Franco Prussian War

I want you to tell me what would happen if...

The events leading to the Franco Prussian war are the same, it starts for the same reason. However France CRUSHES, absolutely demolishes the Prussians and their allies in battle, not due to a change in equipment, but because of near perfect tacticians. I want the French army to steamroll into Berlin, and have Bismark convicted for fabricating a war. However, I want Napoleon to die only a few years after the war, as in real life. I want France to be a republic. What would happen from 1871 to 2000?
 
Where to start!

Firstly I guess Austria would get into the act and reclaim its lost territories / prestegie in the German speaking world. So no Germany as we know it.

With no Germany then, off the top of my head, the Boar War is quicker (no German arms for the Boars) and the British don't have the shake to their confidence that the war gave them.

No WWI as we know it. Britain would remain apart from European conflicts (except to limit the French if necessary), but we could see a French / Russian alliance against the British Empire (possible war in Afganistan).

No Israel, so less conflict in the Middle East.

America and Britain don't cosy up and relationship remains cold.

Napolean would be suceeded by his son (who wouldn't die in a Britsh War) so not quite sure how the Republic would be reborn without the Seige of Paris etc.

This is just the start. My guess is that if France did beat the Prussians easily there would be an awful lot more French interferance around the world, possibly being countered by the British and / or Americans (if in Central / South America. This is the only thing I can think that would unite Britain and the US.
 
Welcome to the board. Sorry to respond that harshly to your first question, but not going to happen. Without huge changes years before the war that is completely impossible. Basically the French Army was in the situation of the Prussians in 1806. The French army was outclassed in almost any regard:

The mobilisation: France had the larger standing army, but that army was actually slower to get into position than German reserves called up. With their reserve activation the German states fielded 1 400 000 fully trained men. France managed in the whole war to raise 900 000, half of them belonging to the Garde mobile. The only thing worse than the garde´s equipment (the best rifle they had was probably the Tabatière, accompanied by everything available or quickly imported) was probably their training: Beyond the initial two weeks they had - in theory, not in praxis - 14 day training each year, but never two following each other.

The strategic level: France did not even manage to get their designated offensive forces fully equipped in advance much less supplied. A prime example of their faulty logistics is the battle of Mars-la-tour or rather what happened before and after. The attempt to improve its supply situation was one of the things delaying their march and allowing the Germans to catch them there. Despite these attempts at supply and a not particular offensive stance of their commander they ran through almost their entire ammunition on that single day, making the draw achieved a moot point.
Even more ridiculous, the French had obviously no contingency planning what to do in the strategical situation on the outbreak of the war. The various parts of that force in the initial stages simply blundered around without any coordination.

On the tactical level the situation was more even, at least while the French where on the defensive: The French regulars had the Chassepot rifle, clearly superior to German rifles and the mitrailleuse had real potential as well. Though it was never used in a sensible way a charge against those would have been really a bad idea. On the other hand Auftragstaktik gave the German armies much better reaction time and they had the far superior artillery. Though not as dominant as 40 years later the tendency of artillery dominating was already there.

With such structures Turenne or Napoleon I. might have reached a draw. Perhaps, but probably not. Anything better requires fundamental reforms before the war, as they were desired by single officers but impossible for political reasons. Anything which could sufficiently change that would all but assure that the war does not happen as otl. Bismarck would act more cautiously if France is actually a threat.
 
The problem is that the Prussians were prepared for this war and the French weren't. The best way for France to win a Franco-Prussian War is to ignore Bismark and that letter and modernise the army even more aiming for a war about 1885. If Prussia attacks then pull back and let the British and Russians have a few stern words.
 

Thank you.

The problem which has been pointed out is that France was not ready to fight that war, contrary to outward appearances, whereas Prussia most definitely was.

Prussia and France had both observed the bloodbath which was the American Civil War, but whereas the Prussians had taken the appropriate lessons from it, such as the use of railroads to rapidly concentrate large numbers in rapid order, the French had not. Further, the French Army artillery corps was in bad shape, fighting primarily with iron muzzle-loaders against the new breach-loading steel guns the Prussians used, which had greater range and much greater accuracy than the French guns.

French troops also misused the mitrailleuse, seeing it as more of a light artillery piece than a machine gun, and often placing batteries of them out in the open, where the aforementioned Prussian artillery could get them easily.

The list goes on. Prussia was ready to fight that war, and France was not.

Lindseyman also presents a policy which would probably have done much better for the French, and changed Europe and the rest of the world beyond recognition.
 
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Thank you.


Prussia and France had both observed the bloodbath which was the American Civil War, but whereas the Prussians had taken the appropriate lessons from it, such as the use of railroads to rapidly concentrate large numbers in rapid order, the French had not.
The modern ideas in the Prussian army actually predate the ACW. The core dates from Roons experience in 1848 and the results differ greatly from US civil war methods. Furthermore Moltke bases his 1859 study about a Franco-Prussian war already heavily on railroads and recognized the need for a review of the plan by railway experts. The refinements done till 1870 were based also a lot more on the experiences of the unification wars, especially the 1866 campaign, where the Austrians worked pretty well in disrupting railway based logistics. Not saying the ACW had no influence on Prussian military thinking at all, but it was clearly secondary. They clearly did not see the lessons of the bloodbathes happening in the US, because it was so different from their campaigns against Danes, Austrians and later the French.
 

Flubber

Banned
Lindseyman also presents a policy which would probably have done much better for the French, and changed Europe and the rest of the world beyond recognition.


And as repeatedly pointed out in the thread you began on this very topic only one week ago, changes in France's capabilities change the prospect, conduct, and outcome of any possible Franco-Prussian War.
 

Flubber

Banned
The modern ideas in the Prussian army actually predate the ACW.


Thank you for posting that. It's disheartening at times when it seems you're the only one laying out actual facts in the face of the overwhelming tide of uninformed shit routinely posted here.

The core dates from Roons experience in 1848 and the results differ greatly from US civil war methods.

Considering the fact that Prussian observers regularly referred to ACW armies as armed mobs, it's hard to see which lessons, other than negative ones, they felt could learned from the ACW.

Furthermore Moltke bases his 1859 study about a Franco-Prussian war already heavily on railroads and recognized the need for a review of the plan by railway experts.

And France's own use of railways during the 2nd War of Italian Independence in which five corps - half the standing army of France - were moved into Piedmont before the Austrians stationed in Lombardy could threaten Turin further reinforced Moltke's plans.

They clearly did not see the lessons of the bloodbathes happening in the US, because it was so different from their campaigns against Danes, Austrians and later the French.

Different not only in the level of training the forces involved had, but also in the equipment those forces employed, the more settled nature of the terrain the wars were fought on, the larger and more professional officer corps involved, the smaller distances traveled, and several other factors.
 
My, my, my somebody did get out of the wrong side of the bed today! If you read what I and Sanderford actually wrote, we both said and/or strongly implied that France could not win the Franco-Prussian War as originally postulated in this thread it would require an earlier POD or France to turn the other cheek and plan for a later war both of which answer the original question. As to lessons learnt from the ACW at least mobility and firepower should have been noted even if they wouldn't have made much impact on the Prussians because they had already come to that conclusion.
 
Thank you for posting that. It's disheartening at times when it seems you're the only one laying out actual facts in the face of the overwhelming tide of uninformed shit routinely posted here.

Could you please be less rude. Even if you are right, there are more diplomatic ways to say it.
 
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