Titus_Pullo
Banned
What happened:
The Prussian victory in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71 was
startling in its rapidity to most of Europe and, coming upon the
heels of the even quicker victory over Austria in 1866, made Berlin
the center of military science. Replacing France as the preeminent
martial power in Europe. Prussia appeared to be waging war in an
entirely new way, one more in tune with the Industrial Revolution
and the modern state. The general staff system was soon copied by
other powers, Jomini was out and Von Clausewitz was in (West Point
added German to the curriculum), and even fashion went Prussian
(kepis were replaced by spiked helmets). The French never forgot their defeat in 1870-71 and over the decades nursed an unquenchable thirst for revenge which was a contributing factor to the First Word War.
What could have happened:
At the time of the Boulanger Crisis, I believe had the Germans launched the preemptive war Waldersee favored should Boulanger actually come to power, I think the French would have won. There was a window of time in the 1880s when France had the better army. So let's set the Second
Franco-Prussian War in 1889. The ironic element in the story of Boulanger, who provided the most serious internal threat to the Third Republic in its history, is that he was promoted Minister of War on the basis that he was about the only republican general to be found in the French army; most of
the others were monarchists. His subsequent reforms of the French
army caused that window of opportunity when France had the better
army in the 1880s and any war between France and Prussia within this
time period meant that the mistakes of the 1870-71 war would not
have been repeated. Boulanger's appeal was fairly broad, though, as
he came to embody French hopes for a successful war of revenge
against Germany (in an extraordinary move, Bismarck even named him
in a speech as the single greatest obstacle to amiable Franco-German
relations. Boulangism rose at exactly the same time there was a
serious deterioration in Russo-German relations. The fear was that a
successful coup by Boulanger would restore the monarchy in France;
while the Tsar would not cut a deal with republican France, he would
not have such an aversion to monarchial France (thus Waldersee's
call for a preemptive war against France in case of a successful
coup by Boulanger). Even French republicans seemed inclined to
accept a constitutional monarchy, with Boulanger as the strongman.
Of course, this all fell apart when Boulanger turned out to have
feet of clay. Had he successfully seized the government, it is hard
to see how Boulanger could have avoided a confrontation with
Germany. Let's have Boulanger leading a sucessful revolt in
April 1889. In OTL (Our Timeline) Boulanger failed to seize the opportunity and fled the country after the French government issued a warrant for his arrest on the charge of reasonous activities. In this timeline a
constitutional monarchy is established with Boulanger as the real
power behind the monarchy. Before the Germans could even
attack, Boulanger launches a preemtive strike and immediately seizes
Alsace-Lorraine, and pushes the Germans back who were caught
completely unprepared, to their pre-1871 border. A relief force
of 100,000 Germans are defeated at the Second Battle of Sedan and
Waldersee himself is captured. By May of 1889 the French cross the border into Germany capturing the Rhineland and Westphalia. The French offensive encounters stiffer resistance as they try to cross the Rhine and are repelled back to the Rhineland. The war settles down to a daily exchange of artillery fire, cavarly and infantry skirmish as both sides lose the offensive momentum. By the winter of 1889 the war had taken on the semblance of trench warfare.
In the spring of 1890, Russia sensing a potential German collapse
sends troops to the East Prussian border. Bismarck, ever the
pragmatist, and realizing that his worst nightmare of having to
fight a two- front war may be coming to pass, sues for peace rather
than have to suffer total defeat in case of a two-front war, and be
made to accept an unconditional surrender.
In May of 1890 the Treaty of Metz is signed in which Germany cedes
the Rhineland to France, except a small peace of North Rhine
Westphalia. In addition Germany had to pay an indemnity of $2
billion dollars to France to be paid within the next four years.
The German navy hadn't yet attained the regional threat status
around 1889, and the French navy would probably end up virtually
being uncontested in the North Sea and defeat any German fleet that
can be mustered against her. So we get a French naval victory at the
Battle of the North Sea sometime in the fall of 1889 or spring of
1890. The French navy blockades Wilhelmshaven and commences a massive
bombardment of German coastal areas. Meanwhile the Franco-Danish Army retakes Schleswig-Holstein and then proceeds on their march to Berlin. The Germans would probably have to divert troops from the Rhine to defend the city for the coming siege and the French army coming in from the Rhineland area encounters lighter resistance and takes Franfurt as well. The war
doesn't look good for Germany as she has never won a multi-front war
in history. She may or may be able to defeat any further Franco-
Danish offensives and delay a linkup between France's Rhineland army
and the Franco-Danish army, but she'd just be prolonging the
inevitable defeat. France can continue sending troops into
Schelswig Hostein because she controls the North Sea. So in any case
we still get the Treaty of Metz in which Germany still cedes the
Rhineland to France, but France gives up Hessen and North Rhine
Westphalia, Denmark gets back what she lost in 1864 Schleswig-
Holstein, and Germany pays a 4 billion dollar indemnity to France.
The actual facts:
Post-1871, France underwent a remarkable military revival, as the
politicans of the Third Republic had not yet turned against the army
and the nation supported the army's rehabilitation. If war had
broken out at the time of the Boulanger Crisis, there would have
been more French infantry battalions and artillery batteries in the
field than the German army could muster AFTER mobilization, and the
difference in the number of cavalry squadrons was closing (Germany
had 465 to France's 385).
While there was little difference in the cavalry and artillery
tactics of the French and the Germans, French infantry had the most
progressive tactics of their time. They broke from company columns
into smaller formations that assumed a broader, loose order front to
survive defenders' fire. Additionally, in 1886, the French began to
rearm with the Lebel magazine rifle that had a rate of fire nearly
twice that of the German M-71/84 Mauser.
There were a whole series of innovations in the French army that
were not found anywhere else: state of the art observation baloons
and tricycles for velocipedists of the messenger corps; gun cotton
was replaced with cordite (a smokeless explosive) and melinite (a
stable nitrogen compound) far superior to the unstable and highly
volatile gun cotton employed in the German army. While the speed of
mobilization was still lower than in the German army, the gap was
not as great as you presume and it was closing, as all militaries in
the wake of the German Wars of Unification realized its centrality
to Prussia's accomplishment; rail capacity between Paris and the
fortresses on the eatsern frontier tripled in between 1877-86.
French reservists were to hold the fortresses, while the regular
armies would flank the forts, employing a defensive strategy which
would have been quite effective given German infantry tactics of the
time (see below). The French were only going to counter-attack after
the Germans had bashed themselves against the fortesses, which
German artillerists were pessimistic about breeching, especially
after 1887, when the French fitted the forts between Verdun and
Belfort with steel towers and reinforced concrete (and which, by the
way, provided the French a huge advantage in heavy artillery-more
below on this) and trenches of eastern France, proving they had
digested the lessons of the Franco-Prussian War. Also, there was no
Belgium option, as in 1914 - the French knew exactly where the
Germans were going to strike. (this is the premise of the above about the French destroying and or capturing a force of 100,000 German reinforcements in 1889)
The notion that the fortress building program was
drawing money away from the regular army is a faulty one; there is no evidence to
support this. Also, one should not confuse the French reserves of the early
Third Republic with those of the late Second Empire. Drawing upon
the lessons of the Franco-Prussian War and the poor performance of
the garde mobile, the law of 1872 addressed the quality of the
reserves. Realizing that reserves were the cheapest way of
maintaining a strong military, the law required that after five
years active service, conscripts enter the reserve, where they would
be required to do about two months service per year (past 30,
reservists were required to provide a months service). There would
be no shortage in the French army of NCOs if one included the
reservists (it was only post-1890 that prejudice against the
reserves became more prominent). Remember that revenge is an
underlying factor behind this war, this ran strong within the French
army from the highest General down to the lowliest private, the prejudice that
French troops would be less motivated than the German troops stems from hindsight to 1940, and not the late 1880s when there was a revival of French militarism and innovations comparable to the Napoleonic period.
In OTL they were itching for a war of revenge with Germany and combined with the improvements in the French army in the years following 1871 would have made for a deadly combination against a German army that had become complacent, more backward in its thinking. More on this below.
Furthermore, given the Third Republic's mania for public
education, the differences in schooling between the soldiers of both
armies would not have been all that great by the late 1880s.
On the administrative side, there existed great divisions,
surrounding the forcing out of Armold von Kameke from the War
Ministry, which only served to make worse the bitter rivalries that
had developed from the mid-1870s between the infantry, cavalry and
artillery (and, in the latter case, within its own arm).
The German army of the 1870s-80s was mired in the past concerning
its ideas when it came to the battlefield, which is why general
trends cannot be projected from 1864-71 to the mid- to late- 1880s.
The German army's history during this period was not a steady climb
to ever increasing efficency - anything but. In fact, the greatest
improvements in the German army came post-1906, not before.
Technopobic senior officers dominated all three branches, managing
to write their positively atavistic doctrines into the regulations.
Drawing the wrong lesson from St. Privat, the infantry was to attack
in massed company and battalion columns because management was
deemed easiest in such formations - of course, they also provided
un-missable targets in the age of repeating rifles; compounding the
problem, the Germans drew the wrong lessons from Mars-la-Tour, with
the infantry adopting the three wave tactics of the previous
century
The artillery situation in the German army was equally dismal and
very divided. The field artillery, still basking in the glory of
Sedan (a situation which was unlikely to happen again) consumed
virtually all the funding to the detriment of the heavy artillery.
Thoughtful officers who pointed to the lesson of Plevna were simply
disregarded or shunted off into perhaps the greatest dead end in the
German army of the time - the heavy artillery, relegated to
fortresses. The belief that the Germans would have enjoyed an
advantage in heavy artillery at the time of Boulanger is a faulty one, given it was
probably the most underfunded branch of the German army.
the Germans were living in the past - and many of them were
accepting of this based upon a chimera. One German military writer,
while noting that Germany's wealthy neighbors may have superior
equipment, weapons, technical education, and an armor of
fortresses ... their officer corps could not match Germany's in
warlike intelligence, independence, initiative and moral strength -
this clearly is a recipe for slaughter. German casualties likely
would have been disastrously high in a war with France at the time
of Boulanger, and not everyone in the German army was blind to this.
Von der Goltz, a thoughtful officer, observed the French maneuvers of
1878 for the General Staff and left impressed by how modern the
French army appeared, compared to when he had last seen it in 1870. He mused
that the tendency of the winner in a war to grow complacent has
overtaken the German army and realized that what had succeeded in
1870 was unlikely to work again - the French army was more up to
date than the German army; eight years later, French observers at
the German manuevers came to exactly the same conclusion as von der
Goltz had. Even Waldersee, who was the proponent of the preemptive
strike against France should Boulanger stage a successful coup,
admitted there were serious problems in the German army. There was
an inclination to return to antiquated battle formations (the
cavalry was perfecting Frederickian tactics) and, as he stated, the
more distance there is between us and our last war, the more
backward our judgement has become.
The French had a very good chance of defeating Germany at the time
of the Boulanger Crisis. And the result of a Franco-Prussian War in
1889-90 would have more likely resulted in a resounding French victory.
Furthermore, The German army at the time of Boulanger was hardly an unbeatable one. At its senior uniformed level, it was a virtual gerontocracy,
with 18 rather elderly corps commanders whom the aged Kaiser Wilhelm
refused to retire out of personal affection. The average age was 64
but a few were in their 70s, the oldest being 76 (the youngest was
49); they largely were averse to field service ( for obvious
reasons) and the French were well aware of this.
The Prussian victory in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71 was
startling in its rapidity to most of Europe and, coming upon the
heels of the even quicker victory over Austria in 1866, made Berlin
the center of military science. Replacing France as the preeminent
martial power in Europe. Prussia appeared to be waging war in an
entirely new way, one more in tune with the Industrial Revolution
and the modern state. The general staff system was soon copied by
other powers, Jomini was out and Von Clausewitz was in (West Point
added German to the curriculum), and even fashion went Prussian
(kepis were replaced by spiked helmets). The French never forgot their defeat in 1870-71 and over the decades nursed an unquenchable thirst for revenge which was a contributing factor to the First Word War.
What could have happened:
At the time of the Boulanger Crisis, I believe had the Germans launched the preemptive war Waldersee favored should Boulanger actually come to power, I think the French would have won. There was a window of time in the 1880s when France had the better army. So let's set the Second
Franco-Prussian War in 1889. The ironic element in the story of Boulanger, who provided the most serious internal threat to the Third Republic in its history, is that he was promoted Minister of War on the basis that he was about the only republican general to be found in the French army; most of
the others were monarchists. His subsequent reforms of the French
army caused that window of opportunity when France had the better
army in the 1880s and any war between France and Prussia within this
time period meant that the mistakes of the 1870-71 war would not
have been repeated. Boulanger's appeal was fairly broad, though, as
he came to embody French hopes for a successful war of revenge
against Germany (in an extraordinary move, Bismarck even named him
in a speech as the single greatest obstacle to amiable Franco-German
relations. Boulangism rose at exactly the same time there was a
serious deterioration in Russo-German relations. The fear was that a
successful coup by Boulanger would restore the monarchy in France;
while the Tsar would not cut a deal with republican France, he would
not have such an aversion to monarchial France (thus Waldersee's
call for a preemptive war against France in case of a successful
coup by Boulanger). Even French republicans seemed inclined to
accept a constitutional monarchy, with Boulanger as the strongman.
Of course, this all fell apart when Boulanger turned out to have
feet of clay. Had he successfully seized the government, it is hard
to see how Boulanger could have avoided a confrontation with
Germany. Let's have Boulanger leading a sucessful revolt in
April 1889. In OTL (Our Timeline) Boulanger failed to seize the opportunity and fled the country after the French government issued a warrant for his arrest on the charge of reasonous activities. In this timeline a
constitutional monarchy is established with Boulanger as the real
power behind the monarchy. Before the Germans could even
attack, Boulanger launches a preemtive strike and immediately seizes
Alsace-Lorraine, and pushes the Germans back who were caught
completely unprepared, to their pre-1871 border. A relief force
of 100,000 Germans are defeated at the Second Battle of Sedan and
Waldersee himself is captured. By May of 1889 the French cross the border into Germany capturing the Rhineland and Westphalia. The French offensive encounters stiffer resistance as they try to cross the Rhine and are repelled back to the Rhineland. The war settles down to a daily exchange of artillery fire, cavarly and infantry skirmish as both sides lose the offensive momentum. By the winter of 1889 the war had taken on the semblance of trench warfare.
In the spring of 1890, Russia sensing a potential German collapse
sends troops to the East Prussian border. Bismarck, ever the
pragmatist, and realizing that his worst nightmare of having to
fight a two- front war may be coming to pass, sues for peace rather
than have to suffer total defeat in case of a two-front war, and be
made to accept an unconditional surrender.
In May of 1890 the Treaty of Metz is signed in which Germany cedes
the Rhineland to France, except a small peace of North Rhine
Westphalia. In addition Germany had to pay an indemnity of $2
billion dollars to France to be paid within the next four years.
The German navy hadn't yet attained the regional threat status
around 1889, and the French navy would probably end up virtually
being uncontested in the North Sea and defeat any German fleet that
can be mustered against her. So we get a French naval victory at the
Battle of the North Sea sometime in the fall of 1889 or spring of
1890. The French navy blockades Wilhelmshaven and commences a massive
bombardment of German coastal areas. Meanwhile the Franco-Danish Army retakes Schleswig-Holstein and then proceeds on their march to Berlin. The Germans would probably have to divert troops from the Rhine to defend the city for the coming siege and the French army coming in from the Rhineland area encounters lighter resistance and takes Franfurt as well. The war
doesn't look good for Germany as she has never won a multi-front war
in history. She may or may be able to defeat any further Franco-
Danish offensives and delay a linkup between France's Rhineland army
and the Franco-Danish army, but she'd just be prolonging the
inevitable defeat. France can continue sending troops into
Schelswig Hostein because she controls the North Sea. So in any case
we still get the Treaty of Metz in which Germany still cedes the
Rhineland to France, but France gives up Hessen and North Rhine
Westphalia, Denmark gets back what she lost in 1864 Schleswig-
Holstein, and Germany pays a 4 billion dollar indemnity to France.
The actual facts:
Post-1871, France underwent a remarkable military revival, as the
politicans of the Third Republic had not yet turned against the army
and the nation supported the army's rehabilitation. If war had
broken out at the time of the Boulanger Crisis, there would have
been more French infantry battalions and artillery batteries in the
field than the German army could muster AFTER mobilization, and the
difference in the number of cavalry squadrons was closing (Germany
had 465 to France's 385).
While there was little difference in the cavalry and artillery
tactics of the French and the Germans, French infantry had the most
progressive tactics of their time. They broke from company columns
into smaller formations that assumed a broader, loose order front to
survive defenders' fire. Additionally, in 1886, the French began to
rearm with the Lebel magazine rifle that had a rate of fire nearly
twice that of the German M-71/84 Mauser.
There were a whole series of innovations in the French army that
were not found anywhere else: state of the art observation baloons
and tricycles for velocipedists of the messenger corps; gun cotton
was replaced with cordite (a smokeless explosive) and melinite (a
stable nitrogen compound) far superior to the unstable and highly
volatile gun cotton employed in the German army. While the speed of
mobilization was still lower than in the German army, the gap was
not as great as you presume and it was closing, as all militaries in
the wake of the German Wars of Unification realized its centrality
to Prussia's accomplishment; rail capacity between Paris and the
fortresses on the eatsern frontier tripled in between 1877-86.
French reservists were to hold the fortresses, while the regular
armies would flank the forts, employing a defensive strategy which
would have been quite effective given German infantry tactics of the
time (see below). The French were only going to counter-attack after
the Germans had bashed themselves against the fortesses, which
German artillerists were pessimistic about breeching, especially
after 1887, when the French fitted the forts between Verdun and
Belfort with steel towers and reinforced concrete (and which, by the
way, provided the French a huge advantage in heavy artillery-more
below on this) and trenches of eastern France, proving they had
digested the lessons of the Franco-Prussian War. Also, there was no
Belgium option, as in 1914 - the French knew exactly where the
Germans were going to strike. (this is the premise of the above about the French destroying and or capturing a force of 100,000 German reinforcements in 1889)
The notion that the fortress building program was
drawing money away from the regular army is a faulty one; there is no evidence to
support this. Also, one should not confuse the French reserves of the early
Third Republic with those of the late Second Empire. Drawing upon
the lessons of the Franco-Prussian War and the poor performance of
the garde mobile, the law of 1872 addressed the quality of the
reserves. Realizing that reserves were the cheapest way of
maintaining a strong military, the law required that after five
years active service, conscripts enter the reserve, where they would
be required to do about two months service per year (past 30,
reservists were required to provide a months service). There would
be no shortage in the French army of NCOs if one included the
reservists (it was only post-1890 that prejudice against the
reserves became more prominent). Remember that revenge is an
underlying factor behind this war, this ran strong within the French
army from the highest General down to the lowliest private, the prejudice that
French troops would be less motivated than the German troops stems from hindsight to 1940, and not the late 1880s when there was a revival of French militarism and innovations comparable to the Napoleonic period.
In OTL they were itching for a war of revenge with Germany and combined with the improvements in the French army in the years following 1871 would have made for a deadly combination against a German army that had become complacent, more backward in its thinking. More on this below.
Furthermore, given the Third Republic's mania for public
education, the differences in schooling between the soldiers of both
armies would not have been all that great by the late 1880s.
On the administrative side, there existed great divisions,
surrounding the forcing out of Armold von Kameke from the War
Ministry, which only served to make worse the bitter rivalries that
had developed from the mid-1870s between the infantry, cavalry and
artillery (and, in the latter case, within its own arm).
The German army of the 1870s-80s was mired in the past concerning
its ideas when it came to the battlefield, which is why general
trends cannot be projected from 1864-71 to the mid- to late- 1880s.
The German army's history during this period was not a steady climb
to ever increasing efficency - anything but. In fact, the greatest
improvements in the German army came post-1906, not before.
Technopobic senior officers dominated all three branches, managing
to write their positively atavistic doctrines into the regulations.
Drawing the wrong lesson from St. Privat, the infantry was to attack
in massed company and battalion columns because management was
deemed easiest in such formations - of course, they also provided
un-missable targets in the age of repeating rifles; compounding the
problem, the Germans drew the wrong lessons from Mars-la-Tour, with
the infantry adopting the three wave tactics of the previous
century
The artillery situation in the German army was equally dismal and
very divided. The field artillery, still basking in the glory of
Sedan (a situation which was unlikely to happen again) consumed
virtually all the funding to the detriment of the heavy artillery.
Thoughtful officers who pointed to the lesson of Plevna were simply
disregarded or shunted off into perhaps the greatest dead end in the
German army of the time - the heavy artillery, relegated to
fortresses. The belief that the Germans would have enjoyed an
advantage in heavy artillery at the time of Boulanger is a faulty one, given it was
probably the most underfunded branch of the German army.
the Germans were living in the past - and many of them were
accepting of this based upon a chimera. One German military writer,
while noting that Germany's wealthy neighbors may have superior
equipment, weapons, technical education, and an armor of
fortresses ... their officer corps could not match Germany's in
warlike intelligence, independence, initiative and moral strength -
this clearly is a recipe for slaughter. German casualties likely
would have been disastrously high in a war with France at the time
of Boulanger, and not everyone in the German army was blind to this.
Von der Goltz, a thoughtful officer, observed the French maneuvers of
1878 for the General Staff and left impressed by how modern the
French army appeared, compared to when he had last seen it in 1870. He mused
that the tendency of the winner in a war to grow complacent has
overtaken the German army and realized that what had succeeded in
1870 was unlikely to work again - the French army was more up to
date than the German army; eight years later, French observers at
the German manuevers came to exactly the same conclusion as von der
Goltz had. Even Waldersee, who was the proponent of the preemptive
strike against France should Boulanger stage a successful coup,
admitted there were serious problems in the German army. There was
an inclination to return to antiquated battle formations (the
cavalry was perfecting Frederickian tactics) and, as he stated, the
more distance there is between us and our last war, the more
backward our judgement has become.
The French had a very good chance of defeating Germany at the time
of the Boulanger Crisis. And the result of a Franco-Prussian War in
1889-90 would have more likely resulted in a resounding French victory.
Furthermore, The German army at the time of Boulanger was hardly an unbeatable one. At its senior uniformed level, it was a virtual gerontocracy,
with 18 rather elderly corps commanders whom the aged Kaiser Wilhelm
refused to retire out of personal affection. The average age was 64
but a few were in their 70s, the oldest being 76 (the youngest was
49); they largely were averse to field service ( for obvious
reasons) and the French were well aware of this.
?