Like the title says. Since there were so many reasons the war started, do you think changing a few of them could have avoided it? I know there was a thread about the aftermath if it didn't happen, but what would prevent the war? This is with a POD after the Luxemburg Crisis.
Franco-Prussian war WI?
- Thread starter SilverSwimmer
- Start date
The proximate cause can easily be turned into a general outbreak of peace in europe (talk about much ado about nothing). That said, there is going to be a lot of tension between France and Prussia anyways (these sorts of crises were becoming an annual occurance); sooner or later Bismark and Napoleon's ambitions and maneuvers, french domestic politics, and a minor issue between the crowned heads of europe is going to cumulate in a major crisis, and quite possibly war. To get this, you may need to go back to before the Sadowa, and at the very least get a different peace in 1866.
The big question is: can German unification be achieved without war? How long would it take to make Bavaria etc. join the North German Federation (which is a 99%-Reich-blueprint)?
Possibilities to butterfly away the war:
-first of all: do not insult that stupid emperor with the Emser Depesche. From then on, war is inevitable.
- strike an accord with Napoleon III which satisfies his hunger for prestige to make up for German unification. French Belgium?
- wait for a revolution in Paris. Napoleon III was already in a difficult position and faced a lot of opposition at home. Unification just at a point when there are barricades in the boulevards might be possible to pull off.
Possibilities to butterfly away the war:
-first of all: do not insult that stupid emperor with the Emser Depesche. From then on, war is inevitable.
- strike an accord with Napoleon III which satisfies his hunger for prestige to make up for German unification. French Belgium?
- wait for a revolution in Paris. Napoleon III was already in a difficult position and faced a lot of opposition at home. Unification just at a point when there are barricades in the boulevards might be possible to pull off.
Susano
Banned
Actually, the Empire even indeed was the renamed and extended NGC
Possibilities to butterfly away the war:
I dont think so. I dont think Bismarck could have possibly foreseen that Nappy would be vain and stupid enough tod eclare wra over such nothingness! And with different domestic dynamics in France, hell maybe even with just a different set of advisors, France might simply state its anger about the depeche, instead of declaring war.
I concede that "inevitable" was too strong - but "could (not) have possibly foreseen" as well.
Why streamlining and leaking the Depesche then?
There would have still been ways to avoid the war afterwards, curiously, none had been undertaken by either side, IIRC.
Susano
Banned
It seems that publishing the shortened depeche was simply quid pro quo. It was after all a pretty unsufferable demand Nappy had sent, so I think Bismarkc sought to answer provocation with provocation. Just the usual diplomatic skirmishes.
Part of me begs to differ, actually. Napoleon had been more or less spoiling for a fight practically since the defeat of Austria, and Bismark did go out of his way to provoke the French during the interwar period. A war can be prevented over the telegram, but you probably need to remove Bismark and/or make some significant changes in the french political scene to prevent a war in the next few years.
A provocation nevertheless. Mastermind Bismarck knew exactly what he was doing and I am sure that he had quite a clear picture of Napoleon III and his politicial situation. He certainly tried to escalate the situation further.
Both sides were confident that a Franco-Prussian war would be favourable to them.
Moltke and Roon yearned for war, and being on the defensive further tied the South Germans to Prussia - paving the way to fulfil Bismarck's plans. Napoleon III hoped to polish his prestige at home and abroad by letting the world's best army beat the Prussians.
That France DOWed Prussia was the jackpot.
Susano
Banned
Mastermind Bismarck is a legend he himself created in his memoirs. Bismarck didnt even have an united Germany as aim in mind. What he wanted was an uber-Prussia, and he got that in the form of the NGC. Further German unification was not really planned, and partly came about as result of the Franco-German War, not the other way round. Thats how I see it at least (following Haeffners intepretation).
As for what the Prussian generals thought, thats irrelevant, considering how Bismarck disliked listening to them in general political matters. Bismarck had what he wanted, and hence played rather safe. Thats why he didnt escalate the Luxemburg Crisis, and thats why he rejected the Badener application to join the NGC in 1869 - partly so to not provoke France (of course also to keep it northern - after all, even the Hesse-Darmstädter territories south of the Main werent part of the NGC).
On the other hand, overplaying domestic problems with foreign adventurism is more or less the essence of Bonapartism. Yes, Bismarck chose further provocation, but diplomacy is full of those provocations which dont lead to war!
That is a valid view about Bismarck. But if the NGC is the final aim of Bismarck's ambition for Prussia, I see no point in provoking Napoleon III at all. The only other explanation were.......Bonapartism.
And (small-) German unification was planned on level after level- maybe not by Bismarck.
Small-Germany as a Super-Prussia had been on the screen as a faint possibility since 1849/1850 (Erfurt).
But especially after 1866, it was on its way. There was the NGC, then the Zollverein, which encompassed almost the complete small-Germany by then. The latter turned into a kind of "secondary NGC", since 1868 there was the "Zollparliament" (as an expanded NGC-Bundesrat) and member states gave up the right to veto common decisions. A currency reform was under discussion. <br>
Since 1866, all small-German nations were tied together in alliances under leadership of the Prussian king, most states forming common structures.
At the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian war, the German Reich was already in formation, economically, politically, militarily - the process is IMHO comparable to the USA in the 1780s or the EU.
If Bismarck didn't want anything more than an NGC-arrondated Prussia, he would have had to actively work against it. Even if I concede that unification wasn't his ambition (it certainly wasn't King Wilhelm's), his policies ensured that the process went carefully, step-by-step and Prussia-dominted, taking the least international risk by avoiding revolutionary acceleration of the process or wars where there would have been any doubt about the defensive role of Prussia & Co.