. This is known as "giving your forces an objective" and it is a universal practice among modern militaries. How the objective was to be accomplished, however, was left up to the element commander. This is the definition of mission-type tactics.

In mission-type tactics, the military commander gives subordinate leaders a clearly defined goal (the mission), the forces needed to accomplish that goal and a time frame within which the goal must be reached. The subordinate leaders then implement the order independently.
Now sometimes, a Soviet senior officer would have to intervene when his subordinate for some reason proved incapable. This is hardly a uniquely Soviet phenomenon either, for example: Guderian had to personally hop in a plane and flying out to Sedan during his breakthrough there to help sort shit out at one point. Yet I don't see you saying the Germans were inflexible and lacked initiative because of it.

Now, to further add, defensively Methodical Battle and Deep Battle are quite different. Methodical Battle thought in terms of a single, static unbroken line. The moment one part of the line starts getting pushed, all of the reserves are immediately rush there to counter-attack and hold the line. In the context of World War 2, this is operationally doomed to failure as it completely hands the initiative to the enemy who can push at multiple points to force the commitment of the reserves before launching the main blow.

Deep Battle, in so far as it addressed defensive concerns, thought in terms of Defense-in-Depth: multiple defense lines, with each line being more of a series of interconnected fortified points designed to funnel the enemy into kill-zones. The defenses in and of themselves do not stop the enemy, rather they slow them down long enough for the counter-stroke to launch. Reserves are to be held back and committed as part of a strategic counter-stroke which does not merely halt the enemy attack, but destroys the attacking forces and seizes the initiative.
 
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Deleted member 1487

Which really isn't different then how the Germans did it. Unless you don't think German high commanders gave their forces objectives, that sometimes these objectives involved avoiding giving battle, and that staff work was orchestrated and methodical (at least on the tactical and operational level, strategically they really did fall down).

Yes, each element was given a task and told to accomplish it. This is known as "giving your forces an objective" and it is a universal practice among modern militaries. How the objective was to be accomplished, however, was left up to the element commander. This is the definition of mission-type tactics.

Now sometimes, a Soviet senior officer would have to intervene when his subordinate for some reason proved incapable. This is hardly a uniquely Soviet phenomenon either, for example: Guderian had to personally hop in a plane and flying out to Sedan during his breakthrough there to help sort shit out at one point. Yet I don't see you saying the Germans were inflexible and lacked initiative because of it.
The difference is the flexibility given to units in the field to adapt to battlefield conditions and ability to call in support, rather than the methodical orchestrating of objectives and fire timetables that impart no flexibility on units in the field and demand that objectives be taken at all cost; how else do you want to explain the casualties taken during Bagration that were double to the attacker than what was inflicted despite the Soviets having crushing superiority in all arms and manpower, plus having virtually total surprise and Hitler ordering troops to hold their ground, which let the Soviet artillery plan have full effect?
 
The difference is the flexibility given to units in the field to adapt to battlefield conditions

Which existed among Soviet forces. Soviet officers would adjust their tactics as the correlation of forces demanded.

and ability to call in support,
Which would already exist in the officer's force. Soviet mechanized forces were inherently organized on a combined-arms basis so that they did not have have to try and replicate the German kampfgruppe system or improvise additional fire support.

rather than the methodical orchestrating of objectives
All armies did (and do) this.

and fire timetables that impart no flexibility on units in the field
Except fire timetables also existed within those units. The Soviet's scientific approach to war meant Soviet commanders at all levels use a concept known as 'correlation of forces and means' (or simply correlation of forces) to determine an objective determination of the degree of superiority of one side over the other. In layman's terms it can be expressed as a series of ratios,. This ratio just does not take into account of the quantitative factors of forces, but also qualitative factors, training, terrain, type of combat action being conducted and logistical support.

The critical task for any officer, at any level, was to create such a decisive correlation of forces advantage in what they designated as the sectors of main effort so that the assigned mission would have a high probability of success.

And when I say "at any level", I mean "at any level". The Soviets practiced this as much at the company level as they did at the battalion level as they did at the divisional level as they did at the army level as they did at the platoon level and so-on-and-so-forth.

and demand that objectives be taken at all cost;
The Soviets were willing to accept higher costs to take an objective then the Western Allies, yes. And so were the Germans.

how else do you want to explain the casualties taken during Bagration that were double to the attacker than what was inflicted despite the Soviets having crushing superiority in all arms and manpower, plus having virtually total surprise and Hitler ordering troops to hold their ground, which let the Soviet artillery plan have full effect?
Aggressively attacking a skilled and determined foe over difficult terrain is always going to result in high overall casualties. It is, however, rather telling that while Soviet overall casualties were greater then the Germans, the irrecoverable losses favored the Soviets. Sanitary losses will be able to return to battle after a few months at most, irrecoverable losses are gone for good.
 

Deleted member 1487

Aggressively attacking a skilled and determined foe over difficult terrain is always going to result in high overall casualties. It is, however, rather telling that while Soviet overall casualties were greater then the Germans, the irrecoverable losses favored the Soviets. Sanitary losses will be able to return to battle after a few months at most, irrecoverable losses are gone for good.
How was Germany able to get a favorable kill ratio against the Soviets during their attack at Kursk, despite giving their foe months to prepare, having no surprise, being outnumbered all all categories, and the Soviets have a better core AFV?

Given all the advantages the Soviets had in July 1944 and the deficits the Germans had due to previous losses and defeats it makes little sense that the Germans were able to inflict so many casualties on the Soviets unless their vaunted doctrine was too rigid for its own good. Did sanitary losses include permanently disabled and those that later died of wounds?
Still given that the Soviets took 150k prisoners and killed about 130k men while on the major attack with superiority in all categories it was a poor showing all things consider for the level of losses taken given the 'superiority' of the Soviet 'maneuver' doctrine, having total surprise, and having vast superiority in all categories of weapons and manpower, given the the highly determined and skilled, on the defensive, Soviets took 3 times as many losses against the German at Kursk despite being superior in all categories there.

Plus of course the Germans lost at Kursk and the Soviets won at Bagration.
 
....

French Methodical Battle on the defensive. They took their experiences of WW1 and just honed them into a methodical doctrine of top down command-push with little flexibility, but very sophisticated methodology. ....

.... Of course the French would have evolved during the war if they survived longer ...

This mistakes the undertrained French army as the norm their doctrine was aimed at. The French politicians had the disadvantage of being fiscally prudent & not spending more on defense that the citizens could pay for. that meant spreading a lesser amount of training across a broader number of reservists. the combat methodology of 1940 reflected this accomadating a undertrained army. That doctrine was aimed at a much more capable army that would have developed as 1940 ran out. German methods were sucessfull because the deficit spending and looting of annexed nations allowed a far more through peace time training regime. As the French training program spun out it performance & doctrine would have looked a lot more like either the British or the US of 1943-44

.... Of course the French would have evolved during the war if they survived longer ...
 
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