French actually launch 1939 Saar Offensive...and bog down

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Deleted member 1487

What if the French opted to follow their Saar Offensive to save Poland...only to find that the Germans are able to bring troops in faster from Poland after they win than the French can attack to any valuable objective?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saar_Offensive
Ofensiva_del_Saar2.jpg

The Saar Offensive was a French ground operation into Saarland, Germany, during the early stages of World War II, from 7 to 16 September 1939. The plans called for roughly 40 divisions, including one armored division, three mechanised divisions, 78 artillery regiments and 40 tank battalions to assist Poland, which was then under invasion, by attacking Germany's understrength western front. Although 30 divisions advanced to the border (and in some cases across it), the assault never happened. When the quick victory in Poland allowed Germany to reinforce its lines with homecoming troops, the offensive was stopped. The French forces eventually withdrew amid a German counter-offensive on 17 October.

According to the Franco-Polish military convention, the French Army was to start preparations for the major offensive three days after mobilization started. The French forces were to effectively gain control over the area between the French border and the Siegfried Line and were to probe the German defenses. The sector was defended by the German 1st Army. On the 15th day of the mobilization (that is on 16 September), the French Army was to start a full-scale assault on Germany. The pre-emptive mobilization was started in France on 26 August and on 1 September, full mobilization was declared.

French mobilization suffered from an inherently out of date system, which greatly affected their ability to swiftly deploy their forces on the field.[4] The French command still believed in the tactics of World War I, which relied heavily on stationary artillery, even though this took time to transport and deploy. Many pieces also had to be retrieved from storage before any advance could be made.[5]

So the French would send in the 40 divisions planned, but find that getting them in place quickly enough is a problem, but feed them in as possible...only to find that it is too late and they are stuck in in a major fight in the Saar? The French launch their historical probing attacks on the 7th and they launch their main attack on the 16th, by then pretty much too late for Poland due to Soviet entry, and unlike OTL don't call the offensive off on the 21st of September. So they are pushing in 40 divisions, but find the Germans are bringing in reserves from Poland without impacting the course of operations there; the slow pace of advance means that the French haven't achieved any major objectives and keep running into minefields and various other delaying tactics. What happens then in October as they are stuck in in Saarland, German reinforcements are accumulating, and casualties are mounting?
 
It only took roughly a month for the Germans to deal with Poland, after the Germans are finished there they would most likely move organize a fairly large offensive during the spring of 1940 or perhaps the winter of 1939 and decisively destroy the French presence. This would in turn result in a weaker defence during the German invasion of France in the summer. Such a brazen invasion of German territory would serve Hitler's propaganda forces well, plus it would galvanize the population. It would be easy for the Third Reich to characterize the French invasion as indicative of a French aggressive expansionist desire to control the Saarland, which they had in the 1920's.
 
It only took roughly a month for the Germans to deal with Poland, after the Germans are finished there they would most likely move organize a fairly large offensive during the spring of 1940 or perhaps the winter of 1939 and decisively destroy the French presence. This would in turn result in a weaker defence during the German invasion of France in the summer. Such a brazen invasion of German territory would serve Hitler's propaganda forces well, plus it would galvanize the population. It would be easy for the Third Reich to characterize the French invasion as indicative of a French aggressive expansionist desire to control the Saarland, which they had in the 1920's.

This is of course possible. Equally possible is that attacking with more vigure in September and the resulting German counter offensive shows the French Generals some of the inherent weaknesses in the French Army and airforce and indeed some of the German strengths. Then thanks to the bitter winter of 39/40 it gives the French time to at least put good some of their issues (admittedly they won't get much done and there will be lots of problems with trying any reform in war time). We must remember that at times the battle of France was a darn close run thing any improvement in the French ability to resist could be decisive. Further making the phoney war less well..... phoney would probably be of more benefit to France as their was a reported rummer throughout France that the war would be finished by a negotiated pease without any hard fighting. This only grew as the inactivity increased. It would also be good for French international prestige post WW2 whatever happens as they wouldn't have just rolled over as was often incorrectly believed.
 

Deleted member 1487

If French launch serious attack in Saar, Soviets might delay their intervention at least for a couple days.
The Soviets attacked before the French offensive was to be launched.
 

Archibald

Banned
This is of course possible. Equally possible is that attacking with more vigure in September and the resulting German counter offensive shows the French Generals some of the inherent weaknesses in the French Army and airforce and indeed some of the German strengths. Then thanks to the bitter winter of 39/40 it gives the French time to at least put good some of their issues (admittedly they won't get much done and there will be lots of problems with trying any reform in war time). We must remember that at times the battle of France was a darn close run thing any improvement in the French ability to resist could be decisive. Further making the phoney war less well..... phoney would probably be of more benefit to France as their was a reported rummer throughout France that the war would be finished by a negotiated pease without any hard fighting. This only grew as the inactivity increased. It would also be good for French international prestige post WW2 whatever happens as they wouldn't have just rolled over as was often incorrectly believed.

I see, Ruhr offensive as a much badly needed "shot in the arm". Alas, there was so much rot everywhere in the Chain of command... what the French armies would have needed would have some nasty influenza strain killing all these cranky generals.

Recently on the French fights On forums we discussed Corap.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/André_Corap
Corap and Huntziger armies bore the brunt of the Sedan fiasco and were quickly destroyed.
Corap took command of the Ninth army in 1939 and Daladier told him this army was the poorest, jokingly adding "it is an army of proletarians" ha ha ha.
Then Corap complained to Gamelin of how the Ardennes sector was weak. Do you know what Gamelin answered ?
"Mais enfin Corap, les Ardennes, ça ne m'intéresse pas." "Corap, I don't really care about the Ardennes".

Roast in hell, Gamelin.
 
The Soviets attacked before the French offensive was to be launched.
??? Otl Soviets attacked on 17th, after Allied conference where it was decided the French would not continue the attack (Edit: and signing ceasefire with Japan on 16th). You have French launching main offensive on 16th instead.
 
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Deleted member 1487

??? Otl Soviets attacked on 17th, after Allied conference where it was decided the French would not continue the attack. You have French launching main offensive on 16th instead.
Sorry, had the 15th in my mind. You might be right then about a potential Soviet delay as a response.
 

PlasmaTorch

Banned
It only took roughly a month for the Germans to deal with Poland, after the Germans are finished there they would most likely move organize a fairly large offensive during the spring of 1940 or perhaps the winter of 1939 and decisively destroy the French presence. This would in turn result in a weaker defence during the German invasion of France in the summer. Such a brazen invasion of German territory would serve Hitler's propaganda forces well, plus it would galvanize the population. It would be easy for the Third Reich to characterize the French invasion as indicative of a French aggressive expansionist desire to control the Saarland, which they had in the 1920's.

A german offensive in the winter of 1939 probably wouldn't happen. Their logistical situation was fine for defense, but inadequate for an offensive.

The victory over poland was swift and decisive, but they lost alot of AFVs. Ammunition expenditure was quite high, as well. Compare their ammo stockpile in october of 1939 to their supplys in may of 1940. They only had 30% as much small arms ammo (9mm, 7.92mm) as they would in may of 1940.

30% light infantry arms
78% 8 cm mortar
56% light infantry gun
25% light howitzer
31% heavy howitzer

This is of course possible. Equally possible is that attacking with more vigure in September and the resulting German counter offensive shows the French Generals some of the inherent weaknesses in the French Army and airforce and indeed some of the German strengths. Then thanks to the bitter winter of 39/40 it gives the French time to at least put good some of their issues (admittedly they won't get much done and there will be lots of problems with trying any reform in war time).

Even if the french used those few months before the invasion to prepare more seriously... It would be treating the symptoms and not the actual cause of their problems. They might be somewhat more prepared strategically, but their fighting power would still be inferior to the germans. They don't have the right generals, doctrine, or training to survive a blitzkrieg. The morale among the leaders and civilian populace was poor, as well.

The french are eventually going to get overpowered by the germans and led into some kindof trap. They could last a couple weeks longer and inflict heavier casualtys, but thats all they can really hope to do.

We must remember that at times the battle of France was a darn close run thing any improvement in the French ability to resist could be decisive. Further making the phoney war less well..... phoney would probably be of more benefit to France as their was a reported rummer throughout France that the war would be finished by a negotiated pease without any hard fighting. This only grew as the inactivity increased. It would also be good for French international prestige post WW2 whatever happens as they wouldn't have just rolled over as was often incorrectly believed.

Your saying that the actual invasion of france was a close run thing? Thats an odd claim to make. By all accounts, the battle was pretty much decided when the germans reached the channel on may 20 (encircling the 1st army group and the BEF). Unless the allys somehow managed to break out of the pocket, or withstand attempts to 'close the noose', there wasn't really anyway that france could be saved.

The depressive attitude of frances leadership was also a major reason behind their fall. They had already admitted defeat by may 15-16, before the germans had even completed the sickle cut.
 
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Probably the German decision-makers do feel compelled to counterattack the French in winter, because they have taken a larger lodging in the Heimat than in OTL, so large they can't ignore it. With indifferent weather (and therefore less importance of air operations) and bad terrain, the Germans are pretty likely to still push the French back - but slowly and at a high cost. It's possible that the French decide to withdraw, since holding out at all costs causes casualties and no advantages save the propaganda one. Maybe they don't go all the way back to beyond their border, keeping a token slice - like in OTL's Phony War.

This still leaves both armies worse for wear (than in OTL) come spring. I wouldn't be surprised if the Germans still launch their attack, in some configuration or other, through Belgium, rather than butting their heads on the small Saar bridgehead again where the French are waiting, and they start out smashingly as per OTL. But then, which of the two will be worse for the wear incurred in the 1939 fighting? Will that wear make a difference?
 
One thing the Germans could do is simply leave the French in the Saarland, because as that point there would be no ability for them to advance forwards or threaten anything significant. This draws forces away from the defence in Belgium and the Northern French plain. This results in a faster crumbling of the defence during the invasion in 1940, and the French forces in the Saar just end up retreating as the French army withers away. Leaving the french there would be a prudent move, and would be consistent with the German mobility centric approach to warfare.
 
A german offensive in the winter of 1939 probably wouldn't happen. Their logistical situation was fine for defense, but inadequate for an offensive.

The victory over poland was swift and decisive, but they lost alot of AFVs. Ammunition expenditure was quite high, as well. Compare their ammo stockpile in october of 1939 to their supplys in may of 1940. They only had 30% as much small arms ammo (9mm, 7.92mm) as they would in may of 1940.

30% light infantry arms
78% 8 cm mortar
56% light infantry gun
25% light howitzer
31% heavy howitzer

....

This is really bad & in no way can compare to the French ammunition reserves. I suspect consumption during this Rhineland battle will far outrun production. If the French can keep up a attritional battle, a battle of material, into the winter then possible depletion of German ammunition should be examined.
 
Despite the poor flying weather this battle benefits the French AF, providing badly needed tactical and operational experience. It can also alter some critical decisions made OTL for standing down air groups to convert to new aircraft types.

On the ground it forces the imeadiatly training of the Series B units These were instead used as construction labor through the winter OTL. A major battle, even if only a few weeks means the training of the B Series formations should have a higher priority.
 
One thing the Germans could do is simply leave the French in the Saarland, because as that point there would be no ability for them to advance forwards or threaten anything significant. This draws forces away from the defence in Belgium and the Northern French plain. This results in a faster crumbling of the defence during the invasion in 1940, and the French forces in the Saar just end up retreating as the French army withers away. Leaving the french there would be a prudent move, and would be consistent with the German mobility centric approach to warfare.

Yes. But as mentioned above, regardless of how pragmatic and strategic that would be, it would be quite hard from a political POV. Germany was a dictatorship, yes, but Hitler and his goons were keenly aware of the German public opinion's moods, and they were wary of taking really unpopular stances. The more the French have advanced into the sacred land of the Aryans, the more it will be necessary to push them back - and the funny thing about it is that it will be the Nazis' own mystique to demand that.

We also have a German non-Nazi historical precedent. In WWI, the generals had pragmatically decided to defeat the faster-to-mobilize enemy first, the French, to then turn east. So there was only a delaying force on the Russian front. That was pragmatic and a decision that made sense, strategically. But the Russians were advancing into Prussia. That couldn't be contemplated. The Germans began redeploying troops East, thus managing to stop the Russians - but also weakening their nearly victorious KO blow in the West.
 
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