Its useful to note that France effectively had no active duty divisions at the beginning of the war.
Due to her political insistence on structuring the Army around conscripts (thus keeping the professional military's influence small, and establishing a "nation-in-arms" supposedly dominated by Republican principles), the peacetime army had shrunk to IIRC only 20 divisions. Upon threat of war, the mobilization plan allowed only ONE move: each active division was broken up to form three divisions composed mostly of conscript reservists.
The best of the three resulting divisions had only 33% active duty officers, 32% active duty NCOs, 55% active duty privates. The newly-created series A divisions had 23% AD officers, 17% AD NCOs, and about 2% AD troops. The series B divisions essentially had no active duty component at all.
Thus, after mobilization, the French Army's best divisions were essentially reserve divisions. Some of these fought well, but none could actually be considered "active duty". And the worst 1/3 of the Army's divisions were just extremely bad.
Due to failure of political willpower, initial active service for conscripts fell to two years, then 18 months, and in 1921, 1922 and 1928, to just 12 months. Longer service was unpopular with the very French people whom the Army was intended to protect. Further, politicians rejected the notion that an extended period of active service was necessary to train the "citizen soldier".
Finally, conscripts were treated as mere numbers. If your active service was spent in, for instance, a support unit, upon call up for war you might be expected to function as a combat infantryman. Whatever specialist skills you had learned were ignored, and you were treated as an undifferentiated cog.
The quality of individual soldiers, and of the Army's divisions, was thus quite low. In the French scheme that didn't matter, since everyone would be trained up during the war, in the presumably extended period of static defensive operations.
Unfortunately, even this didn't work as intended. Units didn't receive the necessary depth of training during the Phony War.
The miracle of 1940 wasn't that the French Army collapsed; it was that numerous divisions even fought as well as they did. The French constructed a wartime army riddled with systemic flaws, then expected it to achieve victory in a 1916-style war.
I recommend reading The Seeds of Disaster by Robert Doughty. If you haven't read it, or something very much like it, then you lack necessary knowledge of the French Army at the beginning of WW2. Breaking Point by the same author provides a revealing look at the actual performance of the French Army and Command during the Sedan battle, and is also recommended.
Due to her political insistence on structuring the Army around conscripts (thus keeping the professional military's influence small, and establishing a "nation-in-arms" supposedly dominated by Republican principles), the peacetime army had shrunk to IIRC only 20 divisions. Upon threat of war, the mobilization plan allowed only ONE move: each active division was broken up to form three divisions composed mostly of conscript reservists.
The best of the three resulting divisions had only 33% active duty officers, 32% active duty NCOs, 55% active duty privates. The newly-created series A divisions had 23% AD officers, 17% AD NCOs, and about 2% AD troops. The series B divisions essentially had no active duty component at all.
Thus, after mobilization, the French Army's best divisions were essentially reserve divisions. Some of these fought well, but none could actually be considered "active duty". And the worst 1/3 of the Army's divisions were just extremely bad.
Due to failure of political willpower, initial active service for conscripts fell to two years, then 18 months, and in 1921, 1922 and 1928, to just 12 months. Longer service was unpopular with the very French people whom the Army was intended to protect. Further, politicians rejected the notion that an extended period of active service was necessary to train the "citizen soldier".
Finally, conscripts were treated as mere numbers. If your active service was spent in, for instance, a support unit, upon call up for war you might be expected to function as a combat infantryman. Whatever specialist skills you had learned were ignored, and you were treated as an undifferentiated cog.
The quality of individual soldiers, and of the Army's divisions, was thus quite low. In the French scheme that didn't matter, since everyone would be trained up during the war, in the presumably extended period of static defensive operations.
Unfortunately, even this didn't work as intended. Units didn't receive the necessary depth of training during the Phony War.
The miracle of 1940 wasn't that the French Army collapsed; it was that numerous divisions even fought as well as they did. The French constructed a wartime army riddled with systemic flaws, then expected it to achieve victory in a 1916-style war.
I recommend reading The Seeds of Disaster by Robert Doughty. If you haven't read it, or something very much like it, then you lack necessary knowledge of the French Army at the beginning of WW2. Breaking Point by the same author provides a revealing look at the actual performance of the French Army and Command during the Sedan battle, and is also recommended.